Security audit follow-up. No Critical/High existed; these close the
Medium/Low findings.
F1 [Med] Host privilege boundary: a host could demote a peer host to
guest and then ban / PIN-reset (→ account takeover via /recover) them,
because the ban/pin-reset peer guards key off the target's *current*
role. set_role now blocks a non-admin from demoting a host.
F2 [Med] Moderation now revokes preview/thumbnail access: they are served
through visibility-checked aliases (/api/v1/upload/{id}/{preview,
thumbnail}) that filter soft-deleted / ban-hidden uploads, and direct
/media/previews|thumbnails is 404-blocked. Feed emits the gated URLs;
Caddy keeps them privately cacheable (max-age=300, short so moderation
revokes promptly — the live feed already evicts cards via SSE). Uses a
lean find_visible_media() (paths+mime only) on the media hot path.
F3 [Med/Low] npm audit fix: svelte 5.55.1→5.56.4 (SSR-XSS advisories),
devalue 5.6.4→5.8.1 (DoS). Prod deps: 0 vulnerabilities.
F4 [Low] /recover no longer leaks account existence: unknown display name
returns the same 401 as a wrong PIN, and runs a dummy bcrypt verify so
timing matches — closing the enumeration + timing oracle.
F5 [Low] SSE streams re-validate the session every ~60s and close once it
is logged out / expired, instead of running until client disconnect.
F6 [Info] X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff set at the app layer on all
media responses (defense-in-depth alongside the edge).
Tests: new e2e specs for F1 (host cannot demote peer host), F2 (preview
gated + 404 after delete + direct /media blocked), F4 (uniform 401).
40 backend unit tests + 182 e2e passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Performance:
- Cache the runtime `config` table in-memory (ConfigCache) with synchronous
invalidation on every write (admin PATCH + test reseed). Was re-reading each
key from Postgres on every request (~8 round-trips per upload).
- Stream uploads chunk-by-chunk to a temp file instead of buffering the whole
body in RAM (peak was up to the per-class cap, e.g. 500 MB/video); only 512
sniff-bytes are kept for magic-byte detection, then atomic rename into place.
- Cache the media-filesystem disk snapshot (DiskCache, 15s TTL) shared by the
quota check and admin stats; drop the discarded System::refresh_all().
- HTML export streams video (and small-image) originals straight into the ZIP
via a manifest instead of copying them to a temp dir first (removed the
transient 2x disk usage) and drops the double directory scan.
- Auth extractor resolves session -> live user in one JOIN (was two queries),
touching last_seen_at by token hash.
Stability:
- SSE: on broadcast lag, emit a `resync` event so the client runs a delta
fetch instead of silently losing events; frontend reconciles adds, deletions,
and (via an in-place refresh) like/comment counts on visible cards.
- Storage quota fails OPEN when the disk can't be read (was a 0-byte limit that
locked out all uploads).
- Graceful shutdown drains in-flight requests on SIGTERM/SIGINT, bounded by a
10s backstop so open SSE streams can't stall a deploy.
- Upload removes the persisted file if the DB transaction fails (no orphaned
bytes with no row to reclaim them).
Tests:
- New pure select_disk() with 5 unit tests (longest-prefix, fallbacks, fail-open).
- New e2e export-video spec covering the HTML export's video-streaming branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A comprehensive role-based E2E audit (guest/host/admin, across browser
sessions) surfaced one critical and several smaller issues; this addresses
them and hardens the tests that missed them.
Critical
- The client upload pipeline was fully broken: the IndexedDB v1->v2 upgrade
opened a *new* transaction inside the upgrade callback, which throws during
a version-change transaction and aborted the whole upgrade, leaving the
queue object store uncreated -- so no UI upload ever fired. Reuse the
version-change transaction the callback provides, and bump the DB to v3 with
a contains() guard so installs already corrupted by the shipped bug
self-heal on next load. Re-enabled the previously-fixme'd UI upload E2E test.
High / Medium
- Event lock is uploads-only again: likes, comments and browsing stay open
while the event is locked (USER_JOURNEYS 9.3 / FEATURES) -- it was wrongly
freezing social interaction. Updated the event-lock spec accordingly.
- get_original now excludes soft-deleted and ban-hidden uploads, and direct
/media/originals/** serving is blocked, so a hidden user's originals can no
longer be pulled by UUID (all originals go through the checked alias).
- The upload handler reads the file field with an early-abort size cap chosen
from the declared content-type, instead of buffering the entire body before
the size check.
Low
- unban_user mirrors the ban role guard (a host can no longer unban a
host/admin banned by an admin).
- reset_user_pin's UPDATE is event-scoped.
- Admin login returns and stores a real identity (user_id + display name)
instead of a blank session.
- The host user list no longer renders target-actions (ban/promote/demote/PIN)
on the caller's own row, where the backend always rejected them.
- /diashow gains a client-side auth guard like the other protected routes.
- The join page shows the event name via a new public GET /api/v1/event.
Verified: backend cargo build clean, frontend svelte-check 0 errors, full
Playwright E2E suite 144 passed / 1 skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The prior test asserted 404 on /media/exports/Gallery.zip against an empty
stack — it would pass even if exports were still written under /media, because
no archive was ever produced. Now it:
1. seeds an upload, releases the gallery, and polls until the real zip job
writes Gallery.zip to disk;
2. asserts the archive is NOT served from public /media (the CR2 leak); and
3. asserts it IS retrievable via the gated ticket endpoint (200 + PK zip
magic) — proving the 404 means "not public", not "no file".
Also fixes a test-isolation gap the CR2 relocation introduced: __truncate wiped
media_path but not export_path, so a real export would leave Gallery.zip on disk
and break export.spec's "ready-but-file-missing → 404" test. truncate_all now
purges export_path too. Full 06-export dir: 5/5 green, no contamination.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The round-2 re-review (full suite green) found two real defects the passing
tests missed, both now fixed and covered:
B1 — banned users could still edit/delete their OWN content: edit_upload,
delete_upload, delete_comment skipped the is_banned guard that upload/
like/comment got (round-2 removed the global extractor block and missed
these three). Added the guard (using auth.is_banned — no extra query).
The moderation ban test now asserts 403 on DELETE upload, PATCH upload,
and DELETE comment for a banned owner (+ upload survives) — it previously
only exercised POST /upload, which is why the gap shipped green.
B2 — H3 live-eviction was dead code: 'user-hidden' and 'comment-deleted' were
missing from KNOWN_EVENTS, so EventSource never listened and the handlers
never fired. Added both. New browser-driven sse-eviction test asserts a
hidden user's card actually evicts from an open feed with no reload — the
backend-only SseListener checks couldn't catch this.
Minor items folded in:
- admin dashboard bounces a mid-session-demoted admin to /feed via live
/me/context (mirrors the host page) instead of a dead error screen.
- feed "new posts" pill cleared on any full refresh (pull-to-refresh no longer
strands it).
- corrected the stale sse.rs comment (banned users may hold a read-only stream).
Verified: backend 35 unit tests; svelte-check 0 errors; e2e 04-host + comment-ui
+ export-leak 13/13 on chromium (incl. the two new regression tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- compression_concurrency wired to boot config (state.rs) and removed as a
dead admin control.
- patch_config gains per-key integer/range validation so numerically-valid-but-
nonsensical values (-1/NaN/3.5) are rejected instead of silently reverting to
default at read time.
- clearAuth now also clears the display name (shared-device residual).
- e2e/Caddyfile.test mirrors prod security headers + the SSE encode-exclusion so
the test stack is representative and can catch header regressions.
- .gitignore: ignore root-level Playwright artifacts (test-results/, report).
- docs: USER_JOURNEYS §10 and SECURITY-BACKLOG updated to match the implemented
read-only-ban behavior and the export-path fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
H1: corrected a round-1 over-reach. Bans are read-only per USER_JOURNEYS §10:
the base AuthUser extractor no longer rejects banned users (they keep read
access); Require{Host,Admin} and write handlers enforce the ban via
auth.is_banned → 403 (incl. self-unban). Demoted hosts still lose powers
immediately (live DB role) and are bounced off the dashboard. Also fixed the
login/recover redirect regression on unauthenticated 401.
H2: failed compression now self-heals instead of leaving a permanent broken
card — refund the quota, delete the orphaned original, soft-delete the row;
the frontend toasts the uploader and evicts the card on upload-error.
H3: self-delete, ban-with-hide (user-hidden), and comment-deletes now broadcast
SSE; feed, diashow, and lightbox evict the affected content live instead of
waiting for a reload. sse-eviction.spec.ts covers it.
Riders: feed/+page.svelte also carries the medium truncated-delta pill; host.rs
also carries the low atomic release_gallery claim; admin/+page.svelte also drops
the dead compression_concurrency control (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CR1: the lightbox comment button POSTed to /upload/{id}/comment (singular);
no such route exists, so every UI-submitted comment 404'd and was lost.
Fixed to /comments (plural). The prior e2e passed because its seed helper
POSTs the API directly — added comment-ui.spec.ts which drives the real
component so this can't regress silently again.
CR2: export archives (Gallery.zip / Memories.zip / HTML viewer) were written
under media_path, which is a public ServeDir — so GET /media/exports/
Gallery.zip served the entire event (every photo, caption, comment,
uploader name) to any anonymous visitor at a guessable URL, bypassing the
ticket + release gate. Moved exports to a separate EXPORT_PATH (=/exports)
on its own volume (Dockerfile chown, compose volume, gated handler reads
the new path). export-leak.spec.ts asserts /media/exports/Gallery.zip → 404.
Riders (git can't split hunks): LightboxModal also gains H3 live-eviction on
comment-deleted/upload-deleted; config.rs also wires compression_concurrency
from boot config (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-review follow-ups (non-blocking quality items):
Tests:
- moderation H1 specs now assert exact `→ 403` instead of bare .rejects.toThrow(),
so a spurious 500 can no longer masquerade as "revocation worked".
- config: added case-insensitivity (upper/mixed-case placeholder) and the
len==32/31 boundary cases for validate_secrets.
- rate_limiter: added the trailing-comma empty-entry case for client_ip (must
fall back, not return "").
(Backend unit tests: 35 pass.)
Docs:
- README: note that with APP_ENV=production a placeholder .env makes the app
refuse to boot and Caddy wait unhealthy — reason is in `docker compose logs app`.
- SECURITY-BACKLOG + sse.rs comment: document that a mid-session ban does not
tear down an already-open SSE stream (new tickets are blocked; low blast radius).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two items surfaced by the branch re-review:
CSP regression (blocking): script-src 'self' blocked the template-authored
anti-FOUC theme script in app.html — SvelteKit's mode:'auto' only hashes
scripts it injects. Added nonce="%sveltekit.nonce%" so it's substituted per
request and included in the CSP (survives future edits, unlike a pinned hash).
Verified: emitted CSP nonce matches the script tag; no violation, no flash.
feed_delta silent truncation: the LIMIT 200 (added earlier to kill the
stale-`since` DoS) returned only the newest slice with no signal, so a client
that missed 200+ uploads during a reconnect could not tell it should full-
refresh — the older missed uploads were dropped and unrecoverable (the next
delta advances `since` past them). DeltaResponse now carries `truncated`; the
feed's feed-delta handler calls loadFeed(true) to resync from page 1 instead
of merging a partial slice.
Verified: cargo check clean, svelte-check 0 errors, production build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
H1: auth extractor re-reads the live user row — trusts the DB role (not the
JWT claim) and rejects banned users mid-session. e2e proves a demoted
host loses powers and a banned host is locked out and can't self-unban.
H2: client_ip takes the right-most XFF hop (the one Caddy appends); spoofed
left-most entries are ignored, restoring IP-based throttles.
H3: Caddy excludes /api/v1/stream from `encode` so SSE isn't buffered.
H4: upload — quota increment + row insert + hashtag links now one txn.
H5: feed keyset pagination tiebroken on (created_at, id) + composite index
(migration 010); feed_delta bounded with LIMIT.
H7: LightboxModal keys its comment load off upload.id, ending the
SSE-driven refetch storm.
H8: CSP via SvelteKit kit.csp (svelte.config.js) hardens the localStorage
token model against injection.
Migration 010 also adds the latent comment/comment_hashtag indexes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
C1: reset_user_pin wrote to a non-existent column (pin_failed_attempts);
the real column is failed_pin_attempts, so every PIN reset 500'd. Fixed
the column name; new e2e (pin-reset.spec.ts) proves a reset returns a
usable PIN and the target can recover with it.
C2: config.rs::validate_secrets now rejects placeholder-ish secrets
(change_me/dev_secret/placeholder), enforces len>=32 in prod, and
requires a real ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH. docker-compose.yml sets
APP_ENV=production so the guard actually runs. Corrected the false
"fixed" claim in SECURITY-BACKLOG.md. .env.example documents the rule.
Riders in these files (documented here since git can't split hunks):
- host.rs also carries the event-scoped ban_user fix and the
close_event/open_event no-op broadcast guard (medium).
- docker-compose.yml also adds ORIGIN (H6), app/frontend healthchecks with
Caddy waiting on health, and per-service memory limits (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The suite was almost entirely e2e; pure logic had no direct coverage. Add fast,
DB-free unit tests on both sides.
Backend (cargo test — inline #[cfg(test)] modules):
- rate_limiter: allow-up-to-max-then-block, per-key independence, sliding-window
expiry, retry-after bounds, clear(), and client_ip X-Forwarded-For parsing
(first entry / whitespace-trim / fallback).
- sse_tickets: single-use consume (replay → None), unknown ticket, uniqueness +
hex shape, prune keeps fresh tickets, and an expired ticket (injected past-TTL
entry) consumes to None.
- hashtag: fill the boundary gaps the 3 existing tests missed — stop-at-non-word,
the 40-char cap (drops, doesn't truncate), no-dedup contract, and the German
umlaut truncation limitation (pinned so a future Unicode fix is deliberate).
Frontend (Vitest — new, standalone config that stubs $app/environment so
server-safe module paths import cleanly under node):
- avatar: avatarPalette (neutral for empty, deterministic, real palette entry) and
initials (?, single word, two words, whitespace collapse).
- data-mode-store: pickMediaUrl across original/saver modes and the
preview→thumbnail→original fallback chain.
- `npm run test:unit` script added.
Backend: 20 passing. Frontend: 11 passing. svelte-check: 0 errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From the 2026-06-27 audit branch (fix/audit-2026-06-27-critical-medium), whose
work was ~80% absorbed into main via the batch branches. This ports the pieces
that were NOT in main:
- compression.rs: cap image decode with image::Limits (12000x12000, 256 MiB
max_alloc) via ImageReader instead of image::open(). The upload body-size cap
bounds the file on disk but not the *decoded* dimensions, so a small
decompression-bomb image could OOM the box during decode/resize. Surgical port
of the audit's decode guard only (not its image/video semaphore split).
- docs/SECURITY-BACKLOG.md: the audit's triaged backlog, reconciled against main
(each item tagged done / open / contingent-on-signed-media). Records the still-
open items: host moderation UI gap, owner-delete SSE broadcast, quota
mount-detection (starts_with) + low-disk guard.
- docs/DECISION-media-auth.md: writes up the one real architectural divergence —
main serves media unauthenticated (ServeDir + UUID-capability) while the audit
built a signed/TTL'd gateway. Lays out the tradeoff (leaked URL = permanent vs
~24h access; banned-user access) and a recommendation, for a human decision.
Verified: cargo build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings the batch-2 security hardening into main (forked from the same base as
the UX batch; auto-merged cleanly — verified both sides' edits to social.rs /
main.rs coexist):
- Cross-event authorization: toggle_like / list_comments / add_comment now
event-scope the upload via Upload::find_by_id_and_event (404 on cross-event
access); delete_comment uses Comment::soft_delete_in_event. Closes the gap
where a guest could like/comment/list across events by upload UUID.
- Upload OOM backstop: the /upload route gets DefaultBodyLimit::max(576 MiB)
instead of disable(), so a multi-GB body can't be buffered before the
handler's per-class size checks run.
- upload.rs per-class size-limit refactor, XSS allowlist, deploy hardening
(Caddyfile, Dockerfiles, docker-compose, .env.example), and a data-mode
doc-comment clarifying the original-media route is capability-(UUID-)gated.
The event-scope checks sit before, and batch-3's best-effort count broadcasts
after, the like/comment mutations — both preserved.
Verified: cargo build clean, svelte-check 0 errors.
Post-commit review follow-ups for the batch-3 feed work.
Frontend — VirtualFeed: the guarded setOptions keyed only on (count, scrollMargin),
so a rotation (or the first-paint 0->real container width) changed colWidth / card
heights without invalidating the cached measurements, leaving getTotalSize and the
scrollbar stale until each row scrolled back through the window. Track appliedWidth
and call virtualizer.measure() on a width delta so heights re-estimate at the new
width (rendered rows re-measure immediately via their ResizeObserver). Covers list +
grid and the first-paint 120px-estimate case.
Backend — social.rs: the fresh like/comment count SELECT used `.await?`, so a
transient DB failure would 500 the request after the like/comment had already
committed. Make the count + broadcast best-effort (if let Ok { ... }); the mutation
succeeds regardless and the next event / pull-to-refresh reconciles the count.
Docs — FOLLOWUPS: record the review findings left as-is (grid-prepend tile reflow,
filtered-grid auto-load which is pre-existing, comment-delete stale count, and the
last-write-wins count ordering note).
Verified: svelte-check 0 errors, cargo build clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address the two items from the adversarial re-review of batch-2.
- upload: remove image/heic + image/heif from ALLOWED_MEDIA. Neither the
`image` crate nor the bundled ffmpeg 6.1 (Alpine 3.21 — HEIF demuxer
only landed in ffmpeg 7.0) can decode them, so accepting them stored
posts that never got a thumbnail. iOS Safari transcodes HEIC->JPEG on
file-input selection, so this rejects only the rare HEIC-preserving
path, now with a clear error instead of a silently broken post.
- data-mode-store: correct the stale "auth-gated" comment — the
/original route is intentionally unauthenticated (UUID-as-capability)
so it works from plain <img src> / <video src>.
Re-verified: cargo build (only the pre-existing middleware.rs warning).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address the seven findings from the security & deployment review.
High:
- upload: make infer authoritative — reject files it can't identify
(SVG/HTML/JS) and require the detected MIME to be on an ALLOWED_MEDIA
allowlist; derive the stored MIME and on-disk extension from the
detected type, ignoring client filename/Content-Type. Closes the
stored-XSS vector via media served on-origin.
- deploy: rename docker-compose.override.yml -> docker-compose.dev.yml
so the default `docker compose up -d` no longer publishes Postgres
5432 to the host; the port map is now opt-in via -f. README updated.
Medium:
- upload: DefaultBodyLimit::disable() -> max(576 MiB) as an HTTP-level
OOM backstop; handler still enforces precise per-class size limits.
- docker: run backend and frontend as non-root users.
Low:
- social/upload: event-scope toggle_like, list_comments, add_comment,
delete_comment, edit_upload, delete_upload via find_by_id_and_event /
soft_delete_in_event — cross-event IDs now resolve to 404.
- Caddy: site-wide HSTS / nosniff / X-Frame-Options / Referrer-Policy,
plus Content-Disposition: attachment on /media/originals/*.
- .env.example: replace default Postgres password with a CHANGE_ME hint.
Out of scope: localStorage JWT (root cause fixed; httpOnly cookies are a
larger change tracked separately).
Verified: cargo build (no new warnings), cargo test (3 passed),
caddy validate, docker compose config (no 5432 published by default).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to the comprehensive code review. Five batches:
1. Cross-event authorization: host_delete_upload, unban_user, and
host_delete_comment now scope by auth.event_id. Adds
Upload::find_by_id_and_event / soft_delete_in_event and a
Comment::soft_delete_in_event variant that joins through upload.
2. Token exposure: SSE auth no longer puts the JWT in the URL.
New /api/v1/stream/ticket endpoint mints a short-lived single-use
ticket bound to the session; the EventSource passes ?ticket=...
instead. Refuse to start in APP_ENV=production with the dev JWT
sentinel; warn loudly otherwise.
3. Account hardening: per-IP+name rate limit on /recover (mitigates
targeted lockout DoS), per-IP rate limit on /admin/login, random
32-char admin recovery PIN (replaces "0000"), structured tracing
events for wrong PIN, lockout, failed admin login, ban/unban/role
change/pin-reset/host-delete.
4. DoS / correctness: comment listing paginated (LIMIT 50 + ?before=
cursor), hashtag extraction whitelisted to ASCII alnum+underscore
(≤40 chars) with unit tests, display_name / caption / comment body
length validated in chars rather than bytes.
5. Cleanup: session-touch failures now logged, DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS
env var (default 10).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two bugs surfaced while running the new E2E suite, plus a small test hook:
- jwt.rs: add a per-token `jti: Uuid` claim. Without it, two `create_token`
calls in the same wall-clock second for the same (sub, role, event_id)
produced identical JWT bytes — and identical sha256(token) hashes —
which then collided on `session.token_hash UNIQUE` with a 500. Manifests
in real use when an admin clicks "Anmelden" twice fast.
- auth/handlers.rs: reject display names containing 0x00. Postgres rejects
NUL in TEXT columns with `invalid byte sequence for encoding "UTF8"` and
the request leaks back as a 500. Now returns 400 with a clean message.
- handlers/test_admin.rs + main.rs: new POST /api/v1/admin/__truncate route,
compiled in always but only **registered** when EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1 is
set on startup. Truncates every event-scoped table, reseeds config from
migration defaults, wipes media on disk, and clears the in-memory rate
limiter. RequireAdmin-gated so it's not anonymous even in test mode. In
production builds (no env var) the route returns 404 — verified by the
startup log message.
- services/rate_limiter.rs: add `clear()` so the truncate handler can wipe
the in-memory window map between tests.
- Dockerfile: bump rust:1.87 → rust:1.88 (current dep tree needs it) and
COPY ./migrations into the build context so the `sqlx::migrate!()` macro
can resolve at compile time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-built output regenerated after frontend/export-viewer/src/app.css
started importing ../../src/tailwind-theme.css. Output now picks up the
same @theme tokens and class-driven dark variant as the live app, so
future viewer-side use of bg-primary / dark: utilities will resolve
identically to the main bundle.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- handlers/me.rs (new): GET /api/v1/me/context (profile + role + privacy_note
+ quota toggle state, fetched once on app bootstrap) and GET /api/v1/me/quota
(live used / limit / active uploaders / free disk).
- handlers/upload.rs:
- quota enforcement via the dynamic formula
floor((free_disk * tolerance) / max(active_uploaders, 1)),
gated by quota_enabled + storage_quota_enabled toggles
- new GET /api/v1/upload/{id}/original — unauthed by design
(matches /media/previews/* — URL is the secret) so it works as
<img src> / <video src> / window.open
- rate-limit toggle wiring (rate_limits_enabled + upload_rate_enabled)
- handlers/host.rs:
- POST /api/v1/host/users/{id}/pin-reset — Host may reset guest PINs,
Admin may reset guest + host PINs (never another admin or self).
Returns the freshly-generated plaintext PIN once; emits a global
pin-reset SSE so the affected user's device can clear its localStorage.
- set_role guard expanded so hosts can demote other hosts (not self,
never admins) — backend match for the doc'd permission model.
- handlers/admin.rs: ALLOWED_KEYS split into NUMERIC_KEYS / BOOL_KEYS /
TEXT_KEYS with per-kind validation; saving privacy_note broadcasts an
event-updated SSE so other clients refresh live.
- handlers/feed.rs, handlers/admin.rs (export), auth/handlers.rs:
rate-limit toggle wiring at every limiter call site.
- auth/handlers.rs: when an expired PIN lockout is detected on /recover,
reset failed_pin_attempts to zero before the bcrypt check — without
this every wrong PIN re-locked the user after the cooldown.
- main.rs: wire startup_recovery + spawn_periodic_tasks, register the
new /me/context, /me/quota, /upload/{id}/original, and
/host/users/{id}/pin-reset routes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Foundations for the v0.16 features. No new endpoints here — those land in
the next commit on top of these.
- migrations 008 + 009: commit the load-bearing compression_status column
that was uncommitted on disk; add 009_feature_toggles seeding the master
+ per-endpoint rate-limit switches, the master + per-area quota switches,
and the admin-editable privacy_note.
- services/config.rs (new): get_str / get_i64 / get_usize / get_f64 / get_bool
consolidating the scattered helpers that lived in three handlers.
- services/maintenance.rs (new):
- startup_recovery() — resets compression_status='processing' and
export_job.status='running' rows orphaned by a previous crashed
instance, so users never see permanent "Wird vorbereitet…" spinners.
- spawn_periodic_tasks() — hourly cleanup of expired sessions (rows
were never pruned) + rate-limiter HashMap pruning (windows kept one
entry per IP forever).
- services/jobs.rs (new sketch): BackgroundJob trait + JobContext for
future jobs to plug into the same progress + SSE pipeline as
compression/export. Not wired yet — codifies the convention.
- services/compression.rs: 120s hard timeout + kill_on_drop on ffmpeg
so a malformed video can't hang and leak a worker semaphore permit.
- services/rate_limiter.rs: new prune() called from the periodic task.
- state.rs: SseEvent::new() constructor so event-type strings stay
consistent instead of being typed inline at every emit site.
- models/user.rs: UserRole::as_str() for /me/context serialization.
- models/upload.rs: soft_delete() now runs in a transaction and
decrements the uploader's total_upload_bytes (GREATEST(0, …) guard) —
fixes a quota drift where deleting reclaimed no quota.
- Cargo.toml + Cargo.lock: add `infer = "0.15"` (multipart MIME sniffing
used by the upload handler).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- PROJECT.md, README.md, TEST_GUIDE.md: status line refreshed; rate-limiter
doc-vs-code drift fixed; HTML export section rewritten for the SvelteKit-
static viewer; SSE event names + new events documented; config seed block
extended with planned toggles + privacy_note; decision log entries added.
- docs/CONCEPT_HTML_VIEWER.md, docs/CONCEPT_MOBILE_UI.md: banner the design
intent as shipped; point at the source-of-truth code paths.
- docs/CONCEPT_DIASHOW.md: planned-then-shipped design for the live diashow
(two-queue policy, pluggable transitions, data-mode aware).
- docs/FEATURES.md: capability matrix by role (Guest / Host / Admin) plus
prose per area (auth, posting, feed, moderation, admin, export, gestures,
data mode, quotas, privacy note, extensibility).
- docs/USER_JOURNEYS.md: step-by-step flows for every supported scenario,
including PIN reset by host, data mode, privacy note, gestures, and the
admin toggles.
- docs/IDEAS.md: speculative extensions (global diashow, reactions,
multi-tenancy, animation pack, etc.) — explicitly out of v0.16 scope.
- backend/migrations/README.md, frontend/src/lib/README.md: codify the
"never edit a shipped migration" rule and the lib/ conventions
(one store per concern, gestures via actions, sheets via ContextSheet,
transitions as drop-in components).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace the minijinja-based HTML export with a full SvelteKit static
viewer app. The new export produces a ZIP with:
- Pre-built viewer assets (index.html + JS/CSS bundle)
- data.json with all posts, comments, tags, and like counts
- Processed media: 400px thumbnails for grid, full images (2000px
cap if >5MB), video thumbnails via ffmpeg
Remove minijinja dependency, add include_dir to embed viewer assets
at compile time. Update Dockerfile to copy static/ for builds.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pre-built SvelteKit static output for embedding into HTML export ZIPs.
When viewer source changes, rebuild with `npm run build` in
frontend/export-viewer/ and re-commit this directory.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Enable minijinja 'json' feature so the tojson filter is available in
the Memories.html template (was causing 'unknown filter' render error)
- Replace window.location.href downloads with fetch+blob so the
Authorization header is sent (window.location.href caused 401)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend: migration 007 adds a case-insensitive unique index on user names
per event. join endpoint returns 409 conflict when the name is taken.
find_by_event_and_name uses LOWER() for case-insensitive recovery.
Frontend: join page handles 409 with a name-taken view — amber warning,
name-choice tips, inline PIN recovery form, and "Anderen Namen wählen"
button. Test guide updated with Steps 8 and 9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend: rate limiter gains check_with_retry() returning seconds until
the next slot opens. Upload 429 responses include retry_after_secs in
JSON and a Retry-After header.
Frontend: upload queue catches 429 as RateLimitError, resets affected
item to pending, schedules processQueue() for the server-reported delay,
and shows a live countdown banner in the queue UI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Disable Axum's 2 MB default body limit on the upload route so large
photos/videos are accepted without HTTP 400
- Serialize UserRole as lowercase in JWT so the frontend role checks
('guest'/'host'/'admin') match correctly
- Drain multipart body before returning early upload errors (rate-limit,
ban, event-lock) to keep the HTTP keep-alive connection clean and
prevent cascading Netzwerkfehler / empty-500 responses
- Add TraceLayer for request logging and Vite dev proxy config
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add sliding-window in-memory RateLimiter service (Arc<Mutex<HashMap>>)
with per-IP and per-user-id limits on all public endpoint classes:
- POST /api/v1/join: 5/min per IP
- GET /api/v1/feed: configurable per IP (feed_rate_per_min, default 60)
- POST /api/v1/upload: configurable per user (upload_rate_per_hour, default 10)
- GET /api/v1/export/zip|html: configurable per IP (export_rate_per_day, default 3)
Limits are hot-reloadable via the config table. All 429 responses use
German error messages. Client IP is read from X-Forwarded-For (Caddy).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add async ZIP and HTML offline viewer export workers, download endpoints,
and a guest-facing /export page.
Backend — export workers (tokio::spawn, run after gallery release):
- ZIP worker: streams all non-deleted originals into Gallery.zip via
async_zip (Stored compression), organised into Photos/ and Videos/
with {date}_{uploader}_{id}.{ext} filenames; updates progress_pct in DB
- HTML worker: renders Memories.html via minijinja template (self-contained:
inlined CSS + JS, relative media paths); packs it with README.txt and
all media into Memories.zip (Deflate for text, Stored for media)
- Both workers mark export_job status (running → done/failed), update
export_zip_ready / export_html_ready on the event, and broadcast SSE
export-progress + export-available when both complete
Backend — new endpoints (AuthUser):
- GET /export/zip → streams Gallery.zip if export_zip_ready
- GET /export/html → streams Memories.zip if export_html_ready
- GET /export/status → released flag + per-type status/progress (moved from admin)
Memories.html features: warm keepsake aesthetic, responsive grid, fullscreen
lightbox with captions/comments/likes, client-side hashtag filter chips,
XSS-safe JS, fully offline (no external deps)
Frontend — /export page:
- Locked state: padlock illustration + message
- Released state: ZIP and HTML cards with progress bars (SSE-driven),
download buttons enabled only when ready
- HTML guide modal (unzip instructions + Wi-Fi tip) before download begins
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add Admin Dashboard at /admin for server configuration, disk usage
monitoring, and export job status, plus a public export/status endpoint.
Backend — new /api/v1/admin/* endpoints (RequireAdmin auth):
- GET /admin/stats → user/upload/comment counts + disk usage
- GET /admin/config → all config key/value pairs
- PATCH /admin/config → update any subset of config keys; validates
key whitelist and numeric values
- GET /admin/export/jobs → export_job rows for the event
Backend — public (AuthUser) endpoint:
- GET /export/status → released flag + zip/html job status/progress
Frontend — /admin page:
- Stats grid: guest count, upload count, comment count
- Disk usage bar with GB/MB formatting; red ≥ 90%, amber ≥ 75%
- Config form: labelled numeric inputs for all eight config keys,
sends only changed values on save
- Export jobs list: type label, status badge, progress bar for running jobs,
error message if failed; manual refresh button
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add Host Dashboard for event and guest management, accessible at /host.
Backend — new /api/v1/host/* endpoints (RequireHost auth):
- GET /host/event → event name + lock/release state
- POST /host/event/close|open → lock or unlock uploads; SSE broadcast
- POST /host/gallery/release → set release timestamp, enqueue export jobs
- GET /host/users → all guests with upload count & bytes
- POST /host/users/{id}/ban → ban with optional upload-hide choice
- POST /host/users/{id}/unban → lift ban
- PATCH /host/users/{id}/role → promote guest→host or demote host→guest
- DELETE /host/upload/{id} → host-level soft-delete + SSE
- DELETE /host/comment/{id} → host-level soft-delete
Frontend — /host page:
- Event controls: lock/unlock toggle and release-gallery button with status badges
- Guest table: display name, role badge, upload count, storage used
- Ban flow: modal asking whether to keep or hide the user's uploads
- Promote/demote buttons respecting caller role (host can promote guests; admin can demote hosts)
- auth.ts: getRole() decodes JWT payload client-side to gate the route
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Cursor-based feed endpoint using v_feed view with hashtag filtering
- Like toggle (INSERT ON CONFLICT), comments CRUD
- Feed delta endpoint for SSE-driven incremental updates
- SSE client with Page Visibility API (pause/reconnect)
- Responsive photo/video grid with infinite scroll
- Hashtag filter chips, lightbox modal with comments
- Media file serving via tower-http ServeDir
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend:
- POST /api/v1/upload: multipart file upload with caption + hashtags
- Validates file size against DB config limits (image/video separate)
- Checks user ban status and event upload lock
- Saves original to disk under {media_path}/originals/{slug}/
- Tracks user total_upload_bytes for quota enforcement
- Extracts hashtags from caption text and explicit CSV field
- Upserts hashtags and links them to uploads
- PATCH /api/v1/upload/{id}: edit caption and hashtags (owner only)
- DELETE /api/v1/upload/{id}: soft-delete (owner only)
- GET /api/v1/stream: SSE endpoint with 30s keepalive
- Broadcasts new-upload events to all connected clients
- Uses tokio broadcast channel for fan-out
Services:
- CompressionWorker: Tokio semaphore-bounded (concurrency=2) background processor
- Images: resize to 800px wide JPEG preview via image crate
- PNG originals: lossless compression via oxipng
- Videos: ffmpeg thumbnail extraction (1 frame at 1s, scaled to 800px)
- Updates upload record with preview_path/thumbnail_path on completion
Models:
- Upload with full CRUD (create, find, update caption, soft delete, set paths)
- Hashtag with upsert, link/unlink, extract_hashtags() text parser
- UploadDto for API serialization with like/comment counts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend:
- AppConfig, AppError, AppState modules for shared infrastructure
- JWT creation/verification with HS256 (jsonwebtoken crate)
- Session management: SHA-256 token hashing, DB-backed sessions
- Auth middleware: AuthUser, RequireHost, RequireAdmin extractors
- POST /api/v1/join: name-only registration, 4-digit PIN + bcrypt hash
- POST /api/v1/recover: PIN-based recovery with 3-attempt lockout (15 min)
- POST /api/v1/admin/login: bcrypt password verification
- DELETE /api/v1/session: logout (session invalidation)
- Migration 006: user PIN lockout columns (failed_pin_attempts, pin_locked_until)
- Models: Event, User (with role enum), Session with all CRUD methods
Frontend:
- api.ts: typed fetch wrapper with automatic Bearer token injection
- auth.ts: JWT/PIN localStorage management with Svelte store
- /join: name entry form with PIN display modal and copy button
- /recover: name + PIN recovery form with saved PIN pre-fill
- /feed: placeholder gallery page with logout
- Root layout: auth initialization on mount
- Root page: redirect to /join or /feed based on auth state
All responses use German language strings as specified.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
