38e34fddf11b2c2067ad81978861b01d0aa1056a
31 Commits
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3c683247c0 |
chore(deploy): expose the export rebuild hatch in the UI; rehearse migration 014
Three deploy-readiness gaps, none of them in the export invariant itself. 1. The escape hatch was unreachable. `POST /host/export/rebuild` was added as the fix for "a failed export is terminal", but nothing in the frontend called it — so recovery required a terminal, the API docs and a valid JWT. The host page instead told the host to reopen uploads and re-release, which is the destructive act the endpoint exists to avoid (it unlocks the gallery to every guest and retracts the release). The failed state now offers "Erneut versuchen"; a ready keepsake can be rebuilt behind a confirm, since a rebuild makes it briefly undownloadable. 2. Migration 014 had never been run against anything. It is the repo's first destructive migration and its backfill has to carry the old notion of "downloadable" across exactly — get it wrong and a released event's keepsake silently 404s, on data that cannot be re-created. backend/scripts/rehearse-014.sh proves it on a throwaway postgres, against a real pg_dump or a synthetic DB covering every pre-014 state, asserting up, down and up-again all preserve downloadability. Verified non-vacuous: retiring nothing (ELSE -1 -> ELSE e.export_epoch) fails it, naming the three keepsakes it would resurrect. It also surfaced that the down migration is an inverse UP TO DRIFT: a ready flag that disagreed with its job row comes back FALSE. That heals corruption rather than restoring it, and costs nothing (no file_path to serve), so the assertion checks what actually matters — no genuinely downloadable keepsake loses its flag — and reports the normalisation instead of failing on it. 3. No advisory scanning. cargo audit + npm audit, in .github/workflows/ because Gitea Actions scans it too and e2e.yml already resolves actions/* from GitHub. The runner is not assumed to have cargo. RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (rsa/Marvin) is ignored SPECIFICALLY, not globally: it is unreachable here (HS256 + bcrypt, Postgres only) and unpatched, so failing on it would mean a permanently red pipeline everyone learns to ignore. Tests: e2e pins that a failed keepsake recovers via rebuild while the event stays released and uploads stay locked — so a future refactor implementing rebuild as an internal reopen+re-release fails — and that rebuild cannot publish an unreleased gallery. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9666d74a46 |
fix(export): close all 13 findings from the multi-agent review
A 6-lens multi-agent review (103 agents; every finding adversarially verified by three
refute-by-default skeptics) confirmed the epoch redesign is sound — the core invariant
holds — and found 13 real defects around it. All are fixed here.
The redesign's invariant was re-verified and stands: an accepted upload is always in the
keepsake, and a downloadable keepsake always reflects the most recent release.
But a WEAKER adjacent invariant did NOT hold — "a downloadable keepsake reflects the
current content" — and that is the theme of the biggest fixes.
CONTENT REMOVAL NOW ALWAYS REACHES THE KEEPSAKE
Regeneration was wired only to host deletes. Ban, unban, guest self-delete and guest
comment-delete did not trigger it — yet the export query filters `is_banned = FALSE`,
so the pipeline already agreed that content must not be there. Ban someone for abusive
content after release and every guest kept downloading an archive containing it.
All five removal paths now invalidate and rebuild. `query_comments` also gained the
banned/hidden filter it was missing entirely (the ZIP had it; the viewer did not).
Each removal is now ATOMIC with its invalidation (one tx, models made executor-generic).
Previously the delete committed in its own tx and the regeneration in a second: a dropped
handler future between them left the taken-down photo permanently downloadable, and
nothing could notice — the keepsake still looked complete and the host could no longer
even find the upload to retry.
NO MORE TAKEDOWN STORM
Every removal spawned two uncancellable full exports. A superseded worker was INERT, not
STOPPED: it still ran every ffmpeg spawn and image resize and wrote a whole archive before
discovering it had lost. Five deletes left ten workers alive, each holding a
full-gallery-sized temp, in a 1 GB container.
Now: a debounce before `claim_job` (a superseded worker fails its claim and does ZERO
work, collapsing a burst into one export), plus `update_progress` — which already ran
exactly the right liveness predicate and threw the answer away — returning it so both file
loops bail the instant they are retired. Moderating a comment no longer rebuilds the
multi-GB ZIP either: the ZIP is media-only, so it is carried forward, with prune taught to
protect any file a live row still references.
AN ESCAPE HATCH
A failed export was terminal at runtime: release_gallery refuses an already-released event,
recovery only runs at boot, and there was no retry route — the only outs were restarting the
container or reopening uploads to every guest. Added POST /host/export/rebuild. Also widened
mark_failed's guard to `status IN ('running','pending')`: when claim_job itself ERRORED, the
row was still `pending`, so the failure was never recorded and the job sat at 0% forever.
SILENT INVALIDATION
Retiring the epoch 404s the download instantly, but nothing told the clients — guests kept
seeing an enabled download button through the whole rebuild. Now broadcasts an invalidation.
And the download was a top-level <a href>: a 404 (or a 429 from the per-IP export limit that
everyone on the venue WiFi shares) NAVIGATED THE USER OUT OF THE PWA onto raw JSON. It now
targets a hidden iframe, so an error response is harmless.
ALSO
- The HTML export still had the exists()-then-open TOCTOU the ZIP path was fixed to remove,
at three sites, two with a hard `?` that failed the ENTIRE viewer. It is reachable: the
compression worker hard-deletes an original when a transcode fails and can still be running
when the gallery is released.
- Crash-orphaned .tmp files were immortal (prune deliberately skips .tmp). Swept at boot,
where it is unambiguously safe.
- export_status read the epoch in one statement and used it in the next; now one query.
- DiskCache::snapshot IGNORED its path argument on a cache hit, returning whatever filesystem
was measured last. Latent only because both callers pass media_path — it would have silently
misreported the moment anyone measured the exports volume. Now keyed by path.
- Corrected two comments that asserted safety properties the code does not have (claim_job
does NOT prevent a retired-epoch claim — retirement is enforced at READ time; and a
multi-replica reap is NOT contained, it can corrupt the keepsake). Added a rollback runbook
to migration 014, the repo's first destructive migration.
TESTS
The regression guard for the headline FOR SHARE fix was probabilistic — it could pass on
broken code if the interleaving fell the wrong way. It is now STRUCTURAL: the upload is held
open mid-body with its pre-flight check already passed, so the release provably lands inside
the exact window. Verified 5/5 FAILING (201 instead of 403) with the fix reverted, 5/5
passing with it.
Verified: backend 40 tests, svelte-check 0 errors, e2e typecheck clean,
e2e 160 passed / 1 skipped on chromium-desktop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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8e906d7866 |
refactor(export): single epoch authority; fix upload-path TOCTOU losing photos
A deep investigative review of the export concurrency (four parallel adversarial
reviewers) found that three rounds of race fixes had been chasing the wrong bug, and
that the model itself was the root cause. This replaces the model and fixes the real
data loss.
THE ACTUAL BUG (upload path, not the state machine)
`upload` checked `uploads_locked_at` BEFORE streaming the body — minutes, for a large
video — then committed the row without re-checking. A release landing mid-upload let the
row commit AFTER the export snapshot: the photo appeared in the live feed and was
PERMANENTLY missing from the keepsake, with nothing to regenerate it. release_gallery's
comment claims to prevent exactly this; it never did. Every prior round fixed the DB
state machine, and the leak was upstream of it.
Fix: re-assert the lock under `SELECT ... FOR SHARE` INSIDE the commit tx. That row lock
conflicts with release_gallery's `UPDATE event`, so either the upload commits first (and
the release — hence the snapshot — is ordered after it) or the release wins and the
upload is rejected as `uploads_locked` (reversible; the client keeps the blob).
Regression test verified NON-VACUOUS: with the fix reverted it fails, reporting accepted
uploads missing from the keepsake.
THE MODEL (migration 014)
"Which generation is current?" had no single answer: it was assembled from three
separately-written pieces across two tables (`export_released_at`, a per-job
`release_seq`, and cached `export_{zip,html}_ready` flags). Keeping them in agreement
took ~10 hand-written guards; each review round found one more path that slipped through.
Now: ONE monotonic `event.export_epoch`, bumped in the same UPDATE as any change to
`export_released_at`. Each job carries a copy. Downloadable IFF
`released AND job.epoch = event.export_epoch AND status = 'done'` — readiness DERIVED,
never stored. A retired-epoch worker is INERT BY CONSTRUCTION: losing a race can no
longer corrupt state, only waste work.
Deleted: both ready-flag columns, both ready-flip blocks, `if ready { continue }`, the
reopen seq-bump, open_event's transaction, and the cross-table claim guard.
That last one was also UNSOUND: under READ COMMITTED, a blocked UPDATE re-evaluates its
WHERE against the updated target row but answers subqueries on OTHER tables from the
original snapshot — so the previous `EXISTS (SELECT ... FROM event ...)` claim guard
could admit a claim against an already-reopened event while RETURNING the post-bump seq.
Every guard is now same-row (`epoch = $n`), which EPQ re-evaluates correctly.
OTHER REAL DEFECTS FIXED
- release_gallery committed the release and THEN awaited the enqueue inside the handler
future. Axum drops that future on client disconnect → event released, uploads locked,
ZERO export_job rows, host unable to retry ("bereits freigegeben"), restart-only
recovery. Now one tx; workers spawn (detached) after commit.
- No flush/fsync before the tmp→final rename. async_zip's close() never flushes the inner
file and tokio's File drop DISCARDS write errors — so a full disk silently produced a
truncated archive that was then marked done and published, after which the last good
generation was pruned. Now flush + sync_all, which also surfaces ENOSPC.
- Download read the ready flag and the file path in TWO queries; a reopen between them
served a keepsake that should 404. Now one read through the `export_current` view.
- `if !src.exists() { continue }` then `open()?` — a TOCTOU that turned a tolerated gap
into a hard failure of the ENTIRE keepsake (unretryable while released). Now open-first,
warn, and skip.
- Recovery was flag-driven and never checked the disk: a `done` row whose archive was gone
was a permanent dead end needing manual DB surgery. Now verifies the file and re-arms.
- Temp files/dirs leaked on every error path (the leak is what fills the disk that
corrupts the next archive). Now cleaned up.
- Export archives were not event-scoped (`viewer_tmp_` already was), so a second event
would collide on paths and one event's prune would delete another's live keepsake.
- Host deletes after release never regenerated the keepsake — a photo removed on request
lived on in the archive forever. Now bumps the epoch and rebuilds without it.
- claim_job swallowed DB errors as "someone else won", stranding a job pending at 0%.
- export_status reported retired-epoch rows (a progress bar that never moves).
- The startup sweep's single-instance assumption is now documented, not hidden.
Verified: backend 40 tests, svelte-check 0 errors, e2e typecheck clean,
e2e 160 passed / 1 skipped on chromium-desktop (incl. 2 new regressions; the
upload-acceptance one confirmed to fail without the fix).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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9f3712894d |
fix(export): pin export workers to a live release epoch; make reopen atomic
Adversarial re-review of |
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d643256f36 |
fix(rereview): close residual export finalize↔flip double-race at reopen
Adversarial re-review of
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df275bbefa |
fix(rereview): close export-flip race + queue-dedup reload regression
Adversarial re-review of the persona-audit + audit-followup rounds (6411747..)
found one HIGH and one MED regression plus LOW gaps. All fixed with coverage.
HIGH — export stale-keepsake resurrected by an open_event race
A reopen landing in the window between a *current* export worker's finalize_job
and its ready-flag flip cleared export_released_at + the ready flags but left the
export_job row `done` at the same release_seq. The seq-guarded flip then still
matched and re-set export_{zip,html}_ready=TRUE on a pre-reopen snapshot; the next
re-release read that stale TRUE and skipped regeneration (`if ready { continue }`),
serving a keepsake missing every upload from the reopen window — the exact data
loss migration 012 exists to prevent. Both ready-flip UPDATEs are now additionally
anchored on `export_released_at IS NOT NULL`, so a landed reopen makes the flip a
no-op and the re-release regenerates cleanly.
MED — queue dedup broke for reloaded items
loadQueue rebuilt QueueItems from IndexedDB without copying lastModified, which the
new addToQueue dedup keys on. A file re-selected after a page reload / PWA relaunch
missed the duplicate check and uploaded twice. Rehydration now carries lastModified
(extracted to a pure, tested entryToQueueItem helper).
LOW
- diashow: clear the upload-processed debounce timer in onDestroy (no stray
post-unmount /feed fetch).
- USER_JOURNEYS §9.5: document the reconnect-delta ban replay (hidden_user_ids /
uploads_hidden_at, migration 013), not just the live user-hidden SSE.
- e2e api-client: drop the misleading hide_uploads param from banUser — the backend
takes no body and always hides; strip the dead boolean at all call sites.
Tests
- Extract isReversibleLock (the terminal-403 KEEP-vs-PURGE-blob discriminator) into a
pure exported helper + unit tests, so the data-loss-critical branch is covered
without an XHR harness.
- entryToQueueItem unit tests lock the lastModified-carry regression.
- Document the export flip-race guard in the reopen/re-release spec (the sub-ms
finalize↔flip interleave isn't deterministically forceable with fast fixtures;
covered by the SQL guard + the end-to-end completeness test).
Verified: backend 40 tests, frontend 44 unit tests, svelte-check 0 errors,
e2e 156 passed / 1 skipped on chromium-desktop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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811c724685 |
fix(audit-followup): close regressions/gaps from the persona-audit re-review
Adversarial re-review of the persona-audit commit surfaced two HIGH regressions I'd introduced plus MED/LOW gaps. All fixed: HIGH - Auth privilege escalation: reads are sessionStorage-first, but guest `setAuth` wrote only localStorage — a resident admin token shadowed a new guest login (guest ran as admin on a shared device). setAuth/setAdminAuth now DISPLACE the other store so exactly one identity is resident. Adds unit + e2e regression guards. - Host dashboard: `exportGenerating` used `||`, so a one-half export failure stuck on "wird erstellt…" forever and never showed the re-release hint. Changed to `&&`. MEDIUM - Locked-upload auto-resume was unreliable (`event-opened` has no reconnect replay and SSE is down on non-feed pages) — now also resumes on `feed-delta`, which fires on every SSE reconnect. - Queue-cap eviction could drop a recoverable locked item (parked as `error` with a live blob) — now evicts only `done`/`blocked`. - Host page async-`onMount` leaked SSE handlers if unmounted mid-load — added a `destroyed` guard before registration. LOW - An unparseable 403 body now keeps the blob (reversible) instead of purging it. - `refreshEventState` is sequence-guarded so a late close-refresh can't clobber a reopen. - `/export/status` moved out of the all-or-nothing `reload()` so its failure can't blank the whole host dashboard. Verified: svelte-check 0 errors, 36 frontend unit tests (incl. new displacement guards). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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36fe59caa5 |
fix(user-flow): persona-audit fixes — ban replay, locked-upload data loss, host UX, admin session
Follows the perf + security + user-flow work with a role/persona audit (guest, host, admin, projector) and fixes across three review rounds. Highlights: HIGH - Ban now replays on reconnect. A ban isn't a soft-delete, and the `user-hidden` SSE has no replay, so a client that missed it (esp. the unattended diashow) kept cycling a banned user's slides. New `uploads_hidden_at` (migration 013) + `hidden_user_ids` in /feed/delta; feed + diashow evict those users. Applied even on a truncated delta. MEDIUM - Locked-upload data loss: a photo staged offline during a lock/release was purged as a terminal 4xx and lost when the host reopened. New reversible `uploads_locked` error code; the queue keeps the blob and auto-resumes on the `event-opened` SSE. - Reopen after release now warns (ConfirmSheet) that it revokes the published keepsake. - Host "forgotten-PIN" badge updates live (`pin-reset-requested` was broadcast but never in KNOWN_EVENTS / subscribed); host page also refetches on `pin-reset` so a two-host race can't hand out a conflicting PIN. - Ban modal copy fixed (read-only ban, not "session ended"); Degradieren/Sperren/Entsperren hidden on peer-host rows for non-admins (they always 403'd). - Host dashboard shows live keepsake generation progress / ready state + link to /export. - Admin JWT moved to sessionStorage (§11.1) to bound exposure on shared devices. Export generation guard (H1 from the prior round, hardened): per-(event,type) `release_seq` (migration 012) with seq-guarded claim/finalize/mark_failed/update_progress, per-generation temp/final paths, download follows `file_path`, prune only strictly-older generations. LOW: diashow coalesces upload-processed (avoids self-rate-limit); event-closed reconciles galleryReleased; /recover gains a forgot-PIN request + drops a stale cached PIN on 401; delta `>=` tie-break + 429 retry; misc copy/labels. Adds e2e: ban-replay, upload-lock-code, and rewrites export-reopen-rerelease with a data-completeness test. Reconciles USER_JOURNEYS §9/§11. Verified: cargo build clean, 40 unit tests, svelte-check 0 errors, 33 frontend unit tests, 155 e2e passing on chromium-desktop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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641174717c |
fix(user-flow): close offline-queue, export, session, ban & realtime gaps
Comprehensive user-flow review across guest/host/admin roles, then fixes with
e2e regression guards. Highlights:
- Offline upload queue auto-resumes on reconnect: network errors keep items
pending (not error), 4xx are terminal (no infinite retry), quota exhaustion
returns a distinct 413; queue cap + dedup.
- Export lifecycle: release atomically locks uploads; reopen invalidates and
re-release regenerates the keepsake; workers claim their job atomically so a
reopen->re-release can't corrupt the ZIP; startup re-spawns interrupted
exports.
- Sessions slide on activity (no 30-day cliff); JWT expiry deferred to the
revocable session row; sign-out-everywhere + revoke-on-PIN-reset.
- Ban always hides content (v_feed / find_visible_media / export filter
is_banned) but stays a read-only ban per USER_JOURNEYS §10 — sessions are
not revoked, read access + keepsake download preserved.
- Realtime: server-clock SSE delta cursor; event-closed/opened drive the UI
live; feed_delta rate-limited; like returns {liked, like_count} to fix
multi-device drift; lightbox live comments; diashow delta backfill.
- Forgotten-PIN in-app request flow; simultaneous same-name join returns 409;
quota increment is transactional; operator floor.
Adds e2e/specs/10-flow-review/ (offline resume, export integrity, deterministic
anti-race guard) and updates existing specs for the new contracts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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a4b2c5bd1c |
fix(security): harden authz, media gating, recover, SSE, deps
Security audit follow-up. No Critical/High existed; these close the
Medium/Low findings.
F1 [Med] Host privilege boundary: a host could demote a peer host to
guest and then ban / PIN-reset (→ account takeover via /recover) them,
because the ban/pin-reset peer guards key off the target's *current*
role. set_role now blocks a non-admin from demoting a host.
F2 [Med] Moderation now revokes preview/thumbnail access: they are served
through visibility-checked aliases (/api/v1/upload/{id}/{preview,
thumbnail}) that filter soft-deleted / ban-hidden uploads, and direct
/media/previews|thumbnails is 404-blocked. Feed emits the gated URLs;
Caddy keeps them privately cacheable (max-age=300, short so moderation
revokes promptly — the live feed already evicts cards via SSE). Uses a
lean find_visible_media() (paths+mime only) on the media hot path.
F3 [Med/Low] npm audit fix: svelte 5.55.1→5.56.4 (SSR-XSS advisories),
devalue 5.6.4→5.8.1 (DoS). Prod deps: 0 vulnerabilities.
F4 [Low] /recover no longer leaks account existence: unknown display name
returns the same 401 as a wrong PIN, and runs a dummy bcrypt verify so
timing matches — closing the enumeration + timing oracle.
F5 [Low] SSE streams re-validate the session every ~60s and close once it
is logged out / expired, instead of running until client disconnect.
F6 [Info] X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff set at the app layer on all
media responses (defense-in-depth alongside the edge).
Tests: new e2e specs for F1 (host cannot demote peer host), F2 (preview
gated + 404 after delete + direct /media blocked), F4 (uniform 401).
40 backend unit tests + 182 e2e passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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d6c91974eb |
perf(backend): close config/upload/export hot paths + stability fixes
Performance: - Cache the runtime `config` table in-memory (ConfigCache) with synchronous invalidation on every write (admin PATCH + test reseed). Was re-reading each key from Postgres on every request (~8 round-trips per upload). - Stream uploads chunk-by-chunk to a temp file instead of buffering the whole body in RAM (peak was up to the per-class cap, e.g. 500 MB/video); only 512 sniff-bytes are kept for magic-byte detection, then atomic rename into place. - Cache the media-filesystem disk snapshot (DiskCache, 15s TTL) shared by the quota check and admin stats; drop the discarded System::refresh_all(). - HTML export streams video (and small-image) originals straight into the ZIP via a manifest instead of copying them to a temp dir first (removed the transient 2x disk usage) and drops the double directory scan. - Auth extractor resolves session -> live user in one JOIN (was two queries), touching last_seen_at by token hash. Stability: - SSE: on broadcast lag, emit a `resync` event so the client runs a delta fetch instead of silently losing events; frontend reconciles adds, deletions, and (via an in-place refresh) like/comment counts on visible cards. - Storage quota fails OPEN when the disk can't be read (was a 0-byte limit that locked out all uploads). - Graceful shutdown drains in-flight requests on SIGTERM/SIGINT, bounded by a 10s backstop so open SSE streams can't stall a deploy. - Upload removes the persisted file if the DB transaction fails (no orphaned bytes with no row to reclaim them). Tests: - New pure select_disk() with 5 unit tests (longest-prefix, fallbacks, fail-open). - New e2e export-video spec covering the HTML export's video-streaming branch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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faf7a2504a |
fix(audit): restore broken upload pipeline + role-based E2E audit fixes
A comprehensive role-based E2E audit (guest/host/admin, across browser sessions) surfaced one critical and several smaller issues; this addresses them and hardens the tests that missed them. Critical - The client upload pipeline was fully broken: the IndexedDB v1->v2 upgrade opened a *new* transaction inside the upgrade callback, which throws during a version-change transaction and aborted the whole upgrade, leaving the queue object store uncreated -- so no UI upload ever fired. Reuse the version-change transaction the callback provides, and bump the DB to v3 with a contains() guard so installs already corrupted by the shipped bug self-heal on next load. Re-enabled the previously-fixme'd UI upload E2E test. High / Medium - Event lock is uploads-only again: likes, comments and browsing stay open while the event is locked (USER_JOURNEYS 9.3 / FEATURES) -- it was wrongly freezing social interaction. Updated the event-lock spec accordingly. - get_original now excludes soft-deleted and ban-hidden uploads, and direct /media/originals/** serving is blocked, so a hidden user's originals can no longer be pulled by UUID (all originals go through the checked alias). - The upload handler reads the file field with an early-abort size cap chosen from the declared content-type, instead of buffering the entire body before the size check. Low - unban_user mirrors the ban role guard (a host can no longer unban a host/admin banned by an admin). - reset_user_pin's UPDATE is event-scoped. - Admin login returns and stores a real identity (user_id + display name) instead of a blank session. - The host user list no longer renders target-actions (ban/promote/demote/PIN) on the caller's own row, where the backend always rejected them. - /diashow gains a client-side auth guard like the other protected routes. - The join page shows the event name via a new public GET /api/v1/event. Verified: backend cargo build clean, frontend svelte-check 0 errors, full Playwright E2E suite 144 passed / 1 skipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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3f6dafba05 |
test(review-2): strengthen CR2 export-leak test to drive a real export
The prior test asserted 404 on /media/exports/Gallery.zip against an empty
stack — it would pass even if exports were still written under /media, because
no archive was ever produced. Now it:
1. seeds an upload, releases the gallery, and polls until the real zip job
writes Gallery.zip to disk;
2. asserts the archive is NOT served from public /media (the CR2 leak); and
3. asserts it IS retrievable via the gated ticket endpoint (200 + PK zip
magic) — proving the 404 means "not public", not "no file".
Also fixes a test-isolation gap the CR2 relocation introduced: __truncate wiped
media_path but not export_path, so a real export would leave Gallery.zip on disk
and break export.spec's "ready-but-file-missing → 404" test. truncate_all now
purges export_path too. Full 06-export dir: 5/5 green, no contamination.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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0ed97f45cf |
fix(review-2): address re-review — close two blocker regressions + harden tests
The round-2 re-review (full suite green) found two real defects the passing
tests missed, both now fixed and covered:
B1 — banned users could still edit/delete their OWN content: edit_upload,
delete_upload, delete_comment skipped the is_banned guard that upload/
like/comment got (round-2 removed the global extractor block and missed
these three). Added the guard (using auth.is_banned — no extra query).
The moderation ban test now asserts 403 on DELETE upload, PATCH upload,
and DELETE comment for a banned owner (+ upload survives) — it previously
only exercised POST /upload, which is why the gap shipped green.
B2 — H3 live-eviction was dead code: 'user-hidden' and 'comment-deleted' were
missing from KNOWN_EVENTS, so EventSource never listened and the handlers
never fired. Added both. New browser-driven sse-eviction test asserts a
hidden user's card actually evicts from an open feed with no reload — the
backend-only SseListener checks couldn't catch this.
Minor items folded in:
- admin dashboard bounces a mid-session-demoted admin to /feed via live
/me/context (mirrors the host page) instead of a dead error screen.
- feed "new posts" pill cleared on any full refresh (pull-to-refresh no longer
strands it).
- corrected the stale sse.rs comment (banned users may hold a read-only stream).
Verified: backend 35 unit tests; svelte-check 0 errors; e2e 04-host + comment-ui
+ export-leak 13/13 on chromium (incl. the two new regression tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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80179357a7 |
fix(review-2): high — read-only ban model, failed-compression cleanup, live SSE eviction
H1: corrected a round-1 over-reach. Bans are read-only per USER_JOURNEYS §10:
the base AuthUser extractor no longer rejects banned users (they keep read
access); Require{Host,Admin} and write handlers enforce the ban via
auth.is_banned → 403 (incl. self-unban). Demoted hosts still lose powers
immediately (live DB role) and are bounced off the dashboard. Also fixed the
login/recover redirect regression on unauthenticated 401.
H2: failed compression now self-heals instead of leaving a permanent broken
card — refund the quota, delete the orphaned original, soft-delete the row;
the frontend toasts the uploader and evicts the card on upload-error.
H3: self-delete, ban-with-hide (user-hidden), and comment-deletes now broadcast
SSE; feed, diashow, and lightbox evict the affected content live instead of
waiting for a reload. sse-eviction.spec.ts covers it.
Riders: feed/+page.svelte also carries the medium truncated-delta pill; host.rs
also carries the low atomic release_gallery claim; admin/+page.svelte also drops
the dead compression_concurrency control (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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dba4d3f932 |
fix(review-2): critical — repair comment posting + close export data leak
CR1: the lightbox comment button POSTed to /upload/{id}/comment (singular);
no such route exists, so every UI-submitted comment 404'd and was lost.
Fixed to /comments (plural). The prior e2e passed because its seed helper
POSTs the API directly — added comment-ui.spec.ts which drives the real
component so this can't regress silently again.
CR2: export archives (Gallery.zip / Memories.zip / HTML viewer) were written
under media_path, which is a public ServeDir — so GET /media/exports/
Gallery.zip served the entire event (every photo, caption, comment,
uploader name) to any anonymous visitor at a guessable URL, bypassing the
ticket + release gate. Moved exports to a separate EXPORT_PATH (=/exports)
on its own volume (Dockerfile chown, compose volume, gated handler reads
the new path). export-leak.spec.ts asserts /media/exports/Gallery.zip → 404.
Riders (git can't split hunks): LightboxModal also gains H3 live-eviction on
comment-deleted/upload-deleted; config.rs also wires compression_concurrency
from boot config (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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41ac742af8 |
test+docs: tighten H1 assertions, cover secret/XFF edges, document boot & SSE-ban
Re-review follow-ups (non-blocking quality items): Tests: - moderation H1 specs now assert exact `→ 403` instead of bare .rejects.toThrow(), so a spurious 500 can no longer masquerade as "revocation worked". - config: added case-insensitivity (upper/mixed-case placeholder) and the len==32/31 boundary cases for validate_secrets. - rate_limiter: added the trailing-comma empty-entry case for client_ip (must fall back, not return ""). (Backend unit tests: 35 pass.) Docs: - README: note that with APP_ENV=production a placeholder .env makes the app refuse to boot and Caddy wait unhealthy — reason is in `docker compose logs app`. - SECURITY-BACKLOG + sse.rs comment: document that a mid-session ban does not tear down an already-open SSE stream (new tickets are blocked; low blast radius). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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91ff961850 |
fix(security): medium/low — event-lock, atomic config, a11y, diashow, hygiene
- social: likes/comments rejected on a closed event (e2e proven). - admin: patch_config validates-then-writes atomically; char-based length. - hashtag/comment models: atomic tag writes in edit + comment paths. - Modal: inert the background (modal-inert action) for screen readers. - sse.ts: idempotent visibilitychange listener (no duplicate reconnects). - diashow: videos advance on `ended` (transitions + page wiring). - docs/hygiene: README clone-case fix; removed stale committed .env.test and gitignored it; docker-compose.dev.yml tidy. Left documented as accepted-risk per plan: PIN-persist-after-logout, UUID-reachable hidden uploads, DECISION-media-auth.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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f08d858281 |
fix(security): high — live authz, XFF, SSE buffering, atomicity, pagination
H1: auth extractor re-reads the live user row — trusts the DB role (not the
JWT claim) and rejects banned users mid-session. e2e proves a demoted
host loses powers and a banned host is locked out and can't self-unban.
H2: client_ip takes the right-most XFF hop (the one Caddy appends); spoofed
left-most entries are ignored, restoring IP-based throttles.
H3: Caddy excludes /api/v1/stream from `encode` so SSE isn't buffered.
H4: upload — quota increment + row insert + hashtag links now one txn.
H5: feed keyset pagination tiebroken on (created_at, id) + composite index
(migration 010); feed_delta bounded with LIMIT.
H7: LightboxModal keys its comment load off upload.id, ending the
SSE-driven refetch storm.
H8: CSP via SvelteKit kit.csp (svelte.config.js) hardens the localStorage
token model against injection.
Migration 010 also adds the latent comment/comment_hashtag indexes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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498b4e256b |
fix(security): critical — repair PIN reset + enforce real prod secrets
C1: reset_user_pin wrote to a non-existent column (pin_failed_attempts);
the real column is failed_pin_attempts, so every PIN reset 500'd. Fixed
the column name; new e2e (pin-reset.spec.ts) proves a reset returns a
usable PIN and the target can recover with it.
C2: config.rs::validate_secrets now rejects placeholder-ish secrets
(change_me/dev_secret/placeholder), enforces len>=32 in prod, and
requires a real ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH. docker-compose.yml sets
APP_ENV=production so the guard actually runs. Corrected the false
"fixed" claim in SECURITY-BACKLOG.md. .env.example documents the rule.
Riders in these files (documented here since git can't split hunks):
- host.rs also carries the event-scoped ban_user fix and the
close_event/open_event no-op broadcast guard (medium).
- docker-compose.yml also adds ORIGIN (H6), app/frontend healthchecks with
Caddy waiting on health, and per-service memory limits (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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74849c8d50 |
test: cover grid filter OR/AND (extract pure fn + unit + real e2e)
The two filter-search cases were test.fixme placeholders (expect(true).toBe(true)), so the OR/AND chip rules were untested. - Extract the grid-filter predicate from feed/+page.svelte into a pure filterUploads(uploads, filters) in $lib/feed-filter (behavior-preserving) and unit-test it (9 cases): tag OR, user OR, tag+user AND, AND-excludes-partial, case-insensitive caption match, null caption. - Replace the e2e fixmes with real tests that seed known captions/uploaders, switch to grid view, activate chips via the search suggestions, and count grid tiles: OR widens 1→2, AND narrows 2→1. Frontend unit: 27 passing. filter-search e2e: 3 passing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b1e2e66305 |
test(e2e): address self-review follow-ups (dedup, XSS render guard, SSE hardening)
Follow-ups from the code review of the test-quality batches: - Consolidate duplicated helpers into e2e/helpers/: seed.ts (seedUpload, seedComment, listComments, findFeedRow) and sse.ts (mintSseTicket, openStream, trackStreamOpens). Refactor authorization-deep, xss-injection, like-comment, sse-ticket-abuse, ddos, sse-realtime, multi-tab, and SseListener to use them — the upload/comment/ticket-flow contracts now live in one place each instead of being re-inlined across 3–7 specs. - xss-injection display-name loop: it navigated to /feed (which renders uploader names, not the viewer's) so "nothing fired" passed vacuously — the payload was never rendered. Now navigate to /account (the actual sink) and add a render guard asserting the payload reached the DOM as escaped text before checking __xssFired. - sse-realtime reconnect: snapshot the stream-open count AFTER backgrounding, so the "new connection" assertion is attributable to the foreground event and can't be satisfied by a spurious native/error reconnect before the toggle. - recover-page: correct the comment (auto-submit is the onPinInput handler, not an $effect). 44 affected specs verified green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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5f523d55fe |
test(e2e): fix vacuous 429 retry test (route never matched the feed)
The "429 from server is surfaced (no infinite retry storm)" test routed `**/api/v1/feed`, but the app requests `/api/v1/feed?limit=20` — a plain glob without a trailing wildcard doesn't match a URL with a query string, so the route never fired: `attempts` stayed 0 and `expect(attempts).toBeLessThan(15)` passed trivially. The test never forced a 429 or exercised any retry behavior. Fix: match with a regex `/\/api\/v1\/feed(\?|$)/` (catches the query-string URL, excludes /feed/delta), and gate on `attempts >= 1` before judging retry behavior so it can't pass again without actually hitting the throttled endpoint. Found during self-review of the test-quality batches. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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564104ae23 |
test(e2e): robustness — stable locators, exact assertions, no fixed sleep
- ContextSheet: add data-testid="context-sheet". longpress tests targeted the open sheet via the `.translate-y-0` animation class (breaks on any animation refactor) — now target `[data-testid="context-sheet"][aria-modal="true"]`, which is stable and unambiguous vs. the centered LightboxModal (also aria-modal). - toast-on-failure: the like button was `button.filter(hasText:/\d+/).first()`, which could match any digit-bearing button (e.g. the comment count) → use the stable aria-label "Gefällt mir". - config stats: assert the exact user_count (4 = 3 seeded guests + admin) instead of `>= 3` — deterministic after the per-test truncate, catches under/overcount. - offline-network 429 test: replace the fixed 3s waitForTimeout with a poll-until-the-retry-count-stabilizes (faster, and a real storm never stabilizes → the poll fails, which is the intended outcome). Note: reviewed the "config restore not in try/finally" finding — it's a non-issue. The truncate auto-fixture wipes+reseeds the whole config table (and clears the rate limiter) before every test, so config state cannot leak between tests. All affected specs verified green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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136417d6b4 |
test(e2e): make vacuous feed/SSE tests assert real behavior
Several tests ran green while asserting nothing. Replace them with real assertions, and fix the SSE helper they depend on. sse-listener: exchange the JWT for a single-use ticket (POST /stream/ticket) and connect via ?ticket= — the helper still used the dead ?token= scheme, so every SSE-based assertion would have silently failed to receive events. like-comment: - "like is idempotent" asserted nothing (void feed; void b) → now seeds a real upload and pins the like contract: counted once per user, toggles off on repeat (guards double-count), and a second user's like is counted independently. - "comment → SSE to B" asserted length >= 0 (always true) → B now subscribes to the stream, A comments, and B must receive the new-comment event for that upload (comment_count === 1). ~30s due to reverse-proxy SSE buffering; timeout raised. sse-realtime: only checked a nav link was visible → now counts EventSource opens and asserts a fresh stream connection after hidden→visible (also fixes the sim, which set visibilityState but not document.hidden, so the close never fired). multi-tab "SSE delivers to both": only checked nav links → now asserts each tab opens its own stream connection (delivery isn't asserted — it hinges on the ~30s proxy buffering; connection establishment is the reliable, honest signal). safe-area: delete the /join probe whose only assertion was Array.isArray(x) === true (always true); the real sheet-level env() check already exists below it. All verified green against the live backend. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8f6e1d4ff7 |
test(e2e): stored-XSS (caption/comment) + SSE-ticket abuse coverage
Close two malicious-input gaps flagged in the suite review: XSS was only fuzzed through display_name, and the SSE ticket flow had no security assertions. xss-injection: - Stored XSS in captions — upload with each XSS payload as the caption, mark it feed-visible, render /feed and assert window.__xssFired stays false, no dialog fires, and no live `img[onerror]`/`<script>` element is produced (Svelte escaping renders it as inert text). A trailing CAPMARK gates the assertion on the caption actually having rendered, so it can't pass vacuously. - Stored XSS in comments — post the two render-executing payloads as a comment, open the lightbox (which loads comments) and assert the same inert-render props. sse-ticket-abuse (new): - Minting a ticket requires auth (POST /stream/ticket without Bearer → 401). - Single-use: after the first open consumes the ticket, replaying it → 401 (a 200 would be capability replay). The first open (→200) also proves a fresh ticket works. - An unminted/garbage ticket → 401. All verified green against the live backend. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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20125fb713 |
test(e2e): pin security assertions + real cross-user IDOR coverage
Turn "accept-both-outcomes" documentation tests — which pass whether the app is secure or vulnerable — into assertions that pin the secure behavior, and replace fake-UUID authz tests that 404'd before ever reaching the ownership guard with real cross-user resources. file-upload-attacks: - SVG-with-<script> → pin 400 (infer returns None for text → stored-XSS defense); was [201,400], which accepted the vulnerable outcome. - zero-byte → pin 400; path-traversal → pin 201 with UUID-derived storage and a no-path-echo check (both were [201,400]). - Fix the application/octet-stream rationale (no "application bypass" exists — the handler ignores the declared type and keys off magic bytes). authorization-deep (IDOR): - B deleting A's comment: seed a real upload+comment as A, assert 403, assert the comment survives, and assert the owner (A) still gets 204 — proving the 403 is about identity, not a broken route. (Was a DELETE on the all-zeros UUID → 404 before the user_id guard, so authorization was never exercised.) - Add B-deletes-A's-upload (403, countUploads unchanged) and B-edits-A's-caption (403, caption intact) — the find_by_id_and_event + ownership guards. export: pin the ZIP-download 404 (was [404,200] — a 200 is a data-exposure regression) and split into the two real branches: not-yet-ready, and ready-but-file-missing (new db.setExportZipReady helper). All 21 assertions verified green against the live secure backend. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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a3c0082c4b |
test(e2e): update suite for shipped features + gate Chromium-only perms
The running test container had been built from an older tree; rebuilding it to pick up current app code surfaced several tests that predated shipped security/UX features: - file-upload-attacks / rate-limit: assert the magic-byte rejection wording and upload a real decodable JPEG (a zero-buffer is now rejected at the boundary). - ddos: open SSE via the single-use /stream/ticket flow, not the dead ?token=. - recover-page / join: the PIN field auto-submits on the 4th digit, so don't race an explicit submit click against the ensuing navigation. - gestures-doubletap / sheet-escape: target the lightbox by aria-labelledby and anchor the radio accessible-name match at the start (gated dialog semantics). playwright.config: camera/mic/clipboard are Chromium-only permissions (they threw "Unknown permission: camera" on firefox/webkit and failed the test at context creation); grant them per-Chromium-project. firefox-android drops the unsupported isMobile flag. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e79e020566 |
feat(eventsnap): UX review batch-3 — feed virtualization, a11y/UX fixes, shared primitives
Frontend - Feed: DOM-windowing via @tanstack/svelte-virtual (new VirtualFeed). The window virtualizer keeps the sticky header, pull-to-refresh, infinite-scroll sentinel and bottom nav working. List = dynamic measured heights keyed by upload id + anchorTo:start so an SSE prepend doesn't jump a scrolled reader; grid = measured square rows. Drops the content-visibility band-aid and the old FeedGrid. measureElement(null) on row unmount prevents ResizeObserver retention; stable option callbacks + guarded setOptions avoid O(n) re-measure on like/comment patches. - Global: viewport-fit=cover (activates safe-area insets), lang=de, PWA manifest + maskable icon + apple-touch metas, prefers-reduced-motion, safe-area-top headers. - Feed reactivity: like/comment SSE patch the single card in place; upload-processed debounced in-place merge; IntersectionObserver leak fixed; shared 60s clock. - CLS: list cards reserve the skeleton aspect box. - Destructive actions (promote/demote/unban, gallery release) routed through ConfirmSheet (host + admin). - Export OOM: streamed download via single-use ticket instead of res.blob(). - Shared primitives: IconButton (44px hit area), scrollLock action; UploadSheet a11y. - Polish: api timeout + non-JSON guard, focus-trap offsetParent fix, pull-to-refresh passive:false + guards, diashow keyboard a11y, Toaster assertive errors, dark-mode gaps, aria-pressed on like/chip state, CameraCapture mic-on-video + retry, ConfirmSheet spinner, upload beforeunload warning, emoji->SVG icons. Backend - social.rs: like/comment SSE broadcasts now carry the fresh count so feed clients patch one card in place instead of refetching page 1. - admin.rs / main.rs: supporting changes for the above. Verified: svelte-check 0 errors, frontend build clean, /feed SSR 200. Runtime feed scroll-feel validation still owed (documented in FOLLOWUPS.md). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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309c25bc06 |
feat(frontend): UX review followups — primitives + a11y/UX fixes across 4 passes
New shared primitives: - Toaster + toast-store, ConfirmSheet, Modal, focusTrap action, pullToRefresh action, avatarPalette + initials helper, Skeleton, HeartBurst, haptics, export-status store with onClearAuth hook Critical UX/a11y: - Replaced window.confirm with branded ConfirmSheet - Focus management + Escape on every modal (PIN, Lightbox, Onboarding, ContextSheet, data-mode sheet, leave-confirm, HTML guide, host/admin ban + PIN-display modals) - Sheet backdrops are real buttons with aria-label - Silent ApiError catches now surface via global Toaster Major polish: - Dark-mode parity on HashtagChips + avatars (shared palette) - Conditional Export tab in BottomNav (badge dot when ZIP ready) - Back chevrons on /recover (history-aware) and /export - Upload composer discard confirmation when content is staged - Camera segmented Photo/Video shutter - PIN auto-submit on 4th digit, paste-flash-free (controlled input) - Welcome-back toast on /feed after PIN recovery Minor: - Skeleton states on feed; pull-to-refresh with live drag indicator - Haptics on like / capture / submit / PIN-copy / onboarding complete - Comment 500-char counter; quota "Fast voll" / "Limit erreicht" labels - Onboarding pip ≥24px tap targets; long-press hint step - overscroll-behavior lock on <html> while feed mounted - teardownExportStatus wired via onClearAuth (covers 401 + explicit logout) - ConfirmSheet per-instance titleId; Modal requires titleId or ariaLabel Tests (7 new Playwright specs): - 01-auth/pin-auto-submit, 01-auth/back-chevron - 03-feed/confirm-sheet-delete, 03-feed/toast-on-failure - 09-mobile/focus-trap, 09-mobile/sheet-escape, 09-mobile/upload-cancel-confirm FOLLOWUPS.md captures the deferred AT inert containment work with acceptance criteria + implementation sketches. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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e42d8a92a1 |
feat(e2e): Playwright suite — 134 tests across 9 spec areas + UA matrix
Adds an end-to-end Playwright test suite under e2e/ that spins up an
isolated docker-compose stack (Postgres :55432, Caddy :3101, backend with
EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1, SvelteKit adapter-node frontend) and exercises the
SvelteKit app against the real Rust backend.
Phase 1 — happy paths covering every documented USER_JOURNEYS.md flow:
01-auth/ join, recover, admin login, leave event, PIN lockout
02-upload/ gallery picker (API path), rate-limit + admin toggle
03-feed/ like/comment SSE, filters, SSE reconnect on visibility
04-host/ event lock API, ban/unban, promote
05-admin/ config validation, foundational authz guards, stats
06-export/ /export status + download stub
__smoke/ cross-UA happy-path (runs on every UA project)
Phase 2 — adversarial + browser chaos:
07-adversarial/ XSS payloads (6 × display name path), SQLi shapes,
length / encoding / RTL override / NUL byte;
file-upload boundaries (ELF body claimed as JPEG,
oversize vs max_image_size_mb, zero-byte, NUL
filename, path-traversal, SVG-with-script);
JWT alg:none, signature/payload tamper, expired
session, PIN brute-force (serial + parallel),
admin password brute-force; deep authz (cross-user
delete, banned user across like/comment/feed-read,
host→admin escalation); small-scale DDoS (20× /join,
10MB comment body, 10 concurrent SSE).
08-browser-chaos/ localStorage / sessionStorage / cookie purge,
IndexedDB drop mid-session, offline → reconnect,
slow-3G, 503 flakes, 429 with no retry storm,
multi-tab same/different user, no-JS, hostile CSS,
clock skew ±1h / -2d, localStorage quota exhausted.
Phase 3 — mobile gestures (runs only on chromium-mobile / Pixel 7):
09-mobile/ touch-target ≥44px audit, env(safe-area-inset-bottom)
structural check, long-press (FeedListCard → ContextSheet,
quick-tap negation, click-suppression), double-tap
(feed card like + lightbox heart-burst, via synthetic
pointer events to bypass the first-tap-fires-click trap),
viewport reflow (portrait/landscape/narrow/phablet),
plus fixme stubs documenting planned gestures (swipe
lightbox L/R, swipe-down dismiss, pull-to-refresh,
long-press-comment).
Cross-UA matrix (chromium-engine projects run @smoke only):
chromium-pixel7, chromium-galaxy-s22, samsung-internet (Samsung UA
emulation on Galaxy viewport), edge-android, plus webkit-iphone,
chrome-ios, firefox-android, firefox-desktop — the latter four need
libavif16 on the host (Playwright dep) but the configs are in place.
Infrastructure:
- fixtures/test.ts central test.extend (api, db, adminToken, guest,
host, signIn). Per-test DB truncate via the dev-only POST
/admin/__truncate route, gated by EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1.
- helpers/sse-listener.ts, helpers/upload-client.ts (Node-side
multipart for adversarial file-upload tests + JPEG/PNG/ELF magic
constants), helpers/touch.ts (longPress / doubleTap / swipe /
inlineStyle / computedStyle).
- 10 page objects covering every route + UploadSheet/Lightbox.
- global-setup waits for /health, logs in admin, disables every
rate-limit and quota toggle.
- .github/workflows/e2e.yml: PR check runs chromium-desktop + the
smoke matrix in parallel, uploads playwright-report/ and traces on
failure.
Findings the suite surfaces as live `[finding]` warnings (not silenced):
1. /admin/login has no rate-limit or lockout (bcrypt cost only).
2. PIN-attempt counter races under parallel /recover requests.
3. Zero-byte uploads pass /api/v1/upload.
4. SVG-with-script can pass the magic-byte check (consider CSP +
X-Content-Type-Options on /media/*).
Stack-internal docs live in e2e/README.md (UA tier table, Samsung
Internet escalation tiers A/B/C, debugging tips, roadmap).
Final tally: 134 passed / 0 failed / 9 skipped (test.fixme stubs for
not-yet-shipped gestures and one UI-upload-flow investigation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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