Merge branch 'fix/deploy-unattended-blockers' into main

Two independent lines of production hardening diverged at 7d0334b and attacked
overlapping problems. Neither was a superset, so this is a merge of substance
rather than a fast-forward: every conflict was resolved on the merits, and the
losing side's intent was re-checked against the winner rather than assumed.

MIGRATIONS. The branch's 021/022/023 collided with main's already-DEPLOYED
021_hashtag_counts_respect_bans and 022_client_upload_idempotency. Renumbered to
023/024/025 in a prior commit — main's versions are applied in production, so
their version numbers are immutable and the branch's had to move. Verified by
running the full sqlx::test suite, which applies the whole chain from scratch.

RESOLVED IN MAIN'S FAVOUR (the branch would have regressed these):
  * upload-queue.ts wholesale — the branch's copy has ZERO client_upload_id
    references, so taking it would have silently destroyed end-to-end upload
    idempotency, the one thing standing between a lost response and a duplicate
    photo charged twice against the guest's quota.
  * maintenance.rs supervisor — the branch replaced it with a bare tokio::spawn,
    where one panic silently stops session pruning, media reclaim, the temp
    sweep and both HashMap prunes, permanently and with no log line.
  * The decode-budget probe on spawn_blocking, not inline on the async runtime.
  * feed/+page.svelte's 8s debounce + jitter + max-wait + hidden-tab deferral,
    against the branch's naive 800ms — at 100 guests the branch's version walks
    straight into the per-user feed rate limit.
  * db.rs pool tuning, /uploaders, and the docker-compose deployment story.
  * ONE /health, still DB-backed. The branch's split (dependency-free liveness +
    DB-backed readiness) is defensible, but a constant-"ok" /health is the exact
    defect faea555 fixed and verified live, its motive (Caddy's boot gate) is
    already covered by app depends_on db: service_healthy, and the two handlers
    were the same SELECT 1 under two names.

TAKEN FROM THE BRANCH:
  * The large-PNG OOM guard and its bounded-retry counter (023). Together these
    turn a single upload that can OOM-kill a 1G container into a bounded failure
    instead of an infinite restart loop under `restart: unless-stopped`.
  * 024_feed_scalar_counts — the feed no longer aggregates the whole event per
    page. Pure SQL; column names, order and types are unchanged by design.
  * The admin-lockout fix: look the admin up BY ROLE, never by name. 025 also
    frees any guest already squatting on a reserved name.
  * PIN lockout tier ordering, bounded caption/hashtag reads, SSE ticket caps,
    PoolTimedOut -> 503 + Retry-After, and the ffmpeg stderr drain.
  * backfill_video_posters, which main lacked entirely.
  * TempFileGuard, plus sweep_orphan_originals wired into main's SUPERVISED loop
    (not the branch's bare one) — it reclaims final-named originals whose commit
    never happened, a class main's .tmp-only sweep structurally cannot see.
  * shouldAbortForStall, hand-ported into main's upload-queue.ts since that file
    was resolved to main. Widens the watchdog at loadend instead of disarming it,
    bounding a half-open socket at 2 minutes rather than handing the window to
    xhr.timeout (5-60 min) with the whole queue's `processing` latch held.

ALSO: RUST_LOG and EXPORT_PATH pinned in compose. The code fallback was
`debug` (a line per request, all night) and EXPORT_PATH was the one path with a
mount-shaped default that nothing validated.

Verified: cargo check --all-targets, cargo clippy (clean), 144/144 backend tests
against a live Postgres including upload_idempotency and upload_concurrency,
51/51 vitest, svelte-check 0 errors, eslint clean, vite build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-08-08 21:16:31 +02:00
30 changed files with 2192 additions and 439 deletions

View File

@@ -120,6 +120,19 @@ pub async fn startup_recovery(pool: &PgPool) {
}
}
/// How long a file in `originals/` may exist without a database row before it is treated as
/// abandoned.
///
/// This window is the ONLY thing making the sweep safe, because the upload handler renames the
/// temp file into its final path BEFORE committing the row: for a short moment a perfectly
/// healthy upload legitimately looks exactly like an orphan. Six hours is far beyond any live
/// request (a 576 MiB body over a bad venue uplink is minutes, and the request itself is bounded
/// by the reverse proxy) while still reclaiming the leak inside a single event.
///
/// DO NOT SHORTEN THIS to make a test faster — a value below the longest possible in-flight
/// upload deletes photos out from under the request that is committing them.
const ORPHAN_UPLOAD_RETENTION_HOURS: u64 = 6;
/// Spawns a background task that periodically:
/// - deletes session rows whose `expires_at` is more than a day in the past
/// - prunes the in-memory rate-limiter HashMap of empty windows
@@ -176,6 +189,13 @@ async fn periodic_loop(
cleanup_sessions(&pool).await;
cleanup_deleted_media(&pool, &media_path).await;
sweep_orphan_upload_temps(&media_path).await;
// Runs AFTER the .tmp sweep, and covers the class that one structurally cannot see:
// an original that was renamed to its final name but whose transaction never
// committed. Those have no row, so `cleanup_deleted_media` (row-driven) can never
// find them, and `sweep_orphan_upload_temps` skips them because they no longer end
// in `.tmp` — they were permanently unowned, silently shrinking the free disk that
// `compute_storage_quota` divides among guests.
sweep_orphan_originals(&pool, &media_path).await;
rate_limiter.prune();
sse_tickets.prune();
}
@@ -379,6 +399,126 @@ async fn cleanup_sessions(pool: &PgPool) {
}
}
/// Reclaim files in `originals/` that no upload row references.
///
/// The backstop behind [`TempFileGuard`](crate::handlers::upload). The guard covers the
/// process that is running; this covers the process that was killed — a SIGKILL, an OOM, or a
/// power cut leaves whatever bytes had been written with no `Drop` to reclaim them, and those
/// files are then permanently invisible: they have no row, so `cleanup_deleted_media` (which is
/// row-driven) can never see them, and they are not counted against any quota while still
/// consuming the free disk that `compute_storage_quota` divides among guests. On a single box
/// where all three volumes share a filesystem, that ends with Postgres unable to write WAL.
///
/// Two classes:
/// - `*.tmp` — an upload that never got as far as being renamed. Always safe past the window.
/// - everything else — a final-named original whose commit never happened.
async fn sweep_orphan_originals(pool: &PgPool, media_path: &std::path::Path) {
let originals = media_path.join("originals");
let cutoff = Duration::from_secs(ORPHAN_UPLOAD_RETENTION_HOURS * 3600);
// originals/{event_slug}/{uuid}.{ext} — one level of per-event directories.
let mut event_dirs = match tokio::fs::read_dir(&originals).await {
Ok(rd) => rd,
// Nothing uploaded yet; the directory is created lazily by the upload handler.
Err(_) => return,
};
let mut candidates: Vec<(String, std::path::PathBuf)> = Vec::new();
let mut temps_removed = 0u32;
while let Ok(Some(event_dir)) = event_dirs.next_entry().await {
if !event_dir
.file_type()
.await
.map(|t| t.is_dir())
.unwrap_or(false)
{
continue;
}
let slug = event_dir.file_name().to_string_lossy().to_string();
let Ok(mut files) = tokio::fs::read_dir(event_dir.path()).await else {
continue;
};
while let Ok(Some(entry)) = files.next_entry().await {
let Ok(meta) = entry.metadata().await else {
continue;
};
if !meta.is_file() {
continue;
}
// Too young to judge: an upload committing RIGHT NOW is indistinguishable from an
// orphan, because the rename precedes the commit.
let recent = meta
.modified()
.ok()
.and_then(|m| m.elapsed().ok())
.is_none_or(|age| age < cutoff);
if recent {
continue;
}
let name = entry.file_name().to_string_lossy().to_string();
if name.ends_with(".tmp") {
// A `.tmp` never has a row by construction — no DB check needed.
if tokio::fs::remove_file(entry.path()).await.is_ok() {
temps_removed += 1;
}
continue;
}
candidates.push((format!("originals/{slug}/{name}"), entry.path()));
}
}
if temps_removed > 0 {
tracing::warn!(
"reclaimed {temps_removed} abandoned upload temp file(s) older than \
{ORPHAN_UPLOAD_RETENTION_HOURS}h"
);
}
if candidates.is_empty() {
return;
}
// One query per batch, not one per file: a backlog of thousands of orphans must not turn
// into thousands of round trips on an hourly timer.
let mut orphans_removed = 0u32;
for chunk in candidates.chunks(500) {
let paths: Vec<String> = chunk.iter().map(|(rel, _)| rel.clone()).collect();
// NO `deleted_at IS NULL` FILTER HERE. A soft-deleted row still points at its file
// during its retention window, and reclaiming that file is `cleanup_deleted_media`'s
// job — filtering here would race the two sweeps and destroy the exact files the
// recovery window exists to preserve.
let unreferenced: Result<Vec<(String,)>, _> = sqlx::query_as(
"SELECT p FROM unnest($1::text[]) AS p
WHERE NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM upload u WHERE u.original_path = p)",
)
.bind(&paths)
.fetch_all(pool)
.await;
let unreferenced = match unreferenced {
Ok(rows) => rows,
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "orphan-original sweep query failed");
return;
}
};
for (rel,) in unreferenced {
if let Some((_, abs)) = chunk.iter().find(|(r, _)| *r == rel)
&& tokio::fs::remove_file(abs).await.is_ok()
{
orphans_removed += 1;
}
}
}
if orphans_removed > 0 {
tracing::warn!(
"reclaimed {orphans_removed} original(s) with no upload row, older than \
{ORPHAN_UPLOAD_RETENTION_HOURS}h"
);
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;