0fa40ddf80b9f599940b8fcc3bd1875e17d7d316
5 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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fabi
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02971f3186 |
test(e2e): de-vacuum security tests; add quota, authz-sweep, keepsake-regen coverage
An audit found tests that pass on broken code. The dominant pattern: fire a security
assertion at the all-zeros UUID and accept [403, 404] — the 404 comes from the resource
LOOKUP, not the guard, so the guard can be deleted and the test still passes. Repaired to
use real resources and demand exactly 403:
- banned-user cannot like / comment (the only coverage of those ban invariants)
- host cannot promote a real guest (or self) to admin — asserts nobody's role changed
- IDOR comment-delete already used a real resource; kept
Also inverted recovery.spec's "unknown name → nicht gefunden" test: that asserted the exact
account-enumeration oracle the F4 fix removed, so restoring the vuln would have made it
pass. Now: an unknown name must be byte-identical to a wrong PIN.
New coverage for paths that ran in production but in zero tests:
- quota.spec.ts: storage quota enforcement (413 over-limit, atomic increment under two
uploads held mid-body so both carry a stale total=0 — the real race; a naive Promise.all
version was itself vacuous and is documented as such). Proven to fail without the guard.
- authz-sweep.spec.ts: table-driven guest→403 / host→403 over ALL 19 privileged routes +
anonymous + __truncate. No live hole found; the whole surface is now locked.
- ban / unban / host-comment-delete AFTER release regenerate the keepsake (data-loss
paths that were dead under test); comment-delete mid-build doesn't strand the ZIP.
Lower-severity de-vacuuming: 10 MB comment test hit Caddy's 502 before the real 500-char
cap (now seeds a real upload, 501→400 / 500→201, mutation-verified); XSS name payloads
shortened under the 50-char cap so they actually store+render; ui-rendering XSS test now
proves the payload rendered before asserting no <b>; export page-object locators fixed to
the real "Download" label with a positive empty-state anchor; avatar palette spread test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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df275bbefa |
fix(rereview): close export-flip race + queue-dedup reload regression
Adversarial re-review of the persona-audit + audit-followup rounds (6411747..)
found one HIGH and one MED regression plus LOW gaps. All fixed with coverage.
HIGH — export stale-keepsake resurrected by an open_event race
A reopen landing in the window between a *current* export worker's finalize_job
and its ready-flag flip cleared export_released_at + the ready flags but left the
export_job row `done` at the same release_seq. The seq-guarded flip then still
matched and re-set export_{zip,html}_ready=TRUE on a pre-reopen snapshot; the next
re-release read that stale TRUE and skipped regeneration (`if ready { continue }`),
serving a keepsake missing every upload from the reopen window — the exact data
loss migration 012 exists to prevent. Both ready-flip UPDATEs are now additionally
anchored on `export_released_at IS NOT NULL`, so a landed reopen makes the flip a
no-op and the re-release regenerates cleanly.
MED — queue dedup broke for reloaded items
loadQueue rebuilt QueueItems from IndexedDB without copying lastModified, which the
new addToQueue dedup keys on. A file re-selected after a page reload / PWA relaunch
missed the duplicate check and uploaded twice. Rehydration now carries lastModified
(extracted to a pure, tested entryToQueueItem helper).
LOW
- diashow: clear the upload-processed debounce timer in onDestroy (no stray
post-unmount /feed fetch).
- USER_JOURNEYS §9.5: document the reconnect-delta ban replay (hidden_user_ids /
uploads_hidden_at, migration 013), not just the live user-hidden SSE.
- e2e api-client: drop the misleading hide_uploads param from banUser — the backend
takes no body and always hides; strip the dead boolean at all call sites.
Tests
- Extract isReversibleLock (the terminal-403 KEEP-vs-PURGE-blob discriminator) into a
pure exported helper + unit tests, so the data-loss-critical branch is covered
without an XHR harness.
- entryToQueueItem unit tests lock the lastModified-carry regression.
- Document the export flip-race guard in the reopen/re-release spec (the sub-ms
finalize↔flip interleave isn't deterministically forceable with fast fixtures;
covered by the SQL guard + the end-to-end completeness test).
Verified: backend 40 tests, frontend 44 unit tests, svelte-check 0 errors,
e2e 156 passed / 1 skipped on chromium-desktop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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b1e2e66305 |
test(e2e): address self-review follow-ups (dedup, XSS render guard, SSE hardening)
Follow-ups from the code review of the test-quality batches: - Consolidate duplicated helpers into e2e/helpers/: seed.ts (seedUpload, seedComment, listComments, findFeedRow) and sse.ts (mintSseTicket, openStream, trackStreamOpens). Refactor authorization-deep, xss-injection, like-comment, sse-ticket-abuse, ddos, sse-realtime, multi-tab, and SseListener to use them — the upload/comment/ticket-flow contracts now live in one place each instead of being re-inlined across 3–7 specs. - xss-injection display-name loop: it navigated to /feed (which renders uploader names, not the viewer's) so "nothing fired" passed vacuously — the payload was never rendered. Now navigate to /account (the actual sink) and add a render guard asserting the payload reached the DOM as escaped text before checking __xssFired. - sse-realtime reconnect: snapshot the stream-open count AFTER backgrounding, so the "new connection" assertion is attributable to the foreground event and can't be satisfied by a spurious native/error reconnect before the toggle. - recover-page: correct the comment (auto-submit is the onPinInput handler, not an $effect). 44 affected specs verified green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fabi
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20125fb713 |
test(e2e): pin security assertions + real cross-user IDOR coverage
Turn "accept-both-outcomes" documentation tests — which pass whether the app is secure or vulnerable — into assertions that pin the secure behavior, and replace fake-UUID authz tests that 404'd before ever reaching the ownership guard with real cross-user resources. file-upload-attacks: - SVG-with-<script> → pin 400 (infer returns None for text → stored-XSS defense); was [201,400], which accepted the vulnerable outcome. - zero-byte → pin 400; path-traversal → pin 201 with UUID-derived storage and a no-path-echo check (both were [201,400]). - Fix the application/octet-stream rationale (no "application bypass" exists — the handler ignores the declared type and keys off magic bytes). authorization-deep (IDOR): - B deleting A's comment: seed a real upload+comment as A, assert 403, assert the comment survives, and assert the owner (A) still gets 204 — proving the 403 is about identity, not a broken route. (Was a DELETE on the all-zeros UUID → 404 before the user_id guard, so authorization was never exercised.) - Add B-deletes-A's-upload (403, countUploads unchanged) and B-edits-A's-caption (403, caption intact) — the find_by_id_and_event + ownership guards. export: pin the ZIP-download 404 (was [404,200] — a 200 is a data-exposure regression) and split into the two real branches: not-yet-ready, and ready-but-file-missing (new db.setExportZipReady helper). All 21 assertions verified green against the live secure backend. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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MechaCat02
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e42d8a92a1 |
feat(e2e): Playwright suite — 134 tests across 9 spec areas + UA matrix
Adds an end-to-end Playwright test suite under e2e/ that spins up an
isolated docker-compose stack (Postgres :55432, Caddy :3101, backend with
EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1, SvelteKit adapter-node frontend) and exercises the
SvelteKit app against the real Rust backend.
Phase 1 — happy paths covering every documented USER_JOURNEYS.md flow:
01-auth/ join, recover, admin login, leave event, PIN lockout
02-upload/ gallery picker (API path), rate-limit + admin toggle
03-feed/ like/comment SSE, filters, SSE reconnect on visibility
04-host/ event lock API, ban/unban, promote
05-admin/ config validation, foundational authz guards, stats
06-export/ /export status + download stub
__smoke/ cross-UA happy-path (runs on every UA project)
Phase 2 — adversarial + browser chaos:
07-adversarial/ XSS payloads (6 × display name path), SQLi shapes,
length / encoding / RTL override / NUL byte;
file-upload boundaries (ELF body claimed as JPEG,
oversize vs max_image_size_mb, zero-byte, NUL
filename, path-traversal, SVG-with-script);
JWT alg:none, signature/payload tamper, expired
session, PIN brute-force (serial + parallel),
admin password brute-force; deep authz (cross-user
delete, banned user across like/comment/feed-read,
host→admin escalation); small-scale DDoS (20× /join,
10MB comment body, 10 concurrent SSE).
08-browser-chaos/ localStorage / sessionStorage / cookie purge,
IndexedDB drop mid-session, offline → reconnect,
slow-3G, 503 flakes, 429 with no retry storm,
multi-tab same/different user, no-JS, hostile CSS,
clock skew ±1h / -2d, localStorage quota exhausted.
Phase 3 — mobile gestures (runs only on chromium-mobile / Pixel 7):
09-mobile/ touch-target ≥44px audit, env(safe-area-inset-bottom)
structural check, long-press (FeedListCard → ContextSheet,
quick-tap negation, click-suppression), double-tap
(feed card like + lightbox heart-burst, via synthetic
pointer events to bypass the first-tap-fires-click trap),
viewport reflow (portrait/landscape/narrow/phablet),
plus fixme stubs documenting planned gestures (swipe
lightbox L/R, swipe-down dismiss, pull-to-refresh,
long-press-comment).
Cross-UA matrix (chromium-engine projects run @smoke only):
chromium-pixel7, chromium-galaxy-s22, samsung-internet (Samsung UA
emulation on Galaxy viewport), edge-android, plus webkit-iphone,
chrome-ios, firefox-android, firefox-desktop — the latter four need
libavif16 on the host (Playwright dep) but the configs are in place.
Infrastructure:
- fixtures/test.ts central test.extend (api, db, adminToken, guest,
host, signIn). Per-test DB truncate via the dev-only POST
/admin/__truncate route, gated by EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1.
- helpers/sse-listener.ts, helpers/upload-client.ts (Node-side
multipart for adversarial file-upload tests + JPEG/PNG/ELF magic
constants), helpers/touch.ts (longPress / doubleTap / swipe /
inlineStyle / computedStyle).
- 10 page objects covering every route + UploadSheet/Lightbox.
- global-setup waits for /health, logs in admin, disables every
rate-limit and quota toggle.
- .github/workflows/e2e.yml: PR check runs chromium-desktop + the
smoke matrix in parallel, uploads playwright-report/ and traces on
failure.
Findings the suite surfaces as live `[finding]` warnings (not silenced):
1. /admin/login has no rate-limit or lockout (bcrypt cost only).
2. PIN-attempt counter races under parallel /recover requests.
3. Zero-byte uploads pass /api/v1/upload.
4. SVG-with-script can pass the magic-byte check (consider CSP +
X-Content-Type-Options on /media/*).
Stack-internal docs live in e2e/README.md (UA tier table, Samsung
Internet escalation tiers A/B/C, debugging tips, roadmap).
Final tally: 134 passed / 0 failed / 9 skipped (test.fixme stubs for
not-yet-shipped gestures and one UI-upload-flow investigation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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