Merge branch 'fix/deploy-unattended-blockers' into main

Two independent lines of production hardening diverged at 7d0334b and attacked
overlapping problems. Neither was a superset, so this is a merge of substance
rather than a fast-forward: every conflict was resolved on the merits, and the
losing side's intent was re-checked against the winner rather than assumed.

MIGRATIONS. The branch's 021/022/023 collided with main's already-DEPLOYED
021_hashtag_counts_respect_bans and 022_client_upload_idempotency. Renumbered to
023/024/025 in a prior commit — main's versions are applied in production, so
their version numbers are immutable and the branch's had to move. Verified by
running the full sqlx::test suite, which applies the whole chain from scratch.

RESOLVED IN MAIN'S FAVOUR (the branch would have regressed these):
  * upload-queue.ts wholesale — the branch's copy has ZERO client_upload_id
    references, so taking it would have silently destroyed end-to-end upload
    idempotency, the one thing standing between a lost response and a duplicate
    photo charged twice against the guest's quota.
  * maintenance.rs supervisor — the branch replaced it with a bare tokio::spawn,
    where one panic silently stops session pruning, media reclaim, the temp
    sweep and both HashMap prunes, permanently and with no log line.
  * The decode-budget probe on spawn_blocking, not inline on the async runtime.
  * feed/+page.svelte's 8s debounce + jitter + max-wait + hidden-tab deferral,
    against the branch's naive 800ms — at 100 guests the branch's version walks
    straight into the per-user feed rate limit.
  * db.rs pool tuning, /uploaders, and the docker-compose deployment story.
  * ONE /health, still DB-backed. The branch's split (dependency-free liveness +
    DB-backed readiness) is defensible, but a constant-"ok" /health is the exact
    defect faea555 fixed and verified live, its motive (Caddy's boot gate) is
    already covered by app depends_on db: service_healthy, and the two handlers
    were the same SELECT 1 under two names.

TAKEN FROM THE BRANCH:
  * The large-PNG OOM guard and its bounded-retry counter (023). Together these
    turn a single upload that can OOM-kill a 1G container into a bounded failure
    instead of an infinite restart loop under `restart: unless-stopped`.
  * 024_feed_scalar_counts — the feed no longer aggregates the whole event per
    page. Pure SQL; column names, order and types are unchanged by design.
  * The admin-lockout fix: look the admin up BY ROLE, never by name. 025 also
    frees any guest already squatting on a reserved name.
  * PIN lockout tier ordering, bounded caption/hashtag reads, SSE ticket caps,
    PoolTimedOut -> 503 + Retry-After, and the ffmpeg stderr drain.
  * backfill_video_posters, which main lacked entirely.
  * TempFileGuard, plus sweep_orphan_originals wired into main's SUPERVISED loop
    (not the branch's bare one) — it reclaims final-named originals whose commit
    never happened, a class main's .tmp-only sweep structurally cannot see.
  * shouldAbortForStall, hand-ported into main's upload-queue.ts since that file
    was resolved to main. Widens the watchdog at loadend instead of disarming it,
    bounding a half-open socket at 2 minutes rather than handing the window to
    xhr.timeout (5-60 min) with the whole queue's `processing` latch held.

ALSO: RUST_LOG and EXPORT_PATH pinned in compose. The code fallback was
`debug` (a line per request, all night) and EXPORT_PATH was the one path with a
mount-shaped default that nothing validated.

Verified: cargo check --all-targets, cargo clippy (clean), 144/144 backend tests
against a live Postgres including upload_idempotency and upload_concurrency,
51/51 vitest, svelte-check 0 errors, eslint clean, vite build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-08-08 21:16:31 +02:00
30 changed files with 2192 additions and 439 deletions

View File

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ pub async fn extract_poster_frame(src: &Path, dest: &Path, width: u32) -> Result
/// Run one ffmpeg attempt. A non-zero exit is NOT an error here — the artifact check above is the
/// authority, and a corrupt input that fails at 1 s may still yield a frame at 0.
async fn run_ffmpeg(src: &Path, dest: &Path, width: u32, seek: &str) -> Result<()> {
let mut child = tokio::process::Command::new("ffmpeg")
let child = tokio::process::Command::new("ffmpeg")
.args([
// BEFORE -i: an input-side seek. See SEEK_POSITIONS.
"-ss",
@@ -90,24 +90,56 @@ async fn run_ffmpeg(src: &Path, dest: &Path, width: u32, seek: &str) -> Result<(
"-y",
dest.to_str().unwrap_or_default(),
])
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped())
// ffmpeg writes the poster to `dest` itself; nothing here ever reads stdout, so
// giving it a pipe only created something that could fill.
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
// stderr IS piped — it is the only diagnostic when a clip yields no frame — but it
// must be DRAINED, which is the whole point of `wait_with_output` below.
.stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped())
.kill_on_drop(true)
.spawn()
.context("failed to spawn ffmpeg")?;
match tokio::time::timeout(FFMPEG_TIMEOUT, child.wait()).await {
Ok(res) => {
res.context("ffmpeg wait failed")?;
}
Err(_) => {
let _ = child.kill().await;
anyhow::bail!("ffmpeg timed out after {}s", FFMPEG_TIMEOUT.as_secs());
}
// `wait_with_output`, NOT `wait`. ffmpeg is verbose on stderr (banner, stream info,
// per-frame progress) and `wait()` reads neither pipe — so once the ~64 KiB pipe buffer
// filled, ffmpeg blocked writing, `wait()` never returned, and the call burned the full
// timeout. That is not merely slow: the timeout is an `Err`, so after 2 seek positions x
// 3 compression attempts the caller soft-deletes a perfectly playable video for a
// poster-frame failure. `wait_with_output` polls the pipe and the exit status together.
//
// It also CONSUMES the child, so the explicit `child.kill()` that used to sit on the
// timeout arm cannot exist here — and is not needed: `kill_on_drop(true)` is set above,
// and dropping the future on timeout drops the child with it.
let out = match tokio::time::timeout(FFMPEG_TIMEOUT, child.wait_with_output()).await {
Ok(res) => res.context("ffmpeg wait failed")?,
Err(_) => anyhow::bail!("ffmpeg timed out after {}s", FFMPEG_TIMEOUT.as_secs()),
};
// A non-zero exit is not an error (see the doc comment) — the artifact check in
// `extract_poster_frame` is the authority. Log the tail so a systematically failing
// format is diagnosable without turning it into data loss.
if !out.status.success() {
tracing::debug!(
seek,
status = ?out.status,
stderr = %tail_lines(&out.stderr, 10),
"ffmpeg exited non-zero; the artifact check decides"
);
}
Ok(())
}
/// Last `n` lines of a child's stderr, lossily decoded.
///
/// Bounded on purpose: ffmpeg's stderr is unbounded, and the reason we now drain it is that
/// unbounded output used to be a hazard. Emitting all of it into a log line — into container
/// logs that are themselves size-capped — would just move the problem.
fn tail_lines(bytes: &[u8], n: usize) -> String {
let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(bytes);
let lines: Vec<&str> = text.lines().filter(|l| !l.trim().is_empty()).collect();
lines[lines.len().saturating_sub(n)..].join(" | ")
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
@@ -167,4 +199,65 @@ mod tests {
);
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}
#[test]
fn the_stderr_tail_is_bounded_and_survives_invalid_utf8() {
let noisy: Vec<u8> = (0..500)
.map(|i| format!("line {i}\n"))
.collect::<String>()
.into_bytes();
let got = tail_lines(&noisy, 3);
assert_eq!(got, "line 497 | line 498 | line 499");
// ffmpeg emits filenames verbatim, so its stderr is not guaranteed to be UTF-8.
assert_eq!(tail_lines(&[b'o', b'k', 0xff], 5), "ok\u{fffd}");
assert_eq!(tail_lines(b"", 5), "");
}
/// A real extraction must finish in a small fraction of `FFMPEG_TIMEOUT`.
///
/// Wall-clock is the ONLY observable of the bug this guards: piping stderr and then
/// calling `wait()` (which drains nothing) blocks ffmpeg on a full pipe buffer until the
/// timeout fires, and the timeout is an `Err`, so the upload is soft-deleted. The
/// assertion is deliberately on elapsed time, not on the exit status.
///
/// Honest limitation: our fixture is quiet enough not to fill a 64 KiB pipe on its own,
/// so this catches a regression to `wait()` only in combination with a verbose input. It
/// is still worth pinning — a reverted drain plus any chatty clip is data loss.
#[tokio::test]
async fn a_real_clip_yields_a_poster_well_inside_the_timeout() {
if tokio::process::Command::new("ffmpeg")
.arg("-version")
.stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
.stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
.status()
.await
.is_err()
{
eprintln!("skipping: ffmpeg not on PATH");
return;
}
let src = Path::new("../e2e/fixtures/media/sample.mp4");
if !src.exists() {
eprintln!("skipping: {} missing", src.display());
return;
}
let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("es-video-ok-{}", std::process::id()));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
let dest = dir.join("poster.jpg");
let started = std::time::Instant::now();
let got = extract_poster_frame(src, &dest, 400).await;
let elapsed = started.elapsed();
assert!(matches!(got, Ok(true)), "expected a poster, got {got:?}");
assert!(dest.metadata().unwrap().len() > 0);
assert!(
elapsed < FFMPEG_TIMEOUT / 4,
"extraction took {elapsed:?}; a drained stderr finishes in well under \
{FFMPEG_TIMEOUT:?} — this is the pipe-deadlock regression guard"
);
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
}
}