c14ccd2df17fdfbcda10e6829c6a9f21e7efca35
14 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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fabi
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1485df5469 |
fix(auth): bind the role store to the identity, not to the tab
The role store I added in the moderation work is a module-level singleton seeded ONCE at import. `goto()` is a client-side navigation, so leaving and re-joining in the same tab re-imports no module and re-runs no onMount — the previous user's role simply stayed resident. Nothing reset it: not join, recover, admin login, "Event verlassen", `clearAuth`, nor the api.ts 401 auto-clear. So a host who left, followed by a guest joining on the same phone, left that guest with `isStaff === true` and a "🚫 Beitrag entfernen" action on other people's photos. The backend 403s the delete, so this was a false affordance rather than a privilege escalation — but `/feed` never fetched `/me/context`, so unlike every other route it never self-corrected either. It survived until a hard reload. The mirror case was equally broken and easier to overlook: a guest who recovered into a host account got NO host affordances. `clearAuth` already had a hook registry for exactly this shape of problem, with a comment explaining it exists to avoid circular imports. Add the missing mirror, `onSetAuth`, fired by both `setAuth` and `setAdminAuth` after the new token is resident, and have the role store register on both sides: clear to null on logout, re-seed from the new token on login. That also gives `syncRoleFromToken` — dead code with zero callers since I introduced it — its intended purpose. Seeding from the claim fixes the reported bug, but the claim is frozen for the token's 30-day life, so a promotion or demotion still wouldn't reach the feed. `/feed` now calls the existing `refreshEventState()` on mount, which fetches `/me/context` and applies both the authoritative role and the lock/release state in one request. The feed is the one route gating a destructive action on the role, so it should not be the only route running on a stale claim. Tests: 04-host/role-identity-reset drives the real flows. The first asserts the host DOES see the action before asserting the newcomer does not — a negative assertion alone would pass against a build that shipped no moderation at all. The second covers the mirror, promoting a guest server-side while their resident token still claims `role: guest`, so a fix that only cleared the role would fail it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fabi
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be6d56f278 |
feat(moderation): let a host remove a guest's photo or comment from the UI
`DELETE /host/upload/{id}` and `DELETE /host/comment/{id}` were complete on the
backend — transactional, SSE-broadcasting, audit-logged — and had zero frontend
callers. The feed context sheet offered "Löschen" only when
`target.user_id === myUserId`, so the only lever a host actually had against an
unwanted photo was banning the uploader.
That is both disproportionate and ineffective. A ban doesn't retract what was
already posted, and it makes things strictly worse for comments: the ban check
runs BEFORE the ownership check on the guest delete route, so banning an abusive
author leaves their comment on screen and permanently undeletable by them. With
no host affordance, nobody could remove it at all.
- feed: hosts/admins get "Beitrag entfernen" on other people's posts, routed to
the host endpoint (the guest route 403s anything the caller doesn't own) with
moderation-specific confirm copy. Own-post "Löschen" is unchanged.
- lightbox: same for comments, via /host/comment/{id}.
- Ban semantics are deliberately untouched (USER_JOURNEYS §10 — banned users keep
read access and cannot write). The deadlock is broken by giving the host a way
in, not by loosening the ban.
Live role (this had to come first). `getRole()` decodes the JWT claim, but the
token is never reissued — the backend slides the session row forward and treats
the DB row as authoritative. The claim is therefore frozen for the token's
lifetime: up to 30 days. A guest promoted at the party saw no Host-Dashboard and
no moderation actions until they signed out and back in, even though
`/me/context` had been returning their real role on every page load and 4 of its
6 call sites dropped the field on the floor.
Add `role-store.ts`: seeded from the claim so there's no flash of the wrong nav,
then corrected by every `/me/context` response. Point the ad-hoc `getRole()`
callers at it (account, upload, host, admin, and the new feed gate). The host and
admin dashboards now derive `myRole` reactively, so a demotion disables their
controls immediately instead of at next login.
Tests: 04-host/moderation-ui drives the real UI — host removes a guest photo and
it's gone from /feed server-side; a plain guest is offered nothing on someone
else's post (the mirror that keeps the first test honest); a promoted guest gains
the dashboard on reload while their token still carries `role: guest`; and a host
removes the comment of an already-banned guest, asserting first that the author's
own delete 403s so the deadlock is real.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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bbdfae09a0 |
chore(e2e): add ESLint + Prettier; fix real findings; dedupe BASE
The Playwright suite had no linter and no formatter — only tsc. Add flat-config ESLint
(typescript-eslint, type-aware) and Prettier (2-space, matching the suite's style).
Rules keep the ones that catch real TEST bugs and drop the noise:
- no-floating-promises KEPT — an un-awaited request/assertion can let a test end before it runs,
passing vacuously. It caught one: the SSE reader loop in sse-listener is now explicitly `void`.
- no-unused-vars KEPT — caught three dead bindings (an unused adminToken fixture arg, an unused
`api` arg, an unused JPEG_MAGIC import), all removed.
- no-explicit-any OFF — all test code; `any` is the honest type for an untyped res.json() body or
a page.evaluate() return.
- no-empty-pattern OFF — Playwright's dependency-free fixtures are `async ({}, use) => {}`.
Refactor: `const BASE = process.env.E2E_FRONTEND_URL ?? '...'` was redeclared verbatim in 23
files — extracted to helpers/env.ts and imported, so a port/scheme change is one edit not a sweep.
Then `prettier --write`. Verified: eslint clean, tsc clean, prettier clean, desktop suite 210
passed / 1 skipped. (One mobile spec flaked once under retries:0 — a pre-existing cross-test
reflow-timing vector from the flakiness audit, not this change: the each-key edit is stable across
16 isolated runs and a clean full mobile re-run.)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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d643256f36 |
fix(rereview): close residual export finalize↔flip double-race at reopen
Adversarial re-review of
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fabi
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df275bbefa |
fix(rereview): close export-flip race + queue-dedup reload regression
Adversarial re-review of the persona-audit + audit-followup rounds (6411747..)
found one HIGH and one MED regression plus LOW gaps. All fixed with coverage.
HIGH — export stale-keepsake resurrected by an open_event race
A reopen landing in the window between a *current* export worker's finalize_job
and its ready-flag flip cleared export_released_at + the ready flags but left the
export_job row `done` at the same release_seq. The seq-guarded flip then still
matched and re-set export_{zip,html}_ready=TRUE on a pre-reopen snapshot; the next
re-release read that stale TRUE and skipped regeneration (`if ready { continue }`),
serving a keepsake missing every upload from the reopen window — the exact data
loss migration 012 exists to prevent. Both ready-flip UPDATEs are now additionally
anchored on `export_released_at IS NOT NULL`, so a landed reopen makes the flip a
no-op and the re-release regenerates cleanly.
MED — queue dedup broke for reloaded items
loadQueue rebuilt QueueItems from IndexedDB without copying lastModified, which the
new addToQueue dedup keys on. A file re-selected after a page reload / PWA relaunch
missed the duplicate check and uploaded twice. Rehydration now carries lastModified
(extracted to a pure, tested entryToQueueItem helper).
LOW
- diashow: clear the upload-processed debounce timer in onDestroy (no stray
post-unmount /feed fetch).
- USER_JOURNEYS §9.5: document the reconnect-delta ban replay (hidden_user_ids /
uploads_hidden_at, migration 013), not just the live user-hidden SSE.
- e2e api-client: drop the misleading hide_uploads param from banUser — the backend
takes no body and always hides; strip the dead boolean at all call sites.
Tests
- Extract isReversibleLock (the terminal-403 KEEP-vs-PURGE-blob discriminator) into a
pure exported helper + unit tests, so the data-loss-critical branch is covered
without an XHR harness.
- entryToQueueItem unit tests lock the lastModified-carry regression.
- Document the export flip-race guard in the reopen/re-release spec (the sub-ms
finalize↔flip interleave isn't deterministically forceable with fast fixtures;
covered by the SQL guard + the end-to-end completeness test).
Verified: backend 40 tests, frontend 44 unit tests, svelte-check 0 errors,
e2e 156 passed / 1 skipped on chromium-desktop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MechaCat02
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641174717c |
fix(user-flow): close offline-queue, export, session, ban & realtime gaps
Comprehensive user-flow review across guest/host/admin roles, then fixes with
e2e regression guards. Highlights:
- Offline upload queue auto-resumes on reconnect: network errors keep items
pending (not error), 4xx are terminal (no infinite retry), quota exhaustion
returns a distinct 413; queue cap + dedup.
- Export lifecycle: release atomically locks uploads; reopen invalidates and
re-release regenerates the keepsake; workers claim their job atomically so a
reopen->re-release can't corrupt the ZIP; startup re-spawns interrupted
exports.
- Sessions slide on activity (no 30-day cliff); JWT expiry deferred to the
revocable session row; sign-out-everywhere + revoke-on-PIN-reset.
- Ban always hides content (v_feed / find_visible_media / export filter
is_banned) but stays a read-only ban per USER_JOURNEYS §10 — sessions are
not revoked, read access + keepsake download preserved.
- Realtime: server-clock SSE delta cursor; event-closed/opened drive the UI
live; feed_delta rate-limited; like returns {liked, like_count} to fix
multi-device drift; lightbox live comments; diashow delta backfill.
- Forgotten-PIN in-app request flow; simultaneous same-name join returns 409;
quota increment is transactional; operator floor.
Adds e2e/specs/10-flow-review/ (offline resume, export integrity, deterministic
anti-race guard) and updates existing specs for the new contracts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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faf7a2504a |
fix(audit): restore broken upload pipeline + role-based E2E audit fixes
A comprehensive role-based E2E audit (guest/host/admin, across browser sessions) surfaced one critical and several smaller issues; this addresses them and hardens the tests that missed them. Critical - The client upload pipeline was fully broken: the IndexedDB v1->v2 upgrade opened a *new* transaction inside the upgrade callback, which throws during a version-change transaction and aborted the whole upgrade, leaving the queue object store uncreated -- so no UI upload ever fired. Reuse the version-change transaction the callback provides, and bump the DB to v3 with a contains() guard so installs already corrupted by the shipped bug self-heal on next load. Re-enabled the previously-fixme'd UI upload E2E test. High / Medium - Event lock is uploads-only again: likes, comments and browsing stay open while the event is locked (USER_JOURNEYS 9.3 / FEATURES) -- it was wrongly freezing social interaction. Updated the event-lock spec accordingly. - get_original now excludes soft-deleted and ban-hidden uploads, and direct /media/originals/** serving is blocked, so a hidden user's originals can no longer be pulled by UUID (all originals go through the checked alias). - The upload handler reads the file field with an early-abort size cap chosen from the declared content-type, instead of buffering the entire body before the size check. Low - unban_user mirrors the ban role guard (a host can no longer unban a host/admin banned by an admin). - reset_user_pin's UPDATE is event-scoped. - Admin login returns and stores a real identity (user_id + display name) instead of a blank session. - The host user list no longer renders target-actions (ban/promote/demote/PIN) on the caller's own row, where the backend always rejected them. - /diashow gains a client-side auth guard like the other protected routes. - The join page shows the event name via a new public GET /api/v1/event. Verified: backend cargo build clean, frontend svelte-check 0 errors, full Playwright E2E suite 144 passed / 1 skipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fabi
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0ed97f45cf |
fix(review-2): address re-review — close two blocker regressions + harden tests
The round-2 re-review (full suite green) found two real defects the passing
tests missed, both now fixed and covered:
B1 — banned users could still edit/delete their OWN content: edit_upload,
delete_upload, delete_comment skipped the is_banned guard that upload/
like/comment got (round-2 removed the global extractor block and missed
these three). Added the guard (using auth.is_banned — no extra query).
The moderation ban test now asserts 403 on DELETE upload, PATCH upload,
and DELETE comment for a banned owner (+ upload survives) — it previously
only exercised POST /upload, which is why the gap shipped green.
B2 — H3 live-eviction was dead code: 'user-hidden' and 'comment-deleted' were
missing from KNOWN_EVENTS, so EventSource never listened and the handlers
never fired. Added both. New browser-driven sse-eviction test asserts a
hidden user's card actually evicts from an open feed with no reload — the
backend-only SseListener checks couldn't catch this.
Minor items folded in:
- admin dashboard bounces a mid-session-demoted admin to /feed via live
/me/context (mirrors the host page) instead of a dead error screen.
- feed "new posts" pill cleared on any full refresh (pull-to-refresh no longer
strands it).
- corrected the stale sse.rs comment (banned users may hold a read-only stream).
Verified: backend 35 unit tests; svelte-check 0 errors; e2e 04-host + comment-ui
+ export-leak 13/13 on chromium (incl. the two new regression tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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80179357a7 |
fix(review-2): high — read-only ban model, failed-compression cleanup, live SSE eviction
H1: corrected a round-1 over-reach. Bans are read-only per USER_JOURNEYS §10:
the base AuthUser extractor no longer rejects banned users (they keep read
access); Require{Host,Admin} and write handlers enforce the ban via
auth.is_banned → 403 (incl. self-unban). Demoted hosts still lose powers
immediately (live DB role) and are bounced off the dashboard. Also fixed the
login/recover redirect regression on unauthenticated 401.
H2: failed compression now self-heals instead of leaving a permanent broken
card — refund the quota, delete the orphaned original, soft-delete the row;
the frontend toasts the uploader and evicts the card on upload-error.
H3: self-delete, ban-with-hide (user-hidden), and comment-deletes now broadcast
SSE; feed, diashow, and lightbox evict the affected content live instead of
waiting for a reload. sse-eviction.spec.ts covers it.
Riders: feed/+page.svelte also carries the medium truncated-delta pill; host.rs
also carries the low atomic release_gallery claim; admin/+page.svelte also drops
the dead compression_concurrency control (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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41ac742af8 |
test+docs: tighten H1 assertions, cover secret/XFF edges, document boot & SSE-ban
Re-review follow-ups (non-blocking quality items): Tests: - moderation H1 specs now assert exact `→ 403` instead of bare .rejects.toThrow(), so a spurious 500 can no longer masquerade as "revocation worked". - config: added case-insensitivity (upper/mixed-case placeholder) and the len==32/31 boundary cases for validate_secrets. - rate_limiter: added the trailing-comma empty-entry case for client_ip (must fall back, not return ""). (Backend unit tests: 35 pass.) Docs: - README: note that with APP_ENV=production a placeholder .env makes the app refuse to boot and Caddy wait unhealthy — reason is in `docker compose logs app`. - SECURITY-BACKLOG + sse.rs comment: document that a mid-session ban does not tear down an already-open SSE stream (new tickets are blocked; low blast radius). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fabi
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91ff961850 |
fix(security): medium/low — event-lock, atomic config, a11y, diashow, hygiene
- social: likes/comments rejected on a closed event (e2e proven). - admin: patch_config validates-then-writes atomically; char-based length. - hashtag/comment models: atomic tag writes in edit + comment paths. - Modal: inert the background (modal-inert action) for screen readers. - sse.ts: idempotent visibilitychange listener (no duplicate reconnects). - diashow: videos advance on `ended` (transitions + page wiring). - docs/hygiene: README clone-case fix; removed stale committed .env.test and gitignored it; docker-compose.dev.yml tidy. Left documented as accepted-risk per plan: PIN-persist-after-logout, UUID-reachable hidden uploads, DECISION-media-auth.md. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fabi
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f08d858281 |
fix(security): high — live authz, XFF, SSE buffering, atomicity, pagination
H1: auth extractor re-reads the live user row — trusts the DB role (not the
JWT claim) and rejects banned users mid-session. e2e proves a demoted
host loses powers and a banned host is locked out and can't self-unban.
H2: client_ip takes the right-most XFF hop (the one Caddy appends); spoofed
left-most entries are ignored, restoring IP-based throttles.
H3: Caddy excludes /api/v1/stream from `encode` so SSE isn't buffered.
H4: upload — quota increment + row insert + hashtag links now one txn.
H5: feed keyset pagination tiebroken on (created_at, id) + composite index
(migration 010); feed_delta bounded with LIMIT.
H7: LightboxModal keys its comment load off upload.id, ending the
SSE-driven refetch storm.
H8: CSP via SvelteKit kit.csp (svelte.config.js) hardens the localStorage
token model against injection.
Migration 010 also adds the latent comment/comment_hashtag indexes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
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498b4e256b |
fix(security): critical — repair PIN reset + enforce real prod secrets
C1: reset_user_pin wrote to a non-existent column (pin_failed_attempts);
the real column is failed_pin_attempts, so every PIN reset 500'd. Fixed
the column name; new e2e (pin-reset.spec.ts) proves a reset returns a
usable PIN and the target can recover with it.
C2: config.rs::validate_secrets now rejects placeholder-ish secrets
(change_me/dev_secret/placeholder), enforces len>=32 in prod, and
requires a real ADMIN_PASSWORD_HASH. docker-compose.yml sets
APP_ENV=production so the guard actually runs. Corrected the false
"fixed" claim in SECURITY-BACKLOG.md. .env.example documents the rule.
Riders in these files (documented here since git can't split hunks):
- host.rs also carries the event-scoped ban_user fix and the
close_event/open_event no-op broadcast guard (medium).
- docker-compose.yml also adds ORIGIN (H6), app/frontend healthchecks with
Caddy waiting on health, and per-service memory limits (medium).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MechaCat02
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e42d8a92a1 |
feat(e2e): Playwright suite — 134 tests across 9 spec areas + UA matrix
Adds an end-to-end Playwright test suite under e2e/ that spins up an
isolated docker-compose stack (Postgres :55432, Caddy :3101, backend with
EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1, SvelteKit adapter-node frontend) and exercises the
SvelteKit app against the real Rust backend.
Phase 1 — happy paths covering every documented USER_JOURNEYS.md flow:
01-auth/ join, recover, admin login, leave event, PIN lockout
02-upload/ gallery picker (API path), rate-limit + admin toggle
03-feed/ like/comment SSE, filters, SSE reconnect on visibility
04-host/ event lock API, ban/unban, promote
05-admin/ config validation, foundational authz guards, stats
06-export/ /export status + download stub
__smoke/ cross-UA happy-path (runs on every UA project)
Phase 2 — adversarial + browser chaos:
07-adversarial/ XSS payloads (6 × display name path), SQLi shapes,
length / encoding / RTL override / NUL byte;
file-upload boundaries (ELF body claimed as JPEG,
oversize vs max_image_size_mb, zero-byte, NUL
filename, path-traversal, SVG-with-script);
JWT alg:none, signature/payload tamper, expired
session, PIN brute-force (serial + parallel),
admin password brute-force; deep authz (cross-user
delete, banned user across like/comment/feed-read,
host→admin escalation); small-scale DDoS (20× /join,
10MB comment body, 10 concurrent SSE).
08-browser-chaos/ localStorage / sessionStorage / cookie purge,
IndexedDB drop mid-session, offline → reconnect,
slow-3G, 503 flakes, 429 with no retry storm,
multi-tab same/different user, no-JS, hostile CSS,
clock skew ±1h / -2d, localStorage quota exhausted.
Phase 3 — mobile gestures (runs only on chromium-mobile / Pixel 7):
09-mobile/ touch-target ≥44px audit, env(safe-area-inset-bottom)
structural check, long-press (FeedListCard → ContextSheet,
quick-tap negation, click-suppression), double-tap
(feed card like + lightbox heart-burst, via synthetic
pointer events to bypass the first-tap-fires-click trap),
viewport reflow (portrait/landscape/narrow/phablet),
plus fixme stubs documenting planned gestures (swipe
lightbox L/R, swipe-down dismiss, pull-to-refresh,
long-press-comment).
Cross-UA matrix (chromium-engine projects run @smoke only):
chromium-pixel7, chromium-galaxy-s22, samsung-internet (Samsung UA
emulation on Galaxy viewport), edge-android, plus webkit-iphone,
chrome-ios, firefox-android, firefox-desktop — the latter four need
libavif16 on the host (Playwright dep) but the configs are in place.
Infrastructure:
- fixtures/test.ts central test.extend (api, db, adminToken, guest,
host, signIn). Per-test DB truncate via the dev-only POST
/admin/__truncate route, gated by EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1.
- helpers/sse-listener.ts, helpers/upload-client.ts (Node-side
multipart for adversarial file-upload tests + JPEG/PNG/ELF magic
constants), helpers/touch.ts (longPress / doubleTap / swipe /
inlineStyle / computedStyle).
- 10 page objects covering every route + UploadSheet/Lightbox.
- global-setup waits for /health, logs in admin, disables every
rate-limit and quota toggle.
- .github/workflows/e2e.yml: PR check runs chromium-desktop + the
smoke matrix in parallel, uploads playwright-report/ and traces on
failure.
Findings the suite surfaces as live `[finding]` warnings (not silenced):
1. /admin/login has no rate-limit or lockout (bcrypt cost only).
2. PIN-attempt counter races under parallel /recover requests.
3. Zero-byte uploads pass /api/v1/upload.
4. SVG-with-script can pass the magic-byte check (consider CSP +
X-Content-Type-Options on /media/*).
Stack-internal docs live in e2e/README.md (UA tier table, Samsung
Internet escalation tiers A/B/C, debugging tips, roadmap).
Final tally: 134 passed / 0 failed / 9 skipped (test.fixme stubs for
not-yet-shipped gestures and one UI-upload-flow investigation).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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