The backend had never been run through rustfmt. Doing it in one mechanical pass (134 files)
so no future functional diff is buried under formatting churn, then gating `cargo fmt
--check` in checks.yml so it stays clean.
Formatting only — no logic, SQL, or behaviour changed. Verified after the reformat:
cargo test 56 passed, clippy --all-targets -D warnings clean, cargo fmt --check clean.
This is the deferred cleanup noted when CI's Format step was first left out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Performance:
- Cache the runtime `config` table in-memory (ConfigCache) with synchronous
invalidation on every write (admin PATCH + test reseed). Was re-reading each
key from Postgres on every request (~8 round-trips per upload).
- Stream uploads chunk-by-chunk to a temp file instead of buffering the whole
body in RAM (peak was up to the per-class cap, e.g. 500 MB/video); only 512
sniff-bytes are kept for magic-byte detection, then atomic rename into place.
- Cache the media-filesystem disk snapshot (DiskCache, 15s TTL) shared by the
quota check and admin stats; drop the discarded System::refresh_all().
- HTML export streams video (and small-image) originals straight into the ZIP
via a manifest instead of copying them to a temp dir first (removed the
transient 2x disk usage) and drops the double directory scan.
- Auth extractor resolves session -> live user in one JOIN (was two queries),
touching last_seen_at by token hash.
Stability:
- SSE: on broadcast lag, emit a `resync` event so the client runs a delta
fetch instead of silently losing events; frontend reconciles adds, deletions,
and (via an in-place refresh) like/comment counts on visible cards.
- Storage quota fails OPEN when the disk can't be read (was a 0-byte limit that
locked out all uploads).
- Graceful shutdown drains in-flight requests on SIGTERM/SIGINT, bounded by a
10s backstop so open SSE streams can't stall a deploy.
- Upload removes the persisted file if the DB transaction fails (no orphaned
bytes with no row to reclaim them).
Tests:
- New pure select_disk() with 5 unit tests (longest-prefix, fallbacks, fail-open).
- New e2e export-video spec covering the HTML export's video-streaming branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
H1: corrected a round-1 over-reach. Bans are read-only per USER_JOURNEYS §10:
the base AuthUser extractor no longer rejects banned users (they keep read
access); Require{Host,Admin} and write handlers enforce the ban via
auth.is_banned → 403 (incl. self-unban). Demoted hosts still lose powers
immediately (live DB role) and are bounced off the dashboard. Also fixed the
login/recover redirect regression on unauthenticated 401.
H2: failed compression now self-heals instead of leaving a permanent broken
card — refund the quota, delete the orphaned original, soft-delete the row;
the frontend toasts the uploader and evicts the card on upload-error.
H3: self-delete, ban-with-hide (user-hidden), and comment-deletes now broadcast
SSE; feed, diashow, and lightbox evict the affected content live instead of
waiting for a reload. sse-eviction.spec.ts covers it.
Riders: feed/+page.svelte also carries the medium truncated-delta pill; host.rs
also carries the low atomic release_gallery claim; admin/+page.svelte also drops
the dead compression_concurrency control (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
H1: auth extractor re-reads the live user row — trusts the DB role (not the
JWT claim) and rejects banned users mid-session. e2e proves a demoted
host loses powers and a banned host is locked out and can't self-unban.
H2: client_ip takes the right-most XFF hop (the one Caddy appends); spoofed
left-most entries are ignored, restoring IP-based throttles.
H3: Caddy excludes /api/v1/stream from `encode` so SSE isn't buffered.
H4: upload — quota increment + row insert + hashtag links now one txn.
H5: feed keyset pagination tiebroken on (created_at, id) + composite index
(migration 010); feed_delta bounded with LIMIT.
H7: LightboxModal keys its comment load off upload.id, ending the
SSE-driven refetch storm.
H8: CSP via SvelteKit kit.csp (svelte.config.js) hardens the localStorage
token model against injection.
Migration 010 also adds the latent comment/comment_hashtag indexes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the comprehensive code review. Five batches:
1. Cross-event authorization: host_delete_upload, unban_user, and
host_delete_comment now scope by auth.event_id. Adds
Upload::find_by_id_and_event / soft_delete_in_event and a
Comment::soft_delete_in_event variant that joins through upload.
2. Token exposure: SSE auth no longer puts the JWT in the URL.
New /api/v1/stream/ticket endpoint mints a short-lived single-use
ticket bound to the session; the EventSource passes ?ticket=...
instead. Refuse to start in APP_ENV=production with the dev JWT
sentinel; warn loudly otherwise.
3. Account hardening: per-IP+name rate limit on /recover (mitigates
targeted lockout DoS), per-IP rate limit on /admin/login, random
32-char admin recovery PIN (replaces "0000"), structured tracing
events for wrong PIN, lockout, failed admin login, ban/unban/role
change/pin-reset/host-delete.
4. DoS / correctness: comment listing paginated (LIMIT 50 + ?before=
cursor), hashtag extraction whitelisted to ASCII alnum+underscore
(≤40 chars) with unit tests, display_name / caption / comment body
length validated in chars rather than bytes.
5. Cleanup: session-touch failures now logged, DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS
env var (default 10).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend:
- AppConfig, AppError, AppState modules for shared infrastructure
- JWT creation/verification with HS256 (jsonwebtoken crate)
- Session management: SHA-256 token hashing, DB-backed sessions
- Auth middleware: AuthUser, RequireHost, RequireAdmin extractors
- POST /api/v1/join: name-only registration, 4-digit PIN + bcrypt hash
- POST /api/v1/recover: PIN-based recovery with 3-attempt lockout (15 min)
- POST /api/v1/admin/login: bcrypt password verification
- DELETE /api/v1/session: logout (session invalidation)
- Migration 006: user PIN lockout columns (failed_pin_attempts, pin_locked_until)
- Models: Event, User (with role enum), Session with all CRUD methods
Frontend:
- api.ts: typed fetch wrapper with automatic Bearer token injection
- auth.ts: JWT/PIN localStorage management with Svelte store
- /join: name entry form with PIN display modal and copy button
- /recover: name + PIN recovery form with saved PIN pre-fill
- /feed: placeholder gallery page with logout
- Root layout: auth initialization on mount
- Root page: redirect to /join or /feed based on auth state
All responses use German language strings as specified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
