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fix(audit-1): media gating, per-user limits, moderation UI, upload integrity

Browse Source 
First audit round: a blocker and eight high-severity findings across the media
access gate, the guest-facing rate limiters, host moderation, and the upload
pipeline — plus the backup commands and the e2e/production divergences that hid
several of them.

Squashed from 7 commits, original messages preserved below.

──────── fix(export): let the keepsake download through X-Frame-Options on iOS

The keepsake download navigates a hidden, same-origin iframe (deliberately:
a top-level navigation to a 404/429 would unload the PWA). Caddy stamped a
site-wide `X-Frame-Options: DENY` that also covered the proxied `/api/*`.

Blink hands a `Content-Disposition: attachment` response to the download
manager at the network layer, so Chromium never noticed. WebKit enforces XFO
on the frame navigation first and aborts the load — so on iOS Safari, the
app's primary platform, tapping Download did nothing at all, silently.

Carve the two export endpoints out to SAMEORIGIN, which still blocks
cross-origin framing. Implemented as two disjoint matchers rather than an
override: Caddy applies the FIRST `header` directive outermost, so it wins on
write and a later, more specific `header` is silently ignored (verified
against the running test stack).

Also close the test gap that let this ship:

- `06-export` ran on chromium-desktop only; add it to `webkit-iphone`, the
  only engine that enforces XFO on the download frame.
- No test in the suite ever clicked a download button — every archive
  assertion used Node `fetch`, which has no frame and no XFO enforcement.
  Add a spec that clicks it and awaits a real `download` event. Verified
  falsifiable: with the blanket DENY reinstated it fails and reports the
  WebKit refusal as the cause.
- Fix `ExportPage`'s card-scoped locators, which matched nothing: the cards
  carry `class="card p-5"` (a Tailwind `@apply` component class), never the
  `rounded-xl` the page object looked for. This had left the "shows enabled
  download buttons" test red on main.

──────── fix(media): close the percent-escape bypass of the media gate

`/media/%70reviews/{id}.jpg` served a taken-down photo to anyone,
unauthenticated. Verified against the running stack: the literal path 404s,
the escaped one returned 200 with the full image. Same for displays,
thumbnails and originals, and any escaped byte in any position works.

Cause: the block was four `nest_service("/media/previews", 404)` route
matches sitting above a `ServeDir` on `/media`. axum matches on the RAW path
(matchit does no percent-decoding), while `ServeDir` percent-decodes when it
resolves the file. So `%70reviews` missed every blocker, fell through to the
ServeDir, and was decoded back to `previews/` on disk — reaching the bytes
with no soft-delete and no ban-hide check. That defeats a host takedown,
which is the entire point of the gate.

Remove the `/media` route tree outright instead of racing the decoder.
Nothing needs it: every media URL the backend emits is already a gated
`/api/v1/upload/{id}/{original,preview,display,thumbnail}` alias
(handlers::feed), the frontend contains zero `/media/` references, and the
`/media` in config.rs/disk.rs is the filesystem path while `media/` in
export.rs is a path inside the zip. `/media/**` now 404s regardless of
encoding. The route's own comment already said it "serves nothing" — it
wasn't a backstop, it was the vector.

Caddy keeps proxying /media/* deliberately: the app 404s it, and forwarding
means the e2e gating specs exercise the app's refusal exactly as production
would rather than being masked by the SvelteKit 404 page.

Extend the gating spec with the encoded variants — asserting only the literal
spelling is what let this sit undetected.

──────── fix(rate-limit): key the guest-facing limiters per user, not per IP

At a venue every guest is behind one NAT, so an IP-keyed limiter hands the
whole party a single bucket. On a fresh deploy 12 guests arriving together
meant 5 joined and 7 were turned away, with no Retry-After telling them when
to retry. `/feed` (60/min) and `/export` (3 per DAY — the fourth guest to
fetch their keepsake locked out until tomorrow) had the same defect.

`feed_delta` was already keyed per-user and its comment states the exact
rationale ("so one client can't starve others behind a shared NAT"); this
makes its siblings match.

- feed:{ip}   -> feed:{user_id}    (auth was already in scope)
- export:{ip} -> export:{user_id}  (resolved from the download ticket's
  session, which was previously looked up and discarded)
- join:{ip}: pre-auth, so there is no user to key on. Split in two — a loose
  per-IP ceiling that only bounds raw volume (new `join_ip_rate_per_min`,
  default 60, migration 017), plus the real 5/60s anti-spam bucket keyed
  per (ip, name), mirroring the existing `recover:{ip}:{name}`.

admin_login / recover / pin_reset_req stay IP-keyed on purpose and are now
commented as such: they guard credential guessing, where a per-user or
per-name key would just hand an attacker a fresh bucket per guess.

Retry-After: the machinery existed but 7 of 8 sites called `check()` and
hard-coded `None`, so a throttled client was told to back off but never for
how long. Delete the bool `check()` wrapper entirely so `check_with_retry`
is the only entry point and the delay cannot be discarded by accident. Also
surface it for the PIN lockout, where the deadline was already known.

Fix the "unknown" fallback while here: every client_ip() caller passed that
literal, so any request without X-Forwarded-For — anything reaching the app
directly rather than through Caddy — shared ONE global bucket. Serve with
connect-info and use the peer address.

Tests: the reseed forces every limiter toggle off before each test, which is
why this whole class was invisible. Add 01-auth/rate-limit-shared-nat, which
enables them and asserts 12 guests share an IP without collision, that one
guest hammering their own name IS still throttled (so the fix re-keys rather
than removes the limit), and that feed/export buckets are per-user. Retarget
the ddos join test at the new per-IP ceiling — it asserted the defect.

Also seed `admin_login_rate_enabled` (read by the handler, seeded by no
migration and no reseed) and register `join_ip_rate_per_min` in the admin
config allowlist. Unrelated pre-existing red test fixed: 01-auth/join
asserted a "Willkommen!" heading the wedding redesign removed.

──────── feat(moderation): let a host remove a guest's photo or comment from the UI

`DELETE /host/upload/{id}` and `DELETE /host/comment/{id}` were complete on the
backend — transactional, SSE-broadcasting, audit-logged — and had zero frontend
callers. The feed context sheet offered "Löschen" only when
`target.user_id === myUserId`, so the only lever a host actually had against an
unwanted photo was banning the uploader.

That is both disproportionate and ineffective. A ban doesn't retract what was
already posted, and it makes things strictly worse for comments: the ban check
runs BEFORE the ownership check on the guest delete route, so banning an abusive
author leaves their comment on screen and permanently undeletable by them. With
no host affordance, nobody could remove it at all.

- feed: hosts/admins get "Beitrag entfernen" on other people's posts, routed to
  the host endpoint (the guest route 403s anything the caller doesn't own) with
  moderation-specific confirm copy. Own-post "Löschen" is unchanged.
- lightbox: same for comments, via /host/comment/{id}.
- Ban semantics are deliberately untouched (USER_JOURNEYS §10 — banned users keep
  read access and cannot write). The deadlock is broken by giving the host a way
  in, not by loosening the ban.

Live role (this had to come first). `getRole()` decodes the JWT claim, but the
token is never reissued — the backend slides the session row forward and treats
the DB row as authoritative. The claim is therefore frozen for the token's
lifetime: up to 30 days. A guest promoted at the party saw no Host-Dashboard and
no moderation actions until they signed out and back in, even though
`/me/context` had been returning their real role on every page load and 4 of its
6 call sites dropped the field on the floor.

Add `role-store.ts`: seeded from the claim so there's no flash of the wrong nav,
then corrected by every `/me/context` response. Point the ad-hoc `getRole()`
callers at it (account, upload, host, admin, and the new feed gate). The host and
admin dashboards now derive `myRole` reactively, so a demotion disables their
controls immediately instead of at next login.

Tests: 04-host/moderation-ui drives the real UI — host removes a guest photo and
it's gone from /feed server-side; a plain guest is offered nothing on someone
else's post (the mirror that keeps the first test honest); a promoted guest gains
the dashboard on reload while their token still carries `role: guest`; and a host
removes the comment of an already-banned guest, asserting first that the author's
own delete 403s so the deadlock is real.

──────── fix(upload): stop destroying originals, apply EXIF orientation, surface rejections

Three defects in the same pipeline, each of which loses a photo or misrepresents
one.

1. A transient error destroyed the guest's only copy.

`process`'s error arm unconditionally `remove_file`d the original. Every failure
routed there: `create_dir_all`, both derivative `save_with_format` calls (disk
full is the canonical case, and it arrives exactly when many guests upload at
once), a panic inside the image codec, or a momentary DB-pool exhaustion. The
row is only SOFT-deleted, so the bytes were the sole unrecoverable part — and
they were the part we deleted. The author already knew this was wrong next door:
`backfill_missing_display` says it "must NEVER soft-delete an upload that already
has a working preview".

Retry up to 3 times with backoff (re-checking the e2e generation guard after each
sleep), and on final failure keep the refund + soft-delete but leave the original
on disk, logging its path. A failed upload is now recoverable instead of gone.

2. Every portrait photo was stored sideways.

Phones don't rotate sensor data — they record the camera orientation in EXIF and
store the pixels as shot. `decode()` returns those raw pixels and the JPEG
re-encode writes no EXIF, so the 800px preview, the 2048px diashow display and
the keepsake were all rotated 90°, while "Original anzeigen" rendered upright
because the original keeps its tag. That asymmetry is why it reads as a viewer
bug. There was no EXIF handling anywhere in the repo and no exif crate.

Read the tag via `into_decoder()` (which carries the decode Limits through, so
the decompression-bomb cap is untouched) and apply it. Missing/malformed tags
fall back to NoTransforms — most images have none.

Existing derivatives are already baked wrong, so migration 018 adds
`derivatives_rev` and `backfill_missing_display` becomes
`backfill_stale_derivatives`: it now also picks up anything below the current rev
and regenerates it once from the original, which still carries its EXIF. Videos
are marked current in the migration — ffmpeg already honours the rotation matrix.
Bump DERIVATIVES_REV for any future change that invalidates derivatives.

3. A rejected upload vanished without a word.

`UploadQueue.svelte` — 162 lines holding the ONLY renderer of an item's error
text, the only "Erneut" retry button and the only rate-limit countdown — was
never imported anywhere, so `retryItem`, `removeItem` and `clearCompleted` were
unreachable at runtime. On a terminal rejection the store purged the blob and
wrote a clear German reason into `entry.error` "so the UI shows a clear reason".
There was no such UI. And `uploadBadgeCount` counted only pending/uploading, so
the badge decremented exactly as if the upload had succeeded.

Mount the queue on /upload, toast the reason immediately (the flow sends the user
to /feed straight after staging, so the list alone would still miss them), and
count blocked/error in the badge so a failure can't read as success.

Tests: 02-upload/exif-orientation uploads a 40x20 fixture tagged Orientation=6
and asserts both derivatives come back PORTRAIT, with a sanity check that the
source really is stored landscape. 02-upload/rejection-visible bans the uploader
between staging and sending, then asserts the toast, the queue row with the
server's reason, and that the item is still counted.

Note: 02-upload/quota's 4 failures are pre-existing and unrelated — see the next
commit.

──────── docs(backup): make the backup commands work; fix the e2e/prod divergences

Backup. Both documented commands failed on the shipped stack, and the sentence
explaining them was wrong too:

- `pg_dump $DATABASE_URL` — `DATABASE_URL` is only ever in the compose
  environment, never an operator's shell, and it points at `db:5432`, which is
  compose-internal DNS. The app image has no postgres client either.
- `> /media/backups/…` — `/media` is a named volume mounted inside the app
  container, not a host path, and nothing ever creates a `backups` subdirectory.
- `rsync /opt/eventsnap/media/` — that path does not exist anywhere.
- "a single path to back up" — false, and dangerously so: exports were moved to
  their own `exports_data` volume precisely so a keepsake (which contains every
  photo in the event) can't be served off the media tree. Backing up only
  `media_data` silently loses every generated keepsake.

Rewritten as three commands — db via `docker compose exec -T db pg_dump`, and one
`docker run … tar` per volume — all verified against the running stack. The
volume mounts use `/src`, not `/media`: I hit the footgun while testing this.
Docker pre-populates an EMPTY volume from the image's own directory and chowns it
to match, so `-v media_data:/media alpine` tars alpine's cdrom/floppy/usb, writes
them into the volume, and leaves it root-owned so the non-root app can no longer
write. Mounting where the image has nothing avoids all of it. Documented inline
so the next person doesn't rediscover it.

Also correct the architecture notes: `/media/*` no longer routes to the backend
(that static tree was removed as a gating bypass), and `exports_data` was missing
from the volume list — the one volume an operator most needs to know about.

e2e stack: add the `EXPORT_PATH` + `/exports` volume it was missing. The file
says "mirrors production layout"; without these, exports landed on the container's
writable layer at the default path, so export-leak and export-video wrote real
archives into ephemeral storage and the "exports live outside media" invariant
was never actually exercised.

Pre-existing red test, unrelated to the audit: all four 02-upload/quota tests
have been failing since 4464147 "stop /me/quota leaking raw disk to guests"
(2026-07-19), which post-dates the spec's last edit. `setLimitTo` calibrated
`quota_tolerance` from `free_disk_bytes` read through the GUEST's token — a field
that commit deliberately zeroes for non-staff. Dividing by it yields a NaN
tolerance, so every test in the block died in the helper. Read the calibration
inputs through a staff token and keep reading the ceiling back through the guest,
whose limit is the thing under test.

──────── test(e2e): document why WebKit can't run the client-queue upload tests

Three 02-upload tests have been failing on `webkit-iphone` on main — `02-upload`
was already in that project's testMatch, so this is pre-existing red, not
something the audit work introduced.

Root cause is the harness, not the app. Playwright's Linux WebKit build cannot
store Blobs in IndexedDB at all: `put()` fails with "UnknownError: Error
preparing Blob/File data to be stored in object store". Confirmed it is not
about how Playwright delivers files — a Blob constructed in-page with
`new Blob([bytes])` fails identically, while Chromium stores both that and a
`setInputFiles` File without complaint.

That breaks every test driving the composer (FAB → UploadSheet → /upload →
submit), because `handleSubmit` awaits `addToQueue`, which persists the file
before it can navigate. The symptom is a submit button stuck on "Wird
hochgeladen…" and a timeout waiting for /feed — which reads like an app hang and
cost real time to run down.

Skip those four (the three above plus the new rejection-visible) on WebKit only,
behind a named helper carrying the full explanation, so the next person gets the
answer instead of the investigation. Deliberately narrow: WebKit still runs every
API-driven upload test, all of 01-auth, 03-feed and 06-export — including the
keepsake download, which only WebKit can meaningfully verify. Chromium continues
to run all 14.

Worth being explicit, since these tests exist to protect iOS: real Safari
supports Blobs in IndexedDB, so this is NOT evidence that the offline upload
queue is broken on the platform. It does mean that guarantee is currently
unverifiable in CI and rests on Chromium coverage plus manual device testing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
fabi
2026-07-28 19:14:37 +02:00
parent a77c2ddc00
commit 0c0eed885a
43 changed files with 1276 additions and 222 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

1
backend/migrations/017_join_ip_rate.down.sql Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
DELETE FROM config WHERE key IN ('join_ip_rate_per_min', 'admin_login_rate_enabled');

18
backend/migrations/017_join_ip_rate.up.sql Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
-- Per-IP flood ceiling for /join, and the `admin_login_rate_enabled` toggle that
-- every prior migration forgot to seed.
--
-- Rationale: /join was throttled at 5 requests per 60s keyed on the client IP. At a
-- venue every guest is behind one NAT, so the whole party shared a single bucket —
-- 12 guests scanning the QR code within a few seconds meant 5 got in and 7 were
-- turned away. The handler now keys the real anti-spam bucket per (ip, name), the
-- same shape as `recover:{ip}:{name}`, and keeps only a loose per-IP ceiling to bound
-- raw volume. 60/min comfortably covers a whole wedding arriving at once while still
-- capping a flood from a single source.
--
-- `admin_login_rate_enabled` is read by auth::handlers::admin_login with a code
-- default of `true`, but no migration ever inserted it, so it was invisible to the
-- admin config UI and to the e2e reseed. Seed it explicitly.
INSERT INTO config (key, value) VALUES
('join_ip_rate_per_min', '60'),
('admin_login_rate_enabled', 'true')
ON CONFLICT (key) DO NOTHING;

2
backend/migrations/018_derivatives_rev.down.sql Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_upload_derivatives_rev;
ALTER TABLE upload DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS derivatives_rev;

18
backend/migrations/018_derivatives_rev.up.sql Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
-- Track which revision of the derivative pipeline produced an upload's preview/display.
--
-- Rev 1 applies the EXIF orientation tag. Everything generated before it decoded the raw
-- sensor pixels and re-encoded to JPEG (which writes no EXIF), so every portrait phone photo
-- was stored sideways in the feed preview, the diashow display and the keepsake — while the
-- untouched original still rendered upright.
--
-- Existing rows default to 0 so the startup backfill can find and re-generate them exactly
-- once; bump the constant in services/compression.rs if the pipeline ever changes again.
ALTER TABLE upload ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS derivatives_rev SMALLINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0;
-- Only image derivatives are affected — video thumbnails are extracted by ffmpeg, which
-- already honours the rotation matrix. Mark them current so the backfill skips them.
UPDATE upload SET derivatives_rev = 1 WHERE mime_type NOT LIKE 'image/%';
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_upload_derivatives_rev
ON upload (derivatives_rev)
WHERE deleted_at IS NULL;

86
backend/src/auth/handlers.rs
View File

@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
use std::time::Duration;
use axum::Json;
use axum::extract::State;
use axum::extract::{ConnectInfo, State};
use axum::http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode};
use chrono::Utc;
use rand::Rng;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::auth::jwt;
@@ -33,22 +34,32 @@ pub struct JoinResponse {
pub async fn join(
State(state): State<AppState>,
ConnectInfo(peer): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
headers: HeaderMap,
Json(body): Json<JoinRequest>,
) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<JoinResponse>), AppError> {
let ip = client_ip(&headers, "unknown");
let ip = client_ip(&headers, &peer.ip().to_string());
let rate_limits_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "rate_limits_enabled", true).await;
let join_rate_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "join_rate_enabled", true).await;
if rate_limits_on
&& join_rate_on
&& !state
.rate_limiter
.check(format!("join:{ip}"), 5, Duration::from_secs(60))
{
return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
"Zu viele Anfragen. Bitte warte kurz und versuche es erneut.".into(),
None,
));
// Coarse per-IP flood ceiling. `/join` is pre-auth so there is no user to key on, and
// at a venue EVERY guest arrives from one public IP — a tight per-IP bucket meant the
// 6th person through the door was turned away by the 5 ahead of them. So the per-IP
// limit here only bounds raw volume; the real anti-spam bucket is per-name below.
// Cheap enough to run before validation, which keeps a flood of malformed bodies from
// being free.
if rate_limits_on && join_rate_on {
let ip_ceiling = config::get_usize(&state.config_cache, "join_ip_rate_per_min", 60).await;
if let Err(retry_after_secs) = state.rate_limiter.check_with_retry(
format!("join_ip:{ip}"),
ip_ceiling,
Duration::from_secs(60),
) {
return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
"Zu viele Anfragen. Bitte warte kurz und versuche es erneut.".into(),
Some(retry_after_secs),
));
}
}
let display_name = body.display_name.trim();
@@ -66,6 +77,23 @@ pub async fn join(
));
}
// Per-guest bucket, keyed like the `recover:{ip}:{name}` limiter below. This carries
// the original 5/60s anti-spam intent, but one guest retrying can no longer consume
// the allowance of everyone else sharing the venue's NAT.
if rate_limits_on && join_rate_on {
let name_key = display_name.to_lowercase();
if let Err(retry_after_secs) = state.rate_limiter.check_with_retry(
format!("join:{ip}:{name_key}"),
5,
Duration::from_secs(60),
) {
return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
"Zu viele Anfragen. Bitte warte kurz und versuche es erneut.".into(),
Some(retry_after_secs),
));
}
}
let event = Event::find_or_create(
&state.pool,
&state.config.event_slug,
@@ -149,6 +177,7 @@ fn dummy_pin_hash() -> &'static str {
pub async fn recover(
State(state): State<AppState>,
ConnectInfo(peer): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
headers: HeaderMap,
Json(body): Json<RecoverRequest>,
) -> Result<Json<RecoverResponse>, AppError> {
@@ -159,19 +188,19 @@ pub async fn recover(
// burn through 3 wrong PINs and lock the victim for 15 minutes — repeated
// every 15 minutes, indefinitely. 5 attempts per 15 minutes per (IP, name)
// softens that into a real cost.
let ip = client_ip(&headers, "unknown");
let ip = client_ip(&headers, &peer.ip().to_string());
let rate_limits_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "rate_limits_enabled", true).await;
let recover_rate_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "recover_rate_enabled", true).await;
if rate_limits_on && recover_rate_on {
let name_key = display_name.to_lowercase();
if !state.rate_limiter.check(
if let Err(retry_after_secs) = state.rate_limiter.check_with_retry(
format!("recover:{ip}:{name_key}"),
5,
Duration::from_secs(15 * 60),
) {
return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
"Zu viele Versuche. Bitte warte kurz und versuche es erneut.".into(),
None,
Some(retry_after_secs),
));
}
}
@@ -200,9 +229,12 @@ pub async fn recover(
// is effectively permanently fragile.
if let Some(locked_until) = user.pin_locked_until {
if Utc::now() < locked_until {
// The exact deadline is known, so surface it as Retry-After instead of
// making the client guess at the "15 Minuten" in the copy.
let retry_after_secs = (locked_until - Utc::now()).num_seconds().max(1) as u64;
return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
"Zu viele Versuche. Bitte warte 15 Minuten.".into(),
None,
Some(retry_after_secs),
));
}
// Lockout window expired — wipe the counter and the timestamp.
@@ -274,6 +306,7 @@ pub struct AdminLoginResponse {
pub async fn admin_login(
State(state): State<AppState>,
ConnectInfo(peer): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
headers: HeaderMap,
Json(body): Json<AdminLoginRequest>,
) -> Result<Json<AdminLoginResponse>, AppError> {
@@ -287,19 +320,23 @@ pub async fn admin_login(
// verify) but with no IP-level limit a determined attacker can still mount
// a long-running guess campaign. 5 attempts / minute / IP is plenty for
// honest typos.
let ip = client_ip(&headers, "unknown");
let ip = client_ip(&headers, &peer.ip().to_string());
let rate_limits_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "rate_limits_enabled", true).await;
let admin_rate_on =
config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "admin_login_rate_enabled", true).await;
// Stays keyed by IP on purpose: this guards a single shared credential, so a per-user
// or per-name key would just hand an attacker a fresh bucket per guess.
if rate_limits_on
&& admin_rate_on
&& !state
.rate_limiter
.check(format!("admin_login:{ip}"), 5, Duration::from_secs(60))
&& let Err(retry_after_secs) = state.rate_limiter.check_with_retry(
format!("admin_login:{ip}"),
5,
Duration::from_secs(60),
)
{
return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
"Zu viele Anmeldeversuche. Bitte warte kurz und versuche es erneut.".into(),
None,
Some(retry_after_secs),
));
}
@@ -390,22 +427,23 @@ pub struct PinResetRequestBody {
/// feed already exposes.
pub async fn request_pin_reset(
State(state): State<AppState>,
ConnectInfo(peer): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
headers: HeaderMap,
Json(body): Json<PinResetRequestBody>,
) -> Result<StatusCode, AppError> {
let display_name = body.display_name.trim();
let ip = client_ip(&headers, "unknown");
let ip = client_ip(&headers, &peer.ip().to_string());
let rate_limits_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "rate_limits_enabled", true).await;
if rate_limits_on {
let name_key = display_name.to_lowercase();
if !state.rate_limiter.check(
if let Err(retry_after_secs) = state.rate_limiter.check_with_retry(
format!("pin_reset_req:{ip}:{name_key}"),
3,
Duration::from_secs(15 * 60),
) {
return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
"Zu viele Anfragen. Bitte warte kurz und versuche es erneut.".into(),
None,
Some(retry_after_secs),
));
}
}

43
backend/src/handlers/admin.rs
View File

@@ -3,13 +3,13 @@ use std::time::Duration;
use axum::Json;
use axum::extract::{Query, State};
use axum::http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode};
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::auth::middleware::RequireAdmin;
use crate::error::AppError;
use crate::services::config;
use crate::services::rate_limiter::client_ip;
use crate::state::AppState;
// ── DTOs ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -120,6 +120,10 @@ pub async fn patch_config(
("upload_rate_per_hour", true, 1.0, 100_000.0),
("feed_rate_per_min", true, 1.0, 100_000.0),
("export_rate_per_day", true, 1.0, 100_000.0),
// Loose per-IP ceiling on /join. The real anti-spam bucket is per (ip, name); this
// only bounds raw volume from one source, so it must stay well above the size of a
// party arriving at once (see migration 017).
("join_ip_rate_per_min", true, 1.0, 100_000.0),
("quota_tolerance", false, 0.0, 1.0),
("estimated_guest_count", true, 1.0, 1_000_000.0),
];
@@ -320,25 +324,26 @@ pub async fn export_ticket(
}
/// Validate a download ticket (single-use) and confirm its session still exists.
async fn authenticate_download_ticket(state: &AppState, ticket: &str) -> Result<(), AppError> {
/// Resolve a single-use download ticket to the user who minted it. The caller needs the
/// id to key the export rate limit per-user (see `enforce_export_rate`).
async fn authenticate_download_ticket(state: &AppState, ticket: &str) -> Result<Uuid, AppError> {
let token_hash = state
.sse_tickets
.consume(ticket)
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Ticket ungültig oder abgelaufen.".into()))?;
crate::models::session::Session::find_by_token_hash(&state.pool, &token_hash)
let session = crate::models::session::Session::find_by_token_hash(&state.pool, &token_hash)
.await
.map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))?
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Sitzung nicht gefunden.".into()))?;
Ok(())
Ok(session.user_id)
}
pub async fn download_zip(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Query(q): Query<DownloadQuery>,
headers: HeaderMap,
) -> Result<axum::response::Response, AppError> {
authenticate_download_ticket(&state, &q.ticket).await?;
enforce_export_rate(&state, &headers).await?;
let user_id = authenticate_download_ticket(&state, &q.ticket).await?;
enforce_export_rate(&state, user_id).await?;
let path =
resolve_export_file(&state, "zip", "Der ZIP-Export ist noch nicht verfügbar.").await?;
@@ -389,10 +394,9 @@ async fn resolve_export_file(
pub async fn download_html(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Query(q): Query<DownloadQuery>,
headers: HeaderMap,
) -> Result<axum::response::Response, AppError> {
authenticate_download_ticket(&state, &q.ticket).await?;
enforce_export_rate(&state, &headers).await?;
let user_id = authenticate_download_ticket(&state, &q.ticket).await?;
enforce_export_rate(&state, user_id).await?;
let path =
resolve_export_file(&state, "html", "Der HTML-Export ist noch nicht verfügbar.").await?;
@@ -476,21 +480,24 @@ pub async fn export_status(
/// Centralised guard for the export rate limit. Same pattern as upload/feed: master
/// switch + per-endpoint switch + numeric value, all stored in `config` and read on
/// each request.
async fn enforce_export_rate(state: &AppState, headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<(), AppError> {
async fn enforce_export_rate(state: &AppState, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<(), AppError> {
let rate_limits_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "rate_limits_enabled", true).await;
let export_rate_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "export_rate_enabled", true).await;
if !(rate_limits_on && export_rate_on) {
return Ok(());
}
let ip = client_ip(headers, "unknown");
let limit = config::get_usize(&state.config_cache, "export_rate_per_day", 3).await;
if !state
.rate_limiter
.check(format!("export:{ip}"), limit, Duration::from_secs(86400))
{
// Keyed per-user. This was the worst of the IP-keyed limiters: 3 downloads per DAY
// shared across every guest behind the venue's public IP, so the fourth person to
// fetch their keepsake was locked out until the next day.
if let Err(retry_after_secs) = state.rate_limiter.check_with_retry(
format!("export:{user_id}"),
limit,
Duration::from_secs(86400),
) {
return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
"Zu viele Anfragen. Bitte warte kurz und versuche es erneut.".into(),
None,
Some(retry_after_secs),
));
}
Ok(())

22
backend/src/handlers/feed.rs
View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ use std::time::Duration;
use axum::Json;
use axum::extract::{Query, State};
use axum::http::HeaderMap;
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use uuid::Uuid;
@@ -10,7 +9,6 @@ use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::auth::middleware::AuthUser;
use crate::error::AppError;
use crate::services::config;
use crate::services::rate_limiter::client_ip;
use crate::state::AppState;
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -61,21 +59,23 @@ struct FeedRow {
pub async fn feed(
State(state): State<AppState>,
auth: AuthUser,
headers: HeaderMap,
Query(q): Query<FeedQuery>,
) -> Result<Json<FeedResponse>, AppError> {
let ip = client_ip(&headers, "unknown");
let rate_limits_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "rate_limits_enabled", true).await;
let feed_rate_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "feed_rate_enabled", true).await;
if rate_limits_on && feed_rate_on {
let rate_limit = config::get_usize(&state.config_cache, "feed_rate_per_min", 60).await;
if !state
.rate_limiter
.check(format!("feed:{ip}"), rate_limit, Duration::from_secs(60))
{
// Keyed per-user, exactly like `feed_delta` below: at a venue every guest shares
// one public IP, so an IP key gave the whole party a single 60/min bucket and the
// fastest scroller starved everyone else.
if let Err(retry_after_secs) = state.rate_limiter.check_with_retry(
format!("feed:{}", auth.user_id),
rate_limit,
Duration::from_secs(60),
) {
return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
"Zu viele Anfragen. Bitte warte kurz und versuche es erneut.".into(),
None,
Some(retry_after_secs),
));
}
}
@@ -225,14 +225,14 @@ pub async fn feed_delta(
let feed_rate_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "feed_rate_enabled", true).await;
if rate_limits_on && feed_rate_on {
let rate_limit = config::get_usize(&state.config_cache, "feed_rate_per_min", 60).await;
if !state.rate_limiter.check(
if let Err(retry_after_secs) = state.rate_limiter.check_with_retry(
format!("feed_delta:{}", auth.user_id),
rate_limit,
Duration::from_secs(60),
) {
return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
"Zu viele Anfragen. Bitte warte kurz und versuche es erneut.".into(),
None,
Some(retry_after_secs),
));
}
}

24
backend/src/handlers/test_admin.rs
View File

@@ -13,9 +13,10 @@ use crate::auth::middleware::RequireAdmin;
use crate::error::AppError;
use crate::state::AppState;
/// Truncates every event-scoped table, wipes media on disk, and reseeds the
/// `config` table from migration defaults. Requires an admin JWT — even with
/// `EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1` it cannot be hit anonymously.
/// Truncates every event-scoped table, wipes media on disk, and reseeds the `config`
/// table: numeric values from the migration defaults, but every feature toggle forced
/// OFF (production seeds them ON — see the note at the reseed below). Requires an admin
/// JWT — even with `EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1` it cannot be hit anonymously.
pub async fn truncate_all(
State(state): State<AppState>,
RequireAdmin(_auth): RequireAdmin,
@@ -40,8 +41,19 @@ pub async fn truncate_all(
.execute(&state.pool)
.await?;
// Reseed config — mirrors migrations 005, 009 and 015. Kept in sync by hand
// because pulling SQL out of the migration files at runtime is fragile.
// Reseed config. The NUMERIC values mirror migrations 005/015/016; the BOOLEAN
// toggles deliberately do NOT — migration 009 seeds every one of them `true`
// (production), and this forces them `false` so the suite isn't fighting rate limits
// and quotas it isn't testing.
//
// Be aware of what that costs: this runs as an auto-fixture before EVERY test, so no
// test starts from production's config unless it explicitly turns a toggle back on
// (02-upload/rate-limit, 07-adversarial/ddos, 01-auth/rate-limit-nat, …). That blind
// spot is exactly why an entire class of per-IP limiter bugs went unnoticed: the
// limiters were simply off. When adding a limiter or quota, add a spec that enables it.
//
// Kept in sync by hand because pulling SQL out of the migration files at runtime is
// fragile — if you add a config key in a migration, add it here too.
sqlx::query(
r#"INSERT INTO config (key, value) VALUES
('max_image_size_mb', '20'),
@@ -49,6 +61,7 @@ pub async fn truncate_all(
('upload_rate_per_hour', '100'),
('feed_rate_per_min', '60'),
('export_rate_per_day', '3'),
('join_ip_rate_per_min', '60'),
('quota_tolerance', '0.75'),
('estimated_guest_count', '100'),
('compression_concurrency', '2'),
@@ -57,6 +70,7 @@ pub async fn truncate_all(
('feed_rate_enabled', 'false'),
('export_rate_enabled', 'false'),
('join_rate_enabled', 'false'),
('admin_login_rate_enabled', 'false'),
('quota_enabled', 'false'),
('storage_quota_enabled', 'false'),
('upload_count_quota_enabled', 'false'),

67
backend/src/main.rs
View File

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ use anyhow::Result;
use axum::Router;
use axum::extract::DefaultBodyLimit;
use axum::routing::{delete, get, patch, post};
use tower_http::services::ServeDir;
use tower_http::trace::TraceLayer;
use tracing_subscriber::{layer::SubscriberExt, util::SubscriberInitExt};
@@ -45,10 +44,12 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
let state = AppState::new(pool.clone(), config.clone());
// Backfill the big-screen display derivative for image uploads processed before it
// existed (v0.17.x). Fire-and-forget behind the compression semaphore; each upload
// falls back to its original in the diashow until its display is generated.
state.compression.backfill_missing_display().await;
// Regenerate image derivatives an older pipeline produced: the big-screen display for
// uploads processed before it existed (v0.17.x), and anything predating the current
// DERIVATIVES_REV (rev 1 applies the EXIF orientation, without which every portrait
// phone photo is stored sideways). Fire-and-forget behind the compression semaphore;
// originals are never touched, so a failure just retries on the next start.
state.compression.backfill_stale_derivatives().await;
// Re-spawn exports for events that were released but whose keepsake never finished
// (crash mid-export). Needs the media/export paths + SSE sender, so it runs here
@@ -229,45 +230,39 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
api
};
// Serve media files from disk
let media_service = ServeDir::new(&config.media_path);
// NOTE: media is deliberately NOT served over HTTP.
//
// Files live under `media_path` so the compression worker and the export job can read
// them off disk, but nothing may pull them straight from `/media/**` — that bypasses
// the visibility checks (soft-delete + ban-hide) that make a host takedown stick.
// Every legitimate fetch goes through `/api/v1/upload/{id}/{original,preview,display,
// thumbnail}`, which filter via `find_visible_media`; those are the only media URLs the
// backend ever emits (see `handlers::feed`).
//
// This used to be a `ServeDir` on `/media` with four `nest_service` blockers on the
// subtrees above it. That was bypassable: axum routes on the RAW path while `ServeDir`
// percent-decodes afterwards, so `/media/%70reviews/{id}.jpg` missed every blocker,
// fell through to the `ServeDir`, and was decoded back to `previews/` on disk — serving
// a taken-down photo to anyone, unauthenticated. Any single escaped byte worked, in all
// four subtrees. Deleting the route removes the vector outright rather than racing the
// decoder; `/media/**` now 404s regardless of encoding.
let router = Router::new()
.route("/health", get(|| async { "ok" }))
.merge(api)
// Block direct HTTP access to ALL media subtrees. The files live under
// `media_path` (so the compression worker and export can read them off disk) but
// must NOT be pullable straight from `/media/**` — that bypasses the visibility
// checks (soft-delete + ban-hide) in the gated handlers. Every legitimate fetch
// goes through `/api/v1/upload/{id}/{original,preview,thumbnail}`, which filter
// via `find_visible_media`. The more specific nests take precedence over the
// `/media` ServeDir below (which, with all three subtrees blocked, now serves
// nothing — kept as a backstop).
.nest_service(
"/media/originals",
get(|| async { axum::http::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND }),
)
.nest_service(
"/media/previews",
get(|| async { axum::http::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND }),
)
.nest_service(
"/media/displays",
get(|| async { axum::http::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND }),
)
.nest_service(
"/media/thumbnails",
get(|| async { axum::http::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND }),
)
.nest_service("/media", media_service)
.layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http())
.with_state(state);
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(("0.0.0.0", config.app_port)).await?;
tracing::info!("listening on {}", listener.local_addr()?);
axum::serve(listener, router)
.with_graceful_shutdown(shutdown_signal())
.await?;
// `into_make_service_with_connect_info` is required by the pre-auth handlers, which
// extract `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` to use the peer address as the rate-limit key when
// X-Forwarded-For is absent. Without it those extractors fail at runtime.
axum::serve(
listener,
router.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>(),
)
.with_graceful_shutdown(shutdown_signal())
.await?;
Ok(())
}

15
backend/src/models/upload.rs
View File

@@ -148,6 +148,21 @@ impl Upload {
Ok(())
}
/// Stamp which revision of the derivative pipeline produced this row's preview/display,
/// so the startup backfill can find rows generated by an older one exactly once.
pub async fn set_derivatives_rev(
pool: &PgPool,
id: Uuid,
rev: i16,
) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
sqlx::query("UPDATE upload SET derivatives_rev = $2 WHERE id = $1")
.bind(id)
.bind(rev)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
pub async fn set_thumbnail_path(
pool: &PgPool,
id: Uuid,

145
backend/src/services/compression.rs
View File

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use image::ImageDecoder;
use sqlx::PgPool;
use tokio::sync::{Semaphore, broadcast};
use uuid::Uuid;
@@ -48,6 +49,16 @@ impl CompressionWorker {
self.generation.fetch_add(1, Ordering::SeqCst);
}
/// How many times `do_process` is attempted before an upload is given up on. The
/// give-up path is user-visible (the photo disappears), so transient infrastructure
/// errors must not reach it.
const MAX_PROCESS_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 3;
/// Revision of the image-derivative pipeline. Bump this whenever a change makes existing
/// previews/displays wrong, so `backfill_stale_derivatives` regenerates them once on the
/// next start. Rev 1 = EXIF orientation is applied.
const DERIVATIVES_REV: i16 = 1;
/// Spawn a background task to process an uploaded file.
pub fn process(&self, upload_id: Uuid, original_path: String, mime_type: String) {
let worker = self.clone();
@@ -60,10 +71,35 @@ impl CompressionWorker {
if worker.generation.load(Ordering::SeqCst) != born_at {
return;
}
match worker
.do_process(upload_id, &original_path, &mime_type)
.await
{
// Retry before giving up. Most failures here are transient and self-clearing —
// an ENOSPC spike while several guests upload at once, a momentary DB-pool
// exhaustion, a panic inside the image codec — and the give-up path is
// user-visible data loss, so it is worth a few seconds to avoid entering it.
let mut attempt = 1u32;
let outcome = loop {
match worker
.do_process(upload_id, &original_path, &mime_type)
.await
{
Ok(v) => break Ok(v),
Err(e) if attempt < Self::MAX_PROCESS_ATTEMPTS => {
tracing::warn!(
error = ?e, %upload_id, attempt,
"compression attempt failed; retrying"
);
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2u64.pow(attempt)))
.await;
attempt += 1;
// The data may have been reset while we slept (e2e TRUNCATE).
if worker.generation.load(Ordering::SeqCst) != born_at {
return;
}
}
Err(e) => break Err(e),
}
};
match outcome {
Ok(_) => {
tracing::info!("compression completed for upload {upload_id}");
let _ = worker.sse_tx.send(SseEvent {
@@ -72,21 +108,31 @@ impl CompressionWorker {
});
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!("compression failed for upload {upload_id}: {e:#}");
// Auto-cleanup: a failed transcode would otherwise leave a
// permanently broken feed card, silently charge the uploader's
// quota, and orphan the original on disk. Refund + soft-delete
// (one tx, so v_feed excludes it), remove the orphan file, then
// tell the uploader (upload-error toast) and evict the card
// everywhere (upload-deleted, already handled by the feed).
tracing::error!(
"compression failed for upload {upload_id} after {attempt} attempt(s): {e:#}"
);
// Refund + soft-delete (one tx, so v_feed excludes it) so a failed
// transcode doesn't leave a permanently broken feed card or silently
// charge the uploader's quota. Then tell the uploader (upload-error
// toast) and evict the card everywhere (upload-deleted).
//
// The ORIGINAL IS DELIBERATELY KEPT. This path used to `remove_file` it
// unconditionally, which meant any transient error — a disk-full blip
// while saving a derivative, a pool hiccup, a panic in the image codec —
// irreversibly destroyed the guest's only copy of a photo they can never
// retake. The row is only soft-deleted, so keeping the bytes makes the
// upload fully recoverable; the file is orphaned rather than lost, and
// the path is logged so it can be found. `backfill_stale_derivatives`
// already refuses to destroy data on error for exactly this reason.
let _ = Upload::set_compression_status(&worker.pool, upload_id, "failed").await;
if let Err(del) = Upload::soft_delete(&worker.pool, upload_id).await {
tracing::warn!(error = ?del, %upload_id, "failed to soft-delete after compression failure");
}
let orphan = worker.media_path.join(&original_path);
if let Err(rm) = tokio::fs::remove_file(&orphan).await {
tracing::warn!(error = ?rm, path = %orphan.display(), "failed to remove orphaned original");
}
tracing::warn!(
%upload_id,
path = %worker.media_path.join(&original_path).display(),
"original retained for recovery after compression failure"
);
let _ = worker.sse_tx.send(SseEvent {
event_type: "upload-error".to_string(),
data: serde_json::json!({ "upload_id": upload_id, "error": e.to_string() })
@@ -117,6 +163,7 @@ impl CompressionWorker {
.await?;
Upload::set_preview_path(&self.pool, upload_id, &preview_rel).await?;
Upload::set_display_path(&self.pool, upload_id, &display_rel).await?;
Upload::set_derivatives_rev(&self.pool, upload_id, Self::DERIVATIVES_REV).await?;
tracing::info!("preview + display generated for upload {upload_id}");
} else if mime_type.starts_with("video/") {
let thumb_rel = self.generate_video_thumbnail(upload_id, &original).await?;
@@ -172,7 +219,24 @@ impl CompressionWorker {
limits.max_image_height = Some(12_000);
limits.max_alloc = Some(256 * 1024 * 1024);
reader.limits(limits);
let img = reader.decode().context("failed to decode image")?;
// Apply the EXIF orientation. Phones do not rotate the sensor data — they record
// the physical camera orientation in a tag and store the pixels as shot. `decode()`
// hands back those raw pixels, and the JPEG re-encode below writes no EXIF at all,
// so skipping this stores EVERY portrait photo sideways in the feed preview, the
// 2048px diashow display and the keepsake — while the untouched original still
// renders upright, which is why it looks like a viewer bug rather than a pipeline
// one. `into_decoder` carries the limits set above through to the decoder, so the
// decompression-bomb guard is unaffected.
let mut decoder = reader.into_decoder().context("failed to decode image")?;
// A missing or malformed tag is not a failure: most images simply have none.
let orientation = decoder
.orientation()
.unwrap_or(image::metadata::Orientation::NoTransforms);
let mut img =
image::DynamicImage::from_decoder(decoder).context("failed to decode image")?;
img.apply_orientation(orientation);
let img = img;
// Preview: max 800px, preserving aspect ratio (data-saver feed).
img.resize(
@@ -221,33 +285,41 @@ impl CompressionWorker {
))
}
/// One-time backfill: existing image uploads processed before the display derivative
/// existed have a preview but no `display_path`. Regenerate both derivatives for them
/// (decode is cheap and idempotent) and set the path. Unlike the failure path in
/// `process`, a backfill error is logged and skipped — it must NEVER soft-delete an
/// upload that already has a working preview. Fire-and-forget from startup.
pub async fn backfill_missing_display(&self) {
/// Regenerate image derivatives that an older pipeline produced. Fire-and-forget from
/// startup; picks up two cases, both of which leave the ORIGINAL untouched:
///
/// - uploads processed before the `display` derivative existed (preview but no
/// `display_path`), and
/// - uploads whose derivatives predate `DERIVATIVES_REV` — currently rev 1, which applies
/// the EXIF orientation. Everything generated before it is stored sideways for any
/// portrait phone photo.
///
/// Unlike the failure path in `process`, a backfill error is logged and skipped — it must
/// NEVER destroy or soft-delete an upload that already has a working preview.
pub async fn backfill_stale_derivatives(&self) {
let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, (Uuid, String, String)>(
"SELECT id, original_path, mime_type FROM upload
WHERE display_path IS NULL AND preview_path IS NOT NULL
AND deleted_at IS NULL AND mime_type LIKE 'image/%'",
WHERE deleted_at IS NULL AND mime_type LIKE 'image/%'
AND original_path IS NOT NULL
AND (
(display_path IS NULL AND preview_path IS NOT NULL)
OR derivatives_rev < $1
)",
)
.bind(Self::DERIVATIVES_REV)
.fetch_all(&self.pool)
.await;
let rows = match rows {
Ok(r) => r,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "display backfill query failed");
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "derivative backfill query failed");
return;
}
};
if rows.is_empty() {
return;
}
tracing::info!(
"backfilling display derivative for {} upload(s)",
rows.len()
);
tracing::info!("regenerating derivatives for {} upload(s)", rows.len());
for (id, original_path, mime_type) in rows {
let worker = self.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -260,12 +332,19 @@ impl CompressionWorker {
Ok((preview_rel, display_rel)) => {
let _ = Upload::set_preview_path(&worker.pool, id, &preview_rel).await;
let _ = Upload::set_display_path(&worker.pool, id, &display_rel).await;
tracing::info!("display backfilled for upload {id}");
let _ = Upload::set_derivatives_rev(
&worker.pool,
id,
Self::DERIVATIVES_REV,
)
.await;
tracing::info!("derivatives regenerated for upload {id}");
}
Err(e) => {
// Leave the existing preview intact; the diashow falls back to the
// original for this upload until a later successful pass.
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, %id, "display backfill failed; leaving as-is");
// Leave the existing derivatives and the original intact; this row is
// simply retried on the next start. The rev stays behind, which is the
// marker that it still needs doing.
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, %id, "derivative backfill failed; leaving as-is");
}
}
});

59
backend/src/services/rate_limiter.rs
View File

@@ -17,13 +17,14 @@ impl RateLimiter {
}
}
/// Returns `true` if the request is allowed, `false` if rate-limited.
pub fn check(&self, key: impl Into<String>, max: usize, window: Duration) -> bool {
self.check_with_retry(key, max, window).is_ok()
}
/// Returns `Ok(())` if allowed, `Err(retry_after_secs)` if rate-limited.
/// `retry_after_secs` is how long until the oldest slot in the window expires.
///
/// This is deliberately the ONLY entry point. There used to be a `check()` wrapper
/// returning a plain bool, and 7 of the 8 call sites used it and then hard-coded
/// `None` for the response's `Retry-After` — so a throttled client was told to back
/// off but never for how long. Forcing every caller through the `Result` makes the
/// retry delay impossible to discard by accident.
pub fn check_with_retry(
&self,
key: impl Into<String>,
@@ -84,6 +85,11 @@ impl RateLimiter {
/// appends is the real client. A client can prepend arbitrary spoofed values to
/// the left of XFF to dodge throttles — those are ignored here. This assumes
/// exactly one trusted proxy (Caddy); revisit if that changes.
///
/// Pass the peer address as `fallback`, never a constant. Every caller used to pass
/// the literal `"unknown"`, so any request that arrived without XFF — i.e. anything
/// reaching the app directly rather than through Caddy — shared ONE bucket with every
/// other such request, turning the limiter into a self-inflicted global throttle.
pub fn client_ip(headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap, fallback: &str) -> String {
headers
.get("x-forwarded-for")
@@ -104,29 +110,35 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn allows_up_to_max_then_blocks() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check("k", 3, MIN));
assert!(rl.check("k", 3, MIN));
assert!(rl.check("k", 3, MIN));
assert!(!rl.check("k", 3, MIN), "the 4th request must be blocked");
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 3, MIN).is_ok());
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 3, MIN).is_ok());
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 3, MIN).is_ok());
assert!(
rl.check_with_retry("k", 3, MIN).is_err(),
"the 4th request must be blocked"
);
}
#[test]
fn keys_are_independent() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check("a", 1, MIN));
assert!(!rl.check("a", 1, MIN));
assert!(rl.check("b", 1, MIN), "a different key has its own window");
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("a", 1, MIN).is_ok());
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("a", 1, MIN).is_err());
assert!(
rl.check_with_retry("b", 1, MIN).is_ok(),
"a different key has its own window"
);
}
#[test]
fn window_slides_and_allows_again_after_expiry() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
let w = Duration::from_millis(40);
assert!(rl.check("k", 1, w));
assert!(!rl.check("k", 1, w));
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).is_ok());
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).is_err());
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(55));
assert!(
rl.check("k", 1, w),
rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).is_ok(),
"the slot should expire once the window passes"
);
}
@@ -191,10 +203,13 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn clear_resets_every_window() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check("k", 1, MIN));
assert!(!rl.check("k", 1, MIN));
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_ok());
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_err());
rl.clear();
assert!(rl.check("k", 1, MIN), "clear() must free the window");
assert!(
rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_ok(),
"clear() must free the window"
);
}
/// `prune()` is a memory-leak guard: without it a long-lived process keeps one HashMap
@@ -216,7 +231,7 @@ mod tests {
.insert("stale".to_string(), vec![ancient]);
// ...alongside a key that is still inside its window.
assert!(rl.check("live", 5, MIN));
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("live", 5, MIN).is_ok());
assert_eq!(rl.windows.lock().unwrap().len(), 2);
rl.prune();
@@ -239,13 +254,13 @@ mod tests {
// prune() dropped live keys, every background sweep would hand attackers a fresh
// budget.
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check("k", 1, MIN));
assert!(!rl.check("k", 1, MIN));
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_ok());
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_err());
rl.prune();
assert!(
!rl.check("k", 1, MIN),
rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_err(),
"prune() must not clear a window that is still active"
);
}