5546fb82e650c8a9ddf17901571913d8bd1d9203
9 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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fabi
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e5201a9889 |
test(backend): DB-backed tests for the risky SQL; test isolation; clippy cleanup
All 40 backend tests were pure-function tests — not one line of SQL ran under `cargo test`,
even though the riskiest code in the repo is SQL. Add 12 DB-backed `#[sqlx::test]` tests
(fresh throwaway DB per test, real migrations) pinning the invariants that code is
load-bearing for, each mutation-verified to fail on broken code:
export_epoch.rs (8): epoch is post-increment on release (a worker born pre-increment is
inert); epoch strictly monotonic across reopen; a retired-epoch worker's writes are
no-ops; export_current is EXACTLY the invariant (8-case table); the ViewerOnly
carry-forward carries a done ZIP forward AND matches nothing when the ZIP is unfinished
(the
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fabi
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9666d74a46 |
fix(export): close all 13 findings from the multi-agent review
A 6-lens multi-agent review (103 agents; every finding adversarially verified by three
refute-by-default skeptics) confirmed the epoch redesign is sound — the core invariant
holds — and found 13 real defects around it. All are fixed here.
The redesign's invariant was re-verified and stands: an accepted upload is always in the
keepsake, and a downloadable keepsake always reflects the most recent release.
But a WEAKER adjacent invariant did NOT hold — "a downloadable keepsake reflects the
current content" — and that is the theme of the biggest fixes.
CONTENT REMOVAL NOW ALWAYS REACHES THE KEEPSAKE
Regeneration was wired only to host deletes. Ban, unban, guest self-delete and guest
comment-delete did not trigger it — yet the export query filters `is_banned = FALSE`,
so the pipeline already agreed that content must not be there. Ban someone for abusive
content after release and every guest kept downloading an archive containing it.
All five removal paths now invalidate and rebuild. `query_comments` also gained the
banned/hidden filter it was missing entirely (the ZIP had it; the viewer did not).
Each removal is now ATOMIC with its invalidation (one tx, models made executor-generic).
Previously the delete committed in its own tx and the regeneration in a second: a dropped
handler future between them left the taken-down photo permanently downloadable, and
nothing could notice — the keepsake still looked complete and the host could no longer
even find the upload to retry.
NO MORE TAKEDOWN STORM
Every removal spawned two uncancellable full exports. A superseded worker was INERT, not
STOPPED: it still ran every ffmpeg spawn and image resize and wrote a whole archive before
discovering it had lost. Five deletes left ten workers alive, each holding a
full-gallery-sized temp, in a 1 GB container.
Now: a debounce before `claim_job` (a superseded worker fails its claim and does ZERO
work, collapsing a burst into one export), plus `update_progress` — which already ran
exactly the right liveness predicate and threw the answer away — returning it so both file
loops bail the instant they are retired. Moderating a comment no longer rebuilds the
multi-GB ZIP either: the ZIP is media-only, so it is carried forward, with prune taught to
protect any file a live row still references.
AN ESCAPE HATCH
A failed export was terminal at runtime: release_gallery refuses an already-released event,
recovery only runs at boot, and there was no retry route — the only outs were restarting the
container or reopening uploads to every guest. Added POST /host/export/rebuild. Also widened
mark_failed's guard to `status IN ('running','pending')`: when claim_job itself ERRORED, the
row was still `pending`, so the failure was never recorded and the job sat at 0% forever.
SILENT INVALIDATION
Retiring the epoch 404s the download instantly, but nothing told the clients — guests kept
seeing an enabled download button through the whole rebuild. Now broadcasts an invalidation.
And the download was a top-level <a href>: a 404 (or a 429 from the per-IP export limit that
everyone on the venue WiFi shares) NAVIGATED THE USER OUT OF THE PWA onto raw JSON. It now
targets a hidden iframe, so an error response is harmless.
ALSO
- The HTML export still had the exists()-then-open TOCTOU the ZIP path was fixed to remove,
at three sites, two with a hard `?` that failed the ENTIRE viewer. It is reachable: the
compression worker hard-deletes an original when a transcode fails and can still be running
when the gallery is released.
- Crash-orphaned .tmp files were immortal (prune deliberately skips .tmp). Swept at boot,
where it is unambiguously safe.
- export_status read the epoch in one statement and used it in the next; now one query.
- DiskCache::snapshot IGNORED its path argument on a cache hit, returning whatever filesystem
was measured last. Latent only because both callers pass media_path — it would have silently
misreported the moment anyone measured the exports volume. Now keyed by path.
- Corrected two comments that asserted safety properties the code does not have (claim_job
does NOT prevent a retired-epoch claim — retirement is enforced at READ time; and a
multi-replica reap is NOT contained, it can corrupt the keepsake). Added a rollback runbook
to migration 014, the repo's first destructive migration.
TESTS
The regression guard for the headline FOR SHARE fix was probabilistic — it could pass on
broken code if the interleaving fell the wrong way. It is now STRUCTURAL: the upload is held
open mid-body with its pre-flight check already passed, so the release provably lands inside
the exact window. Verified 5/5 FAILING (201 instead of 403) with the fix reverted, 5/5
passing with it.
Verified: backend 40 tests, svelte-check 0 errors, e2e typecheck clean,
e2e 160 passed / 1 skipped on chromium-desktop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MechaCat02
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641174717c |
fix(user-flow): close offline-queue, export, session, ban & realtime gaps
Comprehensive user-flow review across guest/host/admin roles, then fixes with
e2e regression guards. Highlights:
- Offline upload queue auto-resumes on reconnect: network errors keep items
pending (not error), 4xx are terminal (no infinite retry), quota exhaustion
returns a distinct 413; queue cap + dedup.
- Export lifecycle: release atomically locks uploads; reopen invalidates and
re-release regenerates the keepsake; workers claim their job atomically so a
reopen->re-release can't corrupt the ZIP; startup re-spawns interrupted
exports.
- Sessions slide on activity (no 30-day cliff); JWT expiry deferred to the
revocable session row; sign-out-everywhere + revoke-on-PIN-reset.
- Ban always hides content (v_feed / find_visible_media / export filter
is_banned) but stays a read-only ban per USER_JOURNEYS §10 — sessions are
not revoked, read access + keepsake download preserved.
- Realtime: server-clock SSE delta cursor; event-closed/opened drive the UI
live; feed_delta rate-limited; like returns {liked, like_count} to fix
multi-device drift; lightbox live comments; diashow delta backfill.
- Forgotten-PIN in-app request flow; simultaneous same-name join returns 409;
quota increment is transactional; operator floor.
Adds e2e/specs/10-flow-review/ (offline resume, export integrity, deterministic
anti-race guard) and updates existing specs for the new contracts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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a4b2c5bd1c |
fix(security): harden authz, media gating, recover, SSE, deps
Security audit follow-up. No Critical/High existed; these close the
Medium/Low findings.
F1 [Med] Host privilege boundary: a host could demote a peer host to
guest and then ban / PIN-reset (→ account takeover via /recover) them,
because the ban/pin-reset peer guards key off the target's *current*
role. set_role now blocks a non-admin from demoting a host.
F2 [Med] Moderation now revokes preview/thumbnail access: they are served
through visibility-checked aliases (/api/v1/upload/{id}/{preview,
thumbnail}) that filter soft-deleted / ban-hidden uploads, and direct
/media/previews|thumbnails is 404-blocked. Feed emits the gated URLs;
Caddy keeps them privately cacheable (max-age=300, short so moderation
revokes promptly — the live feed already evicts cards via SSE). Uses a
lean find_visible_media() (paths+mime only) on the media hot path.
F3 [Med/Low] npm audit fix: svelte 5.55.1→5.56.4 (SSR-XSS advisories),
devalue 5.6.4→5.8.1 (DoS). Prod deps: 0 vulnerabilities.
F4 [Low] /recover no longer leaks account existence: unknown display name
returns the same 401 as a wrong PIN, and runs a dummy bcrypt verify so
timing matches — closing the enumeration + timing oracle.
F5 [Low] SSE streams re-validate the session every ~60s and close once it
is logged out / expired, instead of running until client disconnect.
F6 [Info] X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff set at the app layer on all
media responses (defense-in-depth alongside the edge).
Tests: new e2e specs for F1 (host cannot demote peer host), F2 (preview
gated + 404 after delete + direct /media blocked), F4 (uniform 401).
40 backend unit tests + 182 e2e passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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faf7a2504a |
fix(audit): restore broken upload pipeline + role-based E2E audit fixes
A comprehensive role-based E2E audit (guest/host/admin, across browser sessions) surfaced one critical and several smaller issues; this addresses them and hardens the tests that missed them. Critical - The client upload pipeline was fully broken: the IndexedDB v1->v2 upgrade opened a *new* transaction inside the upgrade callback, which throws during a version-change transaction and aborted the whole upgrade, leaving the queue object store uncreated -- so no UI upload ever fired. Reuse the version-change transaction the callback provides, and bump the DB to v3 with a contains() guard so installs already corrupted by the shipped bug self-heal on next load. Re-enabled the previously-fixme'd UI upload E2E test. High / Medium - Event lock is uploads-only again: likes, comments and browsing stay open while the event is locked (USER_JOURNEYS 9.3 / FEATURES) -- it was wrongly freezing social interaction. Updated the event-lock spec accordingly. - get_original now excludes soft-deleted and ban-hidden uploads, and direct /media/originals/** serving is blocked, so a hidden user's originals can no longer be pulled by UUID (all originals go through the checked alias). - The upload handler reads the file field with an early-abort size cap chosen from the declared content-type, instead of buffering the entire body before the size check. Low - unban_user mirrors the ban role guard (a host can no longer unban a host/admin banned by an admin). - reset_user_pin's UPDATE is event-scoped. - Admin login returns and stores a real identity (user_id + display name) instead of a blank session. - The host user list no longer renders target-actions (ban/promote/demote/PIN) on the caller's own row, where the backend always rejected them. - /diashow gains a client-side auth guard like the other protected routes. - The join page shows the event name via a new public GET /api/v1/event. Verified: backend cargo build clean, frontend svelte-check 0 errors, full Playwright E2E suite 144 passed / 1 skipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fabi
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f08d858281 |
fix(security): high — live authz, XFF, SSE buffering, atomicity, pagination
H1: auth extractor re-reads the live user row — trusts the DB role (not the
JWT claim) and rejects banned users mid-session. e2e proves a demoted
host loses powers and a banned host is locked out and can't self-unban.
H2: client_ip takes the right-most XFF hop (the one Caddy appends); spoofed
left-most entries are ignored, restoring IP-based throttles.
H3: Caddy excludes /api/v1/stream from `encode` so SSE isn't buffered.
H4: upload — quota increment + row insert + hashtag links now one txn.
H5: feed keyset pagination tiebroken on (created_at, id) + composite index
(migration 010); feed_delta bounded with LIMIT.
H7: LightboxModal keys its comment load off upload.id, ending the
SSE-driven refetch storm.
H8: CSP via SvelteKit kit.csp (svelte.config.js) hardens the localStorage
token model against injection.
Migration 010 also adds the latent comment/comment_hashtag indexes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MechaCat02
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d228676a56 |
fix(security): cross-event authz, SSE ticket flow, account hardening, audit logs
Follow-up to the comprehensive code review. Five batches: 1. Cross-event authorization: host_delete_upload, unban_user, and host_delete_comment now scope by auth.event_id. Adds Upload::find_by_id_and_event / soft_delete_in_event and a Comment::soft_delete_in_event variant that joins through upload. 2. Token exposure: SSE auth no longer puts the JWT in the URL. New /api/v1/stream/ticket endpoint mints a short-lived single-use ticket bound to the session; the EventSource passes ?ticket=... instead. Refuse to start in APP_ENV=production with the dev JWT sentinel; warn loudly otherwise. 3. Account hardening: per-IP+name rate limit on /recover (mitigates targeted lockout DoS), per-IP rate limit on /admin/login, random 32-char admin recovery PIN (replaces "0000"), structured tracing events for wrong PIN, lockout, failed admin login, ban/unban/role change/pin-reset/host-delete. 4. DoS / correctness: comment listing paginated (LIMIT 50 + ?before= cursor), hashtag extraction whitelisted to ASCII alnum+underscore (≤40 chars) with unit tests, display_name / caption / comment body length validated in chars rather than bytes. 5. Cleanup: session-touch failures now logged, DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS env var (default 10). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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MechaCat02
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141c918dd5 |
backend(infra): shared config helper, startup recovery, periodic maintenance
Foundations for the v0.16 features. No new endpoints here — those land in
the next commit on top of these.
- migrations 008 + 009: commit the load-bearing compression_status column
that was uncommitted on disk; add 009_feature_toggles seeding the master
+ per-endpoint rate-limit switches, the master + per-area quota switches,
and the admin-editable privacy_note.
- services/config.rs (new): get_str / get_i64 / get_usize / get_f64 / get_bool
consolidating the scattered helpers that lived in three handlers.
- services/maintenance.rs (new):
- startup_recovery() — resets compression_status='processing' and
export_job.status='running' rows orphaned by a previous crashed
instance, so users never see permanent "Wird vorbereitet…" spinners.
- spawn_periodic_tasks() — hourly cleanup of expired sessions (rows
were never pruned) + rate-limiter HashMap pruning (windows kept one
entry per IP forever).
- services/jobs.rs (new sketch): BackgroundJob trait + JobContext for
future jobs to plug into the same progress + SSE pipeline as
compression/export. Not wired yet — codifies the convention.
- services/compression.rs: 120s hard timeout + kill_on_drop on ffmpeg
so a malformed video can't hang and leak a worker semaphore permit.
- services/rate_limiter.rs: new prune() called from the periodic task.
- state.rs: SseEvent::new() constructor so event-type strings stay
consistent instead of being typed inline at every emit site.
- models/user.rs: UserRole::as_str() for /me/context serialization.
- models/upload.rs: soft_delete() now runs in a transaction and
decrements the uploader's total_upload_bytes (GREATEST(0, …) guard) —
fixes a quota drift where deleting reclaimed no quota.
- Cargo.toml + Cargo.lock: add `infer = "0.15"` (multipart MIME sniffing
used by the upload handler).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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3f052a4f91 |
feat: implement upload pipeline with compression and SSE
Backend:
- POST /api/v1/upload: multipart file upload with caption + hashtags
- Validates file size against DB config limits (image/video separate)
- Checks user ban status and event upload lock
- Saves original to disk under {media_path}/originals/{slug}/
- Tracks user total_upload_bytes for quota enforcement
- Extracts hashtags from caption text and explicit CSV field
- Upserts hashtags and links them to uploads
- PATCH /api/v1/upload/{id}: edit caption and hashtags (owner only)
- DELETE /api/v1/upload/{id}: soft-delete (owner only)
- GET /api/v1/stream: SSE endpoint with 30s keepalive
- Broadcasts new-upload events to all connected clients
- Uses tokio broadcast channel for fan-out
Services:
- CompressionWorker: Tokio semaphore-bounded (concurrency=2) background processor
- Images: resize to 800px wide JPEG preview via image crate
- PNG originals: lossless compression via oxipng
- Videos: ffmpeg thumbnail extraction (1 frame at 1s, scaled to 800px)
- Updates upload record with preview_path/thumbnail_path on completion
Models:
- Upload with full CRUD (create, find, update caption, soft delete, set paths)
- Hashtag with upsert, link/unlink, extract_hashtags() text parser
- UploadDto for API serialization with like/comment counts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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