fix(security): cross-event authz, SSE ticket flow, account hardening, audit logs

Follow-up to the comprehensive code review. Five batches:

1. Cross-event authorization: host_delete_upload, unban_user, and
   host_delete_comment now scope by auth.event_id. Adds
   Upload::find_by_id_and_event / soft_delete_in_event and a
   Comment::soft_delete_in_event variant that joins through upload.

2. Token exposure: SSE auth no longer puts the JWT in the URL.
   New /api/v1/stream/ticket endpoint mints a short-lived single-use
   ticket bound to the session; the EventSource passes ?ticket=...
   instead. Refuse to start in APP_ENV=production with the dev JWT
   sentinel; warn loudly otherwise.

3. Account hardening: per-IP+name rate limit on /recover (mitigates
   targeted lockout DoS), per-IP rate limit on /admin/login, random
   32-char admin recovery PIN (replaces "0000"), structured tracing
   events for wrong PIN, lockout, failed admin login, ban/unban/role
   change/pin-reset/host-delete.

4. DoS / correctness: comment listing paginated (LIMIT 50 + ?before=
   cursor), hashtag extraction whitelisted to ASCII alnum+underscore
   (≤40 chars) with unit tests, display_name / caption / comment body
   length validated in chars rather than bytes.

5. Cleanup: session-touch failures now logged, DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS
   env var (default 10).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MechaCat02
2026-05-17 21:00:51 +02:00
parent 2340f21637
commit d228676a56
17 changed files with 507 additions and 79 deletions

View File

@@ -120,18 +120,38 @@ pub async fn ban_user(
.execute(&state.pool)
.await?;
tracing::info!(
actor_user_id = %auth.user_id,
target_user_id = %user_id,
event_id = %auth.event_id,
hide_uploads = body.hide_uploads,
"host: ban_user"
);
Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}
pub async fn unban_user(
State(state): State<AppState>,
RequireHost(_auth): RequireHost,
RequireHost(auth): RequireHost,
Path(user_id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<StatusCode, AppError> {
sqlx::query("UPDATE \"user\" SET is_banned = FALSE WHERE id = $1")
.bind(user_id)
.execute(&state.pool)
.await?;
let result = sqlx::query(
"UPDATE \"user\" SET is_banned = FALSE WHERE id = $1 AND event_id = $2",
)
.bind(user_id)
.bind(auth.event_id)
.execute(&state.pool)
.await?;
if result.rows_affected() == 0 {
return Err(AppError::NotFound("Benutzer nicht gefunden.".into()));
}
tracing::info!(
actor_user_id = %auth.user_id,
target_user_id = %user_id,
event_id = %auth.event_id,
"host: unban_user"
);
Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}
@@ -181,6 +201,14 @@ pub async fn set_role(
.bind(auth.event_id)
.execute(&state.pool)
.await?;
tracing::info!(
actor_user_id = %auth.user_id,
target_user_id = %user_id,
event_id = %auth.event_id,
old_role = %target.0,
new_role,
"host: set_role"
);
Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}
@@ -251,38 +279,61 @@ pub async fn reset_user_pin(
serde_json::json!({ "user_id": user_id }).to_string(),
));
tracing::info!(
actor_user_id = %auth.user_id,
target_user_id = %user_id,
event_id = %auth.event_id,
"host: reset_user_pin"
);
Ok(Json(PinResetResponse { pin }))
}
pub async fn host_delete_upload(
State(state): State<AppState>,
RequireHost(_auth): RequireHost,
RequireHost(auth): RequireHost,
Path(upload_id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<StatusCode, AppError> {
let upload = Upload::find_by_id(&state.pool, upload_id)
let upload = Upload::find_by_id_and_event(&state.pool, upload_id, auth.event_id)
.await?
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Upload nicht gefunden.".into()))?;
Upload::soft_delete(&state.pool, upload_id).await?;
let deleted = Upload::soft_delete_in_event(&state.pool, upload_id, auth.event_id).await?;
if !deleted {
return Err(AppError::NotFound("Upload nicht gefunden.".into()));
}
let _ = state.sse_tx.send(SseEvent::new(
"upload-deleted",
serde_json::json!({ "upload_id": upload.id }).to_string(),
));
tracing::info!(
actor_user_id = %auth.user_id,
event_id = %auth.event_id,
upload_id = %upload.id,
"host: host_delete_upload"
);
Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}
pub async fn host_delete_comment(
State(state): State<AppState>,
RequireHost(_auth): RequireHost,
RequireHost(auth): RequireHost,
Path(comment_id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<StatusCode, AppError> {
Comment::find_by_id(&state.pool, comment_id)
.await?
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Kommentar nicht gefunden.".into()))?;
Comment::soft_delete(&state.pool, comment_id).await?;
let deleted =
Comment::soft_delete_in_event(&state.pool, comment_id, auth.event_id).await?;
if !deleted {
return Err(AppError::NotFound("Kommentar nicht gefunden.".into()));
}
tracing::info!(
actor_user_id = %auth.user_id,
event_id = %auth.event_id,
comment_id = %comment_id,
"host: host_delete_comment"
);
Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
use axum::extract::{Path, State};
use axum::extract::{Path, Query, State};
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use axum::Json;
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use serde::Deserialize;
use uuid::Uuid;
@@ -51,12 +52,24 @@ pub async fn toggle_like(
Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Default)]
pub struct ListCommentsQuery {
/// RFC3339 timestamp — return only comments older than this. Pass the
/// `created_at` of the oldest currently-loaded comment to fetch the next
/// older page.
pub before: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
}
const COMMENT_PAGE_SIZE: i64 = 50;
pub async fn list_comments(
State(state): State<AppState>,
_auth: AuthUser,
Path(upload_id): Path<Uuid>,
Query(q): Query<ListCommentsQuery>,
) -> Result<Json<Vec<CommentDto>>, AppError> {
let comments = Comment::list_for_upload(&state.pool, upload_id).await?;
let comments =
Comment::list_for_upload(&state.pool, upload_id, q.before, COMMENT_PAGE_SIZE).await?;
Ok(Json(comments))
}
@@ -79,7 +92,8 @@ pub async fn add_comment(
}
let text = body.body.trim();
if text.is_empty() || text.len() > 500 {
let text_chars = text.chars().count();
if text_chars == 0 || text_chars > 500 {
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
"Kommentar muss zwischen 1 und 500 Zeichen lang sein.".into(),
));

View File

@@ -3,32 +3,51 @@ use std::time::Duration;
use axum::extract::{Query, State};
use axum::response::sse::{Event, KeepAlive, Sse};
use axum::Json;
use futures::stream::Stream;
use serde::Deserialize;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use tokio_stream::wrappers::BroadcastStream;
use tokio_stream::StreamExt;
use crate::auth::jwt;
use crate::auth::middleware::AuthUser;
use crate::error::AppError;
use crate::models::session::Session;
use crate::state::AppState;
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct SseQuery {
pub token: String,
pub ticket: String,
}
/// SSE stream endpoint. Accepts JWT via query param since EventSource
/// doesn't support custom headers.
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub struct StreamTicketResponse {
pub ticket: String,
}
/// Mint a short-lived single-use SSE ticket. The browser's `EventSource` cannot
/// send an `Authorization` header, so the alternative used to be passing the JWT
/// as `?token=...` — which leaks the bearer token into access logs, referer
/// headers, and browser history. The client now exchanges its Bearer token for
/// an opaque ticket via this endpoint and passes that on the stream open.
pub async fn issue_ticket(
State(state): State<AppState>,
auth: AuthUser,
) -> Json<StreamTicketResponse> {
let ticket = state.sse_tickets.issue(auth.token_hash);
Json(StreamTicketResponse { ticket })
}
/// SSE stream endpoint. Authenticates via a single-use ticket (see
/// [`issue_ticket`]) — never the raw JWT.
pub async fn stream(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Query(q): Query<SseQuery>,
) -> Result<Sse<impl Stream<Item = Result<Event, Infallible>>>, AppError> {
// Verify token
let _claims = jwt::verify_token(&q.token, &state.config.jwt_secret)
.map_err(|_| AppError::Unauthorized("Token ungültig.".into()))?;
let token_hash = state
.sse_tickets
.consume(&q.ticket)
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Ticket ungültig oder abgelaufen.".into()))?;
let token_hash = jwt::hash_token(&q.token);
Session::find_by_token_hash(&state.pool, &token_hash)
.await
.map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))?

View File

@@ -99,9 +99,11 @@ pub async fn upload(
let mime = content_type.unwrap_or_else(|| "application/octet-stream".to_string());
let size = data.len() as i64;
// Validate caption length
// Validate caption length. Counted in chars (code points) to match the
// "Zeichen" wording in the error message — `.len()` would be bytes and
// reject perfectly valid German/emoji captions early.
if let Some(ref cap) = caption {
if cap.len() > MAX_CAPTION_LENGTH {
if cap.chars().count() > MAX_CAPTION_LENGTH {
return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
"Beschreibung ist zu lang. Maximum: {} Zeichen.",
MAX_CAPTION_LENGTH