5f702f2b401e1503649b609e37555dfb1fa455a0
7 Commits
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fabi
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5f702f2b40 |
fix(audit-5): export disk preflight, media reclaim, low-disk warning, restore docs
Fifth round, all storage. The keepsake could not fit on the documented hardware
and failed halfway through a multi-GB write, leaving the deliverable stuck; the
quota had stopped bounding the disk; and the backup had no restore procedure.
Squashed from 6 commits, original messages preserved below.
──────── fix(export): refuse an export that cannot fit, and stop peaking at two generations
Nothing in export.rs ever asked whether the keepsake would fit. Both archives write
their media `Compression::Stored`, so each is essentially a byte-for-byte second copy
of the originals -- Gallery.zip always, and Memories.zip for every video and every
image at or under 5 MB. On the documented CX33 (80 GB, all three volumes on one
filesystem) the upload quota's fixed point leaves ~40 GB free, and a release spawns
BOTH halves concurrently against it.
The failure is not "the export failed", it is "the deliverable is stuck":
1. ENOSPC lands partway through a multi-GB write.
2. The epoch has already moved, so the job row is `failed` at the CURRENT
generation and readiness (epoch = event.export_epoch AND status = 'done') is
false -- GET /export/zip 404s.
3. The last good archive sits on disk, unreferenced and unreachable.
4. POST /host/export/rebuild, the only escape, re-arms the same doomed write.
Three changes.
Reclaim before building. `prune_stale_export_files` ran only after the new archive
was written, renamed and finalised. That reads as durability but buys nothing: the
moment `invalidate_and_arm` bumps the epoch the old archive is ALREADY unreachable,
so keeping it reserves gigabytes for a download nobody can perform -- and for a
takedown it is content someone explicitly asked to have removed. Peak usage is now
one generation. Narrower than the post-finalize prune on purpose: final archives
only, never a `.tmp` or a `viewer_tmp_` dir, since a superseded worker can still be
streaming into those and at build START is far more likely to be alive.
Preflight the space. SUM(original_size_bytes) over exactly `query_uploads`'
visibility filter, +10% for ZIP overhead, multiplied by the number of armed jobs --
without that multiplier each of the two concurrent halves independently sees "it
fits" and together they don't. Runs AFTER claim_job, not before as reported: bailing
before the claim leaves the row `pending` with no worker and no error, the
spinner-forever state `mark_failed`'s status guard exists to prevent. Fails open when
the mount can't be read, exactly as the upload quota does.
Show the host the reason. /export/status returned {status, progress_pct} and nothing
else, so the host dashboard could only render "fehlgeschlagen" next to the retry
button. The message was written to the row and surfaced solely in the ADMIN job list
-- a different screen, possibly a different person. It now travels with the status,
and only on a failure, so a message left on a since-succeeded row can't appear beside
a green "ist bereit".
Tests: 10 unit (the u128 clamp caught a real bug in the first draft -- saturating_mul
then /100 turns an overflow into a number ~100x too small, the one direction that
authorises the write being guarded against; the carried-forward archive must survive
its own older epoch in the filename), 4 DB-backed (the estimate is asserted against
the row set the archive actually contains, not against a restatement of the WHERE
clause, so the two queries cannot drift), 3 e2e over the four-hop plumbing.
──────── fix(maintenance): reclaim the media of deliberately deleted uploads
The quota stopped bounding the disk. `soft_delete_in_event` stamps `deleted_at` and
refunds `total_upload_bytes`, but nothing ever removed the bytes, and the hourly
sweep reached only `compression_status = 'failed'`. Upload 500 MB, delete, quota back
to zero, upload another 500 MB. Not an attack -- a guest curating their camera roll,
which is what people do. The host then sees guests hitting "Du hast dein Upload-Limit
erreicht" while the admin widget shows a disk full of files no upload row points at,
and the quota message is actively misleading because the space really is gone, just
not to anyone the accounting can name.
Two retention windows, because the two deletes mean different things. A compression
failure keeps its 14 days: the guest didn't ask for it and may not be able to retake
the photo. A deliberate removal gets 24 hours -- 14 days outlives the whole event, so
a deliberate delete would never reclaim anything while it mattered, and a day still
covers a mis-tap.
Wider than reported: ALL FOUR paths are reclaimed, not just the original. Preview,
display and thumbnail are each a separate file, none counted in
`original_size_bytes`, and nothing ever removed them either. That was invisible while
the sweep only saw failed compressions (which produce no derivatives) and becomes
three leaked files per upload the moment it reaches a successful one. A row is
re-selected until every path is cleared, and the columns are cleared only once every
file for that upload is gone -- clearing after a partial success would strand the
survivors in exactly the unowned state this drains.
`backfill_stale_derivatives` selects on `display_path IS NULL AND preview_path IS NOT
NULL`, which is close enough to the post-sweep state to be worth pinning: it is
guarded on `deleted_at IS NULL`, so it cannot re-decode an original that is no longer
on disk. Covered.
Residual, deliberately: within the 24h window the bytes are still spent and still
unaccounted, so delete-and-re-upload through an eight-hour event can outrun the
sweep. Bounding that means holding the quota until the file is reclaimed rather than
refunding at `deleted_at`. The low-disk warning is the net under it.
Tests: 6 DB-backed, replacing 3. The one asserting an owner-deleted upload IS
reclaimed is the exact inverse of what this file used to assert.
──────── feat(host): warn about low disk before it becomes unrecoverable
Storage visibility existed in exactly one place: a passive Speicherauslastung widget
on the ADMIN dashboard. A host who isn't the admin had no view of it, and nothing
warned anyone. README carried "Low-disk alert (< 10 GB free)" under Planned since v1.
Two things make this a safety net rather than a nice-to-have. postgres_data,
media_data and exports_data are all Docker named volumes on ONE filesystem, so
running out doesn't degrade a subsystem -- Postgres stops being able to write and the
whole event goes down. And the keepsake needs room for two gallery-sized archives,
which the export preflight can only ever refuse AFTER the release, when the event is
over and every remedy is harder.
So the threshold is not a fixed number alone. It fires on the 10 GB floor the README
always named, OR on "you could not build the keepsake right now" -- the trigger a
host can still act on, computed with the same arithmetic the preflight uses. Unknown
free space is NOT low: it fails open like the upload quota and the preflight do,
because a banner that cries wolf on an unreadable mount is a banner nobody reads.
Carried on GET /host/event, which the dashboard already fetches on load and on every
reload -- no new endpoint, no new poll. Rendered above everything else including the
PIN-reset queue, and it names the consequence (the event, not just the download)
rather than only the number.
Also fixes the host page's formatBytes, which topped out at MB: 30 GB free would have
rendered as "30720.0 MB", and a guest with 2 GB of uploads was already being shown
that way in the user list.
Tests: 5 unit on the threshold (including that plenty of free space is still low when
the keepsake wouldn't fit -- the case a fixed threshold misses entirely), 3 e2e.
The e2e drives it through `original_size_bytes` rather than a genuinely full disk:
the estimate is pure SQL over that column, so overstating one row moves the
accounting without touching a byte on disk.
──────── docs: add a restore procedure, fix the backup cadence, and correct quota_tolerance
Four things, all found by the same question: what does an operator standing at the
venue actually need?
A RESTORE PROCEDURE. There was none anywhere, and a backup you have never restored
isn't a backup. Two hazards worth writing down: media must be extracted preserving
ownership (the app runs as uid 100 / gid 101, and a root-owned restore makes every
upload fail with EACCES surfacing as a generic 500), and the app must be STOPPED
first, because migrations run on boot and a live pool will fight the restore.
Both the backup and the restore commands were run against the real stack before being
written down, which caught two that would have failed:
- The plain `pg_dump` did not restore: `psql` aborted on `ERROR: schema
"_sqlx_test" already exists`. pg_dump emits no DROPs without --clean --if-exists,
so the documented dump could only ever be restored into an empty database. Fixed
at the source (the dump is now self-cleaning) and verified end to end: 16 tables
back, exit 0.
- `--same-owner` does not exist in BusyBox tar, which is what `alpine` ships, so
the extract aborted before unpacking anything. `--numeric-owner` plus the
explicit chown, verified to land 100:101.
BACKUP CADENCE. "Weekly offsite" is the wrong shape when every irreplaceable byte is
created in one eight-hour window and nobody can retake a wedding. The backup that
matters runs that night, and again after the release so the keepsake is captured.
Also: take the DB dump and the media tarball back to back, or you get rows pointing
at files the dump doesn't know about.
quota_tolerance WAS DOCUMENTED AS SOMETHING IT ISN'T. .env.example called it "fraction
of disk that triggers the low-storage warning". It is the multiplier in
`floor(free_disk * tolerance / active_uploaders)` -- so an operator who wants "warn me
later" and sets 0.95 is actually authorising guests to fill 95% of the disk, moving
the fixed point from 43% to ~49% and eating the export headroom. The admin UI labelled
it "Toleranz (0-1)" with no explanation at all, which invites exactly that reading;
it is now "Speicher-Anteil für Gäste" with the formula in the hint. Wrong docs on a
tuning knob are worse than no docs.
SIZING. New section with the arithmetic: three volumes on one filesystem, the quota
fixed point at tolerance/(1+tolerance), and the fact the 80 GB baseline does not cover
the keepsake -- both archives are built concurrently and each is roughly a second copy
of every original. Provision ~3x expected media, or give exports its own volume.
Also ticks the low-disk alert off the roadmap, since it now exists.
──────── chore: raise the db memory limit and rate-limit social writes
Two smaller operational items.
POSTGRES 512M -> 1G. DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS is 30 for a ~100-guest event (feed
polling + SSE + uploads at once), and 30 backends plus Postgres 16's default
shared_buffers leaves very little headroom at 512M. An OOM here doesn't degrade one
feature -- every request path touches the database, so it takes the event down.
Memory is the cheaper knob than shrinking the pool back and reintroducing the
queueing it was raised to fix. .env.example now names the pairing explicitly, the way
it already does for COMPRESSION_WORKER_CONCURRENCY.
SOCIAL WRITES WERE UNTHROTTLED. toggle_like, add_comment and delete_comment were the
only mutating endpoints in the app with no limit at all -- upload, join, recover,
export and admin login all carry one. Asymmetric coverage rather than a deliberate
decision.
Low severity, and honestly so: a like fans an SSE broadcast to every client, but the
export regeneration a comment deletion triggers is contained (REGEN_DEBOUNCE 20s,
workers born with their epoch, superseded ones inert). So the ceiling is 120/min --
far above anything a real guest produces. This bounds a script, not an enthusiastic
double-tapper.
ONE bucket across all three actions: separate buckets would let a caller triple the
aggregate write rate by alternating between them. Keyed per USER, matching the feed
and upload limits -- at a venue every guest is behind one NAT, and an IP key is what
made the /join and /feed limits turn guests away in the first place.
Migration 020 seeds both keys, and both are wired into the admin allowlist, the
config UI and the e2e reseed -- the step two earlier per-area toggles missed, which
left switches that existed in code and could never be flipped.
Tests: 4 e2e, including that the shared bucket really is shared (the part most likely
to be lost in a refactor) and that one guest hitting the ceiling doesn't block
another behind the same IP.
──────── fix(e2e): stop the video poster assertion racing the ffmpeg thumbnail
Pre-existing, and it fired for real during the full-suite run on a cold stack.
The lightbox binds `poster={upload.thumbnail_url ?? undefined}`, so the attribute is
absent until compression produces the thumbnail. This test asserted on it immediately
after seeding, never waiting for the worker -- unlike the Range test further down the
same file, which does poll. Against a warm stack the worker usually wins; against a
freshly rebuilt one (`stack:down -v`, cold ffmpeg) it doesn't.
That is the worst possible time for a false failure: the first run after a rebuild is
exactly when you are trying to establish whether a change broke something. Poll for
`compression_status = 'done'` before the poster assertion. The `src` assertion needs
no wait and keeps none.
Verified with --repeat-each=3.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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0c0eed885a |
fix(audit-1): media gating, per-user limits, moderation UI, upload integrity
First audit round: a blocker and eight high-severity findings across the media
access gate, the guest-facing rate limiters, host moderation, and the upload
pipeline — plus the backup commands and the e2e/production divergences that hid
several of them.
Squashed from 7 commits, original messages preserved below.
──────── fix(export): let the keepsake download through X-Frame-Options on iOS
The keepsake download navigates a hidden, same-origin iframe (deliberately:
a top-level navigation to a 404/429 would unload the PWA). Caddy stamped a
site-wide `X-Frame-Options: DENY` that also covered the proxied `/api/*`.
Blink hands a `Content-Disposition: attachment` response to the download
manager at the network layer, so Chromium never noticed. WebKit enforces XFO
on the frame navigation first and aborts the load — so on iOS Safari, the
app's primary platform, tapping Download did nothing at all, silently.
Carve the two export endpoints out to SAMEORIGIN, which still blocks
cross-origin framing. Implemented as two disjoint matchers rather than an
override: Caddy applies the FIRST `header` directive outermost, so it wins on
write and a later, more specific `header` is silently ignored (verified
against the running test stack).
Also close the test gap that let this ship:
- `06-export` ran on chromium-desktop only; add it to `webkit-iphone`, the
only engine that enforces XFO on the download frame.
- No test in the suite ever clicked a download button — every archive
assertion used Node `fetch`, which has no frame and no XFO enforcement.
Add a spec that clicks it and awaits a real `download` event. Verified
falsifiable: with the blanket DENY reinstated it fails and reports the
WebKit refusal as the cause.
- Fix `ExportPage`'s card-scoped locators, which matched nothing: the cards
carry `class="card p-5"` (a Tailwind `@apply` component class), never the
`rounded-xl` the page object looked for. This had left the "shows enabled
download buttons" test red on main.
──────── fix(media): close the percent-escape bypass of the media gate
`/media/%70reviews/{id}.jpg` served a taken-down photo to anyone,
unauthenticated. Verified against the running stack: the literal path 404s,
the escaped one returned 200 with the full image. Same for displays,
thumbnails and originals, and any escaped byte in any position works.
Cause: the block was four `nest_service("/media/previews", 404)` route
matches sitting above a `ServeDir` on `/media`. axum matches on the RAW path
(matchit does no percent-decoding), while `ServeDir` percent-decodes when it
resolves the file. So `%70reviews` missed every blocker, fell through to the
ServeDir, and was decoded back to `previews/` on disk — reaching the bytes
with no soft-delete and no ban-hide check. That defeats a host takedown,
which is the entire point of the gate.
Remove the `/media` route tree outright instead of racing the decoder.
Nothing needs it: every media URL the backend emits is already a gated
`/api/v1/upload/{id}/{original,preview,display,thumbnail}` alias
(handlers::feed), the frontend contains zero `/media/` references, and the
`/media` in config.rs/disk.rs is the filesystem path while `media/` in
export.rs is a path inside the zip. `/media/**` now 404s regardless of
encoding. The route's own comment already said it "serves nothing" — it
wasn't a backstop, it was the vector.
Caddy keeps proxying /media/* deliberately: the app 404s it, and forwarding
means the e2e gating specs exercise the app's refusal exactly as production
would rather than being masked by the SvelteKit 404 page.
Extend the gating spec with the encoded variants — asserting only the literal
spelling is what let this sit undetected.
──────── fix(rate-limit): key the guest-facing limiters per user, not per IP
At a venue every guest is behind one NAT, so an IP-keyed limiter hands the
whole party a single bucket. On a fresh deploy 12 guests arriving together
meant 5 joined and 7 were turned away, with no Retry-After telling them when
to retry. `/feed` (60/min) and `/export` (3 per DAY — the fourth guest to
fetch their keepsake locked out until tomorrow) had the same defect.
`feed_delta` was already keyed per-user and its comment states the exact
rationale ("so one client can't starve others behind a shared NAT"); this
makes its siblings match.
- feed:{ip} -> feed:{user_id} (auth was already in scope)
- export:{ip} -> export:{user_id} (resolved from the download ticket's
session, which was previously looked up and discarded)
- join:{ip}: pre-auth, so there is no user to key on. Split in two — a loose
per-IP ceiling that only bounds raw volume (new `join_ip_rate_per_min`,
default 60, migration 017), plus the real 5/60s anti-spam bucket keyed
per (ip, name), mirroring the existing `recover:{ip}:{name}`.
admin_login / recover / pin_reset_req stay IP-keyed on purpose and are now
commented as such: they guard credential guessing, where a per-user or
per-name key would just hand an attacker a fresh bucket per guess.
Retry-After: the machinery existed but 7 of 8 sites called `check()` and
hard-coded `None`, so a throttled client was told to back off but never for
how long. Delete the bool `check()` wrapper entirely so `check_with_retry`
is the only entry point and the delay cannot be discarded by accident. Also
surface it for the PIN lockout, where the deadline was already known.
Fix the "unknown" fallback while here: every client_ip() caller passed that
literal, so any request without X-Forwarded-For — anything reaching the app
directly rather than through Caddy — shared ONE global bucket. Serve with
connect-info and use the peer address.
Tests: the reseed forces every limiter toggle off before each test, which is
why this whole class was invisible. Add 01-auth/rate-limit-shared-nat, which
enables them and asserts 12 guests share an IP without collision, that one
guest hammering their own name IS still throttled (so the fix re-keys rather
than removes the limit), and that feed/export buckets are per-user. Retarget
the ddos join test at the new per-IP ceiling — it asserted the defect.
Also seed `admin_login_rate_enabled` (read by the handler, seeded by no
migration and no reseed) and register `join_ip_rate_per_min` in the admin
config allowlist. Unrelated pre-existing red test fixed: 01-auth/join
asserted a "Willkommen!" heading the wedding redesign removed.
──────── feat(moderation): let a host remove a guest's photo or comment from the UI
`DELETE /host/upload/{id}` and `DELETE /host/comment/{id}` were complete on the
backend — transactional, SSE-broadcasting, audit-logged — and had zero frontend
callers. The feed context sheet offered "Löschen" only when
`target.user_id === myUserId`, so the only lever a host actually had against an
unwanted photo was banning the uploader.
That is both disproportionate and ineffective. A ban doesn't retract what was
already posted, and it makes things strictly worse for comments: the ban check
runs BEFORE the ownership check on the guest delete route, so banning an abusive
author leaves their comment on screen and permanently undeletable by them. With
no host affordance, nobody could remove it at all.
- feed: hosts/admins get "Beitrag entfernen" on other people's posts, routed to
the host endpoint (the guest route 403s anything the caller doesn't own) with
moderation-specific confirm copy. Own-post "Löschen" is unchanged.
- lightbox: same for comments, via /host/comment/{id}.
- Ban semantics are deliberately untouched (USER_JOURNEYS §10 — banned users keep
read access and cannot write). The deadlock is broken by giving the host a way
in, not by loosening the ban.
Live role (this had to come first). `getRole()` decodes the JWT claim, but the
token is never reissued — the backend slides the session row forward and treats
the DB row as authoritative. The claim is therefore frozen for the token's
lifetime: up to 30 days. A guest promoted at the party saw no Host-Dashboard and
no moderation actions until they signed out and back in, even though
`/me/context` had been returning their real role on every page load and 4 of its
6 call sites dropped the field on the floor.
Add `role-store.ts`: seeded from the claim so there's no flash of the wrong nav,
then corrected by every `/me/context` response. Point the ad-hoc `getRole()`
callers at it (account, upload, host, admin, and the new feed gate). The host and
admin dashboards now derive `myRole` reactively, so a demotion disables their
controls immediately instead of at next login.
Tests: 04-host/moderation-ui drives the real UI — host removes a guest photo and
it's gone from /feed server-side; a plain guest is offered nothing on someone
else's post (the mirror that keeps the first test honest); a promoted guest gains
the dashboard on reload while their token still carries `role: guest`; and a host
removes the comment of an already-banned guest, asserting first that the author's
own delete 403s so the deadlock is real.
──────── fix(upload): stop destroying originals, apply EXIF orientation, surface rejections
Three defects in the same pipeline, each of which loses a photo or misrepresents
one.
1. A transient error destroyed the guest's only copy.
`process`'s error arm unconditionally `remove_file`d the original. Every failure
routed there: `create_dir_all`, both derivative `save_with_format` calls (disk
full is the canonical case, and it arrives exactly when many guests upload at
once), a panic inside the image codec, or a momentary DB-pool exhaustion. The
row is only SOFT-deleted, so the bytes were the sole unrecoverable part — and
they were the part we deleted. The author already knew this was wrong next door:
`backfill_missing_display` says it "must NEVER soft-delete an upload that already
has a working preview".
Retry up to 3 times with backoff (re-checking the e2e generation guard after each
sleep), and on final failure keep the refund + soft-delete but leave the original
on disk, logging its path. A failed upload is now recoverable instead of gone.
2. Every portrait photo was stored sideways.
Phones don't rotate sensor data — they record the camera orientation in EXIF and
store the pixels as shot. `decode()` returns those raw pixels and the JPEG
re-encode writes no EXIF, so the 800px preview, the 2048px diashow display and
the keepsake were all rotated 90°, while "Original anzeigen" rendered upright
because the original keeps its tag. That asymmetry is why it reads as a viewer
bug. There was no EXIF handling anywhere in the repo and no exif crate.
Read the tag via `into_decoder()` (which carries the decode Limits through, so
the decompression-bomb cap is untouched) and apply it. Missing/malformed tags
fall back to NoTransforms — most images have none.
Existing derivatives are already baked wrong, so migration 018 adds
`derivatives_rev` and `backfill_missing_display` becomes
`backfill_stale_derivatives`: it now also picks up anything below the current rev
and regenerates it once from the original, which still carries its EXIF. Videos
are marked current in the migration — ffmpeg already honours the rotation matrix.
Bump DERIVATIVES_REV for any future change that invalidates derivatives.
3. A rejected upload vanished without a word.
`UploadQueue.svelte` — 162 lines holding the ONLY renderer of an item's error
text, the only "Erneut" retry button and the only rate-limit countdown — was
never imported anywhere, so `retryItem`, `removeItem` and `clearCompleted` were
unreachable at runtime. On a terminal rejection the store purged the blob and
wrote a clear German reason into `entry.error` "so the UI shows a clear reason".
There was no such UI. And `uploadBadgeCount` counted only pending/uploading, so
the badge decremented exactly as if the upload had succeeded.
Mount the queue on /upload, toast the reason immediately (the flow sends the user
to /feed straight after staging, so the list alone would still miss them), and
count blocked/error in the badge so a failure can't read as success.
Tests: 02-upload/exif-orientation uploads a 40x20 fixture tagged Orientation=6
and asserts both derivatives come back PORTRAIT, with a sanity check that the
source really is stored landscape. 02-upload/rejection-visible bans the uploader
between staging and sending, then asserts the toast, the queue row with the
server's reason, and that the item is still counted.
Note: 02-upload/quota's 4 failures are pre-existing and unrelated — see the next
commit.
──────── docs(backup): make the backup commands work; fix the e2e/prod divergences
Backup. Both documented commands failed on the shipped stack, and the sentence
explaining them was wrong too:
- `pg_dump $DATABASE_URL` — `DATABASE_URL` is only ever in the compose
environment, never an operator's shell, and it points at `db:5432`, which is
compose-internal DNS. The app image has no postgres client either.
- `> /media/backups/…` — `/media` is a named volume mounted inside the app
container, not a host path, and nothing ever creates a `backups` subdirectory.
- `rsync /opt/eventsnap/media/` — that path does not exist anywhere.
- "a single path to back up" — false, and dangerously so: exports were moved to
their own `exports_data` volume precisely so a keepsake (which contains every
photo in the event) can't be served off the media tree. Backing up only
`media_data` silently loses every generated keepsake.
Rewritten as three commands — db via `docker compose exec -T db pg_dump`, and one
`docker run … tar` per volume — all verified against the running stack. The
volume mounts use `/src`, not `/media`: I hit the footgun while testing this.
Docker pre-populates an EMPTY volume from the image's own directory and chowns it
to match, so `-v media_data:/media alpine` tars alpine's cdrom/floppy/usb, writes
them into the volume, and leaves it root-owned so the non-root app can no longer
write. Mounting where the image has nothing avoids all of it. Documented inline
so the next person doesn't rediscover it.
Also correct the architecture notes: `/media/*` no longer routes to the backend
(that static tree was removed as a gating bypass), and `exports_data` was missing
from the volume list — the one volume an operator most needs to know about.
e2e stack: add the `EXPORT_PATH` + `/exports` volume it was missing. The file
says "mirrors production layout"; without these, exports landed on the container's
writable layer at the default path, so export-leak and export-video wrote real
archives into ephemeral storage and the "exports live outside media" invariant
was never actually exercised.
Pre-existing red test, unrelated to the audit: all four 02-upload/quota tests
have been failing since
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fabi
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bbdfae09a0 |
chore(e2e): add ESLint + Prettier; fix real findings; dedupe BASE
The Playwright suite had no linter and no formatter — only tsc. Add flat-config ESLint
(typescript-eslint, type-aware) and Prettier (2-space, matching the suite's style).
Rules keep the ones that catch real TEST bugs and drop the noise:
- no-floating-promises KEPT — an un-awaited request/assertion can let a test end before it runs,
passing vacuously. It caught one: the SSE reader loop in sse-listener is now explicitly `void`.
- no-unused-vars KEPT — caught three dead bindings (an unused adminToken fixture arg, an unused
`api` arg, an unused JPEG_MAGIC import), all removed.
- no-explicit-any OFF — all test code; `any` is the honest type for an untyped res.json() body or
a page.evaluate() return.
- no-empty-pattern OFF — Playwright's dependency-free fixtures are `async ({}, use) => {}`.
Refactor: `const BASE = process.env.E2E_FRONTEND_URL ?? '...'` was redeclared verbatim in 23
files — extracted to helpers/env.ts and imported, so a port/scheme change is one edit not a sweep.
Then `prettier --write`. Verified: eslint clean, tsc clean, prettier clean, desktop suite 210
passed / 1 skipped. (One mobile spec flaked once under retries:0 — a pre-existing cross-test
reflow-timing vector from the flakiness audit, not this change: the each-key edit is stable across
16 isolated runs and a clean full mobile re-run.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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c48d43f5b3 |
test(e2e): cover the untested security lifecycles (PIN reset, logout-all, ban gating, caption)
Closes the coverage gaps the audit flagged and I verified were real:
pin-reset-lifecycle.spec.ts (new): the whole "I forgot my PIN" journey (§4) had only its
403 gate tested. Now: the always-204 non-enumeration contract (unknown name looks
identical to known); dedup (ON CONFLICT); admins are EXCLUDED from the queue; the
3-per-15-min throttle; and a host reset REVOKES the target's sessions (the pre-reset JWT
401s afterward) and clears the request. Sessions are validated per-request against the
DB, so the revoke is observable.
logout-everywhere.spec.ts (new): DELETE /sessions ("sign out everywhere") had ZERO tests.
Proves it revokes ALL of the caller's sessions across two devices (both tokens 401 after),
not just the current one, and doesn't touch another user's sessions.
media-gating: the file claimed delete AND ban-hide both revoke preview access, but only
delete was exercised. Add the ban case — a banned uploader's gated preview 404s, same as
a takedown. (Thumbnail shares the identical find_by_id_visible gate; the seed fixture
produces no thumbnail derivative, so preview is the honest thing to assert.)
export caption test: an edit after release regenerates the viewer (epoch bumps) while the
ZIP is carried forward, not rebuilt — guards the fix in the previous commit.
Helpers: api.listPinResetRequests; db.countSessionsForUser / countPinResetRequestsForUser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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8e906d7866 |
refactor(export): single epoch authority; fix upload-path TOCTOU losing photos
A deep investigative review of the export concurrency (four parallel adversarial
reviewers) found that three rounds of race fixes had been chasing the wrong bug, and
that the model itself was the root cause. This replaces the model and fixes the real
data loss.
THE ACTUAL BUG (upload path, not the state machine)
`upload` checked `uploads_locked_at` BEFORE streaming the body — minutes, for a large
video — then committed the row without re-checking. A release landing mid-upload let the
row commit AFTER the export snapshot: the photo appeared in the live feed and was
PERMANENTLY missing from the keepsake, with nothing to regenerate it. release_gallery's
comment claims to prevent exactly this; it never did. Every prior round fixed the DB
state machine, and the leak was upstream of it.
Fix: re-assert the lock under `SELECT ... FOR SHARE` INSIDE the commit tx. That row lock
conflicts with release_gallery's `UPDATE event`, so either the upload commits first (and
the release — hence the snapshot — is ordered after it) or the release wins and the
upload is rejected as `uploads_locked` (reversible; the client keeps the blob).
Regression test verified NON-VACUOUS: with the fix reverted it fails, reporting accepted
uploads missing from the keepsake.
THE MODEL (migration 014)
"Which generation is current?" had no single answer: it was assembled from three
separately-written pieces across two tables (`export_released_at`, a per-job
`release_seq`, and cached `export_{zip,html}_ready` flags). Keeping them in agreement
took ~10 hand-written guards; each review round found one more path that slipped through.
Now: ONE monotonic `event.export_epoch`, bumped in the same UPDATE as any change to
`export_released_at`. Each job carries a copy. Downloadable IFF
`released AND job.epoch = event.export_epoch AND status = 'done'` — readiness DERIVED,
never stored. A retired-epoch worker is INERT BY CONSTRUCTION: losing a race can no
longer corrupt state, only waste work.
Deleted: both ready-flag columns, both ready-flip blocks, `if ready { continue }`, the
reopen seq-bump, open_event's transaction, and the cross-table claim guard.
That last one was also UNSOUND: under READ COMMITTED, a blocked UPDATE re-evaluates its
WHERE against the updated target row but answers subqueries on OTHER tables from the
original snapshot — so the previous `EXISTS (SELECT ... FROM event ...)` claim guard
could admit a claim against an already-reopened event while RETURNING the post-bump seq.
Every guard is now same-row (`epoch = $n`), which EPQ re-evaluates correctly.
OTHER REAL DEFECTS FIXED
- release_gallery committed the release and THEN awaited the enqueue inside the handler
future. Axum drops that future on client disconnect → event released, uploads locked,
ZERO export_job rows, host unable to retry ("bereits freigegeben"), restart-only
recovery. Now one tx; workers spawn (detached) after commit.
- No flush/fsync before the tmp→final rename. async_zip's close() never flushes the inner
file and tokio's File drop DISCARDS write errors — so a full disk silently produced a
truncated archive that was then marked done and published, after which the last good
generation was pruned. Now flush + sync_all, which also surfaces ENOSPC.
- Download read the ready flag and the file path in TWO queries; a reopen between them
served a keepsake that should 404. Now one read through the `export_current` view.
- `if !src.exists() { continue }` then `open()?` — a TOCTOU that turned a tolerated gap
into a hard failure of the ENTIRE keepsake (unretryable while released). Now open-first,
warn, and skip.
- Recovery was flag-driven and never checked the disk: a `done` row whose archive was gone
was a permanent dead end needing manual DB surgery. Now verifies the file and re-arms.
- Temp files/dirs leaked on every error path (the leak is what fills the disk that
corrupts the next archive). Now cleaned up.
- Export archives were not event-scoped (`viewer_tmp_` already was), so a second event
would collide on paths and one event's prune would delete another's live keepsake.
- Host deletes after release never regenerated the keepsake — a photo removed on request
lived on in the archive forever. Now bumps the epoch and rebuilds without it.
- claim_job swallowed DB errors as "someone else won", stranding a job pending at 0%.
- export_status reported retired-epoch rows (a progress bar that never moves).
- The startup sweep's single-instance assumption is now documented, not hidden.
Verified: backend 40 tests, svelte-check 0 errors, e2e typecheck clean,
e2e 160 passed / 1 skipped on chromium-desktop (incl. 2 new regressions; the
upload-acceptance one confirmed to fail without the fix).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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20125fb713 |
test(e2e): pin security assertions + real cross-user IDOR coverage
Turn "accept-both-outcomes" documentation tests — which pass whether the app is secure or vulnerable — into assertions that pin the secure behavior, and replace fake-UUID authz tests that 404'd before ever reaching the ownership guard with real cross-user resources. file-upload-attacks: - SVG-with-<script> → pin 400 (infer returns None for text → stored-XSS defense); was [201,400], which accepted the vulnerable outcome. - zero-byte → pin 400; path-traversal → pin 201 with UUID-derived storage and a no-path-echo check (both were [201,400]). - Fix the application/octet-stream rationale (no "application bypass" exists — the handler ignores the declared type and keys off magic bytes). authorization-deep (IDOR): - B deleting A's comment: seed a real upload+comment as A, assert 403, assert the comment survives, and assert the owner (A) still gets 204 — proving the 403 is about identity, not a broken route. (Was a DELETE on the all-zeros UUID → 404 before the user_id guard, so authorization was never exercised.) - Add B-deletes-A's-upload (403, countUploads unchanged) and B-edits-A's-caption (403, caption intact) — the find_by_id_and_event + ownership guards. export: pin the ZIP-download 404 (was [404,200] — a 200 is a data-exposure regression) and split into the two real branches: not-yet-ready, and ready-but-file-missing (new db.setExportZipReady helper). All 21 assertions verified green against the live secure backend. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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MechaCat02
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e42d8a92a1 |
feat(e2e): Playwright suite — 134 tests across 9 spec areas + UA matrix
Adds an end-to-end Playwright test suite under e2e/ that spins up an
isolated docker-compose stack (Postgres :55432, Caddy :3101, backend with
EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1, SvelteKit adapter-node frontend) and exercises the
SvelteKit app against the real Rust backend.
Phase 1 — happy paths covering every documented USER_JOURNEYS.md flow:
01-auth/ join, recover, admin login, leave event, PIN lockout
02-upload/ gallery picker (API path), rate-limit + admin toggle
03-feed/ like/comment SSE, filters, SSE reconnect on visibility
04-host/ event lock API, ban/unban, promote
05-admin/ config validation, foundational authz guards, stats
06-export/ /export status + download stub
__smoke/ cross-UA happy-path (runs on every UA project)
Phase 2 — adversarial + browser chaos:
07-adversarial/ XSS payloads (6 × display name path), SQLi shapes,
length / encoding / RTL override / NUL byte;
file-upload boundaries (ELF body claimed as JPEG,
oversize vs max_image_size_mb, zero-byte, NUL
filename, path-traversal, SVG-with-script);
JWT alg:none, signature/payload tamper, expired
session, PIN brute-force (serial + parallel),
admin password brute-force; deep authz (cross-user
delete, banned user across like/comment/feed-read,
host→admin escalation); small-scale DDoS (20× /join,
10MB comment body, 10 concurrent SSE).
08-browser-chaos/ localStorage / sessionStorage / cookie purge,
IndexedDB drop mid-session, offline → reconnect,
slow-3G, 503 flakes, 429 with no retry storm,
multi-tab same/different user, no-JS, hostile CSS,
clock skew ±1h / -2d, localStorage quota exhausted.
Phase 3 — mobile gestures (runs only on chromium-mobile / Pixel 7):
09-mobile/ touch-target ≥44px audit, env(safe-area-inset-bottom)
structural check, long-press (FeedListCard → ContextSheet,
quick-tap negation, click-suppression), double-tap
(feed card like + lightbox heart-burst, via synthetic
pointer events to bypass the first-tap-fires-click trap),
viewport reflow (portrait/landscape/narrow/phablet),
plus fixme stubs documenting planned gestures (swipe
lightbox L/R, swipe-down dismiss, pull-to-refresh,
long-press-comment).
Cross-UA matrix (chromium-engine projects run @smoke only):
chromium-pixel7, chromium-galaxy-s22, samsung-internet (Samsung UA
emulation on Galaxy viewport), edge-android, plus webkit-iphone,
chrome-ios, firefox-android, firefox-desktop — the latter four need
libavif16 on the host (Playwright dep) but the configs are in place.
Infrastructure:
- fixtures/test.ts central test.extend (api, db, adminToken, guest,
host, signIn). Per-test DB truncate via the dev-only POST
/admin/__truncate route, gated by EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1.
- helpers/sse-listener.ts, helpers/upload-client.ts (Node-side
multipart for adversarial file-upload tests + JPEG/PNG/ELF magic
constants), helpers/touch.ts (longPress / doubleTap / swipe /
inlineStyle / computedStyle).
- 10 page objects covering every route + UploadSheet/Lightbox.
- global-setup waits for /health, logs in admin, disables every
rate-limit and quota toggle.
- .github/workflows/e2e.yml: PR check runs chromium-desktop + the
smoke matrix in parallel, uploads playwright-report/ and traces on
failure.
Findings the suite surfaces as live `[finding]` warnings (not silenced):
1. /admin/login has no rate-limit or lockout (bcrypt cost only).
2. PIN-attempt counter races under parallel /recover requests.
3. Zero-byte uploads pass /api/v1/upload.
4. SVG-with-script can pass the magic-byte check (consider CSP +
X-Content-Type-Options on /media/*).
Stack-internal docs live in e2e/README.md (UA tier table, Samsung
Internet escalation tiers A/B/C, debugging tips, roadmap).
Final tally: 134 passed / 0 failed / 9 skipped (test.fixme stubs for
not-yet-shipped gestures and one UI-upload-flow investigation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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