Merge test/pin-security-assertions: pin security assertions + real IDOR

Turn accept-both-outcomes documentation tests into pinned secure-behavior
assertions (SVG stored-XSS→400, zero-byte→400, path-traversal→201, export→404),
and replace fake-UUID authz tests with real cross-user IDOR coverage (comment
delete, upload delete, caption edit all → 403 with no state change).

e2e/fixtures/db.ts

@@ -68,6 +68,17 @@ export const db = {
     );
   },
 
+  /**
+   * Flip the `export_zip_ready` gate directly. The download handler serves bytes
+   * only when this boolean is true AND the file exists on disk, so setting it true
+   * without a file lets tests exercise the "ready but file missing" 404 branch.
+   */
+  async setExportZipReady(slug: string, ready: boolean) {
+    await withClient((c) =>
+      c.query(`UPDATE event SET export_zip_ready = $2 WHERE slug = $1`, [slug, ready])
+    );
+  },
+
   /** Insert a pre-baked export job row to skip the (slow) real compression path. */
   async fakeExportJob(eventSlug: string, type: 'zip' | 'html', status: 'pending' | 'running' | 'done') {
     await withClient(async (c) => {

e2e/specs/06-export/export.spec.ts

@@ -42,22 +42,42 @@ test.describe('Export — release and download', () => {
     expect(body.html.status).toBe('done');
   });
 
-  test('ZIP download returns 404 when no file is on disk (export released but never compressed)', async ({ guest, db }) => {
+  const base = process.env.E2E_FRONTEND_URL ?? 'http://localhost:3101';
-    const g = await guest('NoFile');
+
+  // Browser downloads stream to disk via a top-level navigation, so the download
+  // endpoint authenticates with a single-use ticket (no Bearer header).
+  async function mintTicket(jwt: string): Promise<string> {
+    const res = await fetch(base + '/api/v1/export/ticket', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${jwt}` },
+    });
+    return (await res.json()).ticket;
+  }
+
+  test('ZIP download 404s when the export is not yet marked ready', async ({ guest, db }) => {
+    const g = await guest('NotReady');
+    // Released flag set, but export_zip_ready is still false → must refuse, never serve.
     await db.setExportReleased(SLUG, true);
     await db.fakeExportJob(SLUG, 'zip', 'done');
-    const base = process.env.E2E_FRONTEND_URL ?? 'http://localhost:3101';
+    const ticket = await mintTicket(g.jwt);
-    // Browser downloads stream straight to disk via a top-level navigation, so the
+
-    // download endpoint authenticates with a single-use ticket (no Bearer header).
-    const ticketRes = await fetch(base + '/api/v1/export/ticket', {
-      method: 'POST',
-      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${g.jwt}` },
-    });
-    const { ticket } = await ticketRes.json();
-    // Real backend additionally checks event.export_zip_ready. The faked row is
-    // enough for /status; the download path needs the boolean flag too.
     const res = await fetch(base + '/api/v1/export/zip?ticket=' + encodeURIComponent(ticket));
-    // Either 404 ("not available" OR "file not found") — both are valid states for this setup.
+    // Pinned to 404 (not [404,200]): a 200 here would mean serving an export that was
-    expect([404, 200]).toContain(res.status);
+    // never released for download — a data-exposure regression. This hits the
+    // `!export_zip_ready` guard.
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
+  });
+
+  test('ZIP download 404s when marked ready but the file is missing on disk', async ({ guest, db }) => {
+    const g = await guest('ReadyNoFile');
+    // Released AND ready, but no Gallery.zip on disk (we never ran a real export) →
+    // the handler must 404 on the missing-file check, not 200/500 or serve a stale file.
+    await db.setExportReleased(SLUG, true);
+    await db.setExportZipReady(SLUG, true);
+    await db.fakeExportJob(SLUG, 'zip', 'done');
+    const ticket = await mintTicket(g.jwt);
+
+    const res = await fetch(base + '/api/v1/export/zip?ticket=' + encodeURIComponent(ticket));
+    expect(res.status).toBe(404);
   });
 });

e2e/specs/07-adversarial/authorization-deep.spec.ts

@@ -5,26 +5,109 @@
  * with cross-user and banned-user scenarios that span multiple resources.
  */
 import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test';
+import { uploadRaw, JPEG_MAGIC } from '../../helpers/upload-client';
 
 const BASE = process.env.E2E_FRONTEND_URL ?? 'http://localhost:3101';
 
-test.describe('Adversarial — deep authorization', () => {
+/** Seed a real upload owned by `jwt` and return its id. */
-  test('user A cannot delete user B\'s comment via /api/v1/comment/{id}', async ({ api, guest }) => {
+async function seedUpload(jwt: string, caption?: string): Promise<string> {
-    const a = await guest('CommentA');
+  const body = new Uint8Array(1024);
-    const b = await guest('CommentB');
+  body.set(JPEG_MAGIC, 0);
+  const res = await uploadRaw(jwt, body, { filename: 'a.jpg', contentType: 'image/jpeg', caption });
+  if (res.status !== 201) throw new Error(`seed upload failed: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
+  return (await res.json()).id;
+}
 
-    // We need an upload first; without a multipart helper here we use a placeholder:
+/** Seed a real comment on `uploadId` authored by `jwt`; return its id. */
-    // post a comment on a non-existent upload to force the path to return 404 / 403 / 401.
+async function seedComment(jwt: string, uploadId: string, body = 'mine'): Promise<string> {
-    // The real intent is verified once an upload helper feeds this test a real upload_id.
+  const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/upload/${uploadId}/comments`, {
-    const fakeId = '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000';
+    method: 'POST',
-    const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/comment/${fakeId}`, {
+    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${jwt}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ body }),
+  });
+  if (res.status !== 201) throw new Error(`seed comment failed: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
+  return (await res.json()).id;
+}
+
+async function listComments(jwt: string, uploadId: string): Promise<any[]> {
+  const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/upload/${uploadId}/comments`, {
+    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${jwt}` },
+  });
+  return res.json();
+}
+
+test.describe('Adversarial — deep authorization', () => {
+  // IDOR: user B must not be able to delete user A's REAL comment. This exercises the
+  // ownership guard (`comment.user_id != auth.user_id` → 403) — the previous version fired
+  // at the all-zeros UUID, which 404s at the lookup BEFORE that guard runs, so it never
+  // tested authorization at all.
+  test('user B cannot delete user A\'s comment (real resource → 403, comment survives)', async ({ guest }) => {
+    const a = await guest('CommentOwnerA');
+    const b = await guest('AttackerB');
+
+    const uploadId = await seedUpload(a.jwt);
+    const commentId = await seedComment(a.jwt, uploadId, 'A owns this');
+
+    const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/comment/${commentId}`, {
       method: 'DELETE',
       headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${b.jwt}` },
     });
-    // Acceptable: 403 (not your comment), 404 (no such comment), 401.
+    // Must be 403 specifically — the comment exists and is in B's event, so a 404 would
-    expect([401, 403, 404]).toContain(res.status);
+    // mean the ownership check was skipped/reordered.
-    void a;
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
-    void api;
+
+    // No state change: the comment is still there.
+    const after = await listComments(a.jwt, uploadId);
+    expect(after.some((c: any) => c.id === commentId)).toBe(true);
+
+    // Control: the real owner CAN delete it (proves the 403 was about identity, not a broken route).
+    const ownerDel = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/comment/${commentId}`, {
+      method: 'DELETE',
+      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${a.jwt}` },
+    });
+    expect(ownerDel.status).toBe(204);
+  });
+
+  // IDOR: user B must not be able to delete user A's REAL upload.
+  test('user B cannot delete user A\'s upload (403, upload survives)', async ({ guest, db }) => {
+    const a = await guest('UploadOwnerA');
+    const b = await guest('AttackerB2');
+
+    const uploadId = await seedUpload(a.jwt);
+    expect(await db.countUploadsForUser(a.userId)).toBe(1);
+
+    const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/upload/${uploadId}`, {
+      method: 'DELETE',
+      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${b.jwt}` },
+    });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+
+    // No state change: A's upload is still present (not soft-deleted).
+    expect(await db.countUploadsForUser(a.userId)).toBe(1);
+  });
+
+  // IDOR: user B must not be able to edit (re-caption / re-tag) user A's upload.
+  test('user B cannot edit user A\'s upload caption (403, caption unchanged)', async ({ guest, db }) => {
+    const a = await guest('UploadOwnerA2');
+    const b = await guest('AttackerB3');
+
+    const uploadId = await seedUpload(a.jwt, 'original caption');
+    // Make it visible in the feed so we can read the caption back.
+    await db.setUploadCompressionStatus(uploadId, 'done');
+
+    const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/upload/${uploadId}`, {
+      method: 'PATCH',
+      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${b.jwt}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ caption: 'hacked by B' }),
+    });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(403);
+
+    // No state change: the caption A set is intact.
+    const feedRes = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/feed`, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${a.jwt}` } });
+    const feed: any = await feedRes.json();
+    const list: any[] = feed.uploads ?? feed.items ?? feed;
+    const row = list.find((u: any) => u.id === uploadId);
+    expect(row?.caption).toBe('original caption');
   });
 
   test('banned user cannot toggle a like', async ({ api, host, guest }) => {