31faccfdf854da33d35d98df617f384ea72ed79a
9 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
fabi
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31faccfdf8 |
fix(audit-4): refuse undecodable images at admission, stop retrying permanent failures
Fourth round: reject at the door what the worker can only fail on, and stop retrying errors that cannot succeed — while keeping IoError retryable so ENOSPC still gets another attempt. Squashed from 2 commits, original messages preserved below. ──────── fix(upload): refuse undecodable images at the door, and stop retrying them Two halves of the same complaint: an oversized photo was accepted with a 201 and then silently soft-deleted minutes later, after the worker had burned six seconds of backoff re-reaching a conclusion it could not change. Admission. The compression budget now runs at upload time, against the header only, so a guest is told immediately and told why: "Bild hat zu viele Bildpunkte (ca. 99 Megapixel) und kann nicht verarbeitet werden. Bitte verkleinere es und lade es erneut hoch." instead of watching the photo vanish behind a vague "could not be processed" — which arrived only if they happened to still be on the feed with that card loaded. Nothing is stored, so there is no row to soft-delete and no orphan for the sweep to reclaim. Admission and the worker share ONE function (`decoder_within_budget`), so they cannot drift apart and start disagreeing about what is acceptable — a photo accepted at the door and rejected by the worker would be worse than either behaviour alone. The worker keeps its own check: the backfill decodes files that predate this check, and defence in depth is the whole reason the budget exists. Retries. The loop retried every failure, including ones that are a property of the input. An image over the budget, a corrupt file, an unsupported format: each fails identically on all three attempts, so the only effect was 2s + 4s of sleep and three near-identical warnings before the same outcome. `is_permanent_image_error` classifies the `ImageError` variants that cannot change between attempts — Limits, Unsupported, Decoding — and the loop gives up on those at once. `IoError` is deliberately excluded: an ENOSPC while writing a derivative is exactly the transient case the retry exists for, and misclassifying it would turn a blip back into the data loss round 1 fixed. Measured: retry log lines went from 3 per oversized upload to 0. Tests: unit tests for both sides of the classifier (a Limits error is permanent, a missing file is not) and for admission agreeing with the decoder on accept AND reject. The e2e spec is rewritten for the new contract — 400 with an actionable message, nothing stored, backend alive after a burst of four — plus a mirror asserting an ordinary photo still uploads and processes, since a budget that rejected everything would satisfy the other two. ──────── fix(upload): narrow the admission check to the memory budget only The admission check I just added rejected ANY image the decoder couldn't build — corrupt, truncated, or unsupported, not only over-budget. That broke two adversarial tests, and they were right to break. 07-adversarial/file-upload-attacks pins, deliberately, that acceptance follows the MAGIC BYTES: a payload whose first three bytes are a JPEG header is accepted regardless of what follows, because the security property under test is that the client-declared Content-Type has no influence. Both failing cases upload 1024 bytes of JPEG magic followed by zeros. Rejecting those at admission is a different, broader contract than the one asked for, and rewriting an adversarial test to match new behaviour is precisely the thing that needs justifying rather than doing quietly. So admission now checks only what it was meant to: `exceeds_decode_budget` returns true solely for `ImageError::Limits`. A corrupt file goes to the compression worker exactly as before — which handles it gracefully and, since the retry classifier in the previous commit, no longer burns backoff on it. The resource guard is the part that had to move earlier; nothing else did. Tests: the size agreement between admission and the worker is still asserted in both directions, plus a new one writing a magic-bytes-only stub and asserting admission accepts it WHILE the worker still rejects it — pinning the boundary between the two checks so a future widening fails here rather than in the adversarial suite. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fabi
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06ade4e158 |
fix(audit-3): restore the decode allocation guard, route /health in production
Third round. The decode allocation guard is a regression from round 1: swapping
reader.decode() for into_decoder() silently dropped the max_alloc enforcement
while keeping the comment that claimed it held.
Squashed from 3 commits, original messages preserved below.
──────── fix(imaging): restore the decode allocation guard I removed in round 1
This is a regression I introduced, not a pre-existing gap. Before 05948d8 the
compression worker used `ImageReader::decode()`, which does:
let mut decoder = Self::make_decoder(format, self.inner, limits.clone())?;
limits.reserve(decoder.total_bytes())?; // enforces max_alloc
decoder.set_limits(limits)?;
Reading the EXIF orientation tag needs `into_decoder()` instead, and that skips
the reserve entirely — the crate's own FIXME concedes `from_decoder` doesn't
compensate. Nothing else enforces `max_alloc`: the JPEG decoder's `set_limits`
only checks support and dimensions. So the 256 MiB budget has been inert since
that commit, and round 2 then propagated the weakened path into export.rs through
the shared helper, in a commit whose message claimed the helper "carries" the
decompression-bomb cap. It didn't, and the comment saying max_alloc "hard-caps
the decode allocation" was simply false.
What was left was only the per-axis cap, which permits 12000x12000 — 412 MiB
decoded, 824 MiB for the two concurrent decodes the worker runs by default,
against a 1 GiB container. Deploy-blocking right now because bumping
DERIVATIVES_REV makes the first boot after a deploy re-decode the entire gallery
two at a time: an OOM kill there restarts the container, which re-runs the
backfill. A boot loop, on the first deploy of these fixes.
Re-add the reserve exactly as `decode()` does it. Per the budget decision it stays
at 256 MiB (~89 MP for RGB8, above any mainstream phone's real output); two
concurrent decodes now peak at 512 MiB. Oversized images take the graceful path
from round 1 — original retained, quota refunded, upload-error toast — and fail
after the header parse but BEFORE any pixels are read, so they cost a header read
rather than an allocation. Measured peak during a concurrent oversized burst: 3.0
MiB.
Test parity is the other half, and the reason this was invisible: the e2e app
container had NO memory limit while production is capped at 1 GiB, so a decode
that would OOM-kill production simply succeeded in CI. Mirror the 1 GiB cap in
docker-compose.test.yml. That is the third divergence of this shape, after WebKit
missing from CI and /health existing only in Caddyfile.test.
Tests: a fixture that is 568 KiB on disk and 283 MiB decoded (11000x9000 = 99 MP,
deliberately UNDER the per-axis cap so the axis check cannot be what rejects it).
A unit test asserts the refusal — it fails against the old code, which decoded it
into an 11000x9000 buffer — with a companion asserting an ordinary photo still
decodes AND still gets its orientation applied, so the guard didn't become a
blanket refusal. An e2e test uploads it singly and as a concurrent pair, asserting
compression lands in 'failed' and the backend is still serving and still
processing afterwards.
──────── fix(deploy): route /health in production, and actually apply Caddyfile changes
Two defects in the update procedure I wrote last round, both of which make a
successful-looking deploy a lie.
1. The documented health check could never pass.
`curl -fsS https://DOMAIN/health` 404s against a perfectly healthy production
stack. The backend registers /health on its ROOT router, not under /api/v1, and
the production Caddyfile proxies only /api/* and /media/* — so /health fell
through to the SvelteKit catch-all, which has no such route and returns its 404
page. With -f, curl exits 22 and the `&& echo` never runs. My own gloss
("Anything other than ok means check the logs") then sent the operator chasing a
phantom outage.
e2e/Caddyfile.test has carried `reverse_proxy /health app:3000` since it was
written — precisely because the catch-all would otherwise swallow it. Production
never did. Per the fix-the-gap-not-the-doc call, production gets the same line,
and /health joins the no-store matcher so a cached response can't report the last
known state instead of the current one. Verified by running the production
Caddyfile against the real backend: /health -> 200 "ok", Cache-Control: no-store,
with /api/v1/event and / unaffected.
2. The sequence never reloaded Caddy, so a Caddyfile-only change was dropped.
`--build` only rebuilds services with a `build:` section, and caddy is a pinned
upstream image. Compose decides whether to recreate a container from its config
hash, which covers the mount SPECIFICATION but not the mounted file's CONTENTS —
so a git pull that changes ./Caddyfile produces no delta, Compose reports
`Running`, and Caddy serves its old config indefinitely. Exit code 0 throughout.
Round 1's iOS download fix (137c4ee) is exactly this shape: Caddyfile plus four
e2e files, so 100% of its production effect is in that one file. Following the
README to the letter deployed it, showed both image IDs changing, and left iOS
downloads broken.
Demonstrated rather than assumed — added a probe header to a Caddyfile, ran the
old sequence (`up -d --build`): header absent, change silently dropped. Ran the
new step 4 (`up -d --force-recreate caddy`): header served.
`--force-recreate` rather than `restart` or `caddy reload` because the bind mount
is resolved to an inode at container-create time and git pull replaces the file
rather than editing in place, so a restart can re-read the stale content — the
exact failure I hit in round 1 when `caddy reload` didn't pick up an edit.
Also rewrites the "db and caddy are untouched … so data volumes survive" sentence.
I wrote it as reassurance; "caddy is untouched" was the bug.
──────── chore: take the Bash(*) permission change back out of the shared settings
`.claude/settings.json` is committed and applies to anyone who clones. Fabi's
local `allow: ["Bash(*)"]` plus deny list ended up in it, inside f0d69f1 — a
commit about the image decode guard, which has nothing to do with permissions.
That was my mistake, twice. The file was already modified when I started the
round: my `git status --short` check printed "(clean)" from an unconditional
`echo` rather than from the status output, so I read a dirty tree as clean. Then
`git add -A` swept it into an unrelated commit, and I reported afterwards that I
had left it untouched. Neither the check nor the claim was true.
Restores the shared file to its previous three narrow entries. The permission
setup itself is preserved, moved to `.claude/settings.local.json`, which
`.gitignore:34` covers precisely so per-user permissions stay per-user — the
existing 442 entries there are kept alongside it.
Not rewriting f0d69f1 to erase this: main is unpushed so it would be safe, but a
visible correction is worth more than a tidy history, and a rebase across the
merge commits carries more risk than the mistake does.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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0c0eed885a |
fix(audit-1): media gating, per-user limits, moderation UI, upload integrity
First audit round: a blocker and eight high-severity findings across the media
access gate, the guest-facing rate limiters, host moderation, and the upload
pipeline — plus the backup commands and the e2e/production divergences that hid
several of them.
Squashed from 7 commits, original messages preserved below.
──────── fix(export): let the keepsake download through X-Frame-Options on iOS
The keepsake download navigates a hidden, same-origin iframe (deliberately:
a top-level navigation to a 404/429 would unload the PWA). Caddy stamped a
site-wide `X-Frame-Options: DENY` that also covered the proxied `/api/*`.
Blink hands a `Content-Disposition: attachment` response to the download
manager at the network layer, so Chromium never noticed. WebKit enforces XFO
on the frame navigation first and aborts the load — so on iOS Safari, the
app's primary platform, tapping Download did nothing at all, silently.
Carve the two export endpoints out to SAMEORIGIN, which still blocks
cross-origin framing. Implemented as two disjoint matchers rather than an
override: Caddy applies the FIRST `header` directive outermost, so it wins on
write and a later, more specific `header` is silently ignored (verified
against the running test stack).
Also close the test gap that let this ship:
- `06-export` ran on chromium-desktop only; add it to `webkit-iphone`, the
only engine that enforces XFO on the download frame.
- No test in the suite ever clicked a download button — every archive
assertion used Node `fetch`, which has no frame and no XFO enforcement.
Add a spec that clicks it and awaits a real `download` event. Verified
falsifiable: with the blanket DENY reinstated it fails and reports the
WebKit refusal as the cause.
- Fix `ExportPage`'s card-scoped locators, which matched nothing: the cards
carry `class="card p-5"` (a Tailwind `@apply` component class), never the
`rounded-xl` the page object looked for. This had left the "shows enabled
download buttons" test red on main.
──────── fix(media): close the percent-escape bypass of the media gate
`/media/%70reviews/{id}.jpg` served a taken-down photo to anyone,
unauthenticated. Verified against the running stack: the literal path 404s,
the escaped one returned 200 with the full image. Same for displays,
thumbnails and originals, and any escaped byte in any position works.
Cause: the block was four `nest_service("/media/previews", 404)` route
matches sitting above a `ServeDir` on `/media`. axum matches on the RAW path
(matchit does no percent-decoding), while `ServeDir` percent-decodes when it
resolves the file. So `%70reviews` missed every blocker, fell through to the
ServeDir, and was decoded back to `previews/` on disk — reaching the bytes
with no soft-delete and no ban-hide check. That defeats a host takedown,
which is the entire point of the gate.
Remove the `/media` route tree outright instead of racing the decoder.
Nothing needs it: every media URL the backend emits is already a gated
`/api/v1/upload/{id}/{original,preview,display,thumbnail}` alias
(handlers::feed), the frontend contains zero `/media/` references, and the
`/media` in config.rs/disk.rs is the filesystem path while `media/` in
export.rs is a path inside the zip. `/media/**` now 404s regardless of
encoding. The route's own comment already said it "serves nothing" — it
wasn't a backstop, it was the vector.
Caddy keeps proxying /media/* deliberately: the app 404s it, and forwarding
means the e2e gating specs exercise the app's refusal exactly as production
would rather than being masked by the SvelteKit 404 page.
Extend the gating spec with the encoded variants — asserting only the literal
spelling is what let this sit undetected.
──────── fix(rate-limit): key the guest-facing limiters per user, not per IP
At a venue every guest is behind one NAT, so an IP-keyed limiter hands the
whole party a single bucket. On a fresh deploy 12 guests arriving together
meant 5 joined and 7 were turned away, with no Retry-After telling them when
to retry. `/feed` (60/min) and `/export` (3 per DAY — the fourth guest to
fetch their keepsake locked out until tomorrow) had the same defect.
`feed_delta` was already keyed per-user and its comment states the exact
rationale ("so one client can't starve others behind a shared NAT"); this
makes its siblings match.
- feed:{ip} -> feed:{user_id} (auth was already in scope)
- export:{ip} -> export:{user_id} (resolved from the download ticket's
session, which was previously looked up and discarded)
- join:{ip}: pre-auth, so there is no user to key on. Split in two — a loose
per-IP ceiling that only bounds raw volume (new `join_ip_rate_per_min`,
default 60, migration 017), plus the real 5/60s anti-spam bucket keyed
per (ip, name), mirroring the existing `recover:{ip}:{name}`.
admin_login / recover / pin_reset_req stay IP-keyed on purpose and are now
commented as such: they guard credential guessing, where a per-user or
per-name key would just hand an attacker a fresh bucket per guess.
Retry-After: the machinery existed but 7 of 8 sites called `check()` and
hard-coded `None`, so a throttled client was told to back off but never for
how long. Delete the bool `check()` wrapper entirely so `check_with_retry`
is the only entry point and the delay cannot be discarded by accident. Also
surface it for the PIN lockout, where the deadline was already known.
Fix the "unknown" fallback while here: every client_ip() caller passed that
literal, so any request without X-Forwarded-For — anything reaching the app
directly rather than through Caddy — shared ONE global bucket. Serve with
connect-info and use the peer address.
Tests: the reseed forces every limiter toggle off before each test, which is
why this whole class was invisible. Add 01-auth/rate-limit-shared-nat, which
enables them and asserts 12 guests share an IP without collision, that one
guest hammering their own name IS still throttled (so the fix re-keys rather
than removes the limit), and that feed/export buckets are per-user. Retarget
the ddos join test at the new per-IP ceiling — it asserted the defect.
Also seed `admin_login_rate_enabled` (read by the handler, seeded by no
migration and no reseed) and register `join_ip_rate_per_min` in the admin
config allowlist. Unrelated pre-existing red test fixed: 01-auth/join
asserted a "Willkommen!" heading the wedding redesign removed.
──────── feat(moderation): let a host remove a guest's photo or comment from the UI
`DELETE /host/upload/{id}` and `DELETE /host/comment/{id}` were complete on the
backend — transactional, SSE-broadcasting, audit-logged — and had zero frontend
callers. The feed context sheet offered "Löschen" only when
`target.user_id === myUserId`, so the only lever a host actually had against an
unwanted photo was banning the uploader.
That is both disproportionate and ineffective. A ban doesn't retract what was
already posted, and it makes things strictly worse for comments: the ban check
runs BEFORE the ownership check on the guest delete route, so banning an abusive
author leaves their comment on screen and permanently undeletable by them. With
no host affordance, nobody could remove it at all.
- feed: hosts/admins get "Beitrag entfernen" on other people's posts, routed to
the host endpoint (the guest route 403s anything the caller doesn't own) with
moderation-specific confirm copy. Own-post "Löschen" is unchanged.
- lightbox: same for comments, via /host/comment/{id}.
- Ban semantics are deliberately untouched (USER_JOURNEYS §10 — banned users keep
read access and cannot write). The deadlock is broken by giving the host a way
in, not by loosening the ban.
Live role (this had to come first). `getRole()` decodes the JWT claim, but the
token is never reissued — the backend slides the session row forward and treats
the DB row as authoritative. The claim is therefore frozen for the token's
lifetime: up to 30 days. A guest promoted at the party saw no Host-Dashboard and
no moderation actions until they signed out and back in, even though
`/me/context` had been returning their real role on every page load and 4 of its
6 call sites dropped the field on the floor.
Add `role-store.ts`: seeded from the claim so there's no flash of the wrong nav,
then corrected by every `/me/context` response. Point the ad-hoc `getRole()`
callers at it (account, upload, host, admin, and the new feed gate). The host and
admin dashboards now derive `myRole` reactively, so a demotion disables their
controls immediately instead of at next login.
Tests: 04-host/moderation-ui drives the real UI — host removes a guest photo and
it's gone from /feed server-side; a plain guest is offered nothing on someone
else's post (the mirror that keeps the first test honest); a promoted guest gains
the dashboard on reload while their token still carries `role: guest`; and a host
removes the comment of an already-banned guest, asserting first that the author's
own delete 403s so the deadlock is real.
──────── fix(upload): stop destroying originals, apply EXIF orientation, surface rejections
Three defects in the same pipeline, each of which loses a photo or misrepresents
one.
1. A transient error destroyed the guest's only copy.
`process`'s error arm unconditionally `remove_file`d the original. Every failure
routed there: `create_dir_all`, both derivative `save_with_format` calls (disk
full is the canonical case, and it arrives exactly when many guests upload at
once), a panic inside the image codec, or a momentary DB-pool exhaustion. The
row is only SOFT-deleted, so the bytes were the sole unrecoverable part — and
they were the part we deleted. The author already knew this was wrong next door:
`backfill_missing_display` says it "must NEVER soft-delete an upload that already
has a working preview".
Retry up to 3 times with backoff (re-checking the e2e generation guard after each
sleep), and on final failure keep the refund + soft-delete but leave the original
on disk, logging its path. A failed upload is now recoverable instead of gone.
2. Every portrait photo was stored sideways.
Phones don't rotate sensor data — they record the camera orientation in EXIF and
store the pixels as shot. `decode()` returns those raw pixels and the JPEG
re-encode writes no EXIF, so the 800px preview, the 2048px diashow display and
the keepsake were all rotated 90°, while "Original anzeigen" rendered upright
because the original keeps its tag. That asymmetry is why it reads as a viewer
bug. There was no EXIF handling anywhere in the repo and no exif crate.
Read the tag via `into_decoder()` (which carries the decode Limits through, so
the decompression-bomb cap is untouched) and apply it. Missing/malformed tags
fall back to NoTransforms — most images have none.
Existing derivatives are already baked wrong, so migration 018 adds
`derivatives_rev` and `backfill_missing_display` becomes
`backfill_stale_derivatives`: it now also picks up anything below the current rev
and regenerates it once from the original, which still carries its EXIF. Videos
are marked current in the migration — ffmpeg already honours the rotation matrix.
Bump DERIVATIVES_REV for any future change that invalidates derivatives.
3. A rejected upload vanished without a word.
`UploadQueue.svelte` — 162 lines holding the ONLY renderer of an item's error
text, the only "Erneut" retry button and the only rate-limit countdown — was
never imported anywhere, so `retryItem`, `removeItem` and `clearCompleted` were
unreachable at runtime. On a terminal rejection the store purged the blob and
wrote a clear German reason into `entry.error` "so the UI shows a clear reason".
There was no such UI. And `uploadBadgeCount` counted only pending/uploading, so
the badge decremented exactly as if the upload had succeeded.
Mount the queue on /upload, toast the reason immediately (the flow sends the user
to /feed straight after staging, so the list alone would still miss them), and
count blocked/error in the badge so a failure can't read as success.
Tests: 02-upload/exif-orientation uploads a 40x20 fixture tagged Orientation=6
and asserts both derivatives come back PORTRAIT, with a sanity check that the
source really is stored landscape. 02-upload/rejection-visible bans the uploader
between staging and sending, then asserts the toast, the queue row with the
server's reason, and that the item is still counted.
Note: 02-upload/quota's 4 failures are pre-existing and unrelated — see the next
commit.
──────── docs(backup): make the backup commands work; fix the e2e/prod divergences
Backup. Both documented commands failed on the shipped stack, and the sentence
explaining them was wrong too:
- `pg_dump $DATABASE_URL` — `DATABASE_URL` is only ever in the compose
environment, never an operator's shell, and it points at `db:5432`, which is
compose-internal DNS. The app image has no postgres client either.
- `> /media/backups/…` — `/media` is a named volume mounted inside the app
container, not a host path, and nothing ever creates a `backups` subdirectory.
- `rsync /opt/eventsnap/media/` — that path does not exist anywhere.
- "a single path to back up" — false, and dangerously so: exports were moved to
their own `exports_data` volume precisely so a keepsake (which contains every
photo in the event) can't be served off the media tree. Backing up only
`media_data` silently loses every generated keepsake.
Rewritten as three commands — db via `docker compose exec -T db pg_dump`, and one
`docker run … tar` per volume — all verified against the running stack. The
volume mounts use `/src`, not `/media`: I hit the footgun while testing this.
Docker pre-populates an EMPTY volume from the image's own directory and chowns it
to match, so `-v media_data:/media alpine` tars alpine's cdrom/floppy/usb, writes
them into the volume, and leaves it root-owned so the non-root app can no longer
write. Mounting where the image has nothing avoids all of it. Documented inline
so the next person doesn't rediscover it.
Also correct the architecture notes: `/media/*` no longer routes to the backend
(that static tree was removed as a gating bypass), and `exports_data` was missing
from the volume list — the one volume an operator most needs to know about.
e2e stack: add the `EXPORT_PATH` + `/exports` volume it was missing. The file
says "mirrors production layout"; without these, exports landed on the container's
writable layer at the default path, so export-leak and export-video wrote real
archives into ephemeral storage and the "exports live outside media" invariant
was never actually exercised.
Pre-existing red test, unrelated to the audit: all four 02-upload/quota tests
have been failing since
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MechaCat02
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002355ba40 |
test(e2e): client upload-queue under a realistic burst
Cover the scenario the server-side load test could not — a guest multi-selecting 10-20 photos at once — by driving the real client path (UploadSheet → /upload → addToQueue → processQueue → XHR) rather than hitting POST /upload directly. Two tests assert the properties that keep a guest's photos from being lost: serial per-device draining (one upload in flight at a time), IndexedDB persistence (blobs kept until upload, dropped after), every file landing server-side, and a hard reload mid-burst resuming the rest via loadQueue() with no photo lost. Injects small per-upload latency via route interception so the serial drain is observable and the mid-burst reload window is reliable. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fabi
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bbdfae09a0 |
chore(e2e): add ESLint + Prettier; fix real findings; dedupe BASE
The Playwright suite had no linter and no formatter — only tsc. Add flat-config ESLint
(typescript-eslint, type-aware) and Prettier (2-space, matching the suite's style).
Rules keep the ones that catch real TEST bugs and drop the noise:
- no-floating-promises KEPT — an un-awaited request/assertion can let a test end before it runs,
passing vacuously. It caught one: the SSE reader loop in sse-listener is now explicitly `void`.
- no-unused-vars KEPT — caught three dead bindings (an unused adminToken fixture arg, an unused
`api` arg, an unused JPEG_MAGIC import), all removed.
- no-explicit-any OFF — all test code; `any` is the honest type for an untyped res.json() body or
a page.evaluate() return.
- no-empty-pattern OFF — Playwright's dependency-free fixtures are `async ({}, use) => {}`.
Refactor: `const BASE = process.env.E2E_FRONTEND_URL ?? '...'` was redeclared verbatim in 23
files — extracted to helpers/env.ts and imported, so a port/scheme change is one edit not a sweep.
Then `prettier --write`. Verified: eslint clean, tsc clean, prettier clean, desktop suite 210
passed / 1 skipped. (One mobile spec flaked once under retries:0 — a pre-existing cross-test
reflow-timing vector from the flakiness audit, not this change: the each-key edit is stable across
16 isolated runs and a clean full mobile re-run.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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02971f3186 |
test(e2e): de-vacuum security tests; add quota, authz-sweep, keepsake-regen coverage
An audit found tests that pass on broken code. The dominant pattern: fire a security
assertion at the all-zeros UUID and accept [403, 404] — the 404 comes from the resource
LOOKUP, not the guard, so the guard can be deleted and the test still passes. Repaired to
use real resources and demand exactly 403:
- banned-user cannot like / comment (the only coverage of those ban invariants)
- host cannot promote a real guest (or self) to admin — asserts nobody's role changed
- IDOR comment-delete already used a real resource; kept
Also inverted recovery.spec's "unknown name → nicht gefunden" test: that asserted the exact
account-enumeration oracle the F4 fix removed, so restoring the vuln would have made it
pass. Now: an unknown name must be byte-identical to a wrong PIN.
New coverage for paths that ran in production but in zero tests:
- quota.spec.ts: storage quota enforcement (413 over-limit, atomic increment under two
uploads held mid-body so both carry a stale total=0 — the real race; a naive Promise.all
version was itself vacuous and is documented as such). Proven to fail without the guard.
- authz-sweep.spec.ts: table-driven guest→403 / host→403 over ALL 19 privileged routes +
anonymous + __truncate. No live hole found; the whole surface is now locked.
- ban / unban / host-comment-delete AFTER release regenerate the keepsake (data-loss
paths that were dead under test); comment-delete mid-build doesn't strand the ZIP.
Lower-severity de-vacuuming: 10 MB comment test hit Caddy's 502 before the real 500-char
cap (now seeds a real upload, 501→400 / 500→201, mutation-verified); XSS name payloads
shortened under the 50-char cap so they actually store+render; ui-rendering XSS test now
proves the payload rendered before asserting no <b>; export page-object locators fixed to
the real "Download" label with a positive empty-state anchor; avatar palette spread test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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faf7a2504a |
fix(audit): restore broken upload pipeline + role-based E2E audit fixes
A comprehensive role-based E2E audit (guest/host/admin, across browser sessions) surfaced one critical and several smaller issues; this addresses them and hardens the tests that missed them. Critical - The client upload pipeline was fully broken: the IndexedDB v1->v2 upgrade opened a *new* transaction inside the upgrade callback, which throws during a version-change transaction and aborted the whole upgrade, leaving the queue object store uncreated -- so no UI upload ever fired. Reuse the version-change transaction the callback provides, and bump the DB to v3 with a contains() guard so installs already corrupted by the shipped bug self-heal on next load. Re-enabled the previously-fixme'd UI upload E2E test. High / Medium - Event lock is uploads-only again: likes, comments and browsing stay open while the event is locked (USER_JOURNEYS 9.3 / FEATURES) -- it was wrongly freezing social interaction. Updated the event-lock spec accordingly. - get_original now excludes soft-deleted and ban-hidden uploads, and direct /media/originals/** serving is blocked, so a hidden user's originals can no longer be pulled by UUID (all originals go through the checked alias). - The upload handler reads the file field with an early-abort size cap chosen from the declared content-type, instead of buffering the entire body before the size check. Low - unban_user mirrors the ban role guard (a host can no longer unban a host/admin banned by an admin). - reset_user_pin's UPDATE is event-scoped. - Admin login returns and stores a real identity (user_id + display name) instead of a blank session. - The host user list no longer renders target-actions (ban/promote/demote/PIN) on the caller's own row, where the backend always rejected them. - /diashow gains a client-side auth guard like the other protected routes. - The join page shows the event name via a new public GET /api/v1/event. Verified: backend cargo build clean, frontend svelte-check 0 errors, full Playwright E2E suite 144 passed / 1 skipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fabi
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a3c0082c4b |
test(e2e): update suite for shipped features + gate Chromium-only perms
The running test container had been built from an older tree; rebuilding it to pick up current app code surfaced several tests that predated shipped security/UX features: - file-upload-attacks / rate-limit: assert the magic-byte rejection wording and upload a real decodable JPEG (a zero-buffer is now rejected at the boundary). - ddos: open SSE via the single-use /stream/ticket flow, not the dead ?token=. - recover-page / join: the PIN field auto-submits on the 4th digit, so don't race an explicit submit click against the ensuing navigation. - gestures-doubletap / sheet-escape: target the lightbox by aria-labelledby and anchor the radio accessible-name match at the start (gated dialog semantics). playwright.config: camera/mic/clipboard are Chromium-only permissions (they threw "Unknown permission: camera" on firefox/webkit and failed the test at context creation); grant them per-Chromium-project. firefox-android drops the unsupported isMobile flag. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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MechaCat02
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e42d8a92a1 |
feat(e2e): Playwright suite — 134 tests across 9 spec areas + UA matrix
Adds an end-to-end Playwright test suite under e2e/ that spins up an
isolated docker-compose stack (Postgres :55432, Caddy :3101, backend with
EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1, SvelteKit adapter-node frontend) and exercises the
SvelteKit app against the real Rust backend.
Phase 1 — happy paths covering every documented USER_JOURNEYS.md flow:
01-auth/ join, recover, admin login, leave event, PIN lockout
02-upload/ gallery picker (API path), rate-limit + admin toggle
03-feed/ like/comment SSE, filters, SSE reconnect on visibility
04-host/ event lock API, ban/unban, promote
05-admin/ config validation, foundational authz guards, stats
06-export/ /export status + download stub
__smoke/ cross-UA happy-path (runs on every UA project)
Phase 2 — adversarial + browser chaos:
07-adversarial/ XSS payloads (6 × display name path), SQLi shapes,
length / encoding / RTL override / NUL byte;
file-upload boundaries (ELF body claimed as JPEG,
oversize vs max_image_size_mb, zero-byte, NUL
filename, path-traversal, SVG-with-script);
JWT alg:none, signature/payload tamper, expired
session, PIN brute-force (serial + parallel),
admin password brute-force; deep authz (cross-user
delete, banned user across like/comment/feed-read,
host→admin escalation); small-scale DDoS (20× /join,
10MB comment body, 10 concurrent SSE).
08-browser-chaos/ localStorage / sessionStorage / cookie purge,
IndexedDB drop mid-session, offline → reconnect,
slow-3G, 503 flakes, 429 with no retry storm,
multi-tab same/different user, no-JS, hostile CSS,
clock skew ±1h / -2d, localStorage quota exhausted.
Phase 3 — mobile gestures (runs only on chromium-mobile / Pixel 7):
09-mobile/ touch-target ≥44px audit, env(safe-area-inset-bottom)
structural check, long-press (FeedListCard → ContextSheet,
quick-tap negation, click-suppression), double-tap
(feed card like + lightbox heart-burst, via synthetic
pointer events to bypass the first-tap-fires-click trap),
viewport reflow (portrait/landscape/narrow/phablet),
plus fixme stubs documenting planned gestures (swipe
lightbox L/R, swipe-down dismiss, pull-to-refresh,
long-press-comment).
Cross-UA matrix (chromium-engine projects run @smoke only):
chromium-pixel7, chromium-galaxy-s22, samsung-internet (Samsung UA
emulation on Galaxy viewport), edge-android, plus webkit-iphone,
chrome-ios, firefox-android, firefox-desktop — the latter four need
libavif16 on the host (Playwright dep) but the configs are in place.
Infrastructure:
- fixtures/test.ts central test.extend (api, db, adminToken, guest,
host, signIn). Per-test DB truncate via the dev-only POST
/admin/__truncate route, gated by EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1.
- helpers/sse-listener.ts, helpers/upload-client.ts (Node-side
multipart for adversarial file-upload tests + JPEG/PNG/ELF magic
constants), helpers/touch.ts (longPress / doubleTap / swipe /
inlineStyle / computedStyle).
- 10 page objects covering every route + UploadSheet/Lightbox.
- global-setup waits for /health, logs in admin, disables every
rate-limit and quota toggle.
- .github/workflows/e2e.yml: PR check runs chromium-desktop + the
smoke matrix in parallel, uploads playwright-report/ and traces on
failure.
Findings the suite surfaces as live `[finding]` warnings (not silenced):
1. /admin/login has no rate-limit or lockout (bcrypt cost only).
2. PIN-attempt counter races under parallel /recover requests.
3. Zero-byte uploads pass /api/v1/upload.
4. SVG-with-script can pass the magic-byte check (consider CSP +
X-Content-Type-Options on /media/*).
Stack-internal docs live in e2e/README.md (UA tier table, Samsung
Internet escalation tiers A/B/C, debugging tips, roadmap).
Final tally: 134 passed / 0 failed / 9 skipped (test.fixme stubs for
not-yet-shipped gestures and one UI-upload-flow investigation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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