fabi/EventSnap
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

test(e2e): de-vacuum security tests; add quota, authz-sweep, keepsake-regen coverage

Browse Source 
An audit found tests that pass on broken code. The dominant pattern: fire a security
assertion at the all-zeros UUID and accept [403, 404] — the 404 comes from the resource
LOOKUP, not the guard, so the guard can be deleted and the test still passes. Repaired to
use real resources and demand exactly 403:
  - banned-user cannot like / comment (the only coverage of those ban invariants)
  - host cannot promote a real guest (or self) to admin — asserts nobody's role changed
  - IDOR comment-delete already used a real resource; kept
Also inverted recovery.spec's "unknown name → nicht gefunden" test: that asserted the exact
account-enumeration oracle the F4 fix removed, so restoring the vuln would have made it
pass. Now: an unknown name must be byte-identical to a wrong PIN.

New coverage for paths that ran in production but in zero tests:
  - quota.spec.ts: storage quota enforcement (413 over-limit, atomic increment under two
    uploads held mid-body so both carry a stale total=0 — the real race; a naive Promise.all
    version was itself vacuous and is documented as such). Proven to fail without the guard.
  - authz-sweep.spec.ts: table-driven guest→403 / host→403 over ALL 19 privileged routes +
    anonymous + __truncate. No live hole found; the whole surface is now locked.
  - ban / unban / host-comment-delete AFTER release regenerate the keepsake (data-loss
    paths that were dead under test); comment-delete mid-build doesn't strand the ZIP.

Lower-severity de-vacuuming: 10 MB comment test hit Caddy's 502 before the real 500-char
cap (now seeds a real upload, 501→400 / 500→201, mutation-verified); XSS name payloads
shortened under the 50-char cap so they actually store+render; ui-rendering XSS test now
proves the payload rendered before asserting no <b>; export page-object locators fixed to
the real "Download" label with a positive empty-state anchor; avatar palette spread test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
fabi
2026-07-15 07:26:40 +02:00
parent e5201a9889
commit 02971f3186
13 changed files with 681 additions and 67 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

14
e2e/specs/07-adversarial/ui-rendering.spec.ts
View File

@@ -26,14 +26,20 @@ test.describe('Adversarial — UI render escape', () => {
});
await page.goto('/account');
await page.waitForLoadState('domcontentloaded');
// Render guard FIRST. `domcontentloaded` fires before Svelte hydrates, so asserting
// the *absence* of a <b> at that point passes on a page that never rendered the name
// at all — a false green on an XSS test. Prove the payload actually reached the DOM
// (as escaped text) before concluding anything about how it was rendered.
await expect(page.getByText(payload, { exact: false }).first()).toBeVisible({ timeout: 10_000 });
const fired = await page.evaluate(() => (window as any).__xssFired === true);
expect(fired).toBe(false);
// <b> tag inside the name should also not render as bold — Svelte escapes the entire string.
const boldCount = await page.locator('b:has-text("BOLD")').count();
expect(boldCount).toBe(0);
// <b> tag inside the name should also not render as bold — Svelte escapes the entire
// string. toHaveCount auto-retries, so this can't win by racing hydration.
await expect(page.locator('b:has-text("BOLD")')).toHaveCount(0);
await expect(page.locator('script:has-text("__xssFired")')).toHaveCount(0);
});
test('rendering of a known SQL-injection-shaped name does not break the page', async ({ page, api }) => {