402215d40507bde40f51658f372375bcf7b96daf
5 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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fabi
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08d92b7531 |
fix(audit-7): keepsake viewer integrity, readable archives, quota_tolerance floor
Seventh round, both defects in the keepsake — the one artifact that leaves the
system entirely, and so the one where a green server-side signal carries no
information at all.
Squashed from 2 commits, original messages preserved below.
──────── fix(export): stop a caption bricking the viewer, and ship readable archives
Two defects in the keepsake, both silent server-side and both only visible by
extracting the real artifact and trying to use it.
1. A CAPTION COULD BRICK THE VIEWER.
The viewer's data is inlined as `<script>window.__EXPORT_DATA__={…}</script>` -- it has
to be, since guests open index.html over file:// where fetching a sibling data.json is
blocked. The escape was `</` -> `<\/`. Against XSS that holds; I fired
`</script><img src=x onerror=…>` through a real Chromium parser and it round-trips
inert.
It does not stop the caption steering the HTML TOKENIZER. `<!--<script` with no later
`-->` drives the parser into script-data-double-escaped state, where the template's own
`</script>` only steps back to script-data-escaped instead of closing the element.
Everything after it -- including the viewer bundle -- is swallowed as script data.
Nothing executes and nothing leaks: `__EXPORT_DATA__` is simply never assigned and the
keepsake opens blank. A denial of the deliverable, not an XSS.
Reproduced in Chromium before changing anything, and the near-miss is worth recording:
`<!--<script>alert(1)</script>-->` comes back CLEAN, because the trailing `-->` returns
the parser to script-data state. A probe using the terminated form quietly repairs the
thing it is testing for.
Fix: escape every `<` as `<`, not just `</`. `<` never appears in JSON structural
syntax -- only inside string values -- so a global replace is sound, and one rule covers
`</script`, `<!--` and `<script` together. That is the point: the old escape was named
for the single case it handled. Only the INLINED copy is escaped; data.json is written
separately, in no HTML context, and stays literal.
2. EVERY ENTRY IN BOTH ARCHIVES WAS STORED MODE 0000.
`ZipEntryBuilder::new` leaves the external file attribute at zero and async_zip's host
compatibility defaults to Unix, so `unzip -Z` showed `?---------` on every line of both
Gallery.zip and Memories.zip. Windows Explorer ignores Unix modes, which is why this
survived; on Linux and macOS `unzip` faithfully applies what the archive asks for and
the guest gets a folder of photos none of which they can open.
Unconditional -- every keepsake ever produced, no hostile input required -- and
invisible server-side: the export succeeds, the ZIP is well-formed, the job writes
`done`, /export/status is green.
Found by accident. The browser test for defect 1 failed with ERR_ACCESS_DENIED on
file://, which looked exactly like a Playwright sandbox quirk; I twice "worked around"
it (fresh context, then a separately launched browser) before checking the extracted
files and finding mode 000. The workaround was suppressing a real bug. Both workarounds
are gone -- the ordinary `page` fixture loads the archive fine now.
Fix: all six ZipEntryBuilder sites route through one `keepsake_entry` helper stamping
`S_IFREG | 0644`, so the mode cannot be forgotten at a call site.
Tests: 3 unit (no `<` survives; the payload still decodes to the original value, because
this is a transport encoding and not a sanitiser; a clean payload is untouched) and 2
e2e that release for real, download the real archives, and check them from outside the
app -- one opening index.html over file:// in Chromium and asserting the viewer booted,
the captions came back verbatim and nothing executed; one asserting every stored mode
and every extracted file is readable. Both assertions verified to FAIL against the
pre-fix artifacts.
──────── fix(admin): reject quota_tolerance = 0 instead of silently blocking every upload
Zero is inside the documented 0–1 range and catastrophic. The per-user limit is
`free_disk * tolerance / active_uploaders`, so a tolerance of 0 makes every limit 0 and
refuses EVERY upload -- mid-event, with "Du hast dein Upload-Limit für dieses Event
erreicht", an error naming the wrong cause entirely. An admin reaching for an off-switch
wants `storage_quota_enabled`; the rejection now says so.
Rejecting the value rather than raising the floor. A floor of 0.01 was the obvious fix
and it is wrong: very small tolerances are legitimate -- they are how a large disk is
throttled down to a sensible per-guest ceiling, and how the quota specs steer it
(tolerance = target * active / free lands around 1e-5 on the 174 GB volume this suite
runs on). A floor would forbid real configurations, and would have broken the entire
storage-quota describe block, to prevent one typo. Verified: those four tests still pass.
Tests: the rejection, that the stored value is untouched (validation fully precedes any
write), and the mirror -- 0.00001 still round-trips -- so the guard can't quietly become
a floor later.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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bbdfae09a0 |
chore(e2e): add ESLint + Prettier; fix real findings; dedupe BASE
The Playwright suite had no linter and no formatter — only tsc. Add flat-config ESLint
(typescript-eslint, type-aware) and Prettier (2-space, matching the suite's style).
Rules keep the ones that catch real TEST bugs and drop the noise:
- no-floating-promises KEPT — an un-awaited request/assertion can let a test end before it runs,
passing vacuously. It caught one: the SSE reader loop in sse-listener is now explicitly `void`.
- no-unused-vars KEPT — caught three dead bindings (an unused adminToken fixture arg, an unused
`api` arg, an unused JPEG_MAGIC import), all removed.
- no-explicit-any OFF — all test code; `any` is the honest type for an untyped res.json() body or
a page.evaluate() return.
- no-empty-pattern OFF — Playwright's dependency-free fixtures are `async ({}, use) => {}`.
Refactor: `const BASE = process.env.E2E_FRONTEND_URL ?? '...'` was redeclared verbatim in 23
files — extracted to helpers/env.ts and imported, so a port/scheme change is one edit not a sweep.
Then `prettier --write`. Verified: eslint clean, tsc clean, prettier clean, desktop suite 210
passed / 1 skipped. (One mobile spec flaked once under retries:0 — a pre-existing cross-test
reflow-timing vector from the flakiness audit, not this change: the each-key edit is stable across
16 isolated runs and a clean full mobile re-run.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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02971f3186 |
test(e2e): de-vacuum security tests; add quota, authz-sweep, keepsake-regen coverage
An audit found tests that pass on broken code. The dominant pattern: fire a security
assertion at the all-zeros UUID and accept [403, 404] — the 404 comes from the resource
LOOKUP, not the guard, so the guard can be deleted and the test still passes. Repaired to
use real resources and demand exactly 403:
- banned-user cannot like / comment (the only coverage of those ban invariants)
- host cannot promote a real guest (or self) to admin — asserts nobody's role changed
- IDOR comment-delete already used a real resource; kept
Also inverted recovery.spec's "unknown name → nicht gefunden" test: that asserted the exact
account-enumeration oracle the F4 fix removed, so restoring the vuln would have made it
pass. Now: an unknown name must be byte-identical to a wrong PIN.
New coverage for paths that ran in production but in zero tests:
- quota.spec.ts: storage quota enforcement (413 over-limit, atomic increment under two
uploads held mid-body so both carry a stale total=0 — the real race; a naive Promise.all
version was itself vacuous and is documented as such). Proven to fail without the guard.
- authz-sweep.spec.ts: table-driven guest→403 / host→403 over ALL 19 privileged routes +
anonymous + __truncate. No live hole found; the whole surface is now locked.
- ban / unban / host-comment-delete AFTER release regenerate the keepsake (data-loss
paths that were dead under test); comment-delete mid-build doesn't strand the ZIP.
Lower-severity de-vacuuming: 10 MB comment test hit Caddy's 502 before the real 500-char
cap (now seeds a real upload, 501→400 / 500→201, mutation-verified); XSS name payloads
shortened under the 50-char cap so they actually store+render; ui-rendering XSS test now
proves the payload rendered before asserting no <b>; export page-object locators fixed to
the real "Download" label with a positive empty-state anchor; avatar palette spread test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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564104ae23 |
test(e2e): robustness — stable locators, exact assertions, no fixed sleep
- ContextSheet: add data-testid="context-sheet". longpress tests targeted the open sheet via the `.translate-y-0` animation class (breaks on any animation refactor) — now target `[data-testid="context-sheet"][aria-modal="true"]`, which is stable and unambiguous vs. the centered LightboxModal (also aria-modal). - toast-on-failure: the like button was `button.filter(hasText:/\d+/).first()`, which could match any digit-bearing button (e.g. the comment count) → use the stable aria-label "Gefällt mir". - config stats: assert the exact user_count (4 = 3 seeded guests + admin) instead of `>= 3` — deterministic after the per-test truncate, catches under/overcount. - offline-network 429 test: replace the fixed 3s waitForTimeout with a poll-until-the-retry-count-stabilizes (faster, and a real storm never stabilizes → the poll fails, which is the intended outcome). Note: reviewed the "config restore not in try/finally" finding — it's a non-issue. The truncate auto-fixture wipes+reseeds the whole config table (and clears the rate limiter) before every test, so config state cannot leak between tests. All affected specs verified green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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MechaCat02
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e42d8a92a1 |
feat(e2e): Playwright suite — 134 tests across 9 spec areas + UA matrix
Adds an end-to-end Playwright test suite under e2e/ that spins up an
isolated docker-compose stack (Postgres :55432, Caddy :3101, backend with
EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1, SvelteKit adapter-node frontend) and exercises the
SvelteKit app against the real Rust backend.
Phase 1 — happy paths covering every documented USER_JOURNEYS.md flow:
01-auth/ join, recover, admin login, leave event, PIN lockout
02-upload/ gallery picker (API path), rate-limit + admin toggle
03-feed/ like/comment SSE, filters, SSE reconnect on visibility
04-host/ event lock API, ban/unban, promote
05-admin/ config validation, foundational authz guards, stats
06-export/ /export status + download stub
__smoke/ cross-UA happy-path (runs on every UA project)
Phase 2 — adversarial + browser chaos:
07-adversarial/ XSS payloads (6 × display name path), SQLi shapes,
length / encoding / RTL override / NUL byte;
file-upload boundaries (ELF body claimed as JPEG,
oversize vs max_image_size_mb, zero-byte, NUL
filename, path-traversal, SVG-with-script);
JWT alg:none, signature/payload tamper, expired
session, PIN brute-force (serial + parallel),
admin password brute-force; deep authz (cross-user
delete, banned user across like/comment/feed-read,
host→admin escalation); small-scale DDoS (20× /join,
10MB comment body, 10 concurrent SSE).
08-browser-chaos/ localStorage / sessionStorage / cookie purge,
IndexedDB drop mid-session, offline → reconnect,
slow-3G, 503 flakes, 429 with no retry storm,
multi-tab same/different user, no-JS, hostile CSS,
clock skew ±1h / -2d, localStorage quota exhausted.
Phase 3 — mobile gestures (runs only on chromium-mobile / Pixel 7):
09-mobile/ touch-target ≥44px audit, env(safe-area-inset-bottom)
structural check, long-press (FeedListCard → ContextSheet,
quick-tap negation, click-suppression), double-tap
(feed card like + lightbox heart-burst, via synthetic
pointer events to bypass the first-tap-fires-click trap),
viewport reflow (portrait/landscape/narrow/phablet),
plus fixme stubs documenting planned gestures (swipe
lightbox L/R, swipe-down dismiss, pull-to-refresh,
long-press-comment).
Cross-UA matrix (chromium-engine projects run @smoke only):
chromium-pixel7, chromium-galaxy-s22, samsung-internet (Samsung UA
emulation on Galaxy viewport), edge-android, plus webkit-iphone,
chrome-ios, firefox-android, firefox-desktop — the latter four need
libavif16 on the host (Playwright dep) but the configs are in place.
Infrastructure:
- fixtures/test.ts central test.extend (api, db, adminToken, guest,
host, signIn). Per-test DB truncate via the dev-only POST
/admin/__truncate route, gated by EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1.
- helpers/sse-listener.ts, helpers/upload-client.ts (Node-side
multipart for adversarial file-upload tests + JPEG/PNG/ELF magic
constants), helpers/touch.ts (longPress / doubleTap / swipe /
inlineStyle / computedStyle).
- 10 page objects covering every route + UploadSheet/Lightbox.
- global-setup waits for /health, logs in admin, disables every
rate-limit and quota toggle.
- .github/workflows/e2e.yml: PR check runs chromium-desktop + the
smoke matrix in parallel, uploads playwright-report/ and traces on
failure.
Findings the suite surfaces as live `[finding]` warnings (not silenced):
1. /admin/login has no rate-limit or lockout (bcrypt cost only).
2. PIN-attempt counter races under parallel /recover requests.
3. Zero-byte uploads pass /api/v1/upload.
4. SVG-with-script can pass the magic-byte check (consider CSP +
X-Content-Type-Options on /media/*).
Stack-internal docs live in e2e/README.md (UA tier table, Samsung
Internet escalation tiers A/B/C, debugging tips, roadmap).
Final tally: 134 passed / 0 failed / 9 skipped (test.fixme stubs for
not-yet-shipped gestures and one UI-upload-flow investigation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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