Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
fabi
723a492d44 test(unit): add a unit-test layer (backend cargo + frontend vitest)
The suite was almost entirely e2e; pure logic had no direct coverage. Add fast,
DB-free unit tests on both sides.

Backend (cargo test — inline #[cfg(test)] modules):
- rate_limiter: allow-up-to-max-then-block, per-key independence, sliding-window
  expiry, retry-after bounds, clear(), and client_ip X-Forwarded-For parsing
  (first entry / whitespace-trim / fallback).
- sse_tickets: single-use consume (replay → None), unknown ticket, uniqueness +
  hex shape, prune keeps fresh tickets, and an expired ticket (injected past-TTL
  entry) consumes to None.
- hashtag: fill the boundary gaps the 3 existing tests missed — stop-at-non-word,
  the 40-char cap (drops, doesn't truncate), no-dedup contract, and the German
  umlaut truncation limitation (pinned so a future Unicode fix is deliberate).

Frontend (Vitest — new, standalone config that stubs $app/environment so
server-safe module paths import cleanly under node):
- avatar: avatarPalette (neutral for empty, deterministic, real palette entry) and
  initials (?, single word, two words, whitespace collapse).
- data-mode-store: pickMediaUrl across original/saver modes and the
  preview→thumbnail→original fallback chain.
- `npm run test:unit` script added.

Backend: 20 passing. Frontend: 11 passing. svelte-check: 0 errors.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-01 19:14:33 +02:00
MechaCat02
d228676a56 fix(security): cross-event authz, SSE ticket flow, account hardening, audit logs
Follow-up to the comprehensive code review. Five batches:

1. Cross-event authorization: host_delete_upload, unban_user, and
   host_delete_comment now scope by auth.event_id. Adds
   Upload::find_by_id_and_event / soft_delete_in_event and a
   Comment::soft_delete_in_event variant that joins through upload.

2. Token exposure: SSE auth no longer puts the JWT in the URL.
   New /api/v1/stream/ticket endpoint mints a short-lived single-use
   ticket bound to the session; the EventSource passes ?ticket=...
   instead. Refuse to start in APP_ENV=production with the dev JWT
   sentinel; warn loudly otherwise.

3. Account hardening: per-IP+name rate limit on /recover (mitigates
   targeted lockout DoS), per-IP rate limit on /admin/login, random
   32-char admin recovery PIN (replaces "0000"), structured tracing
   events for wrong PIN, lockout, failed admin login, ban/unban/role
   change/pin-reset/host-delete.

4. DoS / correctness: comment listing paginated (LIMIT 50 + ?before=
   cursor), hashtag extraction whitelisted to ASCII alnum+underscore
   (≤40 chars) with unit tests, display_name / caption / comment body
   length validated in chars rather than bytes.

5. Cleanup: session-touch failures now logged, DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS
   env var (default 10).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-17 21:00:51 +02:00