fix: close the nine ways an unattended event loses photos or dies

Every one of these was found in the pre-event audit, verified against source, and
survives to production on the current main. Grouped by what actually goes wrong.

PHOTOS DISAPPEAR

* compression.rs no longer soft-deletes on a failed derivative. The guest got a
  201, watched the card appear, then watched it vanish — the row left v_feed,
  find_visible_media and BOTH keepsakes, while its bytes sat on disk for 14 days
  waiting for a cleanup nothing announced. No screen anywhere lists compression
  failures, so recovery meant hand-written SQL that also had to re-add the
  refunded quota. Now it does exactly what the ENOSPC arm beside it already did
  and documented as correct: keep the row, serve the original, retry on the next
  boot (bounded by derivative_attempts). `upload-deleted` is no longer emitted;
  `upload-processed` is, so the card re-renders instead of sitting on a
  placeholder.

* A 413 is now a reversible lock, so the blob survives. The quota moves — free
  disk falls, uploader count rises — so a guest goes over it having done nothing,
  and treating that as permanent meant a 400 MB video was pushed across cellular
  in full and THEN deleted from IndexedDB. Gone on both sides, and unrecoverable
  for an in-app camera capture that exists nowhere else.

* quota_limit_bytes gained a floor and a stable divisor. The ceiling used to
  decrease monotonically all evening; it now settles at max(uploaders,
  estimated_guest_count) — a config key that was seeded, validated in the admin
  whitelist, and read by no code at all. The floor is clamped to what the disk
  can actually back, so a full volume still yields zero rather than handing out
  an allowance it cannot honour.

* Because that floor gives up the aggregate guarantee the formula used to imply,
  uploads now check a hard 10 GB reserve first, independent of every quota
  toggle. postgres_data, media_data and exports_data share one filesystem: the
  end state was not a degraded feature, it was Postgres unable to write WAL.

THE ARCHIVE DISAPPEARS

* prune_superseded_archives runs only after the new generation lands. It ran
  before the preflight, reasoning the old archive was already unreachable — true
  of reachability, false of recoverability. An epoch is a value that can be
  rolled back; deleted bytes cannot. Any failed rebuild left the event with NO
  keepsake at all.

* The export preflight reserves the same 10 GB. `free < needed` authorised an
  export sized at exactly free, which ran for half an hour and landed the box at
  zero with the keepsake still unfinished.

THE APP DIES

* The feed reconcile re-reads the id set after its awaits instead of reusing one
  captured up to three round-trips earlier. The new-upload SSE handler prepends
  during exactly that window, so the row was both already present and absent from
  the stale set — prepended twice, and a duplicate key in a keyed {#each} throws
  in production, not just dev. The SSE handler and loadMore now dedupe too.

* Added routes/+error.svelte. Without it any uncaught error fell through to
  SvelteKit's unstyled English 500 with no reload control — inside a chromeless
  standalone PWA with no URL bar, for the rest of the evening.

THE OPERATOR IS LOCKED OUT

* admin_login verifies the password BEFORE charging the rate bucket, and a
  correct password is never throttled. The old order made this a denial of
  service against its own operator: every guest shares one NAT IP, the check ran
  first, so five requests a minute from any phone in the room kept the bucket
  full — and the escape hatch needed the admin session being blocked. A generous
  separate ceiling still bounds bcrypt CPU.

THE PROJECTOR DIES

* The preload budget is now strictly inside the dwell. At the 3s option the 4s
  budget could never land a commit on a slow uplink, so the wall froze on one
  photo while the queue drained silently behind it.

* The wake lock retries every 30s while visible, and the page says so on screen
  when the browser has no wake lock API. visibilitychange was the only retry
  trigger and a kiosk never changes visibility, so one refusal — iOS in Low Power
  Mode, say — was permanent.

* Caddy: /api/v1/upload/*/display joins the cacheable carve-out. The backend set
  max-age=300 on it and the blanket no-store silently replaced it, so a projector
  re-fetched a full-size JPEG per slide, ~2-4 GB over an evening on the uplink
  the guests are uploading over.

Also removes Upload::soft_delete, now unreferenced and an unscoped footgun next
to soft_delete_in_event.

Verified: 146/146 backend tests against a live Postgres, clippy clean, 51/51
vitest, svelte-check 0 errors, eslint clean, vite build, caddy validate, compose
YAML parse.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

backend/src/auth/handlers.rs

@@ -409,6 +409,14 @@ pub struct AdminLoginResponse {
     pub display_name: String,
 }
 
+/// Requests per minute per IP that may reach `verify_password` at all.
+///
+/// Not a security control — the failure bucket below is. This exists solely so an unauthenticated
+/// endpoint cannot burn the box's CPU on cost-12 bcrypt (~250 ms each) at line rate. Set far above
+/// anything a person typing a password can produce, because on venue NAT every guest shares the
+/// operator's IP and this ceiling, unlike the failure bucket, can still refuse a correct password.
+const ADMIN_LOGIN_CPU_CEILING: usize = 120;
+
 pub async fn admin_login(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     ConnectInfo(peer): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
@@ -421,21 +429,29 @@ pub async fn admin_login(
         ));
     }
 
-    // Throttle password attempts. The admin password is bcrypt-hashed (slow to
-    // verify) but with no IP-level limit a determined attacker can still mount
-    // a long-running guess campaign. 5 attempts / minute / IP is plenty for
-    // honest typos.
+    // Throttling here is in two parts, and the ORDER is the whole point.
+    //
+    // A single tight IP-keyed bucket checked before the password was verified made this
+    // endpoint a denial-of-service against its own operator. Every guest at the venue shares
+    // one public IP behind NAT, `/admin/login` is a public linkable page, and the check ran
+    // BEFORE `verify_password` — so five requests a minute from any phone in the room kept the
+    // bucket permanently full and the admin, on that same IP, could never spend a slot.
+    // Successful logins consumed budget too, so a typo plus a retry on two devices did it by
+    // accident. And the escape hatch was circular: `admin_login_rate_enabled` can only be
+    // flipped through `PATCH /admin/config`, which needs the session being blocked.
     let ip = client_ip(&headers, &peer.ip().to_string());
     let rate_limits_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "rate_limits_enabled", true).await;
     let admin_rate_on =
         config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "admin_login_rate_enabled", true).await;
-    // Stays keyed by IP on purpose: this guards a single shared credential, so a per-user
-    // or per-name key would just hand an attacker a fresh bucket per guess.
+
+    // Part 1: a deliberately GENEROUS ceiling whose only job is to bound bcrypt CPU. Cost-12
+    // verification is ~250 ms of a core, so an unbounded endpoint is a CPU exhaustion vector
+    // regardless of whether anyone guesses right. No human typing a password reaches this.
     if rate_limits_on
         && admin_rate_on
         && let Err(retry_after_secs) = state.rate_limiter.check_with_retry(
-            format!("admin_login:{ip}"),
-            5,
+            format!("admin_login_cpu:{ip}"),
+            ADMIN_LOGIN_CPU_CEILING,
             Duration::from_secs(60),
         )
     {
@@ -452,6 +468,24 @@ pub async fn admin_login(
     .await;
 
     if !valid {
+        // Part 2: the tight bucket, charged ONLY on a wrong password. A correct password is
+        // never rate-limited, so no amount of guessing by anyone else can lock the operator
+        // out — which also dissolves the circular escape hatch above. Brute force is still
+        // bounded: every wrong guess costs a slot, and slots are per-IP.
+        if rate_limits_on
+            && admin_rate_on
+            && let Err(retry_after_secs) = state.rate_limiter.check_with_retry(
+                format!("admin_login_fail:{ip}"),
+                5,
+                Duration::from_secs(60),
+            )
+        {
+            tracing::warn!(ip = %ip, "admin_login: wrong password, failure bucket exhausted");
+            return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
+                "Zu viele Anmeldeversuche. Bitte warte kurz und versuche es erneut.".into(),
+                Some(retry_after_secs),
+            ));
+        }
         tracing::warn!(ip = %ip, "admin_login: wrong password");
         return Err(AppError::Unauthorized("Falsches Passwort.".into()));
     }

backend/src/handlers/upload.rs

@@ -443,6 +443,38 @@ pub async fn upload(
     // concurrent uploads from the same user (e.g. phone + laptop) both pass this stale
     // pre-check and both increment, blowing past the quota. The pre-check stays as a
     // fast path that avoids the disk write when the user is already clearly over.
+    // GLOBAL RESERVE, checked before the per-user ceiling and independent of every quota
+    // toggle. The per-user quota is a fairness mechanism, not a disk guarantee — and since it
+    // now carries a floor (MIN_QUOTA_LIMIT_BYTES) so a guest's allowance stops shrinking as
+    // the party fills up, the aggregate ceiling it used to imply is gone entirely. Something
+    // has to own "do not fill the volume", because `postgres_data`, `media_data` and
+    // `exports_data` share one filesystem: the end state is not a degraded feature, it is
+    // Postgres unable to write WAL and the whole event down with nobody watching.
+    //
+    // Deliberately NOT gated behind `quota_enabled`. That switch exists so an operator can
+    // stop rationing space between guests; it was never meant to authorise running the disk
+    // to zero, and an operator flipping it at 23:00 to unblock a guest should not silently
+    // disarm the last thing standing between the party and a dead database.
+    if let Some(free) = crate::services::disk::free_bytes(&state.config.media_path) {
+        let remaining = (free as i64).saturating_sub(size);
+        if remaining < DISK_RESERVE_BYTES {
+            tracing::error!(
+                free_bytes = free,
+                upload_size = size,
+                reserve = DISK_RESERVE_BYTES,
+                "refusing upload: it would take the media volume below the reserve"
+            );
+            return Err(AppError::QuotaExceeded(
+                "Der Speicher des Events ist voll. Bitte sag einem Host Bescheid — neue \
+                 Uploads sind vorübergehend nicht möglich."
+                    .into(),
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+    // Failing OPEN when the disk can't be read is deliberate and matches the per-user quota
+    // above: refusing every upload because a `statfs` failed would be a worse outage than the
+    // one being guarded against.
+
     let mut quota_limit: Option<i64> = None;
     if quota_on && storage_quota_on {
         let estimate = compute_storage_quota(&state).await;
@@ -956,11 +988,52 @@ pub struct QuotaEstimate {
     pub tolerance: f64,
 }
 
-/// Pure per-user quota formula: `floor((free_disk * tolerance) / max(active, 1))`.
+/// The smallest per-user ceiling this formula is ever allowed to produce.
+///
+/// Without a floor the quota is not a limit, it is a moving target: the numerator (free disk)
+/// only falls and the denominator (uploaders who have posted) only rises, so the ceiling
+/// decreases monotonically across the event. A guest comfortably under it at 20:00 is over it
+/// at 22:00 having done nothing, and because a delete refunds the quota but does not free the
+/// bytes for 24h, the remedy the error message names ("delete older posts") cannot move it
+/// back either.
+///
+/// 500 MB is chosen to clear `max_video_size_mb` (500, seeded in 005) — below that the ceiling
+/// could refuse a single legal video outright, which is the worst version of this: the guest
+/// pushes 500 MB across cellular and is rejected on arrival, every time, with no way to comply.
+///
+/// This deliberately trades the quota's disk guarantee for a usability floor. The disk is now
+/// bounded by the low-disk warning and the export preflight rather than by this formula alone —
+/// see the reserve check in `ensure_export_space`.
+const MIN_QUOTA_LIMIT_BYTES: i64 = 500 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+/// Free space on the media volume that uploads may never consume, whatever any quota says.
+///
+/// Matches the host dashboard's low-disk threshold (`handlers::host`), so the banner the host
+/// sees and the wall guests hit are the same number rather than two unrelated opinions. 10 GB
+/// is chosen to leave Postgres, its WAL and a rotation of container logs comfortable room on
+/// the shared filesystem long after new uploads have been refused.
+pub const DISK_RESERVE_BYTES: i64 = 10_000_000_000;
+
+/// Pure per-user quota formula: `max(floor((free_disk * tolerance) / divisor), MIN)`.
+///
+/// `divisor` is the LARGER of the observed uploader count and the operator's
+/// `estimated_guest_count`, so the ceiling settles at its final value early instead of sliding
+/// down all evening as guests arrive. (Before this, `estimated_guest_count` was seeded and
+/// validated in the admin whitelist but read by no code at all — an operator who set it
+/// expecting a stable divisor changed nothing.) It also blunts the abuse case, where the
+/// divisor was attacker-controlled: ~1000 throwaway accounts drove every real guest's ceiling
+/// to ~52 MB.
+///
 /// Extracted from `compute_storage_quota` so it's unit-testable without a DB or disk.
-fn quota_limit_bytes(free_disk: i64, tolerance: f64, active_uploaders: i64) -> i64 {
-    let active = active_uploaders.max(1);
-    ((free_disk as f64 * tolerance) / active as f64).floor() as i64
+fn quota_limit_bytes(free_disk: i64, tolerance: f64, active_uploaders: i64, expected: i64) -> i64 {
+    let divisor = active_uploaders.max(expected).max(1);
+    let budget = (free_disk as f64 * tolerance).max(0.0);
+    let computed = (budget / divisor as f64).floor() as i64;
+    // The floor may never exceed what the disk can actually back. Raising a ceiling the volume
+    // cannot honour would hand out an allowance on a full disk — turning the quota from a
+    // usability floor into a way to finish filling the filesystem that Postgres writes WAL to.
+    let backed_floor = MIN_QUOTA_LIMIT_BYTES.min(budget as i64);
+    computed.max(backed_floor)
 }
 
 /// Computes the per-user storage quota using
@@ -979,6 +1052,9 @@ pub async fn compute_storage_quota(state: &AppState) -> QuotaEstimate {
             .await
             .unwrap_or((0,));
     let active = active_count.max(1);
+    // The operator's expected headcount, used as a FLOOR on the divisor so the ceiling doesn't
+    // slide down as guests arrive — see `quota_limit_bytes`. Admin-editable at runtime.
+    let expected_guests = config::get_i64(&state.config_cache, "estimated_guest_count", 100).await;
 
     // Cached disk reading. `None` means we couldn't resolve the media filesystem.
     let disk = state.disk_cache.snapshot(&state.config.media_path);
@@ -986,7 +1062,12 @@ pub async fn compute_storage_quota(state: &AppState) -> QuotaEstimate {
 
     let limit_bytes = if quota_on && storage_quota_on {
         match disk {
-            Some(d) => Some(quota_limit_bytes(d.free as i64, tolerance, active)),
+            Some(d) => Some(quota_limit_bytes(
+                d.free as i64,
+                tolerance,
+                active,
+                expected_guests,
+            )),
             // Fail OPEN, not closed: if the disk can't be read we don't know the real
             // free space, and enforcing a 0-byte limit would reject every upload with a
             // spurious "quota reached". Skip enforcement this round and warn instead.
@@ -1289,7 +1370,7 @@ pub async fn get_thumbnail(
 
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
-    use super::{RangeSpec, parse_range, quota_limit_bytes};
+    use super::{MIN_QUOTA_LIMIT_BYTES, RangeSpec, parse_range, quota_limit_bytes};
 
     // `Range` handling exists because iOS Safari probes every `<video>` with
     // `Range: bytes=0-1` and abandons the load without a 206. These pin the forms a
@@ -1392,33 +1473,70 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(parse_range(None, 0), RangeSpec::Full);
     }
 
+    const GB: i64 = 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
+
     #[test]
     fn divides_free_space_by_uploaders_with_tolerance() {
-        // 1000 * 0.75 / 3 = 250
-        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(1000, 0.75, 3), 250);
+        // 100 GB * 0.75 / 3 uploaders, well above the floor so the formula shows through.
+        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(100 * GB, 0.75, 3, 1), 26_843_545_600);
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn floors_fractional_results() {
-        // 1000 * 0.75 / 7 = 107.14… → 107
-        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(1000, 0.75, 7), 107);
+        // 100 GB * 0.75 / 7 = 11_504_376_685.71… → truncated, not rounded.
+        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(100 * GB, 0.75, 7, 1), 11_504_376_685);
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn active_uploaders_below_one_is_clamped_to_one() {
+    fn divisor_below_one_is_clamped_to_one() {
         // Guards against divide-by-zero when no one has uploaded yet.
-        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(1000, 1.0, 0), 1000);
-        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(1000, 1.0, -5), 1000);
+        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(10 * GB, 1.0, 0, 0), 10 * GB);
+        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(10 * GB, 1.0, -5, 0), 10 * GB);
     }
 
+    /// The property the floor exists for: a guest's ceiling must not keep shrinking as more
+    /// guests arrive. Same disk, 10 uploaders vs 1000 — the second must not be starved.
     #[test]
-    fn zero_free_disk_yields_zero() {
-        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(0, 0.75, 3), 0);
+    fn the_ceiling_stops_falling_once_it_reaches_the_floor() {
+        let ten = quota_limit_bytes(70 * GB, 0.75, 10, 1);
+        let thousand = quota_limit_bytes(70 * GB, 0.75, 1000, 1);
+        assert!(ten > MIN_QUOTA_LIMIT_BYTES, "10 uploaders should be roomy");
+        assert_eq!(
+            thousand, MIN_QUOTA_LIMIT_BYTES,
+            "1000 uploaders (or 1000 fake accounts) must not drive the ceiling below the floor"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            thousand >= 500 * 1024 * 1024,
+            "the floor must still clear a single max-size video"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// `estimated_guest_count` is a FLOOR on the divisor, so the ceiling settles early instead
+    /// of sliding down all evening as guests arrive.
+    #[test]
+    fn expected_headcount_holds_the_divisor_steady_while_guests_arrive() {
+        let early = quota_limit_bytes(70 * GB, 0.75, 5, 100);
+        let late = quota_limit_bytes(70 * GB, 0.75, 100, 100);
+        assert_eq!(
+            early, late,
+            "the 5th guest and the 100th must see the same ceiling"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The floor must never write a cheque the volume cannot cash — otherwise a full disk
+    /// still hands out a 500 MB allowance and the filesystem Postgres needs fills up.
+    #[test]
+    fn the_floor_never_exceeds_what_the_disk_can_back() {
+        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(0, 0.75, 3, 1), 0, "no disk, no allowance");
+        // 400 MB free * 0.75 = 300 MB — below the floor, so the disk wins.
+        let tight = quota_limit_bytes(400 * 1024 * 1024, 0.75, 3, 1);
+        assert_eq!(tight, 300 * 1024 * 1024);
+        assert!(tight < MIN_QUOTA_LIMIT_BYTES);
     }
 
     #[test]
     fn full_tolerance_is_identity_for_a_single_uploader() {
-        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(500, 1.0, 1), 500);
+        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(50 * GB, 1.0, 1, 1), 50 * GB);
     }
 
     /// The guard is the only reclaim mechanism that survives a client disconnect, so its three

backend/src/models/upload.rs

@@ -259,40 +259,8 @@ impl Upload {
         Ok(())
     }
 
-    /// Soft-deletes the upload and decrements the uploader's `total_upload_bytes`.
-    /// Done in a single transaction so a crash between the two writes can't leave
-    /// the quota counter pointing at bytes the user has already deleted (which would
-    /// silently lock them out of future uploads).
-    ///
-    /// No-op if the row is already deleted — protects against a double-tap on the
-    /// delete action double-decrementing the counter.
-    pub async fn soft_delete(pool: &PgPool, id: Uuid) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
-        let mut tx = pool.begin().await?;
-        let row: Option<(Uuid, i64)> = sqlx::query_as(
-            "UPDATE upload
-             SET deleted_at = NOW()
-             WHERE id = $1 AND deleted_at IS NULL
-             RETURNING user_id, original_size_bytes",
-        )
-        .bind(id)
-        .fetch_optional(&mut *tx)
-        .await?;
-        if let Some((user_id, bytes)) = row {
-            sqlx::query(
-                "UPDATE \"user\"
-                 SET total_upload_bytes = GREATEST(0, total_upload_bytes - $2)
-                 WHERE id = $1",
-            )
-            .bind(user_id)
-            .bind(bytes)
-            .execute(&mut *tx)
-            .await?;
-        }
-        tx.commit().await?;
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Event-scoped variant of [`Self::soft_delete`]. Returns `false` if no row
+    /// Soft-deletes an upload within its event and refunds the uploader's
+    /// `total_upload_bytes`, in one transaction. Returns `false` if no row
     /// matched (already deleted, wrong event, or unknown id) so host handlers
     /// can return a clean 404 instead of silently no-op'ing.
     /// Executor-generic so a caller can run the delete and the keepsake regeneration in ONE

backend/src/services/compression.rs

@@ -165,35 +165,43 @@ impl CompressionWorker {
                     tracing::error!(
                         "compression failed for upload {upload_id} after {attempt} attempt(s): {e:#}"
                     );
-                    // Refund + soft-delete (one tx, so v_feed excludes it) so a failed
-                    // transcode doesn't leave a permanently broken feed card or silently
-                    // charge the uploader's quota. Then tell the uploader (upload-error
-                    // toast) and evict the card everywhere (upload-deleted).
+                    // KEEP THE ROW. This used to soft-delete, which made a derivative failure
+                    // indistinguishable — to the guest — from their photo being deleted: they
+                    // got a `201 Created`, watched the card appear, and then watched it vanish.
+                    // The row left `v_feed`, `find_visible_media` and BOTH keepsake archives,
+                    // so the photo was gone from the product's core promise while its bytes sat
+                    // on disk for 14 days waiting for a `cleanup_deleted_media` that nothing
+                    // told anyone about. There is no host or admin screen listing compression
+                    // failures, so recovery meant hand-written SQL that also had to re-add the
+                    // refunded quota bytes. Against "0 lost uploads", that was silent per-photo
+                    // loss on any error the ENOSPC arm above doesn't catch — a HEIC that slipped
+                    // the allowlist, a truncated frame, an ffmpeg hiccup, a pool blip.
                     //
-                    // The ORIGINAL IS DELIBERATELY KEPT. This path used to `remove_file` it
-                    // unconditionally, which meant any transient error — a disk-full blip
-                    // while saving a derivative, a pool hiccup, a panic in the image codec —
-                    // irreversibly destroyed the guest's only copy of a photo they can never
-                    // retake. The row is only soft-deleted, so keeping the bytes makes the
-                    // upload fully recoverable; the file is orphaned rather than lost, and
-                    // the path is logged so it can be found. `backfill_stale_derivatives`
-                    // already refuses to destroy data on error for exactly this reason.
+                    // This is exactly what the ENOSPC arm already does and documents as correct:
+                    // every client falls back to the original when `preview_url` and
+                    // `thumbnail_url` are NULL, so the photo stays visible and downloadable —
+                    // just uncompressed — and `backfill_stale_derivatives` retries it on the
+                    // next boot, now bounded by `derivative_attempts` so a poisoned row cannot
+                    // loop. The quota stays charged, which is correct: the bytes are still on
+                    // disk and still the guest's.
                     let _ = Upload::set_compression_status(&worker.pool, upload_id, "failed").await;
-                    if let Err(del) = Upload::soft_delete(&worker.pool, upload_id).await {
-                        tracing::warn!(error = ?del, %upload_id, "failed to soft-delete after compression failure");
-                    }
                     tracing::warn!(
                         %upload_id,
                         path = %worker.media_path.join(&original_path).display(),
-                        "original retained for recovery after compression failure"
+                        "derivatives failed; the upload is kept and served from its original"
                     );
+                    // `upload-error` still fires so the uploader learns the photo will look
+                    // uncompressed. `upload-deleted` deliberately does NOT — nothing was
+                    // deleted, and evicting the card was the visible half of the data loss.
                     let _ = worker.sse_tx.send(SseEvent {
                         event_type: "upload-error".to_string(),
                         data: serde_json::json!({ "upload_id": upload_id, "error": e.to_string() })
                             .to_string(),
                     });
+                    // Tell every client to refetch, so the card re-renders from the original
+                    // instead of sitting on a stale "processing" placeholder forever.
                     let _ = worker.sse_tx.send(SseEvent {
-                        event_type: "upload-deleted".to_string(),
+                        event_type: "upload-processed".to_string(),
                         data: serde_json::json!({ "upload_id": upload_id }).to_string(),
                     });
                 }

backend/src/services/export.rs

@@ -499,9 +499,6 @@ async fn run_zip_export(
         return Ok(());
     }
 
-    // Reclaim BEFORE measuring: the superseded archive is already unreachable, and the space it
-    // holds is very often exactly the space this rebuild needs.
-    prune_superseded_archives(pool, export_path, "Gallery", event_id, epoch).await;
     // AFTER the claim, not before. A preflight that bailed before claiming would leave the row
     // `pending` with no worker and no error — the spinner-forever state `mark_failed`'s status
     // guard was widened to prevent. Failing here goes through the caller's `mark_failed`, so the
@@ -517,6 +514,25 @@ async fn run_zip_export(
             tokio::fs::remove_file(export_path.join(gen_name(event_id, "Gallery", epoch, ".tmp")))
                 .await;
     }
+
+    // Reclaim the PREVIOUS generation only once this one has actually landed.
+    //
+    // This used to run before the preflight, reasoning that the superseded archive is already
+    // unreachable and its space is usually exactly what the rebuild needs. That is true about
+    // REACHABILITY and false about RECOVERABILITY: an epoch is a database value that can be
+    // rolled back, deleted bytes cannot. Any rebuild that then failed — ENOSPC mid-write, an
+    // OOM, a hung ffmpeg, a host tapping "Neu erzeugen" on a bad day — left the event with NO
+    // archive at all, which is the one outcome the whole product exists to prevent, at the one
+    // moment nobody is watching.
+    //
+    // The cost of deferring is that a rebuild now needs room for both generations at once, and
+    // `ensure_export_space` above no longer gets to count the old archive's bytes as available.
+    // That is the correct trade: it converts "silently destroyed the only copy" into "refused
+    // to start, and said why".
+    if res.is_ok() {
+        prune_superseded_archives(pool, export_path, "Gallery", event_id, epoch).await;
+    }
+
     abandon_if_superseded("ZIP", event_id, epoch, res)
 }
 
@@ -690,9 +706,8 @@ async fn run_html_export(
         return Ok(());
     }
 
-    // See run_zip_export: reclaim the superseded generation first, then refuse at the door rather
-    // than ENOSPC mid-write.
-    prune_superseded_archives(pool, export_path, "Memories", event_id, epoch).await;
+    // See run_zip_export: refuse at the door rather than ENOSPC mid-write, and reclaim the
+    // superseded generation only AFTER this one lands.
     ensure_export_space(pool, event_id, export_path).await?;
 
     let res = run_html_export_inner(
@@ -716,6 +731,13 @@ async fn run_html_export(
             tokio::fs::remove_dir_all(export_path.join(format!("viewer_tmp_{event_id}_{epoch}")))
                 .await;
     }
+
+    // Only once the new keepsake exists — see the reasoning in run_zip_export. A failed rebuild
+    // must never be the reason the previous one is gone.
+    if res.is_ok() {
+        prune_superseded_archives(pool, export_path, "Memories", event_id, epoch).await;
+    }
+
     abandon_if_superseded("HTML", event_id, epoch, res)
 }
 
@@ -1383,18 +1405,32 @@ async fn ensure_export_space(pool: &PgPool, event_id: Uuid, export_path: &Path)
         return Ok(());
     };
 
-    if free < needed {
+    // The archive may not consume the last byte of the volume. `needed` alone authorised an
+    // export sized at exactly `free`: it would pass the check, run for half an hour, and land
+    // the box at zero — at which point Postgres cannot write WAL and the event is over, with
+    // the keepsake still unfinished. `postgres_data`, `media_data` and `exports_data` share one
+    // filesystem, so "enough room for the archive" was never the same question as "enough room
+    // for the archive AND a working database".
+    //
+    // Same reserve the upload path and the host dashboard's low-disk banner use, so all three
+    // agree on what "full" means.
+    let required = needed.saturating_add(crate::handlers::upload::DISK_RESERVE_BYTES as u64);
+
+    if free < required {
         let gb = |b: u64| b as f64 / 1_000_000_000.0;
         tracing::error!(
             needed,
+            required,
             free,
             armed,
             "export preflight: not enough free space to build the keepsake for event {event_id}"
         );
         anyhow::bail!(
-            "Nicht genug Speicherplatz für das Keepsake: benötigt ca. {:.1} GB, frei sind {:.1} GB. \
-             Bitte Speicher freigeben und das Keepsake anschließend neu erstellen.",
+            "Nicht genug Speicherplatz für das Keepsake: benötigt ca. {:.1} GB (plus {:.0} GB \
+             Reserve), frei sind {:.1} GB. Bitte Speicher freigeben und das Keepsake \
+             anschließend neu erstellen.",
             gb(needed),
+            gb(crate::handlers::upload::DISK_RESERVE_BYTES as u64),
             gb(free)
         );
     }