fix(security): harden authz, media gating, recover, SSE, deps
Security audit follow-up. No Critical/High existed; these close the
Medium/Low findings.
F1 [Med] Host privilege boundary: a host could demote a peer host to
guest and then ban / PIN-reset (→ account takeover via /recover) them,
because the ban/pin-reset peer guards key off the target's *current*
role. set_role now blocks a non-admin from demoting a host.
F2 [Med] Moderation now revokes preview/thumbnail access: they are served
through visibility-checked aliases (/api/v1/upload/{id}/{preview,
thumbnail}) that filter soft-deleted / ban-hidden uploads, and direct
/media/previews|thumbnails is 404-blocked. Feed emits the gated URLs;
Caddy keeps them privately cacheable (max-age=300, short so moderation
revokes promptly — the live feed already evicts cards via SSE). Uses a
lean find_visible_media() (paths+mime only) on the media hot path.
F3 [Med/Low] npm audit fix: svelte 5.55.1→5.56.4 (SSR-XSS advisories),
devalue 5.6.4→5.8.1 (DoS). Prod deps: 0 vulnerabilities.
F4 [Low] /recover no longer leaks account existence: unknown display name
returns the same 401 as a wrong PIN, and runs a dummy bcrypt verify so
timing matches — closing the enumeration + timing oracle.
F5 [Low] SSE streams re-validate the session every ~60s and close once it
is logged out / expired, instead of running until client disconnect.
F6 [Info] X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff set at the app layer on all
media responses (defense-in-depth alongside the edge).
Tests: new e2e specs for F1 (host cannot demote peer host), F2 (preview
gated + 404 after delete + direct /media blocked), F4 (uniform 401).
40 backend unit tests + 182 e2e passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ pub async fn stream(
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.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Sitzung nicht gefunden.".into()))?;
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let rx = state.sse_tx.subscribe();
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let stream = BroadcastStream::new(rx).filter_map(|msg| match msg {
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let events = BroadcastStream::new(rx).filter_map(|msg| match msg {
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Ok(sse_event) => Some(Ok(Event::default()
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.event(sse_event.event_type)
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.data(sse_event.data))),
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@@ -73,6 +73,29 @@ pub async fn stream(
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}
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});
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// The session is only checked once at open. Re-validate it periodically so a
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// logged-out or expired session's stream is closed rather than kept alive until the
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// client happens to disconnect. Bounds a stale stream to ~60s. Only a *definitively*
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// gone/expired session ends the stream; a transient DB error just retries next tick.
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let pool = state.pool.clone();
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let session_hash = token_hash.clone();
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let session_gone = async move {
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let mut ticker = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(60));
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ticker.tick().await; // consume the immediate first tick
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loop {
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ticker.tick().await;
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match Session::find_by_token_hash(&pool, &session_hash).await {
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Ok(Some(_)) => {} // still valid — keep streaming
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Ok(None) => break, // logged out or expired — stop
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Err(e) => {
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tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "SSE session revalidation query failed; retrying");
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}
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}
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}
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};
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let stream = futures::StreamExt::take_until(events, Box::pin(session_gone));
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Ok(Sse::new(stream).keep_alive(
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KeepAlive::new()
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.interval(Duration::from_secs(30))
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