Backup. Both documented commands failed on the shipped stack, and the sentence
explaining them was wrong too:
- `pg_dump $DATABASE_URL` — `DATABASE_URL` is only ever in the compose
environment, never an operator's shell, and it points at `db:5432`, which is
compose-internal DNS. The app image has no postgres client either.
- `> /media/backups/…` — `/media` is a named volume mounted inside the app
container, not a host path, and nothing ever creates a `backups` subdirectory.
- `rsync /opt/eventsnap/media/` — that path does not exist anywhere.
- "a single path to back up" — false, and dangerously so: exports were moved to
their own `exports_data` volume precisely so a keepsake (which contains every
photo in the event) can't be served off the media tree. Backing up only
`media_data` silently loses every generated keepsake.
Rewritten as three commands — db via `docker compose exec -T db pg_dump`, and one
`docker run … tar` per volume — all verified against the running stack. The
volume mounts use `/src`, not `/media`: I hit the footgun while testing this.
Docker pre-populates an EMPTY volume from the image's own directory and chowns it
to match, so `-v media_data:/media alpine` tars alpine's cdrom/floppy/usb, writes
them into the volume, and leaves it root-owned so the non-root app can no longer
write. Mounting where the image has nothing avoids all of it. Documented inline
so the next person doesn't rediscover it.
Also correct the architecture notes: `/media/*` no longer routes to the backend
(that static tree was removed as a gating bypass), and `exports_data` was missing
from the volume list — the one volume an operator most needs to know about.
e2e stack: add the `EXPORT_PATH` + `/exports` volume it was missing. The file
says "mirrors production layout"; without these, exports landed on the container's
writable layer at the default path, so export-leak and export-video wrote real
archives into ephemeral storage and the "exports live outside media" invariant
was never actually exercised.
Pre-existing red test, unrelated to the audit: all four 02-upload/quota tests
have been failing since 4464147 "stop /me/quota leaking raw disk to guests"
(2026-07-19), which post-dates the spec's last edit. `setLimitTo` calibrated
`quota_tolerance` from `free_disk_bytes` read through the GUEST's token — a field
that commit deliberately zeroes for non-staff. Dividing by it yields a NaN
tolerance, so every test in the block died in the helper. Read the calibration
inputs through a staff token and keep reading the ceiling back through the guest,
whose limit is the thing under test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI ran Playwright (chromium-desktop) + the dependency audit and nothing else. cargo test,
clippy, the frontend vitest suite, svelte-check and the e2e typecheck were all green on a
developer's machine and gated NOTHING.
checks.yml (new): cargo test (with a Postgres service; --test-threads bounded so the
sqlx per-test DBs can't exhaust connections) + clippy; vitest + svelte-check; e2e tsc.
e2e.yml: also run the chromium-mobile project — 22 tests (focus traps, touch targets,
safe-area, viewport reflow) that never ran in CI on a phone-first app.
playwright.config: widen webkit-iphone beyond @smoke (2 specs) to the core guest journeys
(auth/upload/feed) — iOS Safari is the PRIMARY browser here; and retries 2 → 0.
retries:0 is deliberate and against the usual advice: this repo's real bugs are races, a
race is indistinguishable from a flake from outside, and a retry resolves that ambiguity
toward "flake" every time — it took a real 3%-flaky product bug from 1-in-33 to 1-in-37000,
green. A flake here is a bug report.
Not gated: cargo fmt (the tree has never been rustfmt'd — a 112-file reformat would bury
every real diff; do it separately). WebKit widening is unverified locally (needs libavif16
via sudo), so its first CI run may surface real iOS bugs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-review follow-ups (non-blocking quality items):
Tests:
- moderation H1 specs now assert exact `→ 403` instead of bare .rejects.toThrow(),
so a spurious 500 can no longer masquerade as "revocation worked".
- config: added case-insensitivity (upper/mixed-case placeholder) and the
len==32/31 boundary cases for validate_secrets.
- rate_limiter: added the trailing-comma empty-entry case for client_ip (must
fall back, not return "").
(Backend unit tests: 35 pass.)
Docs:
- README: note that with APP_ENV=production a placeholder .env makes the app
refuse to boot and Caddy wait unhealthy — reason is in `docker compose logs app`.
- SECURITY-BACKLOG + sse.rs comment: document that a mid-session ban does not
tear down an already-open SSE stream (new tickets are blocked; low blast radius).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address the seven findings from the security & deployment review.
High:
- upload: make infer authoritative — reject files it can't identify
(SVG/HTML/JS) and require the detected MIME to be on an ALLOWED_MEDIA
allowlist; derive the stored MIME and on-disk extension from the
detected type, ignoring client filename/Content-Type. Closes the
stored-XSS vector via media served on-origin.
- deploy: rename docker-compose.override.yml -> docker-compose.dev.yml
so the default `docker compose up -d` no longer publishes Postgres
5432 to the host; the port map is now opt-in via -f. README updated.
Medium:
- upload: DefaultBodyLimit::disable() -> max(576 MiB) as an HTTP-level
OOM backstop; handler still enforces precise per-class size limits.
- docker: run backend and frontend as non-root users.
Low:
- social/upload: event-scope toggle_like, list_comments, add_comment,
delete_comment, edit_upload, delete_upload via find_by_id_and_event /
soft_delete_in_event — cross-event IDs now resolve to 404.
- Caddy: site-wide HSTS / nosniff / X-Frame-Options / Referrer-Policy,
plus Content-Disposition: attachment on /media/originals/*.
- .env.example: replace default Postgres password with a CHANGE_ME hint.
Out of scope: localStorage JWT (root cause fixed; httpOnly cookies are a
larger change tracked separately).
Verified: cargo build (no new warnings), cargo test (3 passed),
caddy validate, docker compose config (no 5432 published by default).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- PROJECT.md, README.md, TEST_GUIDE.md: status line refreshed; rate-limiter
doc-vs-code drift fixed; HTML export section rewritten for the SvelteKit-
static viewer; SSE event names + new events documented; config seed block
extended with planned toggles + privacy_note; decision log entries added.
- docs/CONCEPT_HTML_VIEWER.md, docs/CONCEPT_MOBILE_UI.md: banner the design
intent as shipped; point at the source-of-truth code paths.
- docs/CONCEPT_DIASHOW.md: planned-then-shipped design for the live diashow
(two-queue policy, pluggable transitions, data-mode aware).
- docs/FEATURES.md: capability matrix by role (Guest / Host / Admin) plus
prose per area (auth, posting, feed, moderation, admin, export, gestures,
data mode, quotas, privacy note, extensibility).
- docs/USER_JOURNEYS.md: step-by-step flows for every supported scenario,
including PIN reset by host, data mode, privacy note, gestures, and the
admin toggles.
- docs/IDEAS.md: speculative extensions (global diashow, reactions,
multi-tenancy, animation pack, etc.) — explicitly out of v0.16 scope.
- backend/migrations/README.md, frontend/src/lib/README.md: codify the
"never edit a shipped migration" rule and the lib/ conventions
(one store per concern, gestures via actions, sheets via ContextSheet,
transitions as drop-in components).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
