/**
 * USER_JOURNEYS §4 — the "I forgot my PIN" in-app request lifecycle, end to end.
 *
 * This whole journey had ZERO functional coverage (only the 403 gate, from the authz sweep). The
 * invariants below are all security-relevant and none of them were tested:
 *   - the always-204 non-enumeration contract (an unknown name must look identical to a known one)
 *   - the per-IP+name throttle (3 / 15 min)
 *   - admins are EXCLUDED from the request queue (they recover via password, not PIN)
 *   - a host reset REVOKES the target's sessions (the forgotten/compromised device is logged out)
 */
import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test';
import { BASE } from '../../helpers/env';

const requestReset = (displayName: string) =>
  fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/recover/request`, {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
    body: JSON.stringify({ display_name: displayName }),
  });

test.describe('PIN reset — in-app request lifecycle', () => {
  test('a request for a real guest queues exactly one request the host can see', async ({
    api,
    host,
    guest,
    db,
  }) => {
    const g = await guest('ForgetfulFrida');

    expect((await requestReset('ForgetfulFrida')).status).toBe(204);

    // The host sees it...
    const list = await api.listPinResetRequests(host.jwt);
    expect(list.some((r: any) => r.user_id === g.userId)).toBe(true);
    // ...and it's deduped: a second request does not stack a duplicate (ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING).
    expect((await requestReset('ForgetfulFrida')).status).toBe(204);
    expect(await db.countPinResetRequestsForUser(g.userId)).toBe(1);
  });

  test('an UNKNOWN name is indistinguishable from a known one (204, no queue, no enumeration)', async ({
    host,
    api,
    guest,
  }) => {
    // Same status code and no error body as the real path — the only observable difference must be
    // in the host's queue, which the requester cannot see.
    const known = await guest('KnownKarl');
    expect((await requestReset('KnownKarl')).status).toBe(204);
    expect((await requestReset('no-such-guest-' + Date.now())).status).toBe(204);

    // The unknown name queued nothing; the known one queued exactly one.
    const list = await api.listPinResetRequests(host.jwt);
    expect(list).toHaveLength(1);
    expect(list[0].user_id).toBe(known.userId);
  });

  test('an ADMIN never gets a reset request queued (admins recover via password)', async ({
    api,
    host,
    db,
  }) => {
    // The admin user exists (the host fixture logs an admin in to create it). Its display name is "Admin" by
    // convention; request a reset for it and confirm the queue stays empty — the INSERT filters
    // `role <> 'admin'`, so queuing a reset for an admin would be a privilege-relevant leak.
    const admin = (await api.listUsers(host.jwt)).find((u: any) => u.role === 'admin');
    expect(admin, 'an admin user must exist').toBeTruthy();

    expect((await requestReset(admin.display_name)).status).toBe(204);

    expect(await db.countPinResetRequestsForUser(admin.id)).toBe(0);
    expect(await api.listPinResetRequests(host.jwt)).toHaveLength(0);
  });

  test('requests are throttled to 3 per 15 min per IP+name', async ({ api, adminToken, guest }) => {
    await api.patchConfig(adminToken, { rate_limits_enabled: 'true' });
    await guest('ThrottleTarget');

    const statuses: number[] = [];
    for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) statuses.push((await requestReset('ThrottleTarget')).status);

    // First 3 accepted, the rest throttled — proving the limiter is real and keyed.
    expect(statuses.filter((s) => s === 204)).toHaveLength(3);
    expect(statuses.filter((s) => s === 429).length).toBeGreaterThan(0);

    // Restore so the next test's fixtures aren't affected (rate limits share the backend).
    await api.patchConfig(adminToken, { rate_limits_enabled: 'false' });
  });

  test('a host PIN reset revokes the targets sessions and clears the request', async ({
    api,
    host,
    guest,
    db,
  }) => {
    const g = await guest('CompromisedCarl');
    await requestReset('CompromisedCarl');

    // The guest has a live session (the join minted one) and a queued request.
    expect(await db.countSessionsForUser(g.userId)).toBeGreaterThan(0);
    expect(await db.countPinResetRequestsForUser(g.userId)).toBe(1);

    // Host resets the PIN.
    await api.resetUserPin(host.jwt, g.userId);

    // The old device is logged out: the guest's pre-reset JWT no longer authenticates. This is the
    // security point of a reset — sessions are token-bound, so without the revoke the compromised
    // device would stay logged in with full access despite the new PIN.
    const stale = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/me/context`, {
      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${g.jwt}` },
    });
    expect(stale.status, 'the pre-reset session must be revoked').toBe(401);
    expect(await db.countSessionsForUser(g.userId)).toBe(0);

    // And the pending request was resolved.
    expect(await db.countPinResetRequestsForUser(g.userId)).toBe(0);
  });
});
