fix(user-flow): close offline-queue, export, session, ban & realtime gaps
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Comprehensive user-flow review across guest/host/admin roles, then fixes with
e2e regression guards. Highlights:

- Offline upload queue auto-resumes on reconnect: network errors keep items
  pending (not error), 4xx are terminal (no infinite retry), quota exhaustion
  returns a distinct 413; queue cap + dedup.
- Export lifecycle: release atomically locks uploads; reopen invalidates and
  re-release regenerates the keepsake; workers claim their job atomically so a
  reopen->re-release can't corrupt the ZIP; startup re-spawns interrupted
  exports.
- Sessions slide on activity (no 30-day cliff); JWT expiry deferred to the
  revocable session row; sign-out-everywhere + revoke-on-PIN-reset.
- Ban always hides content (v_feed / find_visible_media / export filter
  is_banned) but stays a read-only ban per USER_JOURNEYS §10 — sessions are
  not revoked, read access + keepsake download preserved.
- Realtime: server-clock SSE delta cursor; event-closed/opened drive the UI
  live; feed_delta rate-limited; like returns {liked, like_count} to fix
  multi-device drift; lightbox live comments; diashow delta backfill.
- Forgotten-PIN in-app request flow; simultaneous same-name join returns 409;
  quota increment is transactional; operator floor.

Adds e2e/specs/10-flow-review/ (offline resume, export integrity, deterministic
anti-race guard) and updates existing specs for the new contracts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-07-10 23:05:37 +02:00
parent 16d1f356be
commit 641174717c
38 changed files with 1400 additions and 153 deletions

View File

@@ -37,9 +37,10 @@ impl FromRequestParts<AppState> for AuthUser {
.strip_prefix("Bearer ")
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Ungültiges Token-Format.".into()))?;
// Verify the JWT (signature + expiry). We deliberately do NOT trust its role/ban
// claims — the live user row below is authoritative — so the decoded claims
// themselves aren't needed beyond this check.
// Verify the JWT's signature. Expiry is deliberately NOT enforced here (see
// `jwt::verify_token`) — the authoritative, sliding session lifetime lives in the
// `session` row read below. We also don't trust the token's role/ban claims; the
// live user row is authoritative, so the decoded claims aren't needed beyond this.
jwt::verify_token(token, &state.config.jwt_secret)
.map_err(|_| AppError::Unauthorized("Token ungültig oder abgelaufen.".into()))?;
@@ -55,14 +56,22 @@ impl FromRequestParts<AppState> for AuthUser {
.map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))?
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Sitzung nicht gefunden oder abgelaufen.".into()))?;
// Update last_seen_at in the background (fire-and-forget). Failures are
// non-fatal but worth surfacing — silent swallowing hides DB connection
// pressure that would otherwise be the first symptom of a real problem.
// Touch last_seen_at AND slide the session's expiry forward (fire-and-forget), so
// an active client's session renews instead of hitting the fixed 30-day cliff.
// Admin sessions keep their tighter 1-day window (they renew on activity but still
// lapse a day after the admin goes idle). Failures are non-fatal but worth
// surfacing — silent swallowing hides DB connection pressure that would otherwise
// be the first symptom of a real problem.
let pool = state.pool.clone();
let touch_hash = token_hash.clone();
let expiry_days = if user.role == UserRole::Admin {
1
} else {
state.config.session_expiry_days
};
tokio::spawn(async move {
if let Err(e) = Session::touch_by_token_hash(&pool, &touch_hash).await {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "session touch failed");
if let Err(e) = Session::touch_and_renew(&pool, &touch_hash, expiry_days).await {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "session touch/renew failed");
}
});