From 06ade4e15816db4c692526ad015d93e55b16dc2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: fabi Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2026 07:18:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] fix(audit-3): restore the decode allocation guard, route /health in production MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Third round. The decode allocation guard is a regression from round 1: swapping reader.decode() for into_decoder() silently dropped the max_alloc enforcement while keeping the comment that claimed it held. Squashed from 3 commits, original messages preserved below. ──────── fix(imaging): restore the decode allocation guard I removed in round 1 This is a regression I introduced, not a pre-existing gap. Before 05948d8 the compression worker used `ImageReader::decode()`, which does: let mut decoder = Self::make_decoder(format, self.inner, limits.clone())?; limits.reserve(decoder.total_bytes())?; // enforces max_alloc decoder.set_limits(limits)?; Reading the EXIF orientation tag needs `into_decoder()` instead, and that skips the reserve entirely — the crate's own FIXME concedes `from_decoder` doesn't compensate. Nothing else enforces `max_alloc`: the JPEG decoder's `set_limits` only checks support and dimensions. So the 256 MiB budget has been inert since that commit, and round 2 then propagated the weakened path into export.rs through the shared helper, in a commit whose message claimed the helper "carries" the decompression-bomb cap. It didn't, and the comment saying max_alloc "hard-caps the decode allocation" was simply false. What was left was only the per-axis cap, which permits 12000x12000 — 412 MiB decoded, 824 MiB for the two concurrent decodes the worker runs by default, against a 1 GiB container. Deploy-blocking right now because bumping DERIVATIVES_REV makes the first boot after a deploy re-decode the entire gallery two at a time: an OOM kill there restarts the container, which re-runs the backfill. A boot loop, on the first deploy of these fixes. Re-add the reserve exactly as `decode()` does it. Per the budget decision it stays at 256 MiB (~89 MP for RGB8, above any mainstream phone's real output); two concurrent decodes now peak at 512 MiB. Oversized images take the graceful path from round 1 — original retained, quota refunded, upload-error toast — and fail after the header parse but BEFORE any pixels are read, so they cost a header read rather than an allocation. Measured peak during a concurrent oversized burst: 3.0 MiB. Test parity is the other half, and the reason this was invisible: the e2e app container had NO memory limit while production is capped at 1 GiB, so a decode that would OOM-kill production simply succeeded in CI. Mirror the 1 GiB cap in docker-compose.test.yml. That is the third divergence of this shape, after WebKit missing from CI and /health existing only in Caddyfile.test. Tests: a fixture that is 568 KiB on disk and 283 MiB decoded (11000x9000 = 99 MP, deliberately UNDER the per-axis cap so the axis check cannot be what rejects it). A unit test asserts the refusal — it fails against the old code, which decoded it into an 11000x9000 buffer — with a companion asserting an ordinary photo still decodes AND still gets its orientation applied, so the guard didn't become a blanket refusal. An e2e test uploads it singly and as a concurrent pair, asserting compression lands in 'failed' and the backend is still serving and still processing afterwards. ──────── fix(deploy): route /health in production, and actually apply Caddyfile changes Two defects in the update procedure I wrote last round, both of which make a successful-looking deploy a lie. 1. The documented health check could never pass. `curl -fsS https://DOMAIN/health` 404s against a perfectly healthy production stack. The backend registers /health on its ROOT router, not under /api/v1, and the production Caddyfile proxies only /api/* and /media/* — so /health fell through to the SvelteKit catch-all, which has no such route and returns its 404 page. With -f, curl exits 22 and the `&& echo` never runs. My own gloss ("Anything other than ok means check the logs") then sent the operator chasing a phantom outage. e2e/Caddyfile.test has carried `reverse_proxy /health app:3000` since it was written — precisely because the catch-all would otherwise swallow it. Production never did. Per the fix-the-gap-not-the-doc call, production gets the same line, and /health joins the no-store matcher so a cached response can't report the last known state instead of the current one. Verified by running the production Caddyfile against the real backend: /health -> 200 "ok", Cache-Control: no-store, with /api/v1/event and / unaffected. 2. The sequence never reloaded Caddy, so a Caddyfile-only change was dropped. `--build` only rebuilds services with a `build:` section, and caddy is a pinned upstream image. Compose decides whether to recreate a container from its config hash, which covers the mount SPECIFICATION but not the mounted file's CONTENTS — so a git pull that changes ./Caddyfile produces no delta, Compose reports `Running`, and Caddy serves its old config indefinitely. Exit code 0 throughout. Round 1's iOS download fix (137c4ee) is exactly this shape: Caddyfile plus four e2e files, so 100% of its production effect is in that one file. Following the README to the letter deployed it, showed both image IDs changing, and left iOS downloads broken. Demonstrated rather than assumed — added a probe header to a Caddyfile, ran the old sequence (`up -d --build`): header absent, change silently dropped. Ran the new step 4 (`up -d --force-recreate caddy`): header served. `--force-recreate` rather than `restart` or `caddy reload` because the bind mount is resolved to an inode at container-create time and git pull replaces the file rather than editing in place, so a restart can re-read the stale content — the exact failure I hit in round 1 when `caddy reload` didn't pick up an edit. Also rewrites the "db and caddy are untouched … so data volumes survive" sentence. I wrote it as reassurance; "caddy is untouched" was the bug. ──────── chore: take the Bash(*) permission change back out of the shared settings `.claude/settings.json` is committed and applies to anyone who clones. Fabi's local `allow: ["Bash(*)"]` plus deny list ended up in it, inside f0d69f1 — a commit about the image decode guard, which has nothing to do with permissions. That was my mistake, twice. The file was already modified when I started the round: my `git status --short` check printed "(clean)" from an unconditional `echo` rather than from the status output, so I read a dirty tree as clean. Then `git add -A` swept it into an unrelated commit, and I reported afterwards that I had left it untouched. Neither the check nor the claim was true. Restores the shared file to its previous three narrow entries. The permission setup itself is preserved, moved to `.claude/settings.local.json`, which `.gitignore:34` covers precisely so per-user permissions stay per-user — the existing 442 entries there are kept alongside it. Not rewriting f0d69f1 to erase this: main is unpushed so it would be safe, but a visible correction is worth more than a tidy history, and a rebase across the merge commits carries more risk than the mistake does. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 --- Caddyfile | 12 ++- README.md | 30 +++++-- backend/src/services/imaging.rs | 84 ++++++++++++++++-- e2e/docker-compose.test.yml | 9 ++ e2e/specs/02-upload/oversized-image.spec.ts | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) create mode 100644 e2e/specs/02-upload/oversized-image.spec.ts diff --git a/Caddyfile b/Caddyfile index 138ea14..f401ee6 100644 --- a/Caddyfile +++ b/Caddyfile @@ -40,9 +40,10 @@ @media_api path /api/v1/upload/*/preview /api/v1/upload/*/thumbnail header @media_api Cache-Control "private, max-age=300" - # API — never cache, EXCEPT the gated image routes above. + # API and health — never cache, EXCEPT the gated image routes above. A cached health + # response would report the last known state rather than the current one. @api { - path /api/* + path /api/* /health not path /api/v1/upload/*/preview /api/v1/upload/*/thumbnail } header @api Cache-Control "no-store" @@ -58,6 +59,13 @@ reverse_proxy /api/* app:3000 reverse_proxy /media/* app:3000 + # The backend registers /health on its ROOT router, not under /api/v1, so it needs its + # own line — without it the catch-all below hands /health to SvelteKit, which has no + # such route and returns its 404 page. That made the documented post-deploy check + # (`curl -fsS https://DOMAIN/health`) fail 100% of the time on a perfectly healthy + # stack. e2e/Caddyfile.test has always carried this line; production never did. + reverse_proxy /health app:3000 + # Everything else goes to SvelteKit frontend reverse_proxy frontend:3001 } diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 99d9ac0..33b890d 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -132,13 +132,16 @@ cd /path/to/eventsnap # 2. Fetch the new code. git pull -# 3. Rebuild and restart. --build is NOT optional. +# 3. Rebuild and restart the application services. --build is NOT optional. docker compose up -d --build -# 4. Confirm the app came back up. Anything other than "ok" means check the logs. +# 4. Apply any Caddyfile change. Step 3 does NOT do this — see the warning below. +docker compose up -d --force-recreate caddy + +# 5. Confirm the app came back up. Anything other than "ok" means check the logs. curl -fsS https://DOMAIN/health && echo -# 5. Confirm a NEW image was actually built. Note the IMAGE ID before you start and +# 6. Confirm a NEW image was actually built. Note the IMAGE ID before you start and # compare — it must have changed. (Ignore the CREATED column; it reports the base # layer's age, not this build's.) An unchanged ID means step 3 ran without --build # and you are still serving the old code. @@ -151,8 +154,25 @@ that a migration applied by a *newer* build is not removed by checking out an ol so rolling back code without restoring the database snapshot from step 1 leaves the schema ahead of the binary and the app refusing to boot. -Only the two application services rebuild; `db` and `caddy` are pinned upstream images and -are untouched, so data volumes and the TLS certificate survive. +> **Why step 4 exists.** `--build` only rebuilds services that have a `build:` section, and +> `caddy` is a pinned upstream image. Compose decides whether to recreate a container from its +> *config hash*, which covers the mount **specification** (`./Caddyfile:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro`) +> but **not the file's contents** — so a `git pull` that changes `./Caddyfile` produces no +> delta, Compose reports `Running`, and Caddy keeps serving its old config indefinitely. Exit +> code 0 throughout. +> +> That is not hypothetical: the fix that made the keepsake download work on iOS +> (`137c4ee`) touched the Caddyfile and four e2e files and nothing else, so **all** of its +> production effect lives in that one file. Without step 4 you deploy it, watch both image IDs +> change, and iOS downloads stay broken. +> +> `--force-recreate` rather than `restart` or `caddy reload`: the bind mount is resolved to an +> **inode** when the container is created, and `git pull` replaces the file instead of editing +> it in place, so the container can still be bound to the old, now-unlinked inode. A restart +> then re-reads the stale content. Recreating the container re-resolves the path. + +`db` is never touched, and recreating `caddy` does not disturb the `caddy_data` volume, so the +TLS certificate and all data volumes survive. ### Generate required secrets diff --git a/backend/src/services/imaging.rs b/backend/src/services/imaging.rs index 94dcdab..6854c12 100644 --- a/backend/src/services/imaging.rs +++ b/backend/src/services/imaging.rs @@ -19,8 +19,13 @@ use anyhow::{Context, Result}; use image::{DynamicImage, ImageDecoder}; use std::path::Path; -/// Bounds for any decode of user-supplied image data. 12000×12000 covers any real phone -/// photo; `max_alloc` hard-caps the decode allocation. +/// Bounds for any decode of user-supplied image data. The per-axis cap covers any real phone +/// photo; `max_alloc` bounds the decoded buffer — but only because `decode_oriented` reserves +/// against it explicitly, see there. +/// +/// Sized against the deployment: the app container is capped at 1 GiB and the compression +/// worker runs `compression_concurrency` decodes at once (default 2), so 256 MiB per decode +/// leaves headroom for the resize buffers and the runtime. fn decode_limits() -> image::Limits { let mut limits = image::Limits::default(); limits.max_image_width = Some(12_000); @@ -38,11 +43,30 @@ pub fn decode_oriented(path: &Path) -> Result { .context("failed to open image")? .with_guessed_format() .context("failed to read image header")?; - reader.limits(decode_limits()); + let mut limits = decode_limits(); + reader.limits(limits.clone()); - // `into_decoder` carries the limits above through, so reading the tag costs nothing in - // safety. A missing or malformed tag is not an error — most images simply have none. + // We need `into_decoder` rather than `decode()` to read the EXIF orientation tag before + // the pixels are consumed. But the two are NOT equivalent on safety: `decode()` performs + // + // limits.reserve(decoder.total_bytes())?; + // + // between building the decoder and reading the image, and `into_decoder()` skips it (the + // crate's own FIXME concedes `from_decoder` doesn't compensate). Nothing else enforces + // `max_alloc` — the JPEG decoder's `set_limits` only checks support and dimensions — so + // without the line below the budget is inert and the ONLY bound is the per-axis cap. That + // leaves 12000x12000 decodable at 412 MiB, and two concurrent at 824 MiB against a 1 GiB + // container. Re-add it, exactly as `decode()` does. let mut decoder = reader.into_decoder().context("failed to decode image")?; + limits + .reserve(decoder.total_bytes()) + .context("image too large to decode within the memory budget")?; + decoder + .set_limits(limits) + .context("image too large to decode within the memory budget")?; + + // Cheap, and it happens BEFORE any pixels are read: an oversized image costs a header + // parse, not an allocation. let orientation = decoder .orientation() .unwrap_or(image::metadata::Orientation::NoTransforms); @@ -50,3 +74,53 @@ pub fn decode_oriented(path: &Path) -> Result { img.apply_orientation(orientation); Ok(img) } + +#[cfg(test)] +mod tests { + use super::*; + + /// Shared with the e2e suite rather than duplicating 568 KiB of binary: the same file + /// drives `02-upload/oversized-image` so both layers assert on one artefact. + const HUGE: &str = concat!( + env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), + "/../e2e/fixtures/media/huge-99mp.jpg" + ); + + #[test] + fn rejects_an_image_that_would_blow_the_allocation_budget() { + // 11000x9000 = 99 MP. Deliberately UNDER the 12000px per-axis cap, so the axis check + // cannot reject it — the allocation budget is the only thing that can, which is + // exactly what makes this a regression test rather than a restatement of the axis cap. + // 283 MiB decoded as RGB8 against a 256 MiB budget, from 568 KiB on disk. + // + // This failed before the guard was restored: `ImageReader::decode` performs + // `limits.reserve(decoder.total_bytes())`, and `into_decoder()` — which we need for + // the EXIF tag — skips it, so `max_alloc` was inert and this decoded happily. + // Map the Ok arm to its dimensions first: on failure `expect_err` Debug-prints the + // value, and Debug on a DynamicImage dumps every pixel — 283 MiB of output. + let err = decode_oriented(Path::new(HUGE)) + .map(|img| (img.width(), img.height())) + .expect_err("a 99 MP image must be refused, not allocated"); + let msg = format!("{err:#}"); + assert!( + msg.to_lowercase().contains("limit") || msg.to_lowercase().contains("memory"), + "expected a limits error, got: {msg}" + ); + } + + #[test] + fn still_decodes_an_ordinary_photo_and_applies_orientation() { + // The guard must not have become a blanket refusal. This fixture is 40x20 stored with + // EXIF Orientation=6, so a correct decode returns it rotated to 20x40 portrait. + let path = concat!( + env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), + "/../e2e/fixtures/media/portrait-exif6.jpg" + ); + let img = decode_oriented(Path::new(path)).expect("an ordinary photo must decode"); + assert_eq!( + (img.width(), img.height()), + (20, 40), + "EXIF orientation must still be applied after restoring the guard" + ); + } +} diff --git a/e2e/docker-compose.test.yml b/e2e/docker-compose.test.yml index 15a0440..7d91475 100644 --- a/e2e/docker-compose.test.yml +++ b/e2e/docker-compose.test.yml @@ -56,6 +56,15 @@ services: # Separate volume, exactly as in production: a keepsake archive contains every # photo in the event, so it is kept off the media tree. - exports_data:/exports + # Mirror production's cap (docker-compose.yml). The test stack having NO memory limit is + # why an unbounded image decode was invisible here: a 99 MP upload that would OOM-kill the + # 1 GiB production container simply succeeded in CI. A test environment more generous than + # production cannot catch a resource bug — the same shape as WebKit being absent from CI + # and /health existing only in Caddyfile.test. + deploy: + resources: + limits: + memory: 1G expose: - '3000' diff --git a/e2e/specs/02-upload/oversized-image.spec.ts b/e2e/specs/02-upload/oversized-image.spec.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e4654a --- /dev/null +++ b/e2e/specs/02-upload/oversized-image.spec.ts @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +/** + * Regression guard — an image that would blow the decode budget must be refused, not + * allocated, and the container must survive it. + * + * The compression worker sets `max_alloc = 256 MiB`, but that budget was inert: reading the + * EXIF orientation tag requires `ImageReader::into_decoder()`, which skips the + * `limits.reserve(decoder.total_bytes())` that `decode()` performs, and nothing else enforces + * it (the JPEG decoder's `set_limits` only checks support and dimensions). So the only real + * bound was the 12000px per-axis cap — leaving 12000x12000 decodable at 412 MiB, and two + * concurrent decodes at 824 MiB against a 1 GiB container. + * + * That mattered acutely because bumping DERIVATIVES_REV makes the first boot after a deploy + * re-decode the whole gallery two at a time: an OOM kill there restarts the container, which + * re-runs the backfill — a boot loop. + * + * This suite could never have caught it, because until now the e2e app container had NO + * memory limit at all while production is capped at 1 GiB. The cap is mirrored in + * docker-compose.test.yml so this test means something. + * + * Fixture: 11000x9000 = 99 MP, 568 KiB on disk. Deliberately UNDER the per-axis cap, so the + * axis check cannot be what rejects it — 283 MiB decoded against a 256 MiB budget. + */ +import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test'; +import { uploadRaw } from '../../helpers/upload-client'; +import { BASE } from '../../helpers/env'; +import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; +import { join } from 'node:path'; + +const HUGE = join(process.cwd(), 'fixtures', 'media', 'huge-99mp.jpg'); +const SAMPLE = join(process.cwd(), 'fixtures', 'media', 'sample.jpg'); + +test.describe('Upload — an oversized image is refused, not allocated', () => { + test('a 99 MP upload fails compression gracefully and the backend stays up', async ({ + guest, + db, + }) => { + test.setTimeout(90_000); + const g = await guest('BombThrower'); + + // The upload itself is accepted — 568 KiB is well within the body cap. The rejection + // happens in the compression worker, where the decode budget lives. + const res = await uploadRaw(g.jwt, readFileSync(HUGE), { + filename: 'huge.jpg', + contentType: 'image/jpeg', + caption: 'zu gross', + }); + expect(res.status, 'a 568 KiB file is a legitimate upload').toBe(201); + const { id } = (await res.json()) as { id: string }; + + // It must land in 'failed', not 'done' — and must get there, rather than the container + // dying mid-decode and leaving it stuck in 'processing' forever. + await expect + .poll(() => db.compressionStatus(id), { timeout: 60_000, intervals: [500] }) + .toBe('failed'); + + // The whole point: the process is still alive. An OOM kill would have taken the backend + // down here, and Docker would have restarted it. + const health = await fetch(`${BASE}/health`); + expect(health.status, 'the backend must have survived the oversized decode').toBe(200); + + // And it is still doing useful work afterwards — not wedged or restarting. + const ok = await uploadRaw(g.jwt, readFileSync(SAMPLE), { + filename: 'after.jpg', + contentType: 'image/jpeg', + }); + expect(ok.status).toBe(201); + const after = (await ok.json()) as { id: string }; + await expect.poll(() => db.compressionStatus(after.id), { timeout: 30_000 }).toBe('done'); + }); + + test('two oversized uploads at once still leave the container alive', async ({ guest, db }) => { + // The concurrent case is the one that actually OOM'd: `compression_concurrency` is 2, so + // two decodes overlap. Under the old behaviour this pair peaked near the container cap. + test.setTimeout(90_000); + const g = await guest('BombThrower2'); + const bytes = readFileSync(HUGE); + + const [a, b] = await Promise.all([ + uploadRaw(g.jwt, bytes, { filename: 'huge-a.jpg', contentType: 'image/jpeg' }), + uploadRaw(g.jwt, bytes, { filename: 'huge-b.jpg', contentType: 'image/jpeg' }), + ]); + expect([a.status, b.status]).toEqual([201, 201]); + const ids = [((await a.json()) as { id: string }).id, ((await b.json()) as { id: string }).id]; + + for (const id of ids) { + await expect + .poll(() => db.compressionStatus(id), { timeout: 60_000, intervals: [500] }) + .toBe('failed'); + } + + const health = await fetch(`${BASE}/health`); + expect(health.status, 'two concurrent oversized decodes must not kill the backend').toBe(200); + }); +});