fix(security): harden authz, media gating, recover, SSE, deps

Security audit follow-up. No Critical/High existed; these close the
Medium/Low findings.

F1 [Med] Host privilege boundary: a host could demote a peer host to
  guest and then ban / PIN-reset (→ account takeover via /recover) them,
  because the ban/pin-reset peer guards key off the target's *current*
  role. set_role now blocks a non-admin from demoting a host.

F2 [Med] Moderation now revokes preview/thumbnail access: they are served
  through visibility-checked aliases (/api/v1/upload/{id}/{preview,
  thumbnail}) that filter soft-deleted / ban-hidden uploads, and direct
  /media/previews|thumbnails is 404-blocked. Feed emits the gated URLs;
  Caddy keeps them privately cacheable (max-age=300, short so moderation
  revokes promptly — the live feed already evicts cards via SSE). Uses a
  lean find_visible_media() (paths+mime only) on the media hot path.

F3 [Med/Low] npm audit fix: svelte 5.55.1→5.56.4 (SSR-XSS advisories),
  devalue 5.6.4→5.8.1 (DoS). Prod deps: 0 vulnerabilities.

F4 [Low] /recover no longer leaks account existence: unknown display name
  returns the same 401 as a wrong PIN, and runs a dummy bcrypt verify so
  timing matches — closing the enumeration + timing oracle.

F5 [Low] SSE streams re-validate the session every ~60s and close once it
  is logged out / expired, instead of running until client disconnect.

F6 [Info] X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff set at the app layer on all
  media responses (defense-in-depth alongside the edge).

Tests: new e2e specs for F1 (host cannot demote peer host), F2 (preview
gated + 404 after delete + direct /media blocked), F4 (uniform 401).
40 backend unit tests + 182 e2e passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
fabi
2026-07-08 06:14:00 +02:00
parent 683b1b6f65
commit a4b2c5bd1c
13 changed files with 508 additions and 225 deletions

View File

@@ -35,6 +35,16 @@ pub struct UploadDto {
pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
}
/// Minimal projection of an upload's on-disk file paths, used by the visibility-gated
/// media aliases so they don't hydrate the entire `Upload` row per request.
#[derive(Debug, sqlx::FromRow)]
pub struct VisibleMedia {
pub original_path: String,
pub preview_path: Option<String>,
pub thumbnail_path: Option<String>,
pub mime_type: String,
}
impl Upload {
/// Takes any executor so the caller can run it inside a transaction (atomic
/// quota + insert) or standalone against the pool.
@@ -74,14 +84,22 @@ impl Upload {
.await
}
/// Like [`Self::find_by_id`] but also excludes uploads whose owner has been
/// ban-hidden (`user.uploads_hidden`). Used by the public original-file alias
/// so that moderation which hides a user's content from the feed/export also
/// stops their full-resolution originals from being pulled by UUID. Mirrors the
/// `uploads_hidden` filter that `v_feed` already applies to the feed.
pub async fn find_by_id_visible(pool: &PgPool, id: Uuid) -> Result<Option<Self>, sqlx::Error> {
sqlx::query_as::<_, Self>(
"SELECT up.* FROM upload up
/// Lean lookup for the public media aliases (`get_original`/`get_preview`/
/// `get_thumbnail`): returns ONLY the file paths + mime for a visible upload —
/// excluding soft-deleted rows and ban-hidden owners (`user.uploads_hidden`), the
/// same filter `v_feed` applies. So moderation that removes a post from the feed
/// also stops its original/preview/thumbnail from being pulled by UUID.
///
/// Selects four columns instead of the whole `Upload` row: this runs once per image
/// per cache-miss on the media hot path, so we avoid hydrating fields the response
/// never uses.
pub async fn find_visible_media(
pool: &PgPool,
id: Uuid,
) -> Result<Option<VisibleMedia>, sqlx::Error> {
sqlx::query_as::<_, VisibleMedia>(
"SELECT up.original_path, up.preview_path, up.thumbnail_path, up.mime_type
FROM upload up
JOIN \"user\" u ON u.id = up.user_id
WHERE up.id = $1 AND up.deleted_at IS NULL AND u.uploads_hidden = false",
)