fix(deploy): ship the swap ceilings, pin the last boot-fatal env var, and correct docs that misdirect

* memswap_limit is now IN docker-compose.yml on all four services. Compose
  sets Memory but leaves MemorySwap unset, and Docker then permits swap equal
  to the memory limit — so following §5's "add 2 GB of swap" silently DOUBLED
  every ceiling, to ~5 GiB on a 3.82 GiB box. Nothing OOMs; instead Postgres's
  working set becomes swap-eligible on a shared-tenancy SSD, turning a bounded
  OOM-kill that restarts in seconds into unbounded latency with no signal but
  "everything is slow". The runbook told the operator to hand-add it, which
  also broke §0's own gate that docker-compose.yml must be unmodified.
  Verified rather than assumed: service-level memswap_limit does compose with
  deploy.resources.limits.memory (docker inspect → Memory=1073741824
  MemorySwap=1207959552).

* DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS pinned in compose. It is the one env var that is
  now boot-FATAL when unparseable — the right call, but it means a stray quote
  or a trailing inline comment in .env crash-loops the app behind a live
  Caddy. MEDIA_PATH, EXPORT_PATH and APP_PORT are pinned for weaker reasons.

* .env.example's quota narrative was sized for a CX33: "~30 GB of a fresh
  70 GB" on a box with 40 GB. And on THIS box the fixed point never binds at
  all — ~210 MB/guest is below the 500 MiB floor, so everyone gets the floor
  and the per-user quota stops bounding aggregate growth. What actually stops
  uploads is the keepsake preflight at ~8 GB of media. That paragraph is what
  an operator reads when a guest is blocked, and it pointed at the wrong knob.

* The emergency card gains the one disk symptom that can appear mid-event,
  where `df -h` — its only disk instruction — actively misleads: the gate
  fires ~10 GB + 2.2x media BEFORE the disk is full, so df shows ~20 GB free
  at the moment uploads are being refused.

* Two code comments that now assert the opposite of the code: claim_job
  promised that "the update_progress liveness check bails such a worker out
  early" — it cannot, its predicate is on the job row, which a reopen does not
  touch, so a mid-export reopen grinds the whole gallery to completion on a
  2-vCPU box during the live event. And prune_superseded_archives still argued
  "deleted bytes cannot be rolled back" as an invariant, after the reclaim
  path was changed to prune even when that will not close the shortfall.
  Both now describe what the code does.

* Smaller corrections: runbook §3's "two 48 MP photos ≈ 800 MB" scenario is
  unreachable (compression.rs takes an exclusive heavy permit, so they
  serialise) and contradicted .env.example; "all four healthy" is wrong since
  caddy has no healthcheck; a README line reference pointed at a comment added
  by the same commit that broke it.

README.md

@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ Caddy automatically obtains a Let's Encrypt certificate on first start. The app
 ### Updating an existing deployment
 
 > **The event server never compiles.** `app` and `frontend` have **no `build:` key** — they
-> pull an immutable tag from the registry (`docker-compose.yml:53` says so explicitly, so that
+> pull an immutable tag from the registry (the `app` service in `docker-compose.yml` says so explicitly, so that
 > a wrong tag fails instantly with `manifest unknown` instead of silently starting a 45-minute
 > compile on the box guests are using). A `git pull` therefore deploys **nothing** on its own,
 > and `docker compose up -d --build` **errors** — there is nothing to build. Deploying means