Re-review follow-ups (non-blocking quality items):
Tests:
- moderation H1 specs now assert exact `→ 403` instead of bare .rejects.toThrow(),
so a spurious 500 can no longer masquerade as "revocation worked".
- config: added case-insensitivity (upper/mixed-case placeholder) and the
len==32/31 boundary cases for validate_secrets.
- rate_limiter: added the trailing-comma empty-entry case for client_ip (must
fall back, not return "").
(Backend unit tests: 35 pass.)
Docs:
- README: note that with APP_ENV=production a placeholder .env makes the app
refuse to boot and Caddy wait unhealthy — reason is in `docker compose logs app`.
- SECURITY-BACKLOG + sse.rs comment: document that a mid-session ban does not
tear down an already-open SSE stream (new tickets are blocked; low blast radius).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
C1: reset_user_pin wrote to a non-existent column (pin_failed_attempts);
the real column is failed_pin_attempts, so every PIN reset 500'd. Fixed
the column name; new e2e (pin-reset.spec.ts) proves a reset returns a
usable PIN and the target can recover with it.
C2: config.rs::validate_secrets now rejects placeholder-ish secrets
(change_me/dev_secret/placeholder), enforces len>=32 in prod, and
requires a real ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH. docker-compose.yml sets
APP_ENV=production so the guard actually runs. Corrected the false
"fixed" claim in SECURITY-BACKLOG.md. .env.example documents the rule.
Riders in these files (documented here since git can't split hunks):
- host.rs also carries the event-scoped ban_user fix and the
close_event/open_event no-op broadcast guard (medium).
- docker-compose.yml also adds ORIGIN (H6), app/frontend healthchecks with
Caddy waiting on health, and per-service memory limits (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From the 2026-06-27 audit branch (fix/audit-2026-06-27-critical-medium), whose
work was ~80% absorbed into main via the batch branches. This ports the pieces
that were NOT in main:
- compression.rs: cap image decode with image::Limits (12000x12000, 256 MiB
max_alloc) via ImageReader instead of image::open(). The upload body-size cap
bounds the file on disk but not the *decoded* dimensions, so a small
decompression-bomb image could OOM the box during decode/resize. Surgical port
of the audit's decode guard only (not its image/video semaphore split).
- docs/SECURITY-BACKLOG.md: the audit's triaged backlog, reconciled against main
(each item tagged done / open / contingent-on-signed-media). Records the still-
open items: host moderation UI gap, owner-delete SSE broadcast, quota
mount-detection (starts_with) + low-disk guard.
- docs/DECISION-media-auth.md: writes up the one real architectural divergence —
main serves media unauthenticated (ServeDir + UUID-capability) while the audit
built a signed/TTL'd gateway. Lays out the tradeoff (leaked URL = permanent vs
~24h access; banned-user access) and a recommendation, for a human decision.
Verified: cargo build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
