fix(user-flow): close offline-queue, export, session, ban & realtime gaps
Comprehensive user-flow review across guest/host/admin roles, then fixes with
e2e regression guards. Highlights:
- Offline upload queue auto-resumes on reconnect: network errors keep items
pending (not error), 4xx are terminal (no infinite retry), quota exhaustion
returns a distinct 413; queue cap + dedup.
- Export lifecycle: release atomically locks uploads; reopen invalidates and
re-release regenerates the keepsake; workers claim their job atomically so a
reopen->re-release can't corrupt the ZIP; startup re-spawns interrupted
exports.
- Sessions slide on activity (no 30-day cliff); JWT expiry deferred to the
revocable session row; sign-out-everywhere + revoke-on-PIN-reset.
- Ban always hides content (v_feed / find_visible_media / export filter
is_banned) but stays a read-only ban per USER_JOURNEYS §10 — sessions are
not revoked, read access + keepsake download preserved.
- Realtime: server-clock SSE delta cursor; event-closed/opened drive the UI
live; feed_delta rate-limited; like returns {liked, like_count} to fix
multi-device drift; lightbox live comments; diashow delta backfill.
- Forgotten-PIN in-app request flow; simultaneous same-name join returns 409;
quota increment is transactional; operator floor.
Adds e2e/specs/10-flow-review/ (offline resume, export integrity, deterministic
anti-race guard) and updates existing specs for the new contracts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -37,9 +37,10 @@ impl FromRequestParts<AppState> for AuthUser {
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.strip_prefix("Bearer ")
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.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Ungültiges Token-Format.".into()))?;
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// Verify the JWT (signature + expiry). We deliberately do NOT trust its role/ban
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// claims — the live user row below is authoritative — so the decoded claims
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// themselves aren't needed beyond this check.
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// Verify the JWT's signature. Expiry is deliberately NOT enforced here (see
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// `jwt::verify_token`) — the authoritative, sliding session lifetime lives in the
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// `session` row read below. We also don't trust the token's role/ban claims; the
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// live user row is authoritative, so the decoded claims aren't needed beyond this.
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jwt::verify_token(token, &state.config.jwt_secret)
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.map_err(|_| AppError::Unauthorized("Token ungültig oder abgelaufen.".into()))?;
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@@ -55,14 +56,22 @@ impl FromRequestParts<AppState> for AuthUser {
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.map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))?
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.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Sitzung nicht gefunden oder abgelaufen.".into()))?;
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// Update last_seen_at in the background (fire-and-forget). Failures are
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// non-fatal but worth surfacing — silent swallowing hides DB connection
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// pressure that would otherwise be the first symptom of a real problem.
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// Touch last_seen_at AND slide the session's expiry forward (fire-and-forget), so
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// an active client's session renews instead of hitting the fixed 30-day cliff.
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// Admin sessions keep their tighter 1-day window (they renew on activity but still
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// lapse a day after the admin goes idle). Failures are non-fatal but worth
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// surfacing — silent swallowing hides DB connection pressure that would otherwise
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// be the first symptom of a real problem.
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let pool = state.pool.clone();
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let touch_hash = token_hash.clone();
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let expiry_days = if user.role == UserRole::Admin {
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1
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} else {
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state.config.session_expiry_days
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};
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tokio::spawn(async move {
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if let Err(e) = Session::touch_by_token_hash(&pool, &touch_hash).await {
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tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "session touch failed");
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if let Err(e) = Session::touch_and_renew(&pool, &touch_hash, expiry_days).await {
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tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "session touch/renew failed");
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}
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});
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