fix(user-flow): close offline-queue, export, session, ban & realtime gaps
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Comprehensive user-flow review across guest/host/admin roles, then fixes with
e2e regression guards. Highlights:

- Offline upload queue auto-resumes on reconnect: network errors keep items
  pending (not error), 4xx are terminal (no infinite retry), quota exhaustion
  returns a distinct 413; queue cap + dedup.
- Export lifecycle: release atomically locks uploads; reopen invalidates and
  re-release regenerates the keepsake; workers claim their job atomically so a
  reopen->re-release can't corrupt the ZIP; startup re-spawns interrupted
  exports.
- Sessions slide on activity (no 30-day cliff); JWT expiry deferred to the
  revocable session row; sign-out-everywhere + revoke-on-PIN-reset.
- Ban always hides content (v_feed / find_visible_media / export filter
  is_banned) but stays a read-only ban per USER_JOURNEYS §10 — sessions are
  not revoked, read access + keepsake download preserved.
- Realtime: server-clock SSE delta cursor; event-closed/opened drive the UI
  live; feed_delta rate-limited; like returns {liked, like_count} to fix
  multi-device drift; lightbox live comments; diashow delta backfill.
- Forgotten-PIN in-app request flow; simultaneous same-name join returns 409;
  quota increment is transactional; operator floor.

Adds e2e/specs/10-flow-review/ (offline resume, export integrity, deterministic
anti-race guard) and updates existing specs for the new contracts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-07-10 23:05:37 +02:00
parent 16d1f356be
commit 641174717c
38 changed files with 1400 additions and 153 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS pin_reset_request;
-- Restore v_feed without the is_banned filter.
CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW v_feed AS
SELECT
u.id,
u.event_id,
u.user_id,
usr.display_name AS uploader_name,
usr.is_banned,
usr.uploads_hidden,
u.preview_path,
u.thumbnail_path,
u.mime_type,
u.caption,
u.created_at,
COUNT(DISTINCT l.user_id) AS like_count,
COUNT(DISTINCT c.id) AS comment_count
FROM upload u
JOIN "user" usr ON u.user_id = usr.id
LEFT JOIN "like" l ON l.upload_id = u.id
LEFT JOIN comment c ON c.upload_id = u.id AND c.deleted_at IS NULL
WHERE u.deleted_at IS NULL
AND usr.uploads_hidden = FALSE
GROUP BY u.id, usr.display_name, usr.is_banned, usr.uploads_hidden;

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
-- Ban now ALWAYS hides: exclude banned uploaders from the feed view. Previously ban and
-- hide were decoupled (a host could ban without hiding), leaving a banned user's photos on
-- the feed and baked into the export. `find_visible_media` and the export query get the
-- same `is_banned = FALSE` filter in code.
CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW v_feed AS
SELECT
u.id,
u.event_id,
u.user_id,
usr.display_name AS uploader_name,
usr.is_banned,
usr.uploads_hidden,
u.preview_path,
u.thumbnail_path,
u.mime_type,
u.caption,
u.created_at,
COUNT(DISTINCT l.user_id) AS like_count,
COUNT(DISTINCT c.id) AS comment_count
FROM upload u
JOIN "user" usr ON u.user_id = usr.id
LEFT JOIN "like" l ON l.upload_id = u.id
LEFT JOIN comment c ON c.upload_id = u.id AND c.deleted_at IS NULL
WHERE u.deleted_at IS NULL
AND usr.uploads_hidden = FALSE
AND usr.is_banned = FALSE
GROUP BY u.id, usr.display_name, usr.is_banned, usr.uploads_hidden;
-- pin_reset_request: a guest who forgot their PIN (localStorage was the only copy) can ask
-- a host to reset it in-app, instead of being permanently orphaned. One pending request per
-- user; cleared when the host resets the PIN or dismisses it, and cascades if the user/event
-- is removed.
CREATE TABLE pin_reset_request (
id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
event_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES event(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES "user"(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW(),
UNIQUE (user_id)
);

View File

@@ -83,7 +83,19 @@ pub async fn join(
let pin_hash =
bcrypt::hash(&pin, 12).map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(anyhow::anyhow!(e)))?;
let user = User::create(&state.pool, event.id, display_name, &pin_hash).await?;
// The pre-check above is racy: two simultaneous joins with the same name can both
// pass it, and the DB's unique index then rejects the loser. Map that unique
// violation to the same clean 409 the pre-check returns, not a generic 500.
let user = match User::create(&state.pool, event.id, display_name, &pin_hash).await {
Ok(u) => u,
Err(sqlx::Error::Database(db)) if db.is_unique_violation() => {
return Err(AppError::Conflict(format!(
"Der Name \"{}\" ist bereits vergeben.",
display_name
)));
}
Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
};
let token = jwt::create_token(
user.id,
@@ -359,3 +371,77 @@ pub async fn logout(
Session::delete_by_token_hash(&state.pool, &auth.token_hash).await?;
Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}
/// "Sign out everywhere" — revoke every session for the caller, not just the current one.
/// A single leaked/kept-alive device (a shared phone, a laptop recovered via PIN) can then
/// be cut from any of the user's devices.
pub async fn logout_all(
State(state): State<AppState>,
auth: AuthUser,
) -> Result<StatusCode, AppError> {
Session::delete_all_for_user(&state.pool, auth.user_id).await?;
Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct PinResetRequestBody {
pub display_name: String,
}
/// A guest who forgot their PIN asks a host to reset it in-app. Unauthenticated (they
/// can't log in without the PIN) and rate-limited. Always returns 204 regardless of
/// whether the name exists, so it can't enumerate display names beyond what the public
/// feed already exposes.
pub async fn request_pin_reset(
State(state): State<AppState>,
headers: HeaderMap,
Json(body): Json<PinResetRequestBody>,
) -> Result<StatusCode, AppError> {
let display_name = body.display_name.trim();
let ip = client_ip(&headers, "unknown");
let rate_limits_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "rate_limits_enabled", true).await;
if rate_limits_on {
let name_key = display_name.to_lowercase();
if !state.rate_limiter.check(
format!("pin_reset_req:{ip}:{name_key}"),
3,
Duration::from_secs(15 * 60),
) {
return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
"Zu viele Anfragen. Bitte warte kurz und versuche es erneut.".into(),
None,
));
}
}
if display_name.is_empty() {
return Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT);
}
// Single statement so the existing-name and unknown-name paths do IDENTICAL work
// (same event+user index scans, an INSERT that matches 0 rows for an unknown name) —
// no timing oracle despite the always-204 contract. Admins recover via password, so
// they're excluded from the join and never get a reset request queued.
let _ = sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO pin_reset_request (event_id, user_id)
SELECT e.id, u.id
FROM event e
JOIN \"user\" u
ON u.event_id = e.id
AND lower(u.display_name) = lower($2)
AND u.role <> 'admin'
WHERE e.slug = $1
ON CONFLICT (user_id) DO NOTHING",
)
.bind(&state.config.event_slug)
.bind(display_name)
.execute(&state.pool)
.await;
// Broadcast unconditionally (carries no per-name info) so an online host's request
// badge updates without revealing whether the name existed.
let _ = state
.sse_tx
.send(crate::state::SseEvent::new("pin-reset-requested", "{}"));
Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}

View File

@@ -46,10 +46,20 @@ pub fn create_token(
}
pub fn verify_token(token: &str, secret: &str) -> Result<Claims, jsonwebtoken::errors::Error> {
// We deliberately do NOT enforce the JWT's own `exp`. The authoritative session
// lifetime lives in the `session` row (`expires_at > NOW()`), which SLIDES forward on
// every authenticated request (see `Session::touch_and_renew`). Enforcing the JWT's
// fixed +Nd `exp` here would hard-log-out an actively-used client on day N+1 even
// though its session was renewed — the "30-day cliff" from the review. With server-
// side sliding sessions, the token is a signature-checked bearer credential and its
// lifetime is revocable (logout / expiry / ban all delete the row), which is strictly
// stronger than a stateless non-revocable exp.
let mut validation = Validation::default();
validation.validate_exp = false;
let data = jsonwebtoken::decode::<Claims>(
token,
&DecodingKey::from_secret(secret.as_bytes()),
&Validation::default(),
&validation,
)?;
Ok(data.claims)
}

View File

@@ -37,9 +37,10 @@ impl FromRequestParts<AppState> for AuthUser {
.strip_prefix("Bearer ")
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Ungültiges Token-Format.".into()))?;
// Verify the JWT (signature + expiry). We deliberately do NOT trust its role/ban
// claims — the live user row below is authoritative — so the decoded claims
// themselves aren't needed beyond this check.
// Verify the JWT's signature. Expiry is deliberately NOT enforced here (see
// `jwt::verify_token`) — the authoritative, sliding session lifetime lives in the
// `session` row read below. We also don't trust the token's role/ban claims; the
// live user row is authoritative, so the decoded claims aren't needed beyond this.
jwt::verify_token(token, &state.config.jwt_secret)
.map_err(|_| AppError::Unauthorized("Token ungültig oder abgelaufen.".into()))?;
@@ -55,14 +56,22 @@ impl FromRequestParts<AppState> for AuthUser {
.map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))?
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Sitzung nicht gefunden oder abgelaufen.".into()))?;
// Update last_seen_at in the background (fire-and-forget). Failures are
// non-fatal but worth surfacing — silent swallowing hides DB connection
// pressure that would otherwise be the first symptom of a real problem.
// Touch last_seen_at AND slide the session's expiry forward (fire-and-forget), so
// an active client's session renews instead of hitting the fixed 30-day cliff.
// Admin sessions keep their tighter 1-day window (they renew on activity but still
// lapse a day after the admin goes idle). Failures are non-fatal but worth
// surfacing — silent swallowing hides DB connection pressure that would otherwise
// be the first symptom of a real problem.
let pool = state.pool.clone();
let touch_hash = token_hash.clone();
let expiry_days = if user.role == UserRole::Admin {
1
} else {
state.config.session_expiry_days
};
tokio::spawn(async move {
if let Err(e) = Session::touch_by_token_hash(&pool, &touch_hash).await {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "session touch failed");
if let Err(e) = Session::touch_and_renew(&pool, &touch_hash, expiry_days).await {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "session touch/renew failed");
}
});

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ pub enum AppError {
Conflict(String),
/// Second field: optional retry-after seconds to include in the response.
TooManyRequests(String, Option<u64>),
/// Per-user storage quota exhausted. Distinct from `TooManyRequests` (rate limit) so
/// the client can treat it as *terminal* (413, no retry) instead of backing off and
/// retrying a permanently-failing upload forever.
QuotaExceeded(String),
Internal(anyhow::Error),
}
@@ -22,6 +26,7 @@ impl AppError {
Self::NotFound(_) => (StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found"),
Self::Conflict(_) => (StatusCode::CONFLICT, "conflict"),
Self::TooManyRequests(..) => (StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, "too_many_requests"),
Self::QuotaExceeded(_) => (StatusCode::PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE, "quota_exceeded"),
Self::Internal(_) => (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, "internal_error"),
}
}
@@ -34,6 +39,7 @@ impl AppError {
| Self::NotFound(msg)
| Self::Conflict(msg) => msg.clone(),
Self::TooManyRequests(msg, _) => msg.clone(),
Self::QuotaExceeded(msg) => msg.clone(),
Self::Internal(err) => {
tracing::error!("internal error: {err:#}");
"Ein interner Fehler ist aufgetreten.".to_string()

View File

@@ -186,6 +186,11 @@ pub struct DeltaResponse {
/// rather than merging (the older missed uploads are absent and unrecoverable
/// via a later delta, which advances `since` past them).
pub truncated: bool,
/// The server's clock at the moment this delta was computed. The client advances its
/// reconnect cursor from THIS, never `new Date()` — a browser clock even seconds fast
/// would otherwise silently skip uploads whose server `created_at` falls in the skew
/// window (they'd never reappear without a hard refresh).
pub server_time: DateTime<Utc>,
}
pub async fn feed_delta(
@@ -193,6 +198,33 @@ pub async fn feed_delta(
auth: AuthUser,
Query(q): Query<DeltaQuery>,
) -> Result<Json<DeltaResponse>, AppError> {
// Rate-limit the delta the same way as the paginated feed. Without this, ~100 clients
// reconnecting at once (post-outage, or a flapping network) each fire an unbounded
// delta fetch — a reconnect stampede. Keyed per-user so one client can't starve others
// behind a shared NAT.
let rate_limits_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "rate_limits_enabled", true).await;
let feed_rate_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "feed_rate_enabled", true).await;
if rate_limits_on && feed_rate_on {
let rate_limit = config::get_usize(&state.config_cache, "feed_rate_per_min", 60).await;
if !state.rate_limiter.check(
format!("feed_delta:{}", auth.user_id),
rate_limit,
Duration::from_secs(60),
) {
return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
"Zu viele Anfragen. Bitte warte kurz und versuche es erneut.".into(),
None,
));
}
}
// Anchor the next cursor to the DB clock, captured *before* the queries so an upload
// committed during this handler is re-fetched next time rather than skipped (a
// duplicate id merges idempotently on the client; a miss is unrecoverable).
let server_time: DateTime<Utc> = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT NOW()")
.fetch_one(&state.pool)
.await?;
// Bounded like the paginated feed: a stale `since` could otherwise pull the
// entire event's uploads in one response. If a client hits the cap it should
// fall back to a full feed refresh rather than another delta.
@@ -254,6 +286,7 @@ pub async fn feed_delta(
uploads,
deleted_ids: deleted_ids.into_iter().map(|r| r.0).collect(),
truncated,
server_time,
}))
}

View File

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ use crate::auth::middleware::RequireHost;
use crate::error::AppError;
use crate::models::comment::Comment;
use crate::models::event::Event;
use crate::models::session::Session;
use crate::models::upload::Upload;
use crate::models::user::UserRole;
use crate::state::{AppState, SseEvent};
@@ -35,11 +36,27 @@ pub struct EventStatus {
pub export_released: bool,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct BanRequest {
pub hide_uploads: bool,
/// Count non-banned hosts/admins in the event OTHER than `excluding` — the operators
/// who would remain if `excluding` were demoted or banned. Used to enforce the "an event
/// always keeps at least one operator" floor.
async fn remaining_operators(
state: &AppState,
event_id: Uuid,
excluding: Uuid,
) -> Result<i64, AppError> {
let count = sqlx::query_scalar::<_, i64>(
"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM \"user\"
WHERE event_id = $1 AND id != $2
AND role IN ('host', 'admin') AND is_banned = FALSE",
)
.bind(event_id)
.bind(excluding)
.fetch_one(&state.pool)
.await?;
Ok(count)
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct SetRoleRequest {
pub role: String,
@@ -93,8 +110,8 @@ pub async fn ban_user(
State(state): State<AppState>,
RequireHost(auth): RequireHost,
Path(user_id): Path<Uuid>,
Json(body): Json<BanRequest>,
) -> Result<StatusCode, AppError> {
// The ban request carries no body — ban always hides (no per-request options).
// Cannot ban yourself or another host/admin
if user_id == auth.user_id {
return Err(AppError::BadRequest("Du kannst dich nicht selbst sperren.".into()));
@@ -112,29 +129,46 @@ pub async fn ban_user(
return Err(AppError::Forbidden("Du kannst diesen Benutzer nicht sperren.".into()));
}
// Floor: never leave the event with zero operators. Banning removes the target from
// the active-operator pool, so refuse if they're the last non-banned host/admin.
if target.0 == "host" && remaining_operators(&state, auth.event_id, user_id).await? == 0 {
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
"Der letzte Host kann nicht gesperrt werden.".into(),
));
}
// Ban ALWAYS hides: a banned user's content is "gone" everywhere. The visibility
// views/queries now also filter on `is_banned` (defense in depth), and we set
// `uploads_hidden` so the existing `user-hidden` live-eviction path fires too. The old
// opt-out checkbox is gone — `hide_uploads` in the request is ignored.
//
// We deliberately do NOT revoke the banned user's sessions. This is a *read-only ban*
// by design (USER_JOURNEYS §10.3): the user keeps read access to the feed and can still
// download the released export — writes and host/admin actions are what the ban blocks
// (enforced live on the write handlers + Require{Host,Admin}). Revoking sessions would
// contradict that model, break the documented "banned guest can still download the
// keepsake" flow, and be ineffective anyway (the user could just /recover a new session).
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE \"user\" SET is_banned = TRUE, uploads_hidden = $2 WHERE id = $1 AND event_id = $3",
"UPDATE \"user\" SET is_banned = TRUE, uploads_hidden = TRUE WHERE id = $1 AND event_id = $2",
)
.bind(user_id)
.bind(body.hide_uploads)
.bind(auth.event_id)
.execute(&state.pool)
.await?;
// If we hid their uploads, evict them live from every feed + the diashow so a
// banned guest's content disappears without each viewer having to reload.
if body.hide_uploads {
let _ = state.sse_tx.send(SseEvent::new(
"user-hidden",
serde_json::json!({ "user_id": user_id }).to_string(),
));
}
// Evict their content live from every feed + the diashow so it disappears without
// each viewer having to reload. (Their own SSE stream is separately dropped by the
// is_banned revalidation in `sse::stream`, so they stop receiving live pushes while
// retaining plain read access.)
let _ = state.sse_tx.send(SseEvent::new(
"user-hidden",
serde_json::json!({ "user_id": user_id }).to_string(),
));
tracing::info!(
actor_user_id = %auth.user_id,
target_user_id = %user_id,
event_id = %auth.event_id,
hide_uploads = body.hide_uploads,
"host: ban_user"
);
@@ -166,8 +200,10 @@ pub async fn unban_user(
));
}
// Unban restores visibility too: ban set `uploads_hidden = TRUE`, so clearing only
// `is_banned` would leave their content invisible. Clear both.
let result = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE \"user\" SET is_banned = FALSE WHERE id = $1 AND event_id = $2",
"UPDATE \"user\" SET is_banned = FALSE, uploads_hidden = FALSE WHERE id = $1 AND event_id = $2",
)
.bind(user_id)
.bind(auth.event_id)
@@ -230,6 +266,17 @@ pub async fn set_role(
));
}
// Floor: demoting the last non-banned host/admin to guest would leave the event with
// no operator. Refuse.
if new_role == "guest"
&& target.0 == "host"
&& remaining_operators(&state, auth.event_id, user_id).await? == 0
{
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
"Der letzte Host kann nicht zum Gast gemacht werden.".into(),
));
}
sqlx::query("UPDATE \"user\" SET role = $2::user_role WHERE id = $1 AND event_id = $3")
.bind(user_id)
.bind(new_role)
@@ -308,6 +355,16 @@ pub async fn reset_user_pin(
.execute(&state.pool)
.await?;
// A PIN reset means the old credential is compromised/forgotten — revoke every
// existing session so old devices must re-authenticate with the new PIN.
let _ = Session::delete_all_for_user(&state.pool, user_id).await;
// Resolve any pending in-app "I forgot my PIN" request for this user.
let _ = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM pin_reset_request WHERE user_id = $1")
.bind(user_id)
.execute(&state.pool)
.await;
// Notify the *recipient* device(s) if they happen to be online so they can clear
// their cached local PIN. They'll save the new one on the next /recover.
let _ = state.sse_tx.send(SseEvent::new(
@@ -325,6 +382,48 @@ pub async fn reset_user_pin(
Ok(Json(PinResetResponse { pin }))
}
#[derive(Serialize, sqlx::FromRow)]
pub struct PinResetRequestSummary {
pub id: Uuid,
pub user_id: Uuid,
pub display_name: String,
pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
}
/// List pending in-app PIN-reset requests so a host can action them (via the existing
/// `reset_user_pin`, which also clears the request).
pub async fn list_pin_reset_requests(
State(state): State<AppState>,
RequireHost(auth): RequireHost,
) -> Result<Json<Vec<PinResetRequestSummary>>, AppError> {
let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, PinResetRequestSummary>(
"SELECT r.id, r.user_id, u.display_name, r.created_at
FROM pin_reset_request r
JOIN \"user\" u ON u.id = r.user_id
WHERE r.event_id = $1
ORDER BY r.created_at ASC",
)
.bind(auth.event_id)
.fetch_all(&state.pool)
.await?;
Ok(Json(rows))
}
/// Dismiss a PIN-reset request without resetting (e.g. the host couldn't verify the
/// requester's identity).
pub async fn dismiss_pin_reset_request(
State(state): State<AppState>,
RequireHost(auth): RequireHost,
Path(id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<StatusCode, AppError> {
sqlx::query("DELETE FROM pin_reset_request WHERE id = $1 AND event_id = $2")
.bind(id)
.bind(auth.event_id)
.execute(&state.pool)
.await?;
Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}
pub async fn host_delete_upload(
State(state): State<AppState>,
RequireHost(auth): RequireHost,
@@ -401,8 +500,17 @@ pub async fn open_event(
State(state): State<AppState>,
RequireHost(_auth): RequireHost,
) -> Result<StatusCode, AppError> {
// Reopening also invalidates any prior release: the keepsake was snapshotted at
// release time, so allowing new uploads afterwards would silently diverge the live
// feed from the frozen export. Clearing `export_released_at` (and the readiness
// flags) lets the host re-release later to regenerate a correct, complete keepsake.
let result = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE event SET uploads_locked_at = NULL WHERE slug = $1 AND uploads_locked_at IS NOT NULL",
"UPDATE event
SET uploads_locked_at = NULL,
export_released_at = NULL,
export_zip_ready = FALSE,
export_html_ready = FALSE
WHERE slug = $1 AND (uploads_locked_at IS NOT NULL OR export_released_at IS NOT NULL)",
)
.bind(&state.config.event_slug)
.execute(&state.pool)
@@ -422,8 +530,15 @@ pub async fn release_gallery(
// Atomic claim: the conditional UPDATE is the sole gate, so two concurrent
// release calls can't both pass a check-then-set and double-enqueue exports.
// rows_affected == 0 means someone already released.
//
// Releasing also locks uploads in the same statement (release ⇒ lock). Otherwise a
// guest whose offline upload reconnects *after* the export snapshot would land in the
// live feed but not in the downloaded keepsake — a silent, non-regenerable data loss.
// `COALESCE` preserves an earlier explicit lock time rather than overwriting it.
let result = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE event SET export_released_at = NOW()
"UPDATE event
SET export_released_at = NOW(),
uploads_locked_at = COALESCE(uploads_locked_at, NOW())
WHERE slug = $1 AND export_released_at IS NULL",
)
.bind(&state.config.event_slug)
@@ -441,32 +556,26 @@ pub async fn release_gallery(
});
}
// Release locked uploads too — tell any open composer to flip to the locked UI live
// rather than discovering it via a rejected upload.
let _ = state.sse_tx.send(SseEvent::new("event-closed", "{}"));
// We won the claim — load the event for its id/name to enqueue export jobs.
let event = Event::find_by_slug(&state.pool, &state.config.event_slug)
.await?
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Event nicht gefunden.".into()))?;
// Enqueue export jobs
for export_type in ["zip", "html"] {
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO export_job (event_id, type) VALUES ($1, $2::export_type)
ON CONFLICT (event_id, type) DO NOTHING",
)
.bind(event.id)
.bind(export_type)
.execute(&state.pool)
.await?;
}
// Spawn export workers
crate::services::export::spawn_export_jobs(
// Enqueue + spawn via the shared path so a re-release (after reopen) regenerates
// cleanly and startup recovery uses identical logic.
crate::services::export::enqueue_and_spawn_exports(
event.id,
event.name,
state.pool.clone(),
state.config.media_path.clone(),
state.config.export_path.clone(),
state.sse_tx.clone(),
);
)
.await?;
Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}

View File

@@ -55,6 +55,12 @@ pub struct MeContextDto {
pub privacy_note: String,
pub quota_enabled: bool,
pub storage_quota_enabled: bool,
/// Uploads are locked (event closed) — the composer should show a locked state live
/// instead of letting a guest compose an upload only to eat a 403.
pub uploads_locked: bool,
/// The gallery has been released and the export snapshotted — uploads are permanently
/// closed for this run (release ⇒ lock, and reopening regenerates).
pub gallery_released: bool,
}
pub async fn get_context(
@@ -69,6 +75,11 @@ pub async fn get_context(
let quota_enabled = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "quota_enabled", true).await;
let storage_quota_enabled = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "storage_quota_enabled", true).await;
let event = crate::models::event::Event::find_by_slug(&state.pool, &state.config.event_slug)
.await?;
let uploads_locked = event.as_ref().map(|e| e.uploads_locked_at.is_some()).unwrap_or(false);
let gallery_released = event.as_ref().map(|e| e.export_released_at.is_some()).unwrap_or(false);
Ok(Json(MeContextDto {
user_id: user.id,
display_name: user.display_name,
@@ -76,5 +87,7 @@ pub async fn get_context(
privacy_note,
quota_enabled,
storage_quota_enabled,
uploads_locked,
gallery_released,
}))
}

View File

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ use axum::extract::{Path, Query, State};
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use axum::Json;
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::auth::middleware::AuthUser;
@@ -12,11 +12,22 @@ use crate::models::hashtag::{self, Hashtag};
use crate::models::upload::Upload;
use crate::state::AppState;
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub struct LikeResponse {
/// The caller's like state *after* this toggle. The client sets `liked_by_me` from
/// this rather than blind-inverting local state — otherwise a second device (same
/// recovered user) drifts, since the `like-update` broadcast only carries `like_count`.
pub liked: bool,
/// Fresh like count, or `null` if the (best-effort) count query hiccuped. The client
/// keeps its current count when this is null rather than adopting a wrong number.
pub like_count: Option<i64>,
}
pub async fn toggle_like(
State(state): State<AppState>,
auth: AuthUser,
Path(upload_id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<StatusCode, AppError> {
) -> Result<Json<LikeResponse>, AppError> {
// Check if user is banned
let user = crate::models::user::User::find_by_id(&state.pool, auth.user_id)
.await?
@@ -35,7 +46,7 @@ pub async fn toggle_like(
// ("Event schließen") freezes *new uploads* only — likes, comments and
// browsing stay open (USER_JOURNEYS §9.3, FEATURES capability matrix).
// Try to insert; if conflict, delete (toggle)
// Try to insert; if conflict, delete (toggle). `liked` = the caller's state afterwards.
let result = sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO \"like\" (upload_id, user_id) VALUES ($1, $2)
ON CONFLICT (upload_id, user_id) DO NOTHING",
@@ -45,7 +56,8 @@ pub async fn toggle_like(
.execute(&state.pool)
.await?;
if result.rows_affected() == 0 {
let liked = result.rows_affected() > 0;
if !liked {
// Already liked — remove
sqlx::query("DELETE FROM \"like\" WHERE upload_id = $1 AND user_id = $2")
.bind(upload_id)
@@ -55,24 +67,29 @@ pub async fn toggle_like(
}
// Fresh count so feed clients can patch the single card in place instead of
// refetching page 1 (mirrors v_feed.like_count = COUNT(DISTINCT user_id)). The
// count + broadcast are a UI optimisation — the like itself is already committed,
// so a failure here must not fail the request. Swallow the error and skip the
// broadcast; the next event or a pull-to-refresh reconciles the count.
if let Ok(like_count) = sqlx::query_scalar::<_, i64>(
// refetching page 1 (mirrors v_feed.like_count = COUNT(DISTINCT user_id)). The like
// itself is already committed, so a failed count must not fail the request — but we
// also must NOT broadcast/return a bogus 0 (that would push like_count: 0 to every
// client until the next event). On error we skip the broadcast and return null.
let like_count = sqlx::query_scalar::<_, i64>(
"SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT user_id) FROM \"like\" WHERE upload_id = $1",
)
.bind(upload_id)
.fetch_one(&state.pool)
.await
{
.ok();
if let Some(count) = like_count {
// Broadcast the new count so other clients patch their card. Only `like_count` is
// shared — each client's own `liked_by_me` only changes via its own toggle (which
// now reads it straight from this response).
let _ = state.sse_tx.send(crate::state::SseEvent {
event_type: "like-update".to_string(),
data: serde_json::json!({ "upload_id": upload_id, "like_count": like_count }).to_string(),
data: serde_json::json!({ "upload_id": upload_id, "like_count": count }).to_string(),
});
}
Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
Ok(Json(LikeResponse { liked, like_count }))
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Default)]

View File

@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ pub struct SseQuery {
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub struct StreamTicketResponse {
pub ticket: String,
/// Server clock at mint time — the client seeds its SSE reconnect cursor from this
/// instead of `new Date()`, so a skewed browser clock can't drop uploads. See
/// `DeltaResponse::server_time`.
pub server_time: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
}
/// Mint a short-lived single-use SSE ticket. The browser's `EventSource` cannot
@@ -33,9 +37,12 @@ pub struct StreamTicketResponse {
pub async fn issue_ticket(
State(state): State<AppState>,
auth: AuthUser,
) -> Json<StreamTicketResponse> {
) -> Result<Json<StreamTicketResponse>, AppError> {
let ticket = state.sse_tickets.issue(auth.token_hash);
Json(StreamTicketResponse { ticket })
let server_time = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT NOW()")
.fetch_one(&state.pool)
.await?;
Ok(Json(StreamTicketResponse { ticket, server_time }))
}
/// SSE stream endpoint. Authenticates via a single-use ticket (see
@@ -74,9 +81,12 @@ pub async fn stream(
});
// The session is only checked once at open. Re-validate it periodically so a
// logged-out or expired session's stream is closed rather than kept alive until the
// client happens to disconnect. Bounds a stale stream to ~60s. Only a *definitively*
// gone/expired session ends the stream; a transient DB error just retries next tick.
// logged-out, expired, OR banned session's stream is closed rather than kept alive
// until the client happens to disconnect. Bounds a stale stream to ~60s. Banning
// already revokes the user's sessions (so the row is gone), but re-reading the live
// user row and dropping on `is_banned` is a cheap defense-in-depth. Only a
// *definitive* gone/expired/banned state ends the stream; a transient DB error just
// retries next tick.
let pool = state.pool.clone();
let session_hash = token_hash.clone();
let session_gone = async move {
@@ -84,9 +94,10 @@ pub async fn stream(
ticker.tick().await; // consume the immediate first tick
loop {
ticker.tick().await;
match Session::find_by_token_hash(&pool, &session_hash).await {
Ok(Some(_)) => {} // still valid — keep streaming
Ok(None) => break, // logged out or expired — stop
match Session::find_user_by_token_hash(&pool, &session_hash).await {
Ok(Some(user)) if !user.is_banned => {} // still valid — keep streaming
Ok(Some(_)) => break, // banned — cut the stream
Ok(None) => break, // logged out or expired — stop
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "SSE session revalidation query failed; retrying");
}

View File

@@ -77,6 +77,13 @@ pub async fn upload(
drain_multipart(multipart).await;
return Err(AppError::Forbidden("Uploads sind gesperrt.".into()));
}
// Belt-and-suspenders on top of the lock (release ⇒ lock): once the gallery is
// released the export has been snapshotted, so a late upload could never make it into
// the keepsake. Reject it explicitly rather than silently diverging the live feed.
if event.export_released_at.is_some() {
drain_multipart(multipart).await;
return Err(AppError::Forbidden("Galerie wurde bereits freigegeben.".into()));
}
// Read config limits from DB
let max_image_mb: i64 = config::get_i64(&state.config_cache, "max_image_size_mb", 20).await;
@@ -213,15 +220,21 @@ pub async fn upload(
// disable it on trusted instances.
let quota_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "quota_enabled", true).await;
let storage_quota_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "storage_quota_enabled", true).await;
// When quota is enforced, this holds the byte ceiling so the increment UPDATE below can
// enforce it atomically (`WHERE total + size <= limit`). Without that guard, two
// concurrent uploads from the same user (e.g. phone + laptop) both pass this stale
// pre-check and both increment, blowing past the quota. The pre-check stays as a
// fast path that avoids the disk write when the user is already clearly over.
let mut quota_limit: Option<i64> = None;
if quota_on && storage_quota_on {
let estimate = compute_storage_quota(&state).await;
if let Some(limit) = estimate.limit_bytes {
quota_limit = Some(limit);
let prospective_total = user.total_upload_bytes.saturating_add(size);
if prospective_total > limit {
let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&temp_abs).await;
return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
return Err(AppError::QuotaExceeded(
"Du hast dein Upload-Limit für dieses Event erreicht.".into(),
None,
));
}
}
@@ -256,11 +269,33 @@ pub async fn upload(
// bytes with no row to reclaim them (silent quota erosion / spurious lockout).
let tx_result: Result<Upload, AppError> = async {
let mut tx = state.pool.begin().await?;
sqlx::query("UPDATE \"user\" SET total_upload_bytes = total_upload_bytes + $2 WHERE id = $1")
// Increment the user's byte total. When a quota is in force, guard it atomically
// (`total + size <= limit`) so two concurrent uploads can't both slip past the
// stale pre-check — the loser's UPDATE matches 0 rows and we abort with the same
// terminal quota error (the tx rolls back on drop; the on-disk file is cleaned by
// the error path below).
let inc = if let Some(limit) = quota_limit {
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE \"user\" SET total_upload_bytes = total_upload_bytes + $2
WHERE id = $1 AND total_upload_bytes + $2 <= $3",
)
.bind(auth.user_id)
.bind(size)
.bind(limit)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?;
.await?
} else {
sqlx::query("UPDATE \"user\" SET total_upload_bytes = total_upload_bytes + $2 WHERE id = $1")
.bind(auth.user_id)
.bind(size)
.execute(&mut *tx)
.await?
};
if inc.rows_affected() == 0 {
return Err(AppError::QuotaExceeded(
"Du hast dein Upload-Limit für dieses Event erreicht.".into(),
));
}
let upload = Upload::create(
&mut *tx,
auth.event_id,

View File

@@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
let state = AppState::new(pool.clone(), config.clone());
// Re-spawn exports for events that were released but whose keepsake never finished
// (crash mid-export). Needs the media/export paths + SSE sender, so it runs here
// rather than inside `startup_recovery`. Fire-and-forget: the workers run in the
// background; the HTTP server can start accepting requests meanwhile.
services::export::recover_exports(
pool.clone(),
config.media_path.clone(),
config.export_path.clone(),
state.sse_tx.clone(),
)
.await;
// Hourly background hygiene: prune expired sessions, evict cold rate-limiter
// keys. Keeps the DB and process from growing unboundedly over multi-day events.
services::maintenance::spawn_periodic_tasks(
@@ -60,8 +72,12 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
.route("/api/v1/event", get(handlers::public::get_public_event))
.route("/api/v1/join", post(auth::handlers::join))
.route("/api/v1/recover", post(auth::handlers::recover))
// Forgotten-PIN escape hatch: ask a host to reset it (unauthenticated, throttled).
.route("/api/v1/recover/request", post(auth::handlers::request_pin_reset))
.route("/api/v1/admin/login", post(auth::handlers::admin_login))
.route("/api/v1/session", delete(auth::handlers::logout))
// "Sign out everywhere" — revoke all of the caller's sessions.
.route("/api/v1/sessions", delete(auth::handlers::logout_all))
// Upload — HTTP-level body cap as an OOM backstop. The handler still enforces
// the precise per-class limits from DB config (max_image/video_size_mb); this
// layer just stops a multi-GB body from being buffered into memory before that
@@ -118,6 +134,14 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
"/api/v1/host/users/{id}/pin-reset",
post(handlers::host::reset_user_pin),
)
.route(
"/api/v1/host/pin-reset-requests",
get(handlers::host::list_pin_reset_requests),
)
.route(
"/api/v1/host/pin-reset-requests/{id}",
delete(handlers::host::dismiss_pin_reset_request),
)
.route("/api/v1/host/upload/{id}", delete(handlers::host::host_delete_upload))
.route("/api/v1/host/comment/{id}", delete(handlers::host::host_delete_comment))
// Export (all authenticated users)

View File

@@ -65,13 +65,25 @@ impl Session {
.await
}
/// Update `last_seen_at`, keyed by the token hash so the auth extractor can touch a
/// session without a separate query to fetch its id first.
pub async fn touch_by_token_hash(pool: &PgPool, token_hash: &str) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
sqlx::query("UPDATE session SET last_seen_at = NOW() WHERE token_hash = $1")
.bind(token_hash)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
/// Touch `last_seen_at` AND slide `expires_at` forward by `expiry_days` from now, so
/// an actively-used session never hits the fixed 30-day cliff (it renews on every
/// authenticated request). An idle session still expires `expiry_days` after its last
/// activity. Keyed by token hash so the auth extractor needs no prior id lookup.
pub async fn touch_and_renew(
pool: &PgPool,
token_hash: &str,
expiry_days: i64,
) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE session
SET last_seen_at = NOW(),
expires_at = NOW() + ($2 || ' days')::interval
WHERE token_hash = $1",
)
.bind(token_hash)
.bind(expiry_days.to_string())
.execute(pool)
.await?;
Ok(())
}
@@ -85,4 +97,14 @@ impl Session {
.await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Revoke every session for a user. Backs "sign out everywhere" and the forced
/// re-auth after a host PIN-reset or a ban. Returns the number of sessions cleared.
pub async fn delete_all_for_user(pool: &PgPool, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<u64, sqlx::Error> {
let r = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM session WHERE user_id = $1")
.bind(user_id)
.execute(pool)
.await?;
Ok(r.rows_affected())
}
}

View File

@@ -86,9 +86,9 @@ impl Upload {
/// Lean lookup for the public media aliases (`get_original`/`get_preview`/
/// `get_thumbnail`): returns ONLY the file paths + mime for a visible upload —
/// excluding soft-deleted rows and ban-hidden owners (`user.uploads_hidden`), the
/// same filter `v_feed` applies. So moderation that removes a post from the feed
/// also stops its original/preview/thumbnail from being pulled by UUID.
/// excluding soft-deleted rows, hidden owners (`uploads_hidden`), and banned owners
/// (`is_banned`) — the same filter `v_feed` applies. So moderation that removes a post
/// from the feed also stops its original/preview/thumbnail from being pulled by UUID.
///
/// Selects four columns instead of the whole `Upload` row: this runs once per image
/// per cache-miss on the media hot path, so we avoid hydrating fields the response
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ impl Upload {
"SELECT up.original_path, up.preview_path, up.thumbnail_path, up.mime_type
FROM upload up
JOIN \"user\" u ON u.id = up.user_id
WHERE up.id = $1 AND up.deleted_at IS NULL AND u.uploads_hidden = false",
WHERE up.id = $1 AND up.deleted_at IS NULL
AND u.uploads_hidden = false AND u.is_banned = false",
)
.bind(id)
.fetch_optional(pool)

View File

@@ -82,6 +82,91 @@ struct ViewerMedia {
// ── Entry point ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/// (Re)enqueue the export jobs for an event and spawn the workers. Safe to call on a
/// fresh release *and* on a re-release: the `export_job` rows are reset to a clean
/// `pending` state (clearing any prior `failed`/`done` from an earlier run) and the
/// event's `export_*_ready` flags are cleared so downloads reflect the regenerating
/// export rather than the stale one. This is the single path used by `release_gallery`
/// and by startup export recovery, so the two can't drift.
pub async fn enqueue_and_spawn_exports(
event_id: Uuid,
event_name: String,
pool: PgPool,
media_path: PathBuf,
export_path: PathBuf,
sse_tx: broadcast::Sender<SseEvent>,
) -> Result<()> {
for export_type in ["zip", "html"] {
// Reset a prior 'done'/'failed' row to 'pending' so this (re)release regenerates —
// but DO NOT touch a row that's still 'running'. If a worker from an earlier
// release is mid-export, leaving it 'running' makes the worker we spawn below bail
// its claim (WHERE status='pending' → 0 rows), so the two never race the temp file.
sqlx::query(
"INSERT INTO export_job (event_id, type, status, progress_pct)
VALUES ($1, $2::export_type, 'pending', 0)
ON CONFLICT (event_id, type) DO UPDATE
SET status = 'pending', progress_pct = 0, file_path = NULL,
error_message = NULL, completed_at = NULL
WHERE export_job.status <> 'running'",
)
.bind(event_id)
.bind(export_type)
.execute(&pool)
.await?;
}
// Clear readiness so /export downloads 404 until the fresh run completes, instead of
// serving a stale keepsake that predates a reopen→re-release.
sqlx::query("UPDATE event SET export_zip_ready = FALSE, export_html_ready = FALSE WHERE id = $1")
.bind(event_id)
.execute(&pool)
.await?;
spawn_export_jobs(event_id, event_name, pool, media_path, export_path, sse_tx);
Ok(())
}
/// Startup export recovery: re-spawn exports for any released event whose keepsake is
/// not fully ready (a crash mid-export left `export_released_at` set but the ZIP/HTML
/// jobs `failed`). Without this, `release_gallery` would reject a retry with "bereits
/// freigegeben" and downloads would 404 forever. Runs once at boot, after `AppState`
/// exists (it needs the media/export paths + SSE sender).
pub async fn recover_exports(
pool: PgPool,
media_path: PathBuf,
export_path: PathBuf,
sse_tx: broadcast::Sender<SseEvent>,
) {
let rows = match sqlx::query_as::<_, (Uuid, String)>(
"SELECT id, name FROM event
WHERE export_released_at IS NOT NULL
AND NOT (export_zip_ready AND export_html_ready)",
)
.fetch_all(&pool)
.await
{
Ok(r) => r,
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!("export recovery: failed to query released events: {e:#}");
return;
}
};
for (event_id, event_name) in rows {
tracing::warn!("export recovery: re-spawning export jobs for event {event_id}");
if let Err(e) = enqueue_and_spawn_exports(
event_id,
event_name,
pool.clone(),
media_path.clone(),
export_path.clone(),
sse_tx.clone(),
)
.await
{
tracing::error!("export recovery: failed to re-spawn for event {event_id}: {e:#}");
}
}
}
pub fn spawn_export_jobs(
event_id: Uuid,
event_name: String,
@@ -124,7 +209,10 @@ async fn run_zip_export(
export_path: &Path,
sse_tx: &broadcast::Sender<SseEvent>,
) -> Result<()> {
mark_running(pool, event_id, "zip").await;
if !claim_job(pool, event_id, "zip").await {
// Another worker already owns this ZIP export — bail rather than race the temp file.
return Ok(());
}
let uploads = query_uploads(pool, event_id).await?;
let total = uploads.len().max(1) as f32;
@@ -217,7 +305,10 @@ async fn run_html_export(
export_path: &Path,
sse_tx: &broadcast::Sender<SseEvent>,
) -> Result<()> {
mark_running(pool, event_id, "html").await;
if !claim_job(pool, event_id, "html").await {
// Another worker already owns this HTML export — bail rather than race the temp dir.
return Ok(());
}
// 1. Query data
let uploads = query_uploads(pool, event_id).await?;
@@ -511,7 +602,8 @@ async fn query_uploads(pool: &PgPool, event_id: Uuid) -> Result<Vec<ExportUpload
FROM upload u
JOIN \"user\" usr ON usr.id = u.user_id
LEFT JOIN \"like\" l ON l.upload_id = u.id
WHERE u.event_id = $1 AND u.deleted_at IS NULL AND usr.uploads_hidden = FALSE
WHERE u.event_id = $1 AND u.deleted_at IS NULL
AND usr.uploads_hidden = FALSE AND usr.is_banned = FALSE
GROUP BY u.id, usr.display_name
ORDER BY u.created_at ASC",
)
@@ -548,14 +640,24 @@ async fn query_hashtags(pool: &PgPool, event_id: Uuid) -> Result<Vec<(Uuid, Stri
Ok(rows)
}
async fn mark_running(pool: &PgPool, event_id: Uuid, export_type: &str) {
let _ = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE export_job SET status = 'running' WHERE event_id = $1 AND type = $2::export_type",
/// Atomically claim a pending export job for this worker. Returns `true` only if we won
/// (status flipped `pending`→`running` in one statement). Returns `false` when another
/// worker already owns it — e.g. a reopen→re-release spawned a second worker while a run
/// from the first release is still in flight. Both write the SAME fixed temp path
/// (`Gallery.zip.tmp` / `viewer_tmp_*`), so a loser MUST NOT run or it would interleave
/// bytes and corrupt the archive. The row-level lock serializes the two UPDATEs, so
/// exactly one sees `status = 'pending'`.
async fn claim_job(pool: &PgPool, event_id: Uuid, export_type: &str) -> bool {
sqlx::query(
"UPDATE export_job SET status = 'running'
WHERE event_id = $1 AND type = $2::export_type AND status = 'pending'",
)
.bind(event_id)
.bind(export_type)
.execute(pool)
.await;
.await
.map(|r| r.rows_affected() > 0)
.unwrap_or(false)
}
async fn mark_failed(pool: &PgPool, event_id: Uuid, export_type: &str, msg: &str) {

View File

@@ -44,8 +44,11 @@ pub async fn startup_recovery(pool: &PgPool) {
Err(e) => tracing::error!("startup recovery: failed to sweep uploads: {e:#}"),
}
// Export jobs interrupted mid-run. Mark 'failed' so the host can re-trigger.
// The `UNIQUE(event_id, type)` constraint would otherwise block re-release.
// Export jobs interrupted mid-run are marked 'failed' here so they aren't left
// 'running' forever. The host CANNOT re-trigger a released export (release_gallery
// rejects an already-released event), so `export::recover_exports` re-spawns these
// failed-but-released jobs from `main` once `AppState` exists (it needs the media
// paths + SSE sender this fn doesn't have).
match sqlx::query(
"UPDATE export_job
SET status = 'failed',

View File

@@ -42,7 +42,11 @@ pub struct AppState {
impl AppState {
pub fn new(pool: PgPool, config: AppConfig) -> Self {
let (sse_tx, _) = broadcast::channel(256);
// Broadcast buffer for live SSE fan-out. Sized to absorb a burst (e.g. many
// uploads landing at once during a busy moment) before a slow consumer lags and
// has to `resync`. The resync path is a correctness backstop, not the happy path —
// a roomier buffer keeps ~1000 concurrent clients from all resyncing at once.
let (sse_tx, _) = broadcast::channel(1024);
let compression = CompressionWorker::new(
pool.clone(),
config.media_path.clone(),

View File

@@ -129,9 +129,9 @@ the Host can clean up later).
viewer). Progress is visible in the Admin dashboard's Export tab; SSE
`export-progress` keeps it live; `export-available` notifies all guests when ready.
5. **Nutzerverwaltung** — search users; per-user controls:
- **Sperren** opens a confirmation modal with a checkbox "Uploads aus der Galerie
ausblenden" — Host chooses whether to hide the user's existing uploads or leave them
visible. Submitting calls `POST /host/users/{id}/ban` with `hide_uploads`.
- **Sperren** opens a confirmation modal. Banning **always hides** the user's existing
uploads (a banned user's content is "gone" everywhere) — there is no opt-out. Submitting
calls `POST /host/users/{id}/ban` (no body).
- **Entsperren** lifts the ban.
- **Host** promotes a guest to host.
- **Degradieren** — visible on Host rows. A Host can demote *other* Hosts back to
@@ -154,11 +154,15 @@ the Host can clean up later).
("Du bist gesperrt."). Ban enforcement lives on the write handlers and the
host/admin extractors, not the base auth extractor.
3. They can still browse the read-only feed (and download the export once it's released).
Their sessions are **not** revoked — this is a read-only ban, not a logout. Their own
live SSE stream is dropped by the `is_banned` revalidation (no live pushes), but plain
feed reads still work.
4. They cannot upload, like, or comment; a banned host also loses all host/admin
actions (including unbanning themselves).
5. If `hide_uploads` was set on the ban, their existing uploads are filtered out of the
feed for everyone (`v_feed` enforces this), and a live `user-hidden` SSE event evicts
their cards from every open feed + the diashow without a reload.
5. Banning **always hides**: the user's existing uploads are filtered out of the feed for
everyone (`v_feed`, `find_visible_media`, and the export query all enforce
`is_banned = FALSE`), and a live `user-hidden` SSE event evicts their cards from every
open feed + the diashow without a reload.
## 11. Admin — instance configuration

View File

@@ -31,21 +31,21 @@ test.describe('Feed — like + comment', () => {
expect(row.liked_by_me).toBe(false);
// First like → counted exactly once.
expect(await like(liker.jwt, uploadId)).toBe(204);
expect(await like(liker.jwt, uploadId)).toBe(200);
row = findFeedRow(await api.getFeed(liker.jwt), uploadId);
expect(row.like_count).toBe(1);
expect(row.liked_by_me).toBe(true);
// Liking again is a toggle → back to zero (guards against a regression that
// double-counts a repeated like instead of removing it).
expect(await like(liker.jwt, uploadId)).toBe(204);
expect(await like(liker.jwt, uploadId)).toBe(200);
row = findFeedRow(await api.getFeed(liker.jwt), uploadId);
expect(row.like_count).toBe(0);
expect(row.liked_by_me).toBe(false);
// A second distinct user's like is counted independently (per-user semantics).
expect(await like(liker.jwt, uploadId)).toBe(204); // liker likes again → 1
expect(await like(author.jwt, uploadId)).toBe(204); // author likes too → 2
expect(await like(liker.jwt, uploadId)).toBe(200); // liker likes again → 1
expect(await like(author.jwt, uploadId)).toBe(200); // author likes too → 2
row = findFeedRow(await api.getFeed(liker.jwt), uploadId);
expect(row.like_count).toBe(2);
});

View File

@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ test.describe('Host — event lock', () => {
method: 'POST',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${g.jwt}` },
});
expect(likeRes.status).toBe(204);
expect(likeRes.status).toBe(200);
// Comments stay open on a locked event.
const commentRes = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/upload/${id}/comments`, {

View File

@@ -16,13 +16,15 @@ test.describe('Host — moderation API', () => {
expect(row?.uploads_hidden).toBe(true);
});
test('ban without hiding leaves uploads_hidden=false', async ({ api, host, guest }) => {
test('ban always hides — the hide_uploads flag is ignored (USER_JOURNEYS §10.5)', async ({ api, host, guest }) => {
// Ban is now unconditionally a hide: even asking NOT to hide still hides, because a
// banned user's content is "gone" everywhere. The legacy hide_uploads arg is ignored.
const target = await guest('Banned2');
await api.banUser(host.jwt, target.userId, false);
const users = await api.listUsers(host.jwt);
const row = users.find((u: any) => u.id === target.userId);
expect(row?.is_banned).toBe(true);
expect(row?.uploads_hidden).toBe(false);
expect(row?.uploads_hidden).toBe(true);
});
test('banned user cannot call /upload', async ({ api, host, guest }) => {
@@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ test.describe('Host — live role/ban revocation (H1)', () => {
// H1 / USER_JOURNEYS §10: a banned user keeps *read* access but every write is
// rejected with 403. The ban is enforced on write handlers + Require{Host,Admin},
// NOT in the base extractor (which would wrongly block reads too).
test('a banned user keeps read access but is blocked from writes', async ({ api, host, guest }) => {
test('a banned user keeps read access but is blocked from writes', async ({ api, host, guest, db }) => {
const base = process.env.E2E_FRONTEND_URL ?? 'http://localhost:3101';
const target = await guest('BannedRW');
const auth = (jwt: string) => ({ Authorization: `Bearer ${jwt}` });
@@ -147,10 +149,11 @@ test.describe('Host — live role/ban revocation (H1)', () => {
});
expect(delComment.status).toBe(403);
// The upload survived every blocked write (still fetchable via the feed).
const feed = await fetch(base + '/api/v1/feed', { headers: auth(host.jwt) });
const body = await feed.json();
const rows = body.uploads ?? body.items ?? body;
expect(Array.isArray(rows) && rows.some((u: any) => u.id === ownUpload)).toBe(true);
// The upload survived every blocked write — the delete was rejected, so the row still
// exists (deleted_at IS NULL). We check the DB directly rather than the feed: ban now
// ALWAYS hides, so a banned user's own upload is (correctly) filtered out of every feed
// even though the row is intact. Read access to *other* content is proven by the 200 on
// /me/context above.
expect(await db.countUploadsForUser(target.userId)).toBe(1);
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
/**
* Re-review regression guard — Chain #2 ("export corruption on reopen→re-release").
*
* Bug that was fixed: `spawn_export_jobs` ran the worker unconditionally and the
* worker wrote a FIXED temp path (`Gallery.zip.tmp` / `viewer_tmp_{event}`).
* The new reopen→re-release flow could therefore spawn a second worker while the
* first was still running — two workers stomping the same temp file → a corrupt
* keepsake ZIP served to guests.
*
* The fix: `claim_job` is an atomic `UPDATE ... WHERE status='pending'`; a worker
* that doesn't win the claim bails without touching the temp file. The re-enqueue
* `ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE ... WHERE status <> 'running'` leaves an in-flight job
* alone. Net: exactly one worker per (event,type).
*
* This test seeds real uploads, releases, then churns reopen→re-release (stressing
* the claim guard), waits for the export to settle, and asserts the produced ZIP is
* INTACT (passes `unzip -t`) with exactly one entry per upload — plus that no
* export_job row is left stuck `running`. A temp-file race would corrupt/truncate
* the archive or drop entries, failing these assertions.
*
* Note on scope: a Dockerised export over small fixtures completes in well under a
* second, so this cannot *deterministically* force two workers to overlap in time.
* It stresses the claim/ON-CONFLICT guard under rapid churn and hard-checks archive
* integrity; the atomic single-worker guarantee itself is additionally proven by
* code review + SQL PREPARE. Together they cover the regression.
*/
import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test';
import { Client } from 'pg';
import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { writeFileSync, mkdtempSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { seedUpload } from '../../helpers/seed';
const BASE = process.env.E2E_FRONTEND_URL ?? 'http://localhost:3101';
const SLUG = 'e2e-test-event';
const N_UPLOADS = 6;
const PG = {
host: process.env.E2E_DB_HOST ?? 'localhost',
port: Number(process.env.E2E_DB_PORT ?? '55432'),
user: process.env.E2E_DB_USER ?? 'eventsnap_test',
password: process.env.E2E_DB_PASSWORD ?? 'eventsnap_test',
database: process.env.E2E_DB_NAME ?? 'eventsnap_test',
};
async function pgQuery<T = any>(sql: string): Promise<T[]> {
const c = new Client(PG);
await c.connect();
try {
return (await c.query(sql)).rows as T[];
} finally {
await c.end();
}
}
function post(path: string, jwt: string) {
return fetch(BASE + path, { method: 'POST', headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${jwt}` } });
}
async function exportStatus(jwt: string): Promise<any> {
const res = await fetch(BASE + '/api/v1/export/status', { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${jwt}` } });
return res.json();
}
async function mintTicket(jwt: string): Promise<string> {
const res = await post('/api/v1/export/ticket', jwt);
return (await res.json()).ticket;
}
test.describe('Flow re-review — reopen→re-release export integrity (#2)', () => {
// The real export job runs image processing; give it head-room over the tiny fixtures.
test.setTimeout(90_000);
test('rapid release/reopen/re-release yields exactly one INTACT ZIP and no stuck jobs', async ({
host,
}) => {
// Seed real, decodable uploads while the event is open.
for (let i = 0; i < N_UPLOADS; i++) {
await seedUpload(host.jwt, { caption: `pic ${i}` });
}
// First release → export starts and uploads lock (release ⇒ lock).
expect((await post('/api/v1/host/gallery/release', host.jwt)).status).toBe(204);
// Post-release uploads must be rejected (belt-and-suspenders on top of the lock).
const { uploadRaw } = await import('../../helpers/upload-client');
const { readFileSync } = await import('node:fs');
const rejected = await uploadRaw(host.jwt, readFileSync(join(process.cwd(), 'fixtures', 'media', 'sample.jpg')), {
filename: 'late.jpg',
contentType: 'image/jpeg',
});
expect(rejected.status).toBe(403);
// Churn: reopen (clears release + ready flags) then re-release, several times in
// quick succession. This is the path that used to be able to double-spawn workers
// over the shared temp file. End on a release so the gallery is left released.
for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
expect((await post('/api/v1/host/event/open', host.jwt)).status).toBe(204);
const rel = await post('/api/v1/host/gallery/release', host.jwt);
expect(rel.status).toBe(204);
}
// Wait for the export to settle: both jobs done and the ZIP marked ready.
await expect
.poll(async () => {
const s = await exportStatus(host.jwt);
return s.released === true && s.zip?.status === 'done' && s.html?.status === 'done';
}, { timeout: 60_000, intervals: [500] })
.toBe(true);
// No export_job may be left stuck 'running' (would mean a worker that never
// completed — the failure mode the claim guard exists to avoid).
const jobs = await pgQuery<{ type: string; status: string }>(
`SELECT ej.type::text AS type, ej.status::text AS status
FROM export_job ej JOIN event e ON e.id = ej.event_id
WHERE e.slug = '${SLUG}'`
);
expect(jobs.length).toBe(2);
for (const j of jobs) expect(j.status, `${j.type} job status`).toBe('done');
// Download the ZIP and prove it is INTACT — a temp-file race would corrupt or
// truncate it. `unzip -t` verifies every entry's CRC; a non-zero exit throws.
const ticket = await mintTicket(host.jwt);
const res = await fetch(BASE + '/api/v1/export/zip?ticket=' + encodeURIComponent(ticket));
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const bytes = Buffer.from(await res.arrayBuffer());
// ZIP local-file-header magic — a stomped/half-written file fails this immediately.
expect(bytes.subarray(0, 2).toString('latin1')).toBe('PK');
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'es-zip-'));
const zipPath = join(dir, 'Gallery.zip');
writeFileSync(zipPath, bytes);
// Integrity: `unzip -t` exits 0 only if all CRCs check out and the archive is whole.
execFileSync('unzip', ['-t', zipPath], { stdio: 'pipe' });
// Completeness: exactly one entry per seeded upload — no entry lost to a stomped
// temp file, none duplicated by a second worker.
const listing = execFileSync('unzip', ['-Z1', zipPath], { encoding: 'utf8' })
.split('\n')
.map((l) => l.trim())
.filter((l) => l.length > 0 && !l.endsWith('/'));
expect(listing.length, `zip entries:\n${listing.join('\n')}`).toBe(N_UPLOADS);
});
test('re-release does NOT disturb an in-flight (running) export job — the anti-race guard', async ({
host,
}) => {
// Deterministic proof of the fix, independent of export timing. We simulate a worker
// that is still mid-export by pinning the zip job to `running` with a sentinel
// progress value, then drive reopen→re-release. The fix's
// ON CONFLICT ... DO UPDATE ... WHERE export_job.status <> 'running'
// must leave that row untouched (and the freshly-spawned worker's
// claim_job: UPDATE ... WHERE status = 'pending'
// finds nothing to claim, so it bails without racing the temp file).
//
// On the OLD code (unconditional ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE) the row would be reset to
// pending/progress=0 and a second worker would claim and run concurrently — so the
// sentinel below would be wiped. This assertion therefore fails on the bug and passes
// on the fix.
await seedUpload(host.jwt, { caption: 'a' });
await seedUpload(host.jwt, { caption: 'b' });
// Release and let the first export fully finish so no real worker is active.
expect((await post('/api/v1/host/gallery/release', host.jwt)).status).toBe(204);
await expect
.poll(async () => {
const s = await exportStatus(host.jwt);
return s.zip?.status === 'done' && s.html?.status === 'done';
}, { timeout: 60_000, intervals: [500] })
.toBe(true);
// Simulate an in-flight worker owning the zip job, with a sentinel we can check.
await pgQuery(
`UPDATE export_job ej SET status = 'running', progress_pct = 77
FROM event e
WHERE e.id = ej.event_id AND e.slug = '${SLUG}' AND ej.type = 'zip'`
);
// Reopen (clears release + ready flags, does NOT touch job rows) then re-release.
expect((await post('/api/v1/host/event/open', host.jwt)).status).toBe(204);
expect((await post('/api/v1/host/gallery/release', host.jwt)).status).toBe(204);
// Give any spawned worker a beat to attempt (and, correctly, bail) its claim.
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 750));
// The guard must have preserved the 'running' sentinel — untouched by both the
// re-enqueue and the bailing worker.
const [row] = await pgQuery<{ status: string; progress_pct: number }>(
`SELECT ej.status::text AS status, ej.progress_pct
FROM export_job ej JOIN event e ON e.id = ej.event_id
WHERE e.slug = '${SLUG}' AND ej.type = 'zip'`
);
expect(row.status, 'zip job status').toBe('running');
expect(Number(row.progress_pct), 'zip job sentinel progress').toBe(77);
});
});

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
/**
* Re-review regression guard — Chain B1 ("offline queue must auto-resume").
*
* Bug that was fixed: a file staged while OFFLINE was attempted immediately;
* the XHR network error marked the queue item `error`, and every resume path
* (the `online` listener, `processQueue`, `loadQueue`) only picks up `pending`
* items — so the item was stranded until a manual "Erneut" tap.
*
* The fix: network failures are a distinct `NetworkError` that keeps the item
* `pending`; `processQueue` bails while `navigator.onLine === false` (so an
* offline-staged item is never burned to `error`); and `requeueRetriable()`
* flips transient `error`→`pending` on the `online` event and on mount.
*
* This test drives a REAL browser going offline → stage+submit → reconnect and
* asserts the upload lands with NO manual interaction. It fails on the old code
* (item errors, never resumes) and passes on the fix.
*/
import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test';
import { FeedPage, UploadSheet } from '../../page-objects';
import { join } from 'node:path';
const SAMPLE_JPG = join(process.cwd(), 'fixtures', 'media', 'sample.jpg');
// White-box: read the upload queue straight out of IndexedDB so we can assert
// the item's status without depending on the (currently unrendered) queue widget.
async function queueStatuses(page: import('@playwright/test').Page): Promise<string[]> {
return page.evaluate(async () => {
const statuses = await new Promise<string[]>((resolve, reject) => {
const req = indexedDB.open('eventsnap-uploads', 3);
req.onerror = () => reject(req.error);
req.onsuccess = () => {
const dbh = req.result;
const tx = dbh.transaction('queue', 'readonly');
const all = tx.objectStore('queue').getAll();
all.onsuccess = () => resolve(all.result.map((r: any) => r.status));
all.onerror = () => reject(all.error);
};
});
return statuses;
});
}
test.describe('Flow re-review — offline upload auto-resume (B1)', () => {
test('offline-staged upload stays pending, then flushes on reconnect with no manual tap', async ({
page,
guest,
signIn,
db,
}) => {
const g = await guest('OfflineResume');
await signIn(page, g);
await page.goto('/feed');
expect(await db.countUploadsForUser(g.userId)).toBe(0);
// Warm the code-split `/upload` route chunk while still ONLINE. Without this, the
// client-side navigation the UploadSheet triggers would try to fetch the chunk with
// no connectivity and hit SvelteKit's error boundary — a test artifact unrelated to
// the upload-queue fix under test. (A production PWA service worker would cache it.)
await page.goto('/upload');
await page.goto('/feed');
// Go offline BEFORE staging so the first attempt happens with no connectivity.
await page.context().setOffline(true);
const feed = new FeedPage(page);
const sheet = new UploadSheet(page);
await feed.openUploadSheet();
await sheet.stageFiles([SAMPLE_JPG]);
await sheet.captionInput.waitFor({ state: 'visible', timeout: 10_000 });
await sheet.fillCaption('shot with no signal');
await sheet.submit();
// handleSubmit navigates to /feed after enqueuing even while offline.
await page.waitForURL('**/feed', { timeout: 15_000 });
// While offline: nothing may have reached the server, and — the crux of the
// fix — the item must be parked as `pending`, NOT burned to `error`/`blocked`
// (which on the old code would require a manual retry tap).
await expect
.poll(() => queueStatuses(page), { timeout: 8_000 })
.toEqual(['pending']);
expect(await db.countUploadsForUser(g.userId)).toBe(0);
// Reconnect. The `online` listener must resume the queue automatically — we do
// NOT navigate, tap retry, or otherwise touch the page.
await page.context().setOffline(false);
// The queued upload is now created server-side without any manual interaction.
await expect
.poll(() => db.countUploadsForUser(g.userId), { timeout: 20_000 })
.toBe(1);
// And the queue item ends terminal-good (done) or is drained — never stuck in error.
await expect
.poll(async () => {
const s = await queueStatuses(page);
return s.every((x) => x === 'done') || s.length === 0;
}, { timeout: 10_000 })
.toBe(true);
});
});

View File

@@ -58,9 +58,21 @@
} catch { /* ignore */ }
});
// Pull in a comment posted from another device on the CURRENTLY-open upload, so the
// open list matches the count. The `new-comment` broadcast carries only the count (not
// the body), so refetch — skipped when it's for a different upload, and the dedupe
// below makes our own just-posted optimistic comment a no-op.
const unsubNewComment = onSseEvent('new-comment', (data) => {
try {
const { upload_id } = JSON.parse(data) as { upload_id: string };
if (upload_id === upload.id) void loadComments(upload.id);
} catch { /* ignore */ }
});
onDestroy(() => {
if (burstTimer) clearTimeout(burstTimer);
unsubCommentDeleted();
unsubNewComment();
});
// Only refetch when a *different* upload is shown. The feed reassigns the

View File

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
case 'uploading': return 'Wird hochgeladen';
case 'done': return 'Fertig';
case 'error': return 'Fehler';
case 'blocked': return 'Gesperrt';
}
}
@@ -23,6 +24,7 @@
case 'uploading': return 'text-blue-600 dark:text-blue-400';
case 'done': return 'text-green-600 dark:text-green-400';
case 'error': return 'text-red-600 dark:text-red-400';
case 'blocked': return 'text-red-600 dark:text-red-400';
}
}
@@ -94,7 +96,7 @@
Erneut
</button>
{/if}
{#if item.status === 'done' || item.status === 'error'}
{#if item.status === 'done' || item.status === 'error' || item.status === 'blocked'}
<button
onclick={() => removeItem(item.id)}
class="inline-flex h-9 w-9 items-center justify-center text-gray-400 hover:text-gray-600 dark:text-gray-500 dark:hover:text-gray-300"

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@
import { scrollLock } from '$lib/actions/scroll-lock';
import CameraCapture from '$lib/components/CameraCapture.svelte';
import type { PendingFile } from '$lib/pending-upload-store';
import { eventState, uploadsClosed } from '$lib/event-state-store';
// Uploads closed (event locked or gallery released) — show a lock notice instead of
// the capture options, so a guest can't stage a photo that would just be rejected.
let closed = $derived(uploadsClosed($eventState));
let showCamera = $state(false);
let fileInput: HTMLInputElement;
@@ -149,6 +154,22 @@
</div>
<div class="space-y-3 px-4 pb-4 pt-2">
{#if closed}
<!-- Uploads closed: no capture options, just an explanation + dismiss. -->
<div class="rounded-xl bg-amber-50 px-5 py-4 text-center dark:bg-amber-950/30">
<p class="font-semibold text-amber-800 dark:text-amber-300">Uploads geschlossen</p>
<p class="mt-1 text-sm text-amber-700 dark:text-amber-400">
Der Host hat die Uploads für dieses Event beendet. Du kannst weiterhin Fotos ansehen,
liken und kommentieren.
</p>
</div>
<button
onclick={close}
class="w-full rounded-xl border border-gray-200 py-3 text-sm font-medium text-gray-600 transition hover:bg-gray-50 dark:border-gray-700 dark:text-gray-300 dark:hover:bg-gray-800"
>
Schließen
</button>
{:else}
<!-- Gallery option -->
<button
onclick={openGallery}
@@ -189,5 +210,6 @@
>
Abbrechen
</button>
{/if}
</div>
</div>

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
import { writable } from 'svelte/store';
import { api } from './api';
import type { MeContextDto } from './types';
/**
* Live event lock/release state, so the composer can reflect a close/reopen the *instant*
* it happens instead of a guest discovering the lock via a rejected upload. Seeded from
* `/me/context` on boot and kept current by the `event-closed`/`event-opened` SSE events
* (see the root layout, which subscribes once).
*/
export interface EventState {
uploadsLocked: boolean;
galleryReleased: boolean;
}
export const eventState = writable<EventState>({ uploadsLocked: false, galleryReleased: false });
/** True when uploads are closed for any reason (event locked or gallery released). */
export function uploadsClosed(s: EventState): boolean {
return s.uploadsLocked || s.galleryReleased;
}
/** Refresh from the server. Non-fatal on failure — the next SSE event reconciles. */
export async function refreshEventState(): Promise<void> {
try {
const ctx = await api.get<MeContextDto>('/me/context');
eventState.set({
uploadsLocked: ctx.uploads_locked,
galleryReleased: ctx.gallery_released
});
} catch {
// non-fatal
}
}
/** Apply an `event-closed` SSE event (uploads just locked). */
export function markClosed(): void {
eventState.update((s) => ({ ...s, uploadsLocked: true }));
}
/** Apply an `event-opened` SSE event (uploads reopened → release also cleared). */
export function markOpened(): void {
eventState.set({ uploadsLocked: false, galleryReleased: false });
}

View File

@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ import { getToken } from './auth';
import { api } from './api';
import type { DeltaResponse } from './types';
type StreamTicketResponse = { ticket: string };
type StreamTicketResponse = { ticket: string; server_time: string };
type EventHandler = (data: string) => void;
@@ -78,9 +78,11 @@ export function connectSse(): void {
// pass that on the URL. The JWT itself never appears in URLs / access logs.
void (async () => {
let ticket: string;
let serverTime: string;
try {
const res = await api.post<StreamTicketResponse>('/stream/ticket', {});
ticket = res.ticket;
serverTime = res.server_time;
} catch {
// Failed to mint a ticket (auth lapse, network blip). Back off and retry
// via the existing error path.
@@ -95,12 +97,17 @@ export function connectSse(): void {
eventSource.onopen = () => {
// Successful connection — reset the backoff counter.
reconnectAttempt = 0;
// If we have a previous timestamp this is a reconnect — fetch the gap.
// If we have a previous timestamp this is a reconnect — fetch the gap. The
// delta advances `lastEventTime` from the SERVER clock it returns.
const since = lastEventTime;
if (since) {
void deltaFetchAndFan(since);
} else {
// First connect: seed the cursor from the server clock at ticket-mint time,
// never `new Date()` — a skewed browser clock would otherwise shift the very
// first reconnect window and could drop uploads.
lastEventTime = serverTime;
}
lastEventTime = new Date().toISOString();
};
for (const eventName of KNOWN_EVENTS) {
@@ -159,7 +166,12 @@ export function setLastEventTime(time: string): void {
}
function dispatch(eventType: string, data: string): void {
lastEventTime = new Date().toISOString();
// Advance the reconnect cursor from the SERVER timestamp carried in the payload (when
// present — e.g. a new upload's `created_at`), never the browser clock. Events without
// a timestamp (likes, lock toggles) leave the cursor where it is; the next delta
// re-fetches from the last content timestamp we saw, which merges idempotently.
const ts = extractCreatedAt(data);
if (ts) lastEventTime = ts;
const list = handlers.get(eventType);
if (list) {
for (const handler of list) {
@@ -168,6 +180,17 @@ function dispatch(eventType: string, data: string): void {
}
}
/** Pull an ISO `created_at` out of an event payload if it has one, else undefined. */
function extractCreatedAt(data: string): string | undefined {
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(data);
if (parsed && typeof parsed.created_at === 'string') return parsed.created_at;
} catch {
// non-JSON payload (e.g. a plain count) — no timestamp to extract
}
return undefined;
}
/**
* Fetch all feed activity since `since` and fan it out as a synthetic `feed-delta`
* event. Subscribers (typically the feed page) merge the result into their
@@ -179,6 +202,9 @@ async function deltaFetchAndFan(since: string): Promise<void> {
const response = await api.get<DeltaResponse>(
`/feed/delta?since=${encodeURIComponent(since)}`
);
// Advance the cursor to the server clock this delta was computed at, so the next
// reconnect resumes exactly where the server left off (no browser-clock skew).
lastEventTime = response.server_time;
dispatch('feed-delta', JSON.stringify(response));
} catch {
// non-fatal

View File

@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ export interface DeltaResponse {
// True when the delta hit the backend cap and is only the newest slice of the
// gap — the client must full-refresh rather than merge (see feed-delta handler).
truncated: boolean;
// Server clock when this delta was computed — the next reconnect cursor advances
// from THIS, never the browser clock, so clock skew can't silently drop uploads.
server_time: string;
}
// mirrors backend/src/handlers/feed.rs::HashtagCount
@@ -56,6 +59,8 @@ export interface MeContextDto {
privacy_note: string;
quota_enabled: boolean;
storage_quota_enabled: boolean;
uploads_locked: boolean;
gallery_released: boolean;
}
// mirrors backend/src/handlers/host.rs::PinResetResponse

View File

@@ -11,7 +11,10 @@ export interface QueueItem {
mimeType: string;
caption: string;
hashtags: string;
status: 'pending' | 'uploading' | 'done' | 'error';
// 'error' is retryable (network / 5xx); 'blocked' is TERMINAL (a 4xx the server will
// keep rejecting — locked event, banned user, released gallery, quota full). Blocked
// items have had their blob purged from IndexedDB and offer no retry.
status: 'pending' | 'uploading' | 'done' | 'error' | 'blocked';
progress: number;
error?: string;
}
@@ -26,8 +29,50 @@ export const rateLimitRetryAt = writable<number | null>(null);
const DB_NAME = 'eventsnap-uploads';
const STORE_NAME = 'queue';
/** Hard cap on queued items per device — bounds IndexedDB growth from stuck blobs. */
const MAX_QUEUE_ITEMS = 100;
let db: IDBPDatabase | null = null;
// Resume the queue as soon as connectivity returns. Registered once, guarded for SSR.
// This is the other half of the "flushes when you're back online" promise — without it
// a reconnect only resumes if the user manually re-stages a file.
let onlineBound = false;
function bindOnline(): void {
if (onlineBound || typeof window === 'undefined') return;
window.addEventListener('online', () => {
void (async () => {
await requeueRetriable();
await processQueue();
})();
});
onlineBound = true;
}
bindOnline();
/**
* Flip transient `error` items (5xx / a network drop that got marked before we could
* reclassify it) back to `pending` so a resume actually retries them. Terminal `blocked`
* items (403/413) are left alone — retrying those never succeeds.
*/
async function requeueRetriable(): Promise<void> {
const database = await getDb();
const myUserId = getUserId();
const all = await database.getAll(STORE_NAME);
for (const entry of all) {
if (entry.userId === myUserId && entry.status === 'error' && entry.blob) {
entry.status = 'pending';
entry.error = undefined;
await database.put(STORE_NAME, entry);
}
}
queueItems.update((items) =>
items.map((item) =>
item.status === 'error' ? { ...item, status: 'pending' as const, progress: 0, error: undefined } : item
)
);
}
async function getDb(): Promise<IDBPDatabase> {
if (db) return db;
// v1 → v2: add `userId` index so each guest's queue is isolated on shared devices.
@@ -76,6 +121,26 @@ class RateLimitError extends Error {
}
}
/**
* A permanent, non-retryable failure — the server returned a 4xx (other than 429) that
* will never succeed on retry: uploads locked, user banned, gallery already released, or
* per-user quota full. The item is moved to the terminal `blocked` state and its blob is
* dropped from IndexedDB (no point keeping bytes we'll never send).
*/
class TerminalError extends Error {
constructor(message: string) {
super(message);
}
}
/**
* A connectivity failure — the request never reached the server (offline, DNS, dropped
* connection). The item stays `pending` (not `error`) so the `online` listener and the
* next `processQueue` pick it up automatically. This is what makes "the queue flushes
* when you're back online" actually true for a file staged with no signal.
*/
class NetworkError extends Error {}
export async function loadQueue(): Promise<void> {
const database = await getDb();
const myUserId = getUserId();
@@ -98,6 +163,14 @@ export async function loadQueue(): Promise<void> {
error: entry.error
}));
queueItems.set(items);
// Staged-but-unsent items from a prior session (queued offline, tab closed before
// reconnect) must resume now — otherwise the "queue flushes when you're back online"
// promise only holds if the user manually re-stages a file. Reclaim transient errors
// (a network drop from a prior session) so they retry instead of stalling.
void (async () => {
await requeueRetriable();
await processQueue();
})();
}
export async function addToQueue(
@@ -108,6 +181,33 @@ export async function addToQueue(
const database = await getDb();
const userId = getUserId();
if (!userId) return; // not authenticated — nothing to do
// Dedup: don't queue the same file twice while an identical one is still unsent
// (double-tap, re-added after a flaky reconnect). Matches on name+size+user.
const mine = get(queueItems).filter((i) => i.userId === userId);
const dup = mine.some(
(i) =>
i.fileName === file.name &&
i.fileSize === file.size &&
(i.status === 'pending' || i.status === 'uploading')
);
if (dup) return;
// Cap the queue so stuck/blocked blobs can't grow IndexedDB without bound. When full,
// evict the oldest terminal item (done/error/blocked) to make room; if none exist,
// refuse silently rather than pile on.
if (mine.length >= MAX_QUEUE_ITEMS) {
const evictable = get(queueItems).find(
(i) => i.userId === userId && (i.status === 'done' || i.status === 'error' || i.status === 'blocked')
);
if (evictable) {
await database.delete(STORE_NAME, evictable.id);
queueItems.update((items) => items.filter((it) => it.id !== evictable.id));
} else {
return;
}
}
const id = crypto.randomUUID();
const entry = {
id,
@@ -184,6 +284,10 @@ async function processQueue(): Promise<void> {
try {
while (true) {
// Offline: leave items 'pending' rather than burning through them into 'error'.
// The `online` listener re-enters here the moment connectivity returns.
if (typeof navigator !== 'undefined' && navigator.onLine === false) break;
const items = get(queueItems);
const next = items.find((item) => item.status === 'pending');
if (!next) break;
@@ -201,7 +305,12 @@ async function processQueue(): Promise<void> {
}, e.retryAfterSecs * 1000);
break;
}
// Other errors are already handled inside uploadItem (marked as 'error')
if (e instanceof NetworkError) {
// Connectivity dropped mid-flight — the item is back to 'pending'. Stop the
// loop; the `online` listener resumes it. No error state, no manual tap.
break;
}
// Other errors are already handled inside uploadItem (marked 'error'/'blocked')
}
}
} finally {
@@ -258,6 +367,8 @@ async function uploadItem(id: string): Promise<void> {
if (xhr.status >= 200 && xhr.status < 300) {
resolve();
} else if (xhr.status === 429) {
// Rate limit only (quota-full is now a distinct 413, handled below as
// terminal) — back off and auto-resume when the window lifts.
try {
const body = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
const secs = typeof body.retry_after_secs === 'number' ? body.retry_after_secs : 60;
@@ -265,7 +376,20 @@ async function uploadItem(id: string): Promise<void> {
} catch {
reject(new RateLimitError(60));
}
} else if (xhr.status >= 400 && xhr.status < 500) {
// Any other 4xx is permanent for this blob (locked/banned/released/quota).
// Retrying just re-hits the same rejection forever, so mark it terminal.
let msg = 'Upload nicht möglich.';
try {
const body = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
if (body.message) msg = body.message;
else if (xhr.status === 413) msg = 'Speicher-Limit erreicht.';
} catch {
if (xhr.status === 413) msg = 'Speicher-Limit erreicht.';
}
reject(new TerminalError(msg));
} else {
// 5xx / unexpected — transient, keep it retryable.
try {
const body = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
reject(new Error(body.message || `HTTP ${xhr.status}`));
@@ -275,8 +399,8 @@ async function uploadItem(id: string): Promise<void> {
}
});
xhr.addEventListener('error', () => reject(new Error('Netzwerkfehler')));
xhr.addEventListener('abort', () => reject(new Error('Abgebrochen')));
xhr.addEventListener('error', () => reject(new NetworkError('Netzwerkfehler')));
xhr.addEventListener('abort', () => reject(new NetworkError('Abgebrochen')));
xhr.send(formData);
});
@@ -296,6 +420,24 @@ async function uploadItem(id: string): Promise<void> {
updateItemStatus(id, 'pending');
throw e; // Propagate to processQueue for scheduling
}
if (e instanceof NetworkError) {
// No connectivity — keep the item pending and propagate so processQueue stops
// the loop (no point hammering while offline). The `online` listener resumes it.
entry.status = 'pending';
await database.put(STORE_NAME, entry);
updateItemStatus(id, 'pending');
throw e;
}
if (e instanceof TerminalError) {
// Permanent rejection — drop the blob (we'll never resend it) and mark blocked
// so the UI shows a clear reason and offers no retry.
delete entry.blob;
entry.status = 'blocked';
entry.error = e.message;
await database.put(STORE_NAME, entry);
updateItemStatus(id, 'blocked', e.message);
return;
}
const msg = e instanceof Error ? e.message : 'Upload fehlgeschlagen.';
entry.status = 'error';
entry.error = msg;

View File

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
import { onSseEvent } from '$lib/sse';
import { api } from '$lib/api';
import type { MeContextDto } from '$lib/types';
import { eventState, markClosed, markOpened } from '$lib/event-state-store';
let { children } = $props();
@@ -39,6 +40,10 @@
try {
const ctx = await api.get<MeContextDto>('/me/context');
privacyNote.set(ctx.privacy_note);
eventState.set({
uploadsLocked: ctx.uploads_locked,
galleryReleased: ctx.gallery_released
});
} catch {
// Cross-cutting hydration on boot — failure is non-fatal; users without
// a session land on /join anyway, and the per-page mount will retry.
@@ -61,7 +66,11 @@
} catch {
// Malformed payload — discard; nothing actionable for the user.
}
})
}),
// Reflect a host closing/reopening uploads live, so the composer switches to a
// locked state immediately instead of a guest finding out via a rejected upload.
onSseEvent('event-closed', () => markClosed()),
onSseEvent('event-opened', () => markOpened())
);
});

View File

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
let expiry = $state<Date | null>(null);
let pinCopied = $state(false);
let leaveConfirmOpen = $state(false);
let leaveEverywhere = $state(false);
let dataModeWarningOpen = $state(false);
// `pin` is sourced from the shared `currentPin` store so a global pin-reset SSE
@@ -99,10 +100,14 @@
setTimeout(() => (pinCopied = false), 2000);
}
async function handleLogout() {
async function handleLogout(everywhere = false) {
// Session-delete is best-effort: the JWT is going away on this device either way,
// so a network failure shouldn't block the user from leaving the event.
try { await api.delete('/session'); } catch { /* best-effort logout */ }
// `everywhere` revokes ALL of this user's sessions (other phones/laptops recovered
// via PIN), not just this device.
try {
await api.delete(everywhere ? '/sessions' : '/session');
} catch { /* best-effort logout */ }
// Wipe the IndexedDB upload queue so a second guest using the same device can't
// inherit (or be blamed for) this guest's pending uploads. Not done on a 401
// auto-clear — that path preserves the queue in case the user re-authenticates.
@@ -379,9 +384,9 @@
</svg>
</a>
<!-- Leave / logout -->
<!-- Leave / logout (this device) -->
<button
onclick={() => (leaveConfirmOpen = true)}
onclick={() => { leaveEverywhere = false; leaveConfirmOpen = true; }}
class="flex w-full items-center gap-3 border-t border-gray-100 px-5 py-4 text-left transition hover:bg-red-50 dark:border-gray-700 dark:hover:bg-red-950/30"
>
<svg class="h-5 w-5 text-red-500 dark:text-red-400" fill="none" viewBox="0 0 24 24" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">
@@ -389,6 +394,17 @@
</svg>
<span class="flex-1 text-sm font-medium text-red-600 dark:text-red-400">Event verlassen</span>
</button>
<!-- Sign out everywhere (all devices) -->
<button
onclick={() => { leaveEverywhere = true; leaveConfirmOpen = true; }}
class="flex w-full items-center gap-3 border-t border-gray-100 px-5 py-4 text-left transition hover:bg-red-50 dark:border-gray-700 dark:hover:bg-red-950/30"
>
<svg class="h-5 w-5 text-red-500 dark:text-red-400" fill="none" viewBox="0 0 24 24" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="1.5">
<path stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" d="M12 9v3.75m-9.303 3.376c-.866 1.5.217 3.374 1.948 3.374h14.71c1.73 0 2.813-1.874 1.948-3.374L13.949 3.378c-.866-1.5-3.032-1.5-3.898 0L2.697 16.126ZM12 15.75h.007v.008H12v-.008Z" />
</svg>
<span class="flex-1 text-sm font-medium text-red-600 dark:text-red-400">Auf allen Geräten abmelden</span>
</button>
</div>
</div>
</div>
@@ -435,10 +451,12 @@
<!-- Leave-confirm bottom sheet -->
<ConfirmSheet
open={leaveConfirmOpen}
title="Event verlassen?"
message="Du wirst abgemeldet. Mit deinem PIN kannst du jederzeit zurückkehren."
title={leaveEverywhere ? 'Auf allen Geräten abmelden?' : 'Event verlassen?'}
message={leaveEverywhere
? 'Alle deine Sitzungen (auch auf anderen Geräten) werden beendet. Mit deinem PIN kannst du jederzeit zurückkehren.'
: 'Du wirst abgemeldet. Mit deinem PIN kannst du jederzeit zurückkehren.'}
confirmLabel="Abmelden"
tone="danger"
onConfirm={handleLogout}
onConfirm={() => handleLogout(leaveEverywhere)}
onCancel={() => (leaveConfirmOpen = false)}
/>

View File

@@ -127,7 +127,6 @@
// Ban modal state
let banTarget = $state<UserSummary | null>(null);
let banHideUploads = $state(false);
let banSubmitting = $state(false);
// PIN reset state — `pinModal` holds the freshly-issued plaintext PIN. We forget it
@@ -254,14 +253,13 @@
function openBanModal(user: UserSummary) {
banTarget = user;
banHideUploads = false;
}
async function confirmBan() {
if (!banTarget) return;
banSubmitting = true;
try {
await api.post(`/host/users/${banTarget.id}/ban`, { hide_uploads: banHideUploads });
await api.post(`/host/users/${banTarget.id}/ban`, {});
toast(`${banTarget.display_name} wurde gesperrt.`, 'success');
banTarget = null;
users = await api.get<UserSummary[]>('/host/users');
@@ -416,17 +414,14 @@
{/if}
</Modal>
<!-- Ban modal — checkbox-bearing, so uses the Modal shell instead of ConfirmSheet. -->
<!-- Ban modal — ban always hides now, so this is a plain confirm (no checkbox). -->
<Modal open={banTarget !== null} titleId="admin-ban-modal-title" onClose={() => (banTarget = null)}>
{#if banTarget}
<h2 id="admin-ban-modal-title" class="mb-1 text-lg font-bold text-gray-900 dark:text-gray-100">Benutzer sperren</h2>
<p class="mb-4 text-sm text-gray-600 dark:text-gray-400">
Was soll mit den Uploads von <strong>{banTarget.display_name}</strong> passieren?
<strong>{banTarget.display_name}</strong> wird gesperrt: alle Uploads verschwinden aus
Galerie, Diashow und Export, und die Sitzung wird beendet. Rückgängig machbar über „Entsperren“.
</p>
<label class="mb-4 flex cursor-pointer items-center gap-3 rounded-lg border border-gray-200 p-3 dark:border-gray-700">
<input type="checkbox" bind:checked={banHideUploads} class="h-4 w-4 rounded border-gray-300 text-red-600 focus:ring-red-500 dark:border-gray-600" />
<span class="text-sm text-gray-700 dark:text-gray-300">Uploads aus der Galerie ausblenden</span>
</label>
<div class="flex gap-2">
<button onclick={() => (banTarget = null)} class="flex-1 rounded-lg border border-gray-300 py-2 text-sm text-gray-700 hover:bg-gray-50 active:bg-gray-100 dark:border-gray-700 dark:text-gray-300 dark:hover:bg-gray-800 dark:active:bg-gray-800">Abbrechen</button>
<button onclick={confirmBan} disabled={banSubmitting} class="flex-1 rounded-lg bg-red-600 py-2 text-sm font-medium text-white hover:bg-red-700 active:bg-red-700 disabled:opacity-50 dark:bg-red-500 dark:hover:bg-red-400 dark:active:bg-red-400">

View File

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
import { SlideQueue } from '$lib/diashow/queue';
import { transitions, findTransition } from '$lib/diashow/transitions';
import { acquireWakeLock, releaseWakeLock } from '$lib/diashow/wakelock';
import type { FeedUpload, FeedResponse } from '$lib/types';
import type { FeedUpload, FeedResponse, DeltaResponse } from '$lib/types';
const DWELL_OPTIONS = [3000, 6000, 10000];
@@ -100,6 +100,28 @@
}
}
// After an all-night projector reconnects (SSE drop, network blip), the live events
// it missed are gone. The SSE client fans out a `feed-delta` of everything since the
// last seen timestamp — merge it so the show backfills the gap instead of silently
// stalling on a stale set.
function handleFeedDelta(data: string) {
try {
const delta = JSON.parse(data) as DeltaResponse;
for (const id of delta.deleted_ids) {
const result = queue.remove(id, current?.id ?? null);
if (result.wasCurrent) advance();
}
for (const upload of delta.uploads) {
// Only enqueue displayable (processed) items; pushLive dedupes by id, so a
// later `upload-processed` still refines anything that arrives raw.
if (upload.preview_url || upload.thumbnail_url) queue.pushLive(upload);
}
if (!current) advance();
} catch {
// ignore — non-fatal; the next live event keeps the show moving
}
}
function handleUserHidden(data: string) {
try {
const payload = JSON.parse(data) as { user_id: string };
@@ -164,6 +186,7 @@
unsubs.push(onSseEvent('upload-processed', handleUploadProcessed));
unsubs.push(onSseEvent('upload-deleted', handleUploadDeleted));
unsubs.push(onSseEvent('user-hidden', handleUserHidden));
unsubs.push(onSseEvent('feed-delta', handleFeedDelta));
void loadInitial();
});

View File

@@ -389,18 +389,24 @@
async function handleLike(id: string) {
try {
await api.post(`/upload/${id}/like`);
// Set state from the server's authoritative response rather than blind-inverting
// local state. On a second device (same recovered user), the `like-update`
// broadcast only carries `like_count` — so a blind invert would drift
// `liked_by_me` until refresh. The response gives both, exactly.
const res = await api.post<{ liked: boolean; like_count: number | null }>(`/upload/${id}/like`);
vibrate(10);
// like_count is null when the server's count query hiccuped — keep the current
// count in that case rather than adopting a wrong number.
uploads = uploads.map((u) =>
u.id === id
? { ...u, liked_by_me: !u.liked_by_me, like_count: u.liked_by_me ? u.like_count - 1 : u.like_count + 1 }
? { ...u, liked_by_me: res.liked, like_count: res.like_count ?? u.like_count }
: u
);
if (selectedUpload?.id === id) {
selectedUpload = {
...selectedUpload,
liked_by_me: !selectedUpload.liked_by_me,
like_count: selectedUpload.liked_by_me ? selectedUpload.like_count - 1 : selectedUpload.like_count + 1,
liked_by_me: res.liked,
like_count: res.like_count ?? selectedUpload.like_count,
};
}
} catch (e) {

View File

@@ -27,8 +27,16 @@
export_released: boolean;
}
interface PinResetRequest {
id: string;
user_id: string;
display_name: string;
created_at: string;
}
let event = $state<EventStatus | null>(null);
let users = $state<UserSummary[]>([]);
let pinResetRequests = $state<PinResetRequest[]>([]);
let loading = $state(true);
let error = $state<string | null>(null);
@@ -47,7 +55,6 @@
// Ban modal state
let banTarget = $state<UserSummary | null>(null);
let banHideUploads = $state(false);
let banSubmitting = $state(false);
// PIN reset modal state. `pinModal` holds the freshly-issued plaintext PIN; it is
@@ -114,9 +121,10 @@
loading = true;
error = null;
try {
[event, users] = await Promise.all([
[event, users, pinResetRequests] = await Promise.all([
api.get<EventStatus>('/host/event'),
api.get<UserSummary[]>('/host/users')
api.get<UserSummary[]>('/host/users'),
api.get<PinResetRequest[]>('/host/pin-reset-requests')
]);
} catch (e: unknown) {
error = e instanceof Error ? e.message : 'Fehler beim Laden.';
@@ -125,6 +133,25 @@
}
}
async function resetPinForRequest(req: PinResetRequest) {
try {
const res = await api.post<{ pin: string }>(`/host/users/${req.user_id}/pin-reset`);
pinModal = { name: req.display_name, pin: res.pin };
await reload();
} catch (e: unknown) {
toastError(e);
}
}
async function dismissPinRequest(req: PinResetRequest) {
try {
await api.delete(`/host/pin-reset-requests/${req.id}`);
pinResetRequests = pinResetRequests.filter((r) => r.id !== req.id);
} catch (e: unknown) {
toastError(e);
}
}
async function toggleEventLock() {
if (!event) return;
try {
@@ -153,14 +180,13 @@
function openBanModal(user: UserSummary) {
banTarget = user;
banHideUploads = false;
}
async function confirmBan() {
if (!banTarget) return;
banSubmitting = true;
try {
await api.post(`/host/users/${banTarget.id}/ban`, { hide_uploads: banHideUploads });
await api.post(`/host/users/${banTarget.id}/ban`, {});
toast(`${banTarget.display_name} wurde gesperrt.`, 'success');
banTarget = null;
await reload();
@@ -278,21 +304,14 @@
{/if}
</Modal>
<!-- Ban modal — needs a checkbox so it's not a pure ConfirmSheet, but still gets the same a11y shell. -->
<!-- Ban modal — ban always hides now, so this is a plain confirm (no checkbox). -->
<Modal open={banTarget !== null} titleId="host-ban-modal-title" onClose={() => (banTarget = null)}>
{#if banTarget}
<h2 id="host-ban-modal-title" class="mb-1 text-lg font-bold text-gray-900 dark:text-gray-100">Benutzer sperren</h2>
<p class="mb-4 text-sm text-gray-600 dark:text-gray-400">
Was soll mit den Uploads von <strong>{banTarget.display_name}</strong> passieren?
<strong>{banTarget.display_name}</strong> wird gesperrt: alle Uploads verschwinden aus
Galerie, Diashow und Export, und die Sitzung wird beendet. Rückgängig machbar über „Entsperren“.
</p>
<label class="mb-4 flex cursor-pointer items-center gap-3 rounded-lg border border-gray-200 p-3 dark:border-gray-700">
<input
type="checkbox"
bind:checked={banHideUploads}
class="h-4 w-4 rounded border-gray-300 text-red-600 focus:ring-red-500 dark:border-gray-600"
/>
<span class="text-sm text-gray-700 dark:text-gray-300">Uploads aus der Galerie ausblenden</span>
</label>
<div class="flex gap-2">
<button
onclick={() => (banTarget = null)}
@@ -336,6 +355,41 @@
<div class="rounded-lg bg-red-50 p-4 text-sm text-red-700 dark:bg-red-950/30 dark:text-red-300">{error}</div>
{:else if event}
<!-- ── PIN-Reset-Anfragen ──────────────────────────────────────── -->
{#if pinResetRequests.length > 0}
<div class="overflow-hidden rounded-xl border border-amber-300 bg-amber-50 dark:border-amber-800 dark:bg-amber-950/30">
<div class="border-b border-amber-200 px-5 py-3 dark:border-amber-900">
<h2 class="font-semibold text-amber-900 dark:text-amber-200">
PIN vergessen — {pinResetRequests.length} Anfrage{pinResetRequests.length === 1 ? '' : 'n'}
</h2>
<p class="mt-0.5 text-xs text-amber-700 dark:text-amber-400">
Prüfe die Identität, bevor du eine PIN zurücksetzt.
</p>
</div>
<ul class="divide-y divide-amber-200 dark:divide-amber-900">
{#each pinResetRequests as req (req.id)}
<li class="flex items-center justify-between gap-3 px-5 py-3">
<span class="min-w-0 truncate font-medium text-amber-900 dark:text-amber-100">{req.display_name}</span>
<div class="flex shrink-0 gap-2">
<button
onclick={() => dismissPinRequest(req)}
class="rounded-lg border border-amber-300 px-3 py-1.5 text-sm text-amber-800 hover:bg-amber-100 dark:border-amber-700 dark:text-amber-200 dark:hover:bg-amber-900/40"
>
Ablehnen
</button>
<button
onclick={() => resetPinForRequest(req)}
class="rounded-lg bg-amber-600 px-3 py-1.5 text-sm font-medium text-white hover:bg-amber-700 dark:bg-amber-500 dark:hover:bg-amber-400"
>
PIN zurücksetzen
</button>
</div>
</li>
{/each}
</ul>
</div>
{/if}
<!-- ── Statistiken ─────────────────────────────────────────────── -->
<div class="overflow-hidden rounded-xl border border-gray-200 bg-white dark:border-gray-700 dark:bg-gray-800">
<button

View File

@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@
let recoveryPin = $state('');
let recoveryError = $state('');
let recoveryLoading = $state(false);
// Forgot-PIN request state (asks a host to reset it).
let pinRequestSent = $state(false);
let pinRequestLoading = $state(false);
async function handleJoin() {
if (!displayName.trim()) return;
@@ -85,9 +88,24 @@
nameTaken = false;
recoveryPin = '';
recoveryError = '';
pinRequestSent = false;
// Keep displayName so the user can edit it slightly
}
// Forgot the PIN entirely: ask a host to reset it. The endpoint always 204s (no name
// enumeration), so we optimistically show a confirmation regardless.
async function requestPinReset() {
pinRequestLoading = true;
try {
await api.post('/recover/request', { display_name: takenName });
} catch {
// Non-fatal (rate limit etc.) — still show the confirmation so the user isn't stuck.
} finally {
pinRequestLoading = false;
pinRequestSent = true;
}
}
function copyPin() {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(pin);
copied = true;
@@ -173,6 +191,23 @@
Anderen Namen wählen
</button>
<!-- Forgot the PIN entirely — ask a host to reset it in-app. -->
{#if pinRequestSent}
<p class="mt-3 rounded-lg bg-green-50 px-4 py-3 text-center text-sm text-green-700 dark:bg-green-950/30 dark:text-green-300">
Anfrage gesendet. Bitte einen Host, deine PIN zurückzusetzen — danach kannst du dich
mit der neuen PIN anmelden.
</p>
{:else}
<button
onclick={requestPinReset}
disabled={pinRequestLoading}
data-testid="request-pin-reset"
class="mt-3 w-full text-center text-sm text-blue-600 underline decoration-dotted underline-offset-2 hover:text-blue-700 disabled:opacity-50 dark:text-blue-400"
>
{pinRequestLoading ? 'Wird gesendet…' : 'PIN vergessen? Host um Zurücksetzen bitten'}
</button>
{/if}
{:else}
<!-- Normal join form -->
<h1 class="mb-2 text-center text-2xl font-bold text-gray-900 dark:text-gray-100">Willkommen!</h1>