Colour theme is configurable at runtime from two seed colours (brand + accent);
neutrals stay fixed for contrast safety. Tailwind v4 var()-based tokens let a
:root:root override recolour everything with no rebuild; the 50->950 ramps are
derived via a color-mix ladder. Config lives in the DB config table (admin UI:
Config > Farbschema, presets + custom pickers + live preview), served on the public
/event endpoint with env defaults (THEME_PRESET/PRIMARY/ACCENT), propagated live via
event-updated SSE, and cached in localStorage for a no-flash boot. The keepsake export
mirrors the same ladder in Rust so offline archives match the event theme.
COMMENTS_ENABLED (env, default true) is a boot-time kill-switch: the backend rejects
new comments with 403 and the frontend hides the comment button (feed card) and
panel/composer (lightbox). Existing comments stay in the DB, hidden, and return when
re-enabled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The backend had never been run through rustfmt. Doing it in one mechanical pass (134 files)
so no future functional diff is buried under formatting churn, then gating `cargo fmt
--check` in checks.yml so it stays clean.
Formatting only — no logic, SQL, or behaviour changed. Verified after the reformat:
cargo test 56 passed, clippy --all-targets -D warnings clean, cargo fmt --check clean.
This is the deferred cleanup noted when CI's Format step was first left out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CR1: the lightbox comment button POSTed to /upload/{id}/comment (singular);
no such route exists, so every UI-submitted comment 404'd and was lost.
Fixed to /comments (plural). The prior e2e passed because its seed helper
POSTs the API directly — added comment-ui.spec.ts which drives the real
component so this can't regress silently again.
CR2: export archives (Gallery.zip / Memories.zip / HTML viewer) were written
under media_path, which is a public ServeDir — so GET /media/exports/
Gallery.zip served the entire event (every photo, caption, comment,
uploader name) to any anonymous visitor at a guessable URL, bypassing the
ticket + release gate. Moved exports to a separate EXPORT_PATH (=/exports)
on its own volume (Dockerfile chown, compose volume, gated handler reads
the new path). export-leak.spec.ts asserts /media/exports/Gallery.zip → 404.
Riders (git can't split hunks): LightboxModal also gains H3 live-eviction on
comment-deleted/upload-deleted; config.rs also wires compression_concurrency
from boot config (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-review follow-ups (non-blocking quality items):
Tests:
- moderation H1 specs now assert exact `→ 403` instead of bare .rejects.toThrow(),
so a spurious 500 can no longer masquerade as "revocation worked".
- config: added case-insensitivity (upper/mixed-case placeholder) and the
len==32/31 boundary cases for validate_secrets.
- rate_limiter: added the trailing-comma empty-entry case for client_ip (must
fall back, not return "").
(Backend unit tests: 35 pass.)
Docs:
- README: note that with APP_ENV=production a placeholder .env makes the app
refuse to boot and Caddy wait unhealthy — reason is in `docker compose logs app`.
- SECURITY-BACKLOG + sse.rs comment: document that a mid-session ban does not
tear down an already-open SSE stream (new tickets are blocked; low blast radius).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
C1: reset_user_pin wrote to a non-existent column (pin_failed_attempts);
the real column is failed_pin_attempts, so every PIN reset 500'd. Fixed
the column name; new e2e (pin-reset.spec.ts) proves a reset returns a
usable PIN and the target can recover with it.
C2: config.rs::validate_secrets now rejects placeholder-ish secrets
(change_me/dev_secret/placeholder), enforces len>=32 in prod, and
requires a real ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH. docker-compose.yml sets
APP_ENV=production so the guard actually runs. Corrected the false
"fixed" claim in SECURITY-BACKLOG.md. .env.example documents the rule.
Riders in these files (documented here since git can't split hunks):
- host.rs also carries the event-scoped ban_user fix and the
close_event/open_event no-op broadcast guard (medium).
- docker-compose.yml also adds ORIGIN (H6), app/frontend healthchecks with
Caddy waiting on health, and per-service memory limits (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the comprehensive code review. Five batches:
1. Cross-event authorization: host_delete_upload, unban_user, and
host_delete_comment now scope by auth.event_id. Adds
Upload::find_by_id_and_event / soft_delete_in_event and a
Comment::soft_delete_in_event variant that joins through upload.
2. Token exposure: SSE auth no longer puts the JWT in the URL.
New /api/v1/stream/ticket endpoint mints a short-lived single-use
ticket bound to the session; the EventSource passes ?ticket=...
instead. Refuse to start in APP_ENV=production with the dev JWT
sentinel; warn loudly otherwise.
3. Account hardening: per-IP+name rate limit on /recover (mitigates
targeted lockout DoS), per-IP rate limit on /admin/login, random
32-char admin recovery PIN (replaces "0000"), structured tracing
events for wrong PIN, lockout, failed admin login, ban/unban/role
change/pin-reset/host-delete.
4. DoS / correctness: comment listing paginated (LIMIT 50 + ?before=
cursor), hashtag extraction whitelisted to ASCII alnum+underscore
(≤40 chars) with unit tests, display_name / caption / comment body
length validated in chars rather than bytes.
5. Cleanup: session-touch failures now logged, DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS
env var (default 10).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend:
- AppConfig, AppError, AppState modules for shared infrastructure
- JWT creation/verification with HS256 (jsonwebtoken crate)
- Session management: SHA-256 token hashing, DB-backed sessions
- Auth middleware: AuthUser, RequireHost, RequireAdmin extractors
- POST /api/v1/join: name-only registration, 4-digit PIN + bcrypt hash
- POST /api/v1/recover: PIN-based recovery with 3-attempt lockout (15 min)
- POST /api/v1/admin/login: bcrypt password verification
- DELETE /api/v1/session: logout (session invalidation)
- Migration 006: user PIN lockout columns (failed_pin_attempts, pin_locked_until)
- Models: Event, User (with role enum), Session with all CRUD methods
Frontend:
- api.ts: typed fetch wrapper with automatic Bearer token injection
- auth.ts: JWT/PIN localStorage management with Svelte store
- /join: name entry form with PIN display modal and copy button
- /recover: name + PIN recovery form with saved PIN pre-fill
- /feed: placeholder gallery page with logout
- Root layout: auth initialization on mount
- Root page: redirect to /join or /feed based on auth state
All responses use German language strings as specified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
