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3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
fabi
faf7a2504a fix(audit): restore broken upload pipeline + role-based E2E audit fixes 
A comprehensive role-based E2E audit (guest/host/admin, across browser
sessions) surfaced one critical and several smaller issues; this addresses
them and hardens the tests that missed them.

Critical
- The client upload pipeline was fully broken: the IndexedDB v1->v2 upgrade
  opened a *new* transaction inside the upgrade callback, which throws during
  a version-change transaction and aborted the whole upgrade, leaving the
  queue object store uncreated -- so no UI upload ever fired. Reuse the
  version-change transaction the callback provides, and bump the DB to v3 with
  a contains() guard so installs already corrupted by the shipped bug
  self-heal on next load. Re-enabled the previously-fixme'd UI upload E2E test.

High / Medium
- Event lock is uploads-only again: likes, comments and browsing stay open
  while the event is locked (USER_JOURNEYS 9.3 / FEATURES) -- it was wrongly
  freezing social interaction. Updated the event-lock spec accordingly.
- get_original now excludes soft-deleted and ban-hidden uploads, and direct
  /media/originals/** serving is blocked, so a hidden user's originals can no
  longer be pulled by UUID (all originals go through the checked alias).
- The upload handler reads the file field with an early-abort size cap chosen
  from the declared content-type, instead of buffering the entire body before
  the size check.

Low
- unban_user mirrors the ban role guard (a host can no longer unban a
  host/admin banned by an admin).
- reset_user_pin's UPDATE is event-scoped.
- Admin login returns and stores a real identity (user_id + display name)
  instead of a blank session.
- The host user list no longer renders target-actions (ban/promote/demote/PIN)
  on the caller's own row, where the backend always rejected them.
- /diashow gains a client-side auth guard like the other protected routes.
- The join page shows the event name via a new public GET /api/v1/event.

Verified: backend cargo build clean, frontend svelte-check 0 errors, full
Playwright E2E suite 144 passed / 1 skipped.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-07-07 07:28:27 +02:00
fabi
91ff961850 fix(security): medium/low — event-lock, atomic config, a11y, diashow, hygiene 
- social: likes/comments rejected on a closed event (e2e proven).
- admin: patch_config validates-then-writes atomically; char-based length.
- hashtag/comment models: atomic tag writes in edit + comment paths.
- Modal: inert the background (modal-inert action) for screen readers.
- sse.ts: idempotent visibilitychange listener (no duplicate reconnects).
- diashow: videos advance on `ended` (transitions + page wiring).
- docs/hygiene: README clone-case fix; removed stale committed .env.test and
  gitignored it; docker-compose.dev.yml tidy.

Left documented as accepted-risk per plan: PIN-persist-after-logout,
UUID-reachable hidden uploads, DECISION-media-auth.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-07-01 21:25:58 +02:00
MechaCat02
e42d8a92a1 feat(e2e): Playwright suite — 134 tests across 9 spec areas + UA matrix 
Adds an end-to-end Playwright test suite under e2e/ that spins up an
isolated docker-compose stack (Postgres :55432, Caddy :3101, backend with
EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1, SvelteKit adapter-node frontend) and exercises the
SvelteKit app against the real Rust backend.

Phase 1 — happy paths covering every documented USER_JOURNEYS.md flow:
  01-auth/      join, recover, admin login, leave event, PIN lockout
  02-upload/    gallery picker (API path), rate-limit + admin toggle
  03-feed/      like/comment SSE, filters, SSE reconnect on visibility
  04-host/      event lock API, ban/unban, promote
  05-admin/     config validation, foundational authz guards, stats
  06-export/    /export status + download stub
  __smoke/      cross-UA happy-path (runs on every UA project)

Phase 2 — adversarial + browser chaos:
  07-adversarial/  XSS payloads (6 × display name path), SQLi shapes,
                   length / encoding / RTL override / NUL byte;
                   file-upload boundaries (ELF body claimed as JPEG,
                   oversize vs max_image_size_mb, zero-byte, NUL
                   filename, path-traversal, SVG-with-script);
                   JWT alg:none, signature/payload tamper, expired
                   session, PIN brute-force (serial + parallel),
                   admin password brute-force; deep authz (cross-user
                   delete, banned user across like/comment/feed-read,
                   host→admin escalation); small-scale DDoS (20× /join,
                   10MB comment body, 10 concurrent SSE).
  08-browser-chaos/ localStorage / sessionStorage / cookie purge,
                    IndexedDB drop mid-session, offline → reconnect,
                    slow-3G, 503 flakes, 429 with no retry storm,
                    multi-tab same/different user, no-JS, hostile CSS,
                    clock skew ±1h / -2d, localStorage quota exhausted.

Phase 3 — mobile gestures (runs only on chromium-mobile / Pixel 7):
  09-mobile/    touch-target ≥44px audit, env(safe-area-inset-bottom)
                structural check, long-press (FeedListCard → ContextSheet,
                quick-tap negation, click-suppression), double-tap
                (feed card like + lightbox heart-burst, via synthetic
                pointer events to bypass the first-tap-fires-click trap),
                viewport reflow (portrait/landscape/narrow/phablet),
                plus fixme stubs documenting planned gestures (swipe
                lightbox L/R, swipe-down dismiss, pull-to-refresh,
                long-press-comment).

Cross-UA matrix (chromium-engine projects run @smoke only):
  chromium-pixel7, chromium-galaxy-s22, samsung-internet (Samsung UA
  emulation on Galaxy viewport), edge-android, plus webkit-iphone,
  chrome-ios, firefox-android, firefox-desktop — the latter four need
  libavif16 on the host (Playwright dep) but the configs are in place.

Infrastructure:
  - fixtures/test.ts central test.extend (api, db, adminToken, guest,
    host, signIn). Per-test DB truncate via the dev-only POST
    /admin/__truncate route, gated by EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1.
  - helpers/sse-listener.ts, helpers/upload-client.ts (Node-side
    multipart for adversarial file-upload tests + JPEG/PNG/ELF magic
    constants), helpers/touch.ts (longPress / doubleTap / swipe /
    inlineStyle / computedStyle).
  - 10 page objects covering every route + UploadSheet/Lightbox.
  - global-setup waits for /health, logs in admin, disables every
    rate-limit and quota toggle.
  - .github/workflows/e2e.yml: PR check runs chromium-desktop + the
    smoke matrix in parallel, uploads playwright-report/ and traces on
    failure.

Findings the suite surfaces as live `[finding]` warnings (not silenced):
  1. /admin/login has no rate-limit or lockout (bcrypt cost only).
  2. PIN-attempt counter races under parallel /recover requests.
  3. Zero-byte uploads pass /api/v1/upload.
  4. SVG-with-script can pass the magic-byte check (consider CSP +
     X-Content-Type-Options on /media/*).

Stack-internal docs live in e2e/README.md (UA tier table, Samsung
Internet escalation tiers A/B/C, debugging tips, roadmap).

Final tally: 134 passed / 0 failed / 9 skipped (test.fixme stubs for
not-yet-shipped gestures and one UI-upload-flow investigation).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-16 19:37:11 +02:00