Performance:
- Cache the runtime `config` table in-memory (ConfigCache) with synchronous
invalidation on every write (admin PATCH + test reseed). Was re-reading each
key from Postgres on every request (~8 round-trips per upload).
- Stream uploads chunk-by-chunk to a temp file instead of buffering the whole
body in RAM (peak was up to the per-class cap, e.g. 500 MB/video); only 512
sniff-bytes are kept for magic-byte detection, then atomic rename into place.
- Cache the media-filesystem disk snapshot (DiskCache, 15s TTL) shared by the
quota check and admin stats; drop the discarded System::refresh_all().
- HTML export streams video (and small-image) originals straight into the ZIP
via a manifest instead of copying them to a temp dir first (removed the
transient 2x disk usage) and drops the double directory scan.
- Auth extractor resolves session -> live user in one JOIN (was two queries),
touching last_seen_at by token hash.
Stability:
- SSE: on broadcast lag, emit a `resync` event so the client runs a delta
fetch instead of silently losing events; frontend reconciles adds, deletions,
and (via an in-place refresh) like/comment counts on visible cards.
- Storage quota fails OPEN when the disk can't be read (was a 0-byte limit that
locked out all uploads).
- Graceful shutdown drains in-flight requests on SIGTERM/SIGINT, bounded by a
10s backstop so open SSE streams can't stall a deploy.
- Upload removes the persisted file if the DB transaction fails (no orphaned
bytes with no row to reclaim them).
Tests:
- New pure select_disk() with 5 unit tests (longest-prefix, fallbacks, fail-open).
- New e2e export-video spec covering the HTML export's video-streaming branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The prior test asserted 404 on /media/exports/Gallery.zip against an empty
stack — it would pass even if exports were still written under /media, because
no archive was ever produced. Now it:
1. seeds an upload, releases the gallery, and polls until the real zip job
writes Gallery.zip to disk;
2. asserts the archive is NOT served from public /media (the CR2 leak); and
3. asserts it IS retrievable via the gated ticket endpoint (200 + PK zip
magic) — proving the 404 means "not public", not "no file".
Also fixes a test-isolation gap the CR2 relocation introduced: __truncate wiped
media_path but not export_path, so a real export would leave Gallery.zip on disk
and break export.spec's "ready-but-file-missing → 404" test. truncate_all now
purges export_path too. Full 06-export dir: 5/5 green, no contamination.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CR1: the lightbox comment button POSTed to /upload/{id}/comment (singular);
no such route exists, so every UI-submitted comment 404'd and was lost.
Fixed to /comments (plural). The prior e2e passed because its seed helper
POSTs the API directly — added comment-ui.spec.ts which drives the real
component so this can't regress silently again.
CR2: export archives (Gallery.zip / Memories.zip / HTML viewer) were written
under media_path, which is a public ServeDir — so GET /media/exports/
Gallery.zip served the entire event (every photo, caption, comment,
uploader name) to any anonymous visitor at a guessable URL, bypassing the
ticket + release gate. Moved exports to a separate EXPORT_PATH (=/exports)
on its own volume (Dockerfile chown, compose volume, gated handler reads
the new path). export-leak.spec.ts asserts /media/exports/Gallery.zip → 404.
Riders (git can't split hunks): LightboxModal also gains H3 live-eviction on
comment-deleted/upload-deleted; config.rs also wires compression_concurrency
from boot config (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Turn "accept-both-outcomes" documentation tests — which pass whether the app is
secure or vulnerable — into assertions that pin the secure behavior, and replace
fake-UUID authz tests that 404'd before ever reaching the ownership guard with
real cross-user resources.
file-upload-attacks:
- SVG-with-<script> → pin 400 (infer returns None for text → stored-XSS defense);
was [201,400], which accepted the vulnerable outcome.
- zero-byte → pin 400; path-traversal → pin 201 with UUID-derived storage and a
no-path-echo check (both were [201,400]).
- Fix the application/octet-stream rationale (no "application bypass" exists — the
handler ignores the declared type and keys off magic bytes).
authorization-deep (IDOR):
- B deleting A's comment: seed a real upload+comment as A, assert 403, assert the
comment survives, and assert the owner (A) still gets 204 — proving the 403 is
about identity, not a broken route. (Was a DELETE on the all-zeros UUID → 404
before the user_id guard, so authorization was never exercised.)
- Add B-deletes-A's-upload (403, countUploads unchanged) and B-edits-A's-caption
(403, caption intact) — the find_by_id_and_event + ownership guards.
export: pin the ZIP-download 404 (was [404,200] — a 200 is a data-exposure
regression) and split into the two real branches: not-yet-ready, and
ready-but-file-missing (new db.setExportZipReady helper).
All 21 assertions verified green against the live secure backend.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
