fix(upload): remove the /original rate limit that would have broken the feed
The limiter added here was justified as bounding "100 guests occasionally tapping Original anzeigen". That is not what this route is. `pickMediaUrl` resolves to `preview_url ?? thumbnail_url ?? /original`, and a freshly committed upload has BOTH derivatives null until the compression worker reaches it — at COMPRESSION_WORKER_CONCURRENCY=2 that is minutes during a post-ceremony burst. So /original is the feed's hot path for exactly the newest photos, in a newest-first grid, at the busiest moment. With every guest behind one NAT the 600/min bucket is venue-wide: six new photos fanned out by `upload-new` to ~100 open feeds exhausts it, and then every original fetch from anyone 429s for the rest of the window. The tiles' own 4-second retry uses a fresh `?r=` nonce, so the clients hold the bucket saturated themselves — the whole venue watching the newest photos render as broken tiles while the projector skips slides. A per-IP bucket cannot separate one scraper from the entire party when they share an address, and these media routes are unauthenticated by design (an `<img>` cannot send a bearer token), so there is no per-user key to move to. Bandwidth abuse belongs at the proxy. Also here: the release/lock check order. `release ⇒ lock`, so testing the lock first made the `GalleryReleased` arm unreachable dead code and every post-release upload answered `uploads_locked`. The codes are not interchangeable to the client — `uploads_locked` charges a retry attempt and re-pushes the whole photo on the backoff ladder against an answer that cannot change, while `gallery_released` parks it and says the photo is safe but the hosts must reopen. Both sites now test release first, so the fast path and the commit-time re-check agree. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -21,6 +21,15 @@ pub struct PublicEventDto {
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pub theme_preset: String,
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pub theme_primary: String,
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pub theme_accent: String,
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/// The operator's data notice, if they set one. Empty string when unset (migration 009
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/// defaults it to `''`).
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///
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/// Exposed PUBLICLY — it was only on `/me/context`, which requires a token, so the one place a
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/// notice actually has to appear (before a name is collected) could not read it. The join page
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/// pairs this with a baseline notice of its own, precisely because this can be empty: relying
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/// on an operator-supplied string meant a stock deploy collected ~100 EU guests' photos of
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/// identifiable people, including children, with no notice at the point of collection at all.
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pub privacy_note: String,
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}
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/// Public event identity + presentation config, used by the pre-auth join/recover
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@@ -40,5 +49,6 @@ pub async fn get_public_event(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<PublicEvent
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.await,
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theme_accent: config::get_str(cache, "theme_accent", &state.config.default_theme_accent)
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.await,
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privacy_note: config::get_str(cache, "privacy_note", "").await,
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})
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}
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