Performance:
- Cache the runtime `config` table in-memory (ConfigCache) with synchronous
invalidation on every write (admin PATCH + test reseed). Was re-reading each
key from Postgres on every request (~8 round-trips per upload).
- Stream uploads chunk-by-chunk to a temp file instead of buffering the whole
body in RAM (peak was up to the per-class cap, e.g. 500 MB/video); only 512
sniff-bytes are kept for magic-byte detection, then atomic rename into place.
- Cache the media-filesystem disk snapshot (DiskCache, 15s TTL) shared by the
quota check and admin stats; drop the discarded System::refresh_all().
- HTML export streams video (and small-image) originals straight into the ZIP
via a manifest instead of copying them to a temp dir first (removed the
transient 2x disk usage) and drops the double directory scan.
- Auth extractor resolves session -> live user in one JOIN (was two queries),
touching last_seen_at by token hash.
Stability:
- SSE: on broadcast lag, emit a `resync` event so the client runs a delta
fetch instead of silently losing events; frontend reconciles adds, deletions,
and (via an in-place refresh) like/comment counts on visible cards.
- Storage quota fails OPEN when the disk can't be read (was a 0-byte limit that
locked out all uploads).
- Graceful shutdown drains in-flight requests on SIGTERM/SIGINT, bounded by a
10s backstop so open SSE streams can't stall a deploy.
- Upload removes the persisted file if the DB transaction fails (no orphaned
bytes with no row to reclaim them).
Tests:
- New pure select_disk() with 5 unit tests (longest-prefix, fallbacks, fail-open).
- New e2e export-video spec covering the HTML export's video-streaming branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A comprehensive role-based E2E audit (guest/host/admin, across browser
sessions) surfaced one critical and several smaller issues; this addresses
them and hardens the tests that missed them.
Critical
- The client upload pipeline was fully broken: the IndexedDB v1->v2 upgrade
opened a *new* transaction inside the upgrade callback, which throws during
a version-change transaction and aborted the whole upgrade, leaving the
queue object store uncreated -- so no UI upload ever fired. Reuse the
version-change transaction the callback provides, and bump the DB to v3 with
a contains() guard so installs already corrupted by the shipped bug
self-heal on next load. Re-enabled the previously-fixme'd UI upload E2E test.
High / Medium
- Event lock is uploads-only again: likes, comments and browsing stay open
while the event is locked (USER_JOURNEYS 9.3 / FEATURES) -- it was wrongly
freezing social interaction. Updated the event-lock spec accordingly.
- get_original now excludes soft-deleted and ban-hidden uploads, and direct
/media/originals/** serving is blocked, so a hidden user's originals can no
longer be pulled by UUID (all originals go through the checked alias).
- The upload handler reads the file field with an early-abort size cap chosen
from the declared content-type, instead of buffering the entire body before
the size check.
Low
- unban_user mirrors the ban role guard (a host can no longer unban a
host/admin banned by an admin).
- reset_user_pin's UPDATE is event-scoped.
- Admin login returns and stores a real identity (user_id + display name)
instead of a blank session.
- The host user list no longer renders target-actions (ban/promote/demote/PIN)
on the caller's own row, where the backend always rejected them.
- /diashow gains a client-side auth guard like the other protected routes.
- The join page shows the event name via a new public GET /api/v1/event.
Verified: backend cargo build clean, frontend svelte-check 0 errors, full
Playwright E2E suite 144 passed / 1 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings the batch-2 security hardening into main (forked from the same base as
the UX batch; auto-merged cleanly — verified both sides' edits to social.rs /
main.rs coexist):
- Cross-event authorization: toggle_like / list_comments / add_comment now
event-scope the upload via Upload::find_by_id_and_event (404 on cross-event
access); delete_comment uses Comment::soft_delete_in_event. Closes the gap
where a guest could like/comment/list across events by upload UUID.
- Upload OOM backstop: the /upload route gets DefaultBodyLimit::max(576 MiB)
instead of disable(), so a multi-GB body can't be buffered before the
handler's per-class size checks run.
- upload.rs per-class size-limit refactor, XSS allowlist, deploy hardening
(Caddyfile, Dockerfiles, docker-compose, .env.example), and a data-mode
doc-comment clarifying the original-media route is capability-(UUID-)gated.
The event-scope checks sit before, and batch-3's best-effort count broadcasts
after, the like/comment mutations — both preserved.
Verified: cargo build clean, svelte-check 0 errors.
Address the seven findings from the security & deployment review.
High:
- upload: make infer authoritative — reject files it can't identify
(SVG/HTML/JS) and require the detected MIME to be on an ALLOWED_MEDIA
allowlist; derive the stored MIME and on-disk extension from the
detected type, ignoring client filename/Content-Type. Closes the
stored-XSS vector via media served on-origin.
- deploy: rename docker-compose.override.yml -> docker-compose.dev.yml
so the default `docker compose up -d` no longer publishes Postgres
5432 to the host; the port map is now opt-in via -f. README updated.
Medium:
- upload: DefaultBodyLimit::disable() -> max(576 MiB) as an HTTP-level
OOM backstop; handler still enforces precise per-class size limits.
- docker: run backend and frontend as non-root users.
Low:
- social/upload: event-scope toggle_like, list_comments, add_comment,
delete_comment, edit_upload, delete_upload via find_by_id_and_event /
soft_delete_in_event — cross-event IDs now resolve to 404.
- Caddy: site-wide HSTS / nosniff / X-Frame-Options / Referrer-Policy,
plus Content-Disposition: attachment on /media/originals/*.
- .env.example: replace default Postgres password with a CHANGE_ME hint.
Out of scope: localStorage JWT (root cause fixed; httpOnly cookies are a
larger change tracked separately).
Verified: cargo build (no new warnings), cargo test (3 passed),
caddy validate, docker compose config (no 5432 published by default).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the comprehensive code review. Five batches:
1. Cross-event authorization: host_delete_upload, unban_user, and
host_delete_comment now scope by auth.event_id. Adds
Upload::find_by_id_and_event / soft_delete_in_event and a
Comment::soft_delete_in_event variant that joins through upload.
2. Token exposure: SSE auth no longer puts the JWT in the URL.
New /api/v1/stream/ticket endpoint mints a short-lived single-use
ticket bound to the session; the EventSource passes ?ticket=...
instead. Refuse to start in APP_ENV=production with the dev JWT
sentinel; warn loudly otherwise.
3. Account hardening: per-IP+name rate limit on /recover (mitigates
targeted lockout DoS), per-IP rate limit on /admin/login, random
32-char admin recovery PIN (replaces "0000"), structured tracing
events for wrong PIN, lockout, failed admin login, ban/unban/role
change/pin-reset/host-delete.
4. DoS / correctness: comment listing paginated (LIMIT 50 + ?before=
cursor), hashtag extraction whitelisted to ASCII alnum+underscore
(≤40 chars) with unit tests, display_name / caption / comment body
length validated in chars rather than bytes.
5. Cleanup: session-touch failures now logged, DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS
env var (default 10).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two bugs surfaced while running the new E2E suite, plus a small test hook:
- jwt.rs: add a per-token `jti: Uuid` claim. Without it, two `create_token`
calls in the same wall-clock second for the same (sub, role, event_id)
produced identical JWT bytes — and identical sha256(token) hashes —
which then collided on `session.token_hash UNIQUE` with a 500. Manifests
in real use when an admin clicks "Anmelden" twice fast.
- auth/handlers.rs: reject display names containing 0x00. Postgres rejects
NUL in TEXT columns with `invalid byte sequence for encoding "UTF8"` and
the request leaks back as a 500. Now returns 400 with a clean message.
- handlers/test_admin.rs + main.rs: new POST /api/v1/admin/__truncate route,
compiled in always but only **registered** when EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1 is
set on startup. Truncates every event-scoped table, reseeds config from
migration defaults, wipes media on disk, and clears the in-memory rate
limiter. RequireAdmin-gated so it's not anonymous even in test mode. In
production builds (no env var) the route returns 404 — verified by the
startup log message.
- services/rate_limiter.rs: add `clear()` so the truncate handler can wipe
the in-memory window map between tests.
- Dockerfile: bump rust:1.87 → rust:1.88 (current dep tree needs it) and
COPY ./migrations into the build context so the `sqlx::migrate!()` macro
can resolve at compile time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- handlers/me.rs (new): GET /api/v1/me/context (profile + role + privacy_note
+ quota toggle state, fetched once on app bootstrap) and GET /api/v1/me/quota
(live used / limit / active uploaders / free disk).
- handlers/upload.rs:
- quota enforcement via the dynamic formula
floor((free_disk * tolerance) / max(active_uploaders, 1)),
gated by quota_enabled + storage_quota_enabled toggles
- new GET /api/v1/upload/{id}/original — unauthed by design
(matches /media/previews/* — URL is the secret) so it works as
<img src> / <video src> / window.open
- rate-limit toggle wiring (rate_limits_enabled + upload_rate_enabled)
- handlers/host.rs:
- POST /api/v1/host/users/{id}/pin-reset — Host may reset guest PINs,
Admin may reset guest + host PINs (never another admin or self).
Returns the freshly-generated plaintext PIN once; emits a global
pin-reset SSE so the affected user's device can clear its localStorage.
- set_role guard expanded so hosts can demote other hosts (not self,
never admins) — backend match for the doc'd permission model.
- handlers/admin.rs: ALLOWED_KEYS split into NUMERIC_KEYS / BOOL_KEYS /
TEXT_KEYS with per-kind validation; saving privacy_note broadcasts an
event-updated SSE so other clients refresh live.
- handlers/feed.rs, handlers/admin.rs (export), auth/handlers.rs:
rate-limit toggle wiring at every limiter call site.
- auth/handlers.rs: when an expired PIN lockout is detected on /recover,
reset failed_pin_attempts to zero before the bcrypt check — without
this every wrong PIN re-locked the user after the cooldown.
- main.rs: wire startup_recovery + spawn_periodic_tasks, register the
new /me/context, /me/quota, /upload/{id}/original, and
/host/users/{id}/pin-reset routes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Disable Axum's 2 MB default body limit on the upload route so large
photos/videos are accepted without HTTP 400
- Serialize UserRole as lowercase in JWT so the frontend role checks
('guest'/'host'/'admin') match correctly
- Drain multipart body before returning early upload errors (rate-limit,
ban, event-lock) to keep the HTTP keep-alive connection clean and
prevent cascading Netzwerkfehler / empty-500 responses
- Add TraceLayer for request logging and Vite dev proxy config
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add async ZIP and HTML offline viewer export workers, download endpoints,
and a guest-facing /export page.
Backend — export workers (tokio::spawn, run after gallery release):
- ZIP worker: streams all non-deleted originals into Gallery.zip via
async_zip (Stored compression), organised into Photos/ and Videos/
with {date}_{uploader}_{id}.{ext} filenames; updates progress_pct in DB
- HTML worker: renders Memories.html via minijinja template (self-contained:
inlined CSS + JS, relative media paths); packs it with README.txt and
all media into Memories.zip (Deflate for text, Stored for media)
- Both workers mark export_job status (running → done/failed), update
export_zip_ready / export_html_ready on the event, and broadcast SSE
export-progress + export-available when both complete
Backend — new endpoints (AuthUser):
- GET /export/zip → streams Gallery.zip if export_zip_ready
- GET /export/html → streams Memories.zip if export_html_ready
- GET /export/status → released flag + per-type status/progress (moved from admin)
Memories.html features: warm keepsake aesthetic, responsive grid, fullscreen
lightbox with captions/comments/likes, client-side hashtag filter chips,
XSS-safe JS, fully offline (no external deps)
Frontend — /export page:
- Locked state: padlock illustration + message
- Released state: ZIP and HTML cards with progress bars (SSE-driven),
download buttons enabled only when ready
- HTML guide modal (unzip instructions + Wi-Fi tip) before download begins
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add Admin Dashboard at /admin for server configuration, disk usage
monitoring, and export job status, plus a public export/status endpoint.
Backend — new /api/v1/admin/* endpoints (RequireAdmin auth):
- GET /admin/stats → user/upload/comment counts + disk usage
- GET /admin/config → all config key/value pairs
- PATCH /admin/config → update any subset of config keys; validates
key whitelist and numeric values
- GET /admin/export/jobs → export_job rows for the event
Backend — public (AuthUser) endpoint:
- GET /export/status → released flag + zip/html job status/progress
Frontend — /admin page:
- Stats grid: guest count, upload count, comment count
- Disk usage bar with GB/MB formatting; red ≥ 90%, amber ≥ 75%
- Config form: labelled numeric inputs for all eight config keys,
sends only changed values on save
- Export jobs list: type label, status badge, progress bar for running jobs,
error message if failed; manual refresh button
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add Host Dashboard for event and guest management, accessible at /host.
Backend — new /api/v1/host/* endpoints (RequireHost auth):
- GET /host/event → event name + lock/release state
- POST /host/event/close|open → lock or unlock uploads; SSE broadcast
- POST /host/gallery/release → set release timestamp, enqueue export jobs
- GET /host/users → all guests with upload count & bytes
- POST /host/users/{id}/ban → ban with optional upload-hide choice
- POST /host/users/{id}/unban → lift ban
- PATCH /host/users/{id}/role → promote guest→host or demote host→guest
- DELETE /host/upload/{id} → host-level soft-delete + SSE
- DELETE /host/comment/{id} → host-level soft-delete
Frontend — /host page:
- Event controls: lock/unlock toggle and release-gallery button with status badges
- Guest table: display name, role badge, upload count, storage used
- Ban flow: modal asking whether to keep or hide the user's uploads
- Promote/demote buttons respecting caller role (host can promote guests; admin can demote hosts)
- auth.ts: getRole() decodes JWT payload client-side to gate the route
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Cursor-based feed endpoint using v_feed view with hashtag filtering
- Like toggle (INSERT ON CONFLICT), comments CRUD
- Feed delta endpoint for SSE-driven incremental updates
- SSE client with Page Visibility API (pause/reconnect)
- Responsive photo/video grid with infinite scroll
- Hashtag filter chips, lightbox modal with comments
- Media file serving via tower-http ServeDir
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend:
- POST /api/v1/upload: multipart file upload with caption + hashtags
- Validates file size against DB config limits (image/video separate)
- Checks user ban status and event upload lock
- Saves original to disk under {media_path}/originals/{slug}/
- Tracks user total_upload_bytes for quota enforcement
- Extracts hashtags from caption text and explicit CSV field
- Upserts hashtags and links them to uploads
- PATCH /api/v1/upload/{id}: edit caption and hashtags (owner only)
- DELETE /api/v1/upload/{id}: soft-delete (owner only)
- GET /api/v1/stream: SSE endpoint with 30s keepalive
- Broadcasts new-upload events to all connected clients
- Uses tokio broadcast channel for fan-out
Services:
- CompressionWorker: Tokio semaphore-bounded (concurrency=2) background processor
- Images: resize to 800px wide JPEG preview via image crate
- PNG originals: lossless compression via oxipng
- Videos: ffmpeg thumbnail extraction (1 frame at 1s, scaled to 800px)
- Updates upload record with preview_path/thumbnail_path on completion
Models:
- Upload with full CRUD (create, find, update caption, soft delete, set paths)
- Hashtag with upsert, link/unlink, extract_hashtags() text parser
- UploadDto for API serialization with like/comment counts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend:
- AppConfig, AppError, AppState modules for shared infrastructure
- JWT creation/verification with HS256 (jsonwebtoken crate)
- Session management: SHA-256 token hashing, DB-backed sessions
- Auth middleware: AuthUser, RequireHost, RequireAdmin extractors
- POST /api/v1/join: name-only registration, 4-digit PIN + bcrypt hash
- POST /api/v1/recover: PIN-based recovery with 3-attempt lockout (15 min)
- POST /api/v1/admin/login: bcrypt password verification
- DELETE /api/v1/session: logout (session invalidation)
- Migration 006: user PIN lockout columns (failed_pin_attempts, pin_locked_until)
- Models: Event, User (with role enum), Session with all CRUD methods
Frontend:
- api.ts: typed fetch wrapper with automatic Bearer token injection
- auth.ts: JWT/PIN localStorage management with Svelte store
- /join: name entry form with PIN display modal and copy button
- /recover: name + PIN recovery form with saved PIN pre-fill
- /feed: placeholder gallery page with logout
- Root layout: auth initialization on mount
- Root page: redirect to /join or /feed based on auth state
All responses use German language strings as specified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
