Six independent operational defects, none of which needed a new feature to fix.
Log rotation. Docker's json-file driver is unbounded by default, and those files
land on the HOST filesystem — outside every deploy.resources.limits in the compose
file, and on the same disk as postgres_data and media_data. A full disk stops
Postgres writing WAL, which takes the event down. Capped at 10m x 3 per service.
Log level. RUST_LOG was set in neither .env.example nor docker-compose.yml, so the
code fallback WAS the production level — and it was `debug`, with tower_http=debug
emitting a line per request and per response into that unrotated file. Now info,
with tower_http=warn to state that those spans are diagnostics, not an access log.
ffmpeg pipe deadlock. run_ffmpeg piped stdout and stderr and then called wait(),
which drains neither. Once the ~64 KiB pipe buffer filled, ffmpeg blocked writing
and wait() never returned — burning the full 120s timeout, twice per seek position,
three times per compression attempt. And the timeout is an Err, so the end state was
a soft-deleted upload: a guest's playable video destroyed by a poster-frame failure.
Now stdout is null (nothing ever read it) and stderr is drained by wait_with_output,
whose tail is logged on a non-zero exit. Note wait_with_output consumes the child, so
the old kill-on-timeout is gone; kill_on_drop(true) already covers it.
Readiness probe. /health never touched the pool, so the disk-full endgame above
stayed green all the way down. Adds /health/ready (SELECT 1 under 2s) as a SECOND
route — the compose healthcheck deliberately keeps pointing at /health, because
caddy gates its startup on it and a DB-dependent probe would turn a Postgres blip
into the reverse proxy refusing to start.
api.ts request timeout. The abort timer was cleared in a finally around fetch(),
which resolves on the response HEAD — leaving res.text() uncovered and no longer
abortable. An upstream that sends headers then stalls the body hung the call
forever. The timer now lives until the body is read, including the 204 path (which
otherwise leaked a live 20s timer per no-content request).
Upload XHR watchdog. The XHR had no timeout while processQueue held the
isProcessing latch across it; on a half-open socket neither error nor abort ever
fires, so the latch pinned and the queue wedged. Bounds SILENCE rather than total
duration — a 500 MB video over a venue uplink legitimately runs 30+ minutes while
making steady progress. Rejects as NetworkError, which is already the retryable
branch, so a stalled upload now recovers like any network blip.
IndexedDB failures. addToQueue called getDb() unguarded and handleSubmit had no
catch, so a private-mode refusal or a QuotaExceededError on a large blob left a
permanent "Wird hochgeladen…" spinner, no toast, and — for an in-app camera
capture — the only copy of the photo gone. Now reported as 'failed', which keeps
the staged files on screen and stays on the page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
`.gitignore` carried an unanchored `media/`, commented "Media uploads (mounted volume in
production)". Production media lives in the `media_data` Docker volume and never
appears in the working tree, so that rule guarded nothing real — but unanchored it
matches a directory of that name at ANY depth, and the only one in the repo is
`e2e/fixtures/media/`.
Its entire practical effect was to keep every E2E fixture untracked. A fresh clone got
the specs and none of the images or videos they read, and
`.github/workflows/e2e.yml` does a plain `actions/checkout` and generates nothing — so
the committed CI job could not have run the upload, video, EXIF, quota, oversized-image
or export suites at all. It only ever looked green locally, where the fixtures survive
as untracked leftovers from whoever first created them.
The `origin` remote is git.mc02.dev rather than GitHub, so those workflows have most
likely never executed against this repo, which is consistent with nobody noticing. That
also makes this a live blocker for the standing "rotate the token and push" item: the
first time CI runs, it fails on ENOENT in a way that looks like a broken suite rather
than a missing file.
Anchors the pattern to `/media/` and commits the six fixtures (672 KB total). Verified
`e2e/fixtures/media` is the ONLY directory the old pattern matched, so nothing else
changes visibility.
Found while adding `sample-5s.mp4` for the video-poster work: the new fixture would
have been invisible to every other machine, which is how the existing ones got here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
