test(e2e): make nine red specs assert the contracts the code actually implements

The e2e suite had never been run during this audit. It failed 9 of 256; seven of those
predated the audit's changes, established by building a stack from a clean HEAD worktree
and running the same specs against it rather than guessing.

Most were stale assertions rather than product defects:

- quota.spec solved for a target limit using the observed uploader count, but the divisor is
  max(active, estimated_guest_count, 1) and that config seeds at 100 — so every limit it
  aimed for came out 100x small and every "within quota" upload 413'd.
- rate-limit-shared-nat destructured `ticket` from a 429 body and fetched with
  `ticket=undefined`, turning the 429 under test into an unrelated 401. It also faked a
  release with no archive on disk, so the mint's pre-check 404'd and the per-day limiter was
  never reached; it now does a real release and asserts 200 rather than "not 429".
- ddos allowed only [200,429] from ten concurrent streams, so it failed on the very defence
  it exercises: four tickets per session survive and the rest correctly 401. Now asserts
  exactly four, which a tightened cap or an inverted eviction order would catch.
- auth-tampering asserted a throttled IP is refused EVEN with the correct password. That
  contract was deliberately removed — it let any phone on the venue NAT lock the operator
  out of their own admin panel, with a circular escape hatch. Inverted, plus a new check
  that a success does not refill an attacker's bucket.
- moderation-ui assumed a ban leaves a comment "stuck on screen"; `list_for_upload` filters
  banned authors, so it is hidden from everyone including the host. Now pins the pair that
  matters — the ban hides it, and the host's permanent removal survives an unban — and the
  UI leg it used to own is restored as a separate test on a reachable comment.

The export specs mint with `?kind=` now that a download ticket is bound to one archive, and
four of them assert the mint's 404 rather than the download's: with the kind always known,
the pre-check refuses up front instead of after charging a daily download for an archive
that cannot be served.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

e2e/specs/10-flow-review/upload-lock-code.spec.ts

@@ -36,7 +36,15 @@ test.describe('Upload — locked event uses a distinct, reversible 403 (audit fi
     expect(ok.status, 'upload succeeds once the host reopens').toBeLessThan(300);
   });
 
-  test('released gallery → 403 uploads_locked (also reversible via reopen)', async ({ host }) => {
+  test('released gallery → 403 gallery_released, the PARKING code (not uploads_locked)', async ({
+    host,
+  }) => {
+    // `release ⇒ lock`, so a released gallery satisfies both conditions and the handler's check
+    // ORDER decides which code the guest gets. It must be the release one, and the difference is
+    // not cosmetic: `uploads_locked` charges a retry attempt and re-pushes the whole photo on the
+    // backoff ladder, against an answer that cannot change until a host acts. `gallery_released`
+    // parks it — blob kept, nothing re-sent, and the guest is told to ask the hosts to reopen.
+    // This asserted `uploads_locked` while the release branch was unreachable dead code.
     const rel = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/host/gallery/release`, {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${host.jwt}` },
@@ -49,6 +57,6 @@ test.describe('Upload — locked event uses a distinct, reversible 403 (audit fi
     });
     expect(rejected.status).toBe(403);
     const body = await rejected.json();
-    expect(body.error).toBe('uploads_locked');
+    expect(body.error).toBe('gallery_released');
   });
 });