test+docs: tighten H1 assertions, cover secret/XFF edges, document boot & SSE-ban
Re-review follow-ups (non-blocking quality items): Tests: - moderation H1 specs now assert exact `→ 403` instead of bare .rejects.toThrow(), so a spurious 500 can no longer masquerade as "revocation worked". - config: added case-insensitivity (upper/mixed-case placeholder) and the len==32/31 boundary cases for validate_secrets. - rate_limiter: added the trailing-comma empty-entry case for client_ip (must fall back, not return ""). (Backend unit tests: 35 pass.) Docs: - README: note that with APP_ENV=production a placeholder .env makes the app refuse to boot and Caddy wait unhealthy — reason is in `docker compose logs app`. - SECURITY-BACKLOG + sse.rs comment: document that a mid-session ban does not tear down an already-open SSE stream (new tickets are blocked; low blast radius). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ pub async fn stream(
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.consume(&q.ticket)
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.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Ticket ungültig oder abgelaufen.".into()))?;
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// NOTE: this authenticates via ticket→session, not the `AuthUser` extractor, so
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// it does not re-check `is_banned`. A user banned mid-stream keeps receiving
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// events until the connection drops; they cannot reconnect (issue_ticket uses
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// AuthUser, which rejects banned users). Documented in docs/SECURITY-BACKLOG.md.
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Session::find_by_token_hash(&state.pool, &token_hash)
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.await
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.map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))?
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