ef6d3a077ab8770910246e8c3999d9ea57512109
29 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
MechaCat02
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61119be817 |
Merge branch 'fix/deploy-unattended-blockers' into main
Two independent lines of production hardening diverged at |
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Fabian Hamm (Privat)
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faea555967 |
fix(ops): make /health a readiness probe, and bound how long the pool waits
`/health` returned the literal string "ok" and touched nothing. Every request in this app needs the database, so that answered a question nobody asked: the container reported healthy while every request 500'd, and with no operator watching during the event there was no signal at all. It now runs `SELECT 1` with a 2s timeout. Verified live against the production stack: 200, stop Postgres, 503 "database timeout", start Postgres, 200 again — with no app restart, because sqlx revalidates on acquire. Deliberately NOT wired to automatic recovery. Compose's `restart: unless-stopped` does not react to healthcheck state anyway, and an autoheal sidecar would be actively wrong here: it would truncate every in-flight upload to "fix" an outage that, as the test above shows, clears on its own. This is a diagnostic — including for the runbook's event-day `curl`. The pool had only `max_connections` set. Three additions: - `acquire_timeout(5s)`. sqlx defaults to 30, so a DB blip parked every request AND all ~100 SSE session revalidations for half a minute before erroring — the app looked hung rather than degraded, and the backlog outlived the blip. - `min_connections(2)`, so the first request after the setup-to-guests-arriving gap doesn't pay TCP + auth. - `statement_timeout=15s` / `lock_timeout=5s` per connection. Without them a single pathological query holds a pool slot indefinitely and no client-side timeout can take it back, because the slot is only released when Postgres finishes. Those two SETs are sent as two statements. `sqlx::query` uses the extended query protocol, which permits exactly one per call — as `SET a; SET b` every new connection failed, which surfaced as the pool never opening one and `create_pool` reporting a connect timeout. Caught by booting against an empty database rather than a warm one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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MechaCat02
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5969ec74ea |
fix(compression): bound derivative retries so one bad upload can't loop forever
The OOM in the previous commit was survivable; what made it an outage was that it repeated. The upload row is committed before compression starts, derivatives_rev defaults to 0, and set_derivatives_rev only runs on success — so a row whose processing killed the container survived at rev 0, and backfill_stale_derivatives (called unconditionally at every boot) re-selected it and re-ran the identical workload. With restart: unless-stopped that is an infinite kill loop, and every cycle also drops every SSE stream and truncates every in-flight upload. Verified end to end against the real schema in a scratch database: with the new guard the backfill selects the row on boots 1-3 and zero rows from boot 4 on, and a later success resets the counter. migration 021 adds derivative_attempts and derivative_last_error. The counter is incremented WRITE-AHEAD, before the work is attempted. This is the whole design: the failure being bounded is a cgroup SIGKILL, so no Err is returned, no error handler runs and no Drop fires. A counter bumped in a failure path increments zero times per crash and the loop would be unchanged. set_derivatives_rev clears it, so success is the only reset and both the live path and the backfill get it without a new call site to forget. Also in the backfill: - one task walking the rows sequentially instead of one task per row. A large backlog used to spawn thousands of tasks, each holding a pool handle and queueing on the same two permits, competing with live uploads for a whole boot. - LIMIT 200 per boot, and original_path <> '' replacing an IS NOT NULL that was dead (the column is NOT NULL; cleanup_deleted_media blanks it instead). - a once-per-boot error log naming how many uploads have given up. Without it the give-up is invisible — the loop stops, which is the point, but the photos keep a stale derivative forever with nothing to notice. Adds backfill_video_posters for the mirror-image gap: a video interrupted by a restart has its compression_status flipped processing -> failed by startup_recovery and is never re-enqueued, so thumbnail_path stays NULL for the rest of the event while the clip itself plays fine. It shares the same attempt budget, which means a genuinely posterless sub-second clip (Live Photo, mis-tap) stops being re-ffmpeg'd after three boots. That is intended, not a bug to fix later — Ok(false) is a normal permanent outcome there. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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MechaCat02
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6fd75adb27 |
fix(ops): bound logs, drain ffmpeg's stderr, and stop three silent hangs
Six independent operational defects, none of which needed a new feature to fix. Log rotation. Docker's json-file driver is unbounded by default, and those files land on the HOST filesystem — outside every deploy.resources.limits in the compose file, and on the same disk as postgres_data and media_data. A full disk stops Postgres writing WAL, which takes the event down. Capped at 10m x 3 per service. Log level. RUST_LOG was set in neither .env.example nor docker-compose.yml, so the code fallback WAS the production level — and it was `debug`, with tower_http=debug emitting a line per request and per response into that unrotated file. Now info, with tower_http=warn to state that those spans are diagnostics, not an access log. ffmpeg pipe deadlock. run_ffmpeg piped stdout and stderr and then called wait(), which drains neither. Once the ~64 KiB pipe buffer filled, ffmpeg blocked writing and wait() never returned — burning the full 120s timeout, twice per seek position, three times per compression attempt. And the timeout is an Err, so the end state was a soft-deleted upload: a guest's playable video destroyed by a poster-frame failure. Now stdout is null (nothing ever read it) and stderr is drained by wait_with_output, whose tail is logged on a non-zero exit. Note wait_with_output consumes the child, so the old kill-on-timeout is gone; kill_on_drop(true) already covers it. Readiness probe. /health never touched the pool, so the disk-full endgame above stayed green all the way down. Adds /health/ready (SELECT 1 under 2s) as a SECOND route — the compose healthcheck deliberately keeps pointing at /health, because caddy gates its startup on it and a DB-dependent probe would turn a Postgres blip into the reverse proxy refusing to start. api.ts request timeout. The abort timer was cleared in a finally around fetch(), which resolves on the response HEAD — leaving res.text() uncovered and no longer abortable. An upstream that sends headers then stalls the body hung the call forever. The timer now lives until the body is read, including the 204 path (which otherwise leaked a live 20s timer per no-content request). Upload XHR watchdog. The XHR had no timeout while processQueue held the isProcessing latch across it; on a half-open socket neither error nor abort ever fires, so the latch pinned and the queue wedged. Bounds SILENCE rather than total duration — a 500 MB video over a venue uplink legitimately runs 30+ minutes while making steady progress. Rejects as NetworkError, which is already the retryable branch, so a stalled upload now recovers like any network blip. IndexedDB failures. addToQueue called getDb() unguarded and handleSubmit had no catch, so a private-mode refusal or a QuotaExceededError on a large blob left a permanent "Wird hochgeladen…" spinner, no toast, and — for an in-app camera capture — the only copy of the photo gone. Now reported as 'failed', which keeps the staged files on screen and stays on the page. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fabi
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b601c062bd |
fix(audit-2): video playback, role identity, keepsake EXIF, recover ceiling, WebKit CI
Second round: the two regressions the first round introduced, the remaining
gaps it left, and the CI change that makes the iOS guarantees actually gate a
change rather than being asserted.
Squashed from 9 commits, original messages preserved below.
──────── docs(deploy): document the update path — `up -d` alone ships nothing
The README only ever described a fresh install. There was no update section
anywhere, and `--build` appeared nowhere in the docs.
That matters because `app` and `frontend` are `build:` services with no published
image tag, and Compose has no source-change detection: if an image by that name
exists it is reused. So the natural `git pull && docker compose up -d` reports
"Container app-1 Running", rebuilds nothing, and exits 0. A deploy that shipped
none of the new code is indistinguishable from a successful one — which is how
eleven merged fixes can sit in the repo and never reach the box.
Verified both halves against a real stack rather than asserting them: with a
source change staged, `up -d` left the image ID untouched; `up -d --build`
produced a new image ID and a healthy /health.
Adds an "Updating an existing deployment" section covering backup-before-migrate,
pull, rebuild, health check, and an image-ID comparison to prove a build actually
happened. Also spells out the rollback trap: migrations run on boot and are not
undone by checking out an older commit, so rolling back code without restoring
the snapshot leaves the schema ahead of the binary and the app refusing to start.
──────── fix(video): play the actual video, and answer Range requests
Every video in the app was unplayable. Two independent defects, either one
sufficient on its own, and nothing in the suite covered either — no test
anywhere played media or asserted a `<video>` src.
1. The lightbox handed `<video>` a JPEG.
`pickMediaUrl` is mime-agnostic, and compression only ever produces a THUMBNAIL
for a video (one `ffmpeg -vframes 1` frame) — no preview, no display. So in the
DEFAULT saver mode the element's src resolved to `/api/v1/upload/{id}/thumbnail`,
served as `image/jpeg` with `nosniff` so the browser can't even sniff its way
out. Chromium reports DEMUXER_ERROR_COULD_NOT_OPEN.
Fixed in the lightbox rather than in `pickMediaUrl`: FeedListCard shares that
helper and legitimately wants the thumbnail for its `<img>` poster, so a central
mime branch would break the feed. This mirrors the rule the diashow already
applies ("videos play the original file directly"). Added `preload="none"` so
saver-mode guests on cellular still fetch nothing until they press play — there
is no smaller video derivative to offer them — plus `playsinline`, without which
iOS hijacks playback into fullscreen.
2. `stream_media_file` ignored Range entirely.
It took no request headers, so it could not see `Range`; it always returned 200
with the whole body and never sent Accept-Ranges or Content-Range. iOS Safari
opens every `<video>` with a `Range: bytes=0-1` probe and abandons the load
without a 206 — so video failed on the app's primary platform even in `original`
mode, where the src was already correct.
Adds single-range support (`bytes=N-`, `bytes=N-M`, `bytes=-S`) with 206 +
Content-Range, 416 + `bytes */len` past EOF, and Accept-Ranges advertised on
every response. Anything it won't handle — multi-range, non-bytes units, garbage
— falls back to a full 200, which RFC 9110 explicitly permits and which is safer
than guessing. All four media routes share the helper, so seeking works
uniformly.
`get_original` now serves `inline` instead of `attachment`. An attachment
disposition is hostile to a `<video>` element, and this route is the only source
of playable video bytes; it also matches what the UI promises, since the action
is labelled "Original anzeigen" — view, not download. `no-store` is deliberately
kept so a takedown still revokes access promptly; ranges work fine under it, the
client just re-fetches.
Tests: 11 unit tests pin the parser (the iOS `bytes=0-1` probe, inclusive ends,
suffix ranges, clamping past EOF, 416 vs 200, malformed fallbacks). A new
03-feed/video-playback spec asserts the src is the original and not the
thumbnail, that the browser accepts the bytes as media (readyState > 0, no
MediaError), that no video bytes are delivered before play, and that Range
returns the correct 206 slices and a 416 past EOF — verified on both Chromium
and WebKit.
The "not downloaded before play" test asserts no *delivered body* rather than no
request: WebKit opens a connection for a preload="none" video and immediately
aborts it (GET, no Range, status 0, nothing transferred) while Chromium issues
nothing at all. The portable guarantee is that no response carrying bytes
completes.
──────── fix(auth): bind the role store to the identity, not to the tab
The role store I added in the moderation work is a module-level singleton seeded
ONCE at import. `goto()` is a client-side navigation, so leaving and re-joining in
the same tab re-imports no module and re-runs no onMount — the previous user's
role simply stayed resident. Nothing reset it: not join, recover, admin login,
"Event verlassen", `clearAuth`, nor the api.ts 401 auto-clear.
So a host who left, followed by a guest joining on the same phone, left that guest
with `isStaff === true` and a "🚫 Beitrag entfernen" action on other people's
photos. The backend 403s the delete, so this was a false affordance rather than a
privilege escalation — but `/feed` never fetched `/me/context`, so unlike every
other route it never self-corrected either. It survived until a hard reload.
The mirror case was equally broken and easier to overlook: a guest who recovered
into a host account got NO host affordances.
`clearAuth` already had a hook registry for exactly this shape of problem, with a
comment explaining it exists to avoid circular imports. Add the missing mirror,
`onSetAuth`, fired by both `setAuth` and `setAdminAuth` after the new token is
resident, and have the role store register on both sides: clear to null on
logout, re-seed from the new token on login. That also gives
`syncRoleFromToken` — dead code with zero callers since I introduced it — its
intended purpose.
Seeding from the claim fixes the reported bug, but the claim is frozen for the
token's 30-day life, so a promotion or demotion still wouldn't reach the feed.
`/feed` now calls the existing `refreshEventState()` on mount, which fetches
`/me/context` and applies both the authoritative role and the lock/release state
in one request. The feed is the one route gating a destructive action on the role,
so it should not be the only route running on a stale claim.
Tests: 04-host/role-identity-reset drives the real flows. The first asserts the
host DOES see the action before asserting the newcomer does not — a negative
assertion alone would pass against a build that shipped no moderation at all. The
second covers the mirror, promoting a guest server-side while their resident token
still claims `role: guest`, so a fix that only cleared the role would fail it.
──────── fix(compression): reclaim failed originals instead of leaking them
Round 1 stopped the compression worker deleting an upload's original on failure —
a transient ENOSPC or a codec panic must never destroy the only copy of a photo a
guest cannot retake. But it left `Upload::soft_delete`'s quota refund in place, so
the bytes stayed on disk while the uploader was charged nothing for them.
That is worse than it first looks. The row is soft-deleted, so the file is
invisible and unowned; a guest hitting a reproducible codec failure can accumulate
orphans indefinitely at zero personal cost. And `active_uploaders` counts only
users with non-deleted uploads, so dropping out of that count RAISES everyone's
per-user ceiling — the leak loosens the very quota meant to contain it.
Keep the refund: the uploader didn't cause the failure and shouldn't silently lose
quota to it. Bound the leak instead, with an hourly sweep alongside the existing
session cleanup in `spawn_periodic_tasks`, reclaiming failed originals older than
14 days — comfortably longer than any single event, so an operator investigating a
failed upload still has the file.
The selection predicate is the entire safety argument, so it is deliberately
narrow: `compression_status = 'failed'` AND soft-deleted AND past the window AND
`original_path <> ''`. That is exactly the state the give-up path leaves behind,
and it cannot reach a live upload, an owner-deleted one, or a failure still inside
its recovery window. `original_path` is cleared after a successful reclaim, which
makes the sweep idempotent — otherwise a row whose file is already gone is
re-selected on every tick forever. The row itself is kept as the audit trail.
Tests reproduce the selection verbatim (same pattern as upload_concurrency) and
assert it against five near-misses that must survive, both sides of the retention
boundary, and the idempotence property.
Also fixes two comments in export.rs still claiming "the compression worker
hard-deletes an original when its transcode fails" — no longer true, and the
defensive handling they justify is now justified by this sweep and by ordinary
deletes instead.
──────── fix(export): apply EXIF orientation in the keepsake too
Round 1 fixed EXIF orientation in the compression worker, which corrected the live
app — feed preview and diashow display. The export worker was missed, and it does
not reuse those derivatives: it re-decodes the originals itself with `image::open`,
which ignores the orientation tag, then re-encodes to JPEG, which drops the tag —
so the viewer has no way to recover it.
The damage was oddly shaped, which is exactly why it reads as a viewer bug:
Gallery.zip originals correct (byte-copied, EXIF intact)
Memories viewer grid thumbnails SIDEWAYS (always)
Memories viewer full image >5 MB SIDEWAYS (re-encoded at 2000px)
Memories viewer full image ≤5 MB correct (streamed byte-for-byte)
So in the keepsake people actually keep, every portrait photo in the grid was on
its side, and clicking through silently "fixed" small photos but not large ones.
Rather than paste the decoder dance a third time, extract `services::imaging::
decode_oriented` and route both workers through it, so there is exactly one way to
turn a file on disk into a DynamicImage. It carries a second invariant that had
also drifted: `image::open` applies NO decode limits, so the export path was
decoding arbitrary user-supplied images unbounded — the decompression-bomb cap
existed only in the compression worker. Both now come as a pair, which is the
point of having one function.
Not done: switching export to consume the existing `display` derivative. It would
fix orientation and drop a redundant full-resolution decode per photo, but it
would also replace the pristine ≤5 MB originals in the keepsake with 2048px
re-encodes — a real quality regression in the one artefact people keep forever.
Test uploads the round-1 fixture (40x20 landscape tagged Orientation=6), runs a
real export, pulls the thumbnail out of Memories.zip and asserts it came back
portrait — with a sanity check that the source really is stored landscape, so the
test can't pass against a pipeline that does nothing.
──────── fix(recover): cap name cycling, and stop bcrypt blocking the runtime
Round 1 gave /join a per-IP ceiling and left /recover with only its
`recover:{ip}:{name}` bucket. That key is right for the job it was written for —
stopping someone who knows a display name (they're listed on the feed) from
burning the victim's 3-strike PIN counter and locking them out on repeat. But the
name is ATTACKER-CHOSEN, so cycling names mints a fresh 5-attempt bucket every
time and the per-IP cost is unbounded.
What sits behind that limiter makes it worse than a normal flood: every call runs
a cost-12 bcrypt verify, including an UNCONDITIONAL throwaway verify for names
that don't exist — added deliberately to close a timing oracle. So an unknown name
is the single cheapest way to make the server do ~200ms of hashing.
Adds `recover_ip_rate_per_min` (default 30, migration 019), checked BEFORE the
per-name bucket so a name generator can't walk past it. 30/min is far above any
real recovery attempt while capping a flood. The per-name bucket is untouched and
remains the anti-guessing control.
The second half matters as much as the first: bcrypt was running inline on the
async runtime everywhere. At cost 12 that pins a tokio worker thread for ~200ms,
and there is only one per core — so a login flood stalled every other request on
the box, including the feed. There was no spawn_blocking anywhere in the auth
module, despite SECURITY-BACKLOG claiming bcrypt had been offloaded.
Route all of it through `verify_password` / `hash_password` on the blocking pool.
That covers /recover, /admin/login, the host PIN reset, and — the one most likely
to bite at a real event — the PIN hash minted on every single /join. Saturating
the blocking pool degrades logins; saturating the worker threads degrades
everything.
Tests: cycling distinct names from one IP now hits the ceiling with a Retry-After,
and — the assertion that keeps the fix honest — repeated wrong PINs against ONE
name are still throttled with the ceiling set generously high, so the ceiling
added protection rather than replacing it.
──────── ci(e2e): run WebKit, so the iOS guarantees actually gate a PR
The workflow installed only Chromium and ran chromium-desktop + chromium-mobile.
iOS Safari is the app's stated primary user — a wedding guest opening a QR link —
and WebKit is the only engine in the matrix that reproduces two of its behaviours:
- it enforces X-Frame-Options on the hidden download iframe, so a site-wide DENY
makes the keepsake download silently do nothing. Blink hands attachments to
the download manager before the frame check and never notices.
- it abandons a <video> load unless its Range probe gets a 206.
Both of those shipped. Adding 06-export to the webkit project in the round-1 fix
bought nothing on a PR, because CI never ran that project at all — the regression
test written specifically to catch the blocker only ever executed locally.
Runs 71 tests (67 pass, 4 skip on the documented IndexedDB-blob harness
limitation) in ~1.5 minutes locally, using the exact command added here.
──────── chore(backend): satisfy cargo fmt
`checks.yml` runs `cargo fmt --check`, and it has been failing since the round-1
audit fixes: I gated those on `cargo build` and `cargo clippy` but never ran fmt,
so three files drifted then and eight more this round. Pure formatting — no
behaviour change; clippy stays at zero and all 70 backend tests still pass.
Worth noting for next time: clippy passing is not evidence fmt does.
──────── chore: satisfy prettier in frontend and e2e
`checks.yml` runs `npm run format:check` for both projects and both were failing.
- frontend/src/lib/ui-store.ts is mine, unformatted since the round-1 upload-queue
badge fix — the same miss as the rustfmt one: I gated on svelte-check and eslint
but never on format:check.
- e2e/loadtest/* and e2e/shots.mjs have been unformatted since
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fabi
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0c0eed885a |
fix(audit-1): media gating, per-user limits, moderation UI, upload integrity
First audit round: a blocker and eight high-severity findings across the media
access gate, the guest-facing rate limiters, host moderation, and the upload
pipeline — plus the backup commands and the e2e/production divergences that hid
several of them.
Squashed from 7 commits, original messages preserved below.
──────── fix(export): let the keepsake download through X-Frame-Options on iOS
The keepsake download navigates a hidden, same-origin iframe (deliberately:
a top-level navigation to a 404/429 would unload the PWA). Caddy stamped a
site-wide `X-Frame-Options: DENY` that also covered the proxied `/api/*`.
Blink hands a `Content-Disposition: attachment` response to the download
manager at the network layer, so Chromium never noticed. WebKit enforces XFO
on the frame navigation first and aborts the load — so on iOS Safari, the
app's primary platform, tapping Download did nothing at all, silently.
Carve the two export endpoints out to SAMEORIGIN, which still blocks
cross-origin framing. Implemented as two disjoint matchers rather than an
override: Caddy applies the FIRST `header` directive outermost, so it wins on
write and a later, more specific `header` is silently ignored (verified
against the running test stack).
Also close the test gap that let this ship:
- `06-export` ran on chromium-desktop only; add it to `webkit-iphone`, the
only engine that enforces XFO on the download frame.
- No test in the suite ever clicked a download button — every archive
assertion used Node `fetch`, which has no frame and no XFO enforcement.
Add a spec that clicks it and awaits a real `download` event. Verified
falsifiable: with the blanket DENY reinstated it fails and reports the
WebKit refusal as the cause.
- Fix `ExportPage`'s card-scoped locators, which matched nothing: the cards
carry `class="card p-5"` (a Tailwind `@apply` component class), never the
`rounded-xl` the page object looked for. This had left the "shows enabled
download buttons" test red on main.
──────── fix(media): close the percent-escape bypass of the media gate
`/media/%70reviews/{id}.jpg` served a taken-down photo to anyone,
unauthenticated. Verified against the running stack: the literal path 404s,
the escaped one returned 200 with the full image. Same for displays,
thumbnails and originals, and any escaped byte in any position works.
Cause: the block was four `nest_service("/media/previews", 404)` route
matches sitting above a `ServeDir` on `/media`. axum matches on the RAW path
(matchit does no percent-decoding), while `ServeDir` percent-decodes when it
resolves the file. So `%70reviews` missed every blocker, fell through to the
ServeDir, and was decoded back to `previews/` on disk — reaching the bytes
with no soft-delete and no ban-hide check. That defeats a host takedown,
which is the entire point of the gate.
Remove the `/media` route tree outright instead of racing the decoder.
Nothing needs it: every media URL the backend emits is already a gated
`/api/v1/upload/{id}/{original,preview,display,thumbnail}` alias
(handlers::feed), the frontend contains zero `/media/` references, and the
`/media` in config.rs/disk.rs is the filesystem path while `media/` in
export.rs is a path inside the zip. `/media/**` now 404s regardless of
encoding. The route's own comment already said it "serves nothing" — it
wasn't a backstop, it was the vector.
Caddy keeps proxying /media/* deliberately: the app 404s it, and forwarding
means the e2e gating specs exercise the app's refusal exactly as production
would rather than being masked by the SvelteKit 404 page.
Extend the gating spec with the encoded variants — asserting only the literal
spelling is what let this sit undetected.
──────── fix(rate-limit): key the guest-facing limiters per user, not per IP
At a venue every guest is behind one NAT, so an IP-keyed limiter hands the
whole party a single bucket. On a fresh deploy 12 guests arriving together
meant 5 joined and 7 were turned away, with no Retry-After telling them when
to retry. `/feed` (60/min) and `/export` (3 per DAY — the fourth guest to
fetch their keepsake locked out until tomorrow) had the same defect.
`feed_delta` was already keyed per-user and its comment states the exact
rationale ("so one client can't starve others behind a shared NAT"); this
makes its siblings match.
- feed:{ip} -> feed:{user_id} (auth was already in scope)
- export:{ip} -> export:{user_id} (resolved from the download ticket's
session, which was previously looked up and discarded)
- join:{ip}: pre-auth, so there is no user to key on. Split in two — a loose
per-IP ceiling that only bounds raw volume (new `join_ip_rate_per_min`,
default 60, migration 017), plus the real 5/60s anti-spam bucket keyed
per (ip, name), mirroring the existing `recover:{ip}:{name}`.
admin_login / recover / pin_reset_req stay IP-keyed on purpose and are now
commented as such: they guard credential guessing, where a per-user or
per-name key would just hand an attacker a fresh bucket per guess.
Retry-After: the machinery existed but 7 of 8 sites called `check()` and
hard-coded `None`, so a throttled client was told to back off but never for
how long. Delete the bool `check()` wrapper entirely so `check_with_retry`
is the only entry point and the delay cannot be discarded by accident. Also
surface it for the PIN lockout, where the deadline was already known.
Fix the "unknown" fallback while here: every client_ip() caller passed that
literal, so any request without X-Forwarded-For — anything reaching the app
directly rather than through Caddy — shared ONE global bucket. Serve with
connect-info and use the peer address.
Tests: the reseed forces every limiter toggle off before each test, which is
why this whole class was invisible. Add 01-auth/rate-limit-shared-nat, which
enables them and asserts 12 guests share an IP without collision, that one
guest hammering their own name IS still throttled (so the fix re-keys rather
than removes the limit), and that feed/export buckets are per-user. Retarget
the ddos join test at the new per-IP ceiling — it asserted the defect.
Also seed `admin_login_rate_enabled` (read by the handler, seeded by no
migration and no reseed) and register `join_ip_rate_per_min` in the admin
config allowlist. Unrelated pre-existing red test fixed: 01-auth/join
asserted a "Willkommen!" heading the wedding redesign removed.
──────── feat(moderation): let a host remove a guest's photo or comment from the UI
`DELETE /host/upload/{id}` and `DELETE /host/comment/{id}` were complete on the
backend — transactional, SSE-broadcasting, audit-logged — and had zero frontend
callers. The feed context sheet offered "Löschen" only when
`target.user_id === myUserId`, so the only lever a host actually had against an
unwanted photo was banning the uploader.
That is both disproportionate and ineffective. A ban doesn't retract what was
already posted, and it makes things strictly worse for comments: the ban check
runs BEFORE the ownership check on the guest delete route, so banning an abusive
author leaves their comment on screen and permanently undeletable by them. With
no host affordance, nobody could remove it at all.
- feed: hosts/admins get "Beitrag entfernen" on other people's posts, routed to
the host endpoint (the guest route 403s anything the caller doesn't own) with
moderation-specific confirm copy. Own-post "Löschen" is unchanged.
- lightbox: same for comments, via /host/comment/{id}.
- Ban semantics are deliberately untouched (USER_JOURNEYS §10 — banned users keep
read access and cannot write). The deadlock is broken by giving the host a way
in, not by loosening the ban.
Live role (this had to come first). `getRole()` decodes the JWT claim, but the
token is never reissued — the backend slides the session row forward and treats
the DB row as authoritative. The claim is therefore frozen for the token's
lifetime: up to 30 days. A guest promoted at the party saw no Host-Dashboard and
no moderation actions until they signed out and back in, even though
`/me/context` had been returning their real role on every page load and 4 of its
6 call sites dropped the field on the floor.
Add `role-store.ts`: seeded from the claim so there's no flash of the wrong nav,
then corrected by every `/me/context` response. Point the ad-hoc `getRole()`
callers at it (account, upload, host, admin, and the new feed gate). The host and
admin dashboards now derive `myRole` reactively, so a demotion disables their
controls immediately instead of at next login.
Tests: 04-host/moderation-ui drives the real UI — host removes a guest photo and
it's gone from /feed server-side; a plain guest is offered nothing on someone
else's post (the mirror that keeps the first test honest); a promoted guest gains
the dashboard on reload while their token still carries `role: guest`; and a host
removes the comment of an already-banned guest, asserting first that the author's
own delete 403s so the deadlock is real.
──────── fix(upload): stop destroying originals, apply EXIF orientation, surface rejections
Three defects in the same pipeline, each of which loses a photo or misrepresents
one.
1. A transient error destroyed the guest's only copy.
`process`'s error arm unconditionally `remove_file`d the original. Every failure
routed there: `create_dir_all`, both derivative `save_with_format` calls (disk
full is the canonical case, and it arrives exactly when many guests upload at
once), a panic inside the image codec, or a momentary DB-pool exhaustion. The
row is only SOFT-deleted, so the bytes were the sole unrecoverable part — and
they were the part we deleted. The author already knew this was wrong next door:
`backfill_missing_display` says it "must NEVER soft-delete an upload that already
has a working preview".
Retry up to 3 times with backoff (re-checking the e2e generation guard after each
sleep), and on final failure keep the refund + soft-delete but leave the original
on disk, logging its path. A failed upload is now recoverable instead of gone.
2. Every portrait photo was stored sideways.
Phones don't rotate sensor data — they record the camera orientation in EXIF and
store the pixels as shot. `decode()` returns those raw pixels and the JPEG
re-encode writes no EXIF, so the 800px preview, the 2048px diashow display and
the keepsake were all rotated 90°, while "Original anzeigen" rendered upright
because the original keeps its tag. That asymmetry is why it reads as a viewer
bug. There was no EXIF handling anywhere in the repo and no exif crate.
Read the tag via `into_decoder()` (which carries the decode Limits through, so
the decompression-bomb cap is untouched) and apply it. Missing/malformed tags
fall back to NoTransforms — most images have none.
Existing derivatives are already baked wrong, so migration 018 adds
`derivatives_rev` and `backfill_missing_display` becomes
`backfill_stale_derivatives`: it now also picks up anything below the current rev
and regenerates it once from the original, which still carries its EXIF. Videos
are marked current in the migration — ffmpeg already honours the rotation matrix.
Bump DERIVATIVES_REV for any future change that invalidates derivatives.
3. A rejected upload vanished without a word.
`UploadQueue.svelte` — 162 lines holding the ONLY renderer of an item's error
text, the only "Erneut" retry button and the only rate-limit countdown — was
never imported anywhere, so `retryItem`, `removeItem` and `clearCompleted` were
unreachable at runtime. On a terminal rejection the store purged the blob and
wrote a clear German reason into `entry.error` "so the UI shows a clear reason".
There was no such UI. And `uploadBadgeCount` counted only pending/uploading, so
the badge decremented exactly as if the upload had succeeded.
Mount the queue on /upload, toast the reason immediately (the flow sends the user
to /feed straight after staging, so the list alone would still miss them), and
count blocked/error in the badge so a failure can't read as success.
Tests: 02-upload/exif-orientation uploads a 40x20 fixture tagged Orientation=6
and asserts both derivatives come back PORTRAIT, with a sanity check that the
source really is stored landscape. 02-upload/rejection-visible bans the uploader
between staging and sending, then asserts the toast, the queue row with the
server's reason, and that the item is still counted.
Note: 02-upload/quota's 4 failures are pre-existing and unrelated — see the next
commit.
──────── docs(backup): make the backup commands work; fix the e2e/prod divergences
Backup. Both documented commands failed on the shipped stack, and the sentence
explaining them was wrong too:
- `pg_dump $DATABASE_URL` — `DATABASE_URL` is only ever in the compose
environment, never an operator's shell, and it points at `db:5432`, which is
compose-internal DNS. The app image has no postgres client either.
- `> /media/backups/…` — `/media` is a named volume mounted inside the app
container, not a host path, and nothing ever creates a `backups` subdirectory.
- `rsync /opt/eventsnap/media/` — that path does not exist anywhere.
- "a single path to back up" — false, and dangerously so: exports were moved to
their own `exports_data` volume precisely so a keepsake (which contains every
photo in the event) can't be served off the media tree. Backing up only
`media_data` silently loses every generated keepsake.
Rewritten as three commands — db via `docker compose exec -T db pg_dump`, and one
`docker run … tar` per volume — all verified against the running stack. The
volume mounts use `/src`, not `/media`: I hit the footgun while testing this.
Docker pre-populates an EMPTY volume from the image's own directory and chowns it
to match, so `-v media_data:/media alpine` tars alpine's cdrom/floppy/usb, writes
them into the volume, and leaves it root-owned so the non-root app can no longer
write. Mounting where the image has nothing avoids all of it. Documented inline
so the next person doesn't rediscover it.
Also correct the architecture notes: `/media/*` no longer routes to the backend
(that static tree was removed as a gating bypass), and `exports_data` was missing
from the volume list — the one volume an operator most needs to know about.
e2e stack: add the `EXPORT_PATH` + `/exports` volume it was missing. The file
says "mirrors production layout"; without these, exports landed on the container's
writable layer at the default path, so export-leak and export-video wrote real
archives into ephemeral storage and the "exports live outside media" invariant
was never actually exercised.
Pre-existing red test, unrelated to the audit: all four 02-upload/quota tests
have been failing since
|
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MechaCat02
|
3fb1b5d80d |
feat(comments): hide every comment mention when COMMENTS_ENABLED=false
The kill-switch previously left comment UI/text visible in several places. Sweep the whole surface so a comments-off instance shows no trace: Frontend (main app): - VirtualFeed grid tile: gate the comment button/count on $commentsEnabled (was ungated — the only feed surface still showing it). - admin stats: hide the "Kommentare" count card. - UploadSheet "Uploads geschlossen" notice, host ban-modal description, and host/admin unban confirmations: drop the "…und kommentieren" wording. - export page: drop "Kommentaren" from the keepsake description. Keepsake export (had no concept of the flag): - export.rs: thread comments_enabled into the exported data (ViewerEvent), wired through spawn_export_jobs/recover_exports and their call sites (host.rs, main.rs). - export-viewer: gate comment counts (list + grid) and the lightbox comments section; older exports without the field default to enabled (?? true). Backend still 403s comment writes when disabled (unchanged) — this is the UI half so stale clients and archives match. Verified on the running stack (COMMENTS_ENABLED=false): /event reports comments_enabled=false, a regenerated keepsake embeds "comments_enabled": false with no comment UI, and the uploads-closed notice renders "…ansehen und liken." Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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MechaCat02
|
5009590882 |
feat(diashow): guarantee all eligible photos shown + 2048px display derivative
Diashow completeness rewrite so every eligible upload is shown regardless of
bursts, disconnects, or library size:
- queue.ts: SlideQueue with live/shuffle queues, allKnown map, recentlyShown
ring; merge(dedup, live-first), remove/removeByUser (prunes recentlyShown),
knownIds for reconcile-eviction. Adds queue.test.ts (burst/completeness/race).
- diashow/+page.svelte: reconcile (full paginate + evict, pre-scan snapshot to
spare concurrent uploads) on mount/reconnect/periodic; catchUpNew paginate-
until-known for bursts with debounced maxWait; hard-cut removals; decode
timeout + candidate fallback + bounded skip so a broken image never stalls.
New ~2048px "display" derivative for big-screen sharpness, decoupled from the
data-saver preview (800px) used on phones:
- migration 016: upload.display_path + v_feed rebuilt (DROP+CREATE, not REPLACE,
to slot the column beside preview/thumbnail).
- compression: generate_image_derivatives emits preview+display (downscale-only
guard, no upscaling); backfill_missing_display regenerates on startup (safe:
logs on error, never soft-deletes).
- upload.rs/main.rs: GET /upload/{id}/display (mirrors preview auth/cache),
/media/displays direct-serve blocked.
- feed.rs + types.ts: display_url in feed/delta DTOs.
- diashow candidate chain: display -> original -> preview.
Verified on the running stack: migration applied, 10/10 existing images
backfilled (2048px cap honoured, small images not upscaled), /display serves
200, /feed returns display_url, diashow cycles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
fabi
|
ee554e7f38 |
style(backend): rustfmt the whole tree; gate cargo fmt --check in CI
The backend had never been run through rustfmt. Doing it in one mechanical pass (134 files) so no future functional diff is buried under formatting churn, then gating `cargo fmt --check` in checks.yml so it stays clean. Formatting only — no logic, SQL, or behaviour changed. Verified after the reformat: cargo test 56 passed, clippy --all-targets -D warnings clean, cargo fmt --check clean. This is the deferred cleanup noted when CI's Format step was first left out. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
fabi
|
9666d74a46 |
fix(export): close all 13 findings from the multi-agent review
A 6-lens multi-agent review (103 agents; every finding adversarially verified by three
refute-by-default skeptics) confirmed the epoch redesign is sound — the core invariant
holds — and found 13 real defects around it. All are fixed here.
The redesign's invariant was re-verified and stands: an accepted upload is always in the
keepsake, and a downloadable keepsake always reflects the most recent release.
But a WEAKER adjacent invariant did NOT hold — "a downloadable keepsake reflects the
current content" — and that is the theme of the biggest fixes.
CONTENT REMOVAL NOW ALWAYS REACHES THE KEEPSAKE
Regeneration was wired only to host deletes. Ban, unban, guest self-delete and guest
comment-delete did not trigger it — yet the export query filters `is_banned = FALSE`,
so the pipeline already agreed that content must not be there. Ban someone for abusive
content after release and every guest kept downloading an archive containing it.
All five removal paths now invalidate and rebuild. `query_comments` also gained the
banned/hidden filter it was missing entirely (the ZIP had it; the viewer did not).
Each removal is now ATOMIC with its invalidation (one tx, models made executor-generic).
Previously the delete committed in its own tx and the regeneration in a second: a dropped
handler future between them left the taken-down photo permanently downloadable, and
nothing could notice — the keepsake still looked complete and the host could no longer
even find the upload to retry.
NO MORE TAKEDOWN STORM
Every removal spawned two uncancellable full exports. A superseded worker was INERT, not
STOPPED: it still ran every ffmpeg spawn and image resize and wrote a whole archive before
discovering it had lost. Five deletes left ten workers alive, each holding a
full-gallery-sized temp, in a 1 GB container.
Now: a debounce before `claim_job` (a superseded worker fails its claim and does ZERO
work, collapsing a burst into one export), plus `update_progress` — which already ran
exactly the right liveness predicate and threw the answer away — returning it so both file
loops bail the instant they are retired. Moderating a comment no longer rebuilds the
multi-GB ZIP either: the ZIP is media-only, so it is carried forward, with prune taught to
protect any file a live row still references.
AN ESCAPE HATCH
A failed export was terminal at runtime: release_gallery refuses an already-released event,
recovery only runs at boot, and there was no retry route — the only outs were restarting the
container or reopening uploads to every guest. Added POST /host/export/rebuild. Also widened
mark_failed's guard to `status IN ('running','pending')`: when claim_job itself ERRORED, the
row was still `pending`, so the failure was never recorded and the job sat at 0% forever.
SILENT INVALIDATION
Retiring the epoch 404s the download instantly, but nothing told the clients — guests kept
seeing an enabled download button through the whole rebuild. Now broadcasts an invalidation.
And the download was a top-level <a href>: a 404 (or a 429 from the per-IP export limit that
everyone on the venue WiFi shares) NAVIGATED THE USER OUT OF THE PWA onto raw JSON. It now
targets a hidden iframe, so an error response is harmless.
ALSO
- The HTML export still had the exists()-then-open TOCTOU the ZIP path was fixed to remove,
at three sites, two with a hard `?` that failed the ENTIRE viewer. It is reachable: the
compression worker hard-deletes an original when a transcode fails and can still be running
when the gallery is released.
- Crash-orphaned .tmp files were immortal (prune deliberately skips .tmp). Swept at boot,
where it is unambiguously safe.
- export_status read the epoch in one statement and used it in the next; now one query.
- DiskCache::snapshot IGNORED its path argument on a cache hit, returning whatever filesystem
was measured last. Latent only because both callers pass media_path — it would have silently
misreported the moment anyone measured the exports volume. Now keyed by path.
- Corrected two comments that asserted safety properties the code does not have (claim_job
does NOT prevent a retired-epoch claim — retirement is enforced at READ time; and a
multi-replica reap is NOT contained, it can corrupt the keepsake). Added a rollback runbook
to migration 014, the repo's first destructive migration.
TESTS
The regression guard for the headline FOR SHARE fix was probabilistic — it could pass on
broken code if the interleaving fell the wrong way. It is now STRUCTURAL: the upload is held
open mid-body with its pre-flight check already passed, so the release provably lands inside
the exact window. Verified 5/5 FAILING (201 instead of 403) with the fix reverted, 5/5
passing with it.
Verified: backend 40 tests, svelte-check 0 errors, e2e typecheck clean,
e2e 160 passed / 1 skipped on chromium-desktop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
MechaCat02
|
641174717c |
fix(user-flow): close offline-queue, export, session, ban & realtime gaps
Comprehensive user-flow review across guest/host/admin roles, then fixes with
e2e regression guards. Highlights:
- Offline upload queue auto-resumes on reconnect: network errors keep items
pending (not error), 4xx are terminal (no infinite retry), quota exhaustion
returns a distinct 413; queue cap + dedup.
- Export lifecycle: release atomically locks uploads; reopen invalidates and
re-release regenerates the keepsake; workers claim their job atomically so a
reopen->re-release can't corrupt the ZIP; startup re-spawns interrupted
exports.
- Sessions slide on activity (no 30-day cliff); JWT expiry deferred to the
revocable session row; sign-out-everywhere + revoke-on-PIN-reset.
- Ban always hides content (v_feed / find_visible_media / export filter
is_banned) but stays a read-only ban per USER_JOURNEYS §10 — sessions are
not revoked, read access + keepsake download preserved.
- Realtime: server-clock SSE delta cursor; event-closed/opened drive the UI
live; feed_delta rate-limited; like returns {liked, like_count} to fix
multi-device drift; lightbox live comments; diashow delta backfill.
- Forgotten-PIN in-app request flow; simultaneous same-name join returns 409;
quota increment is transactional; operator floor.
Adds e2e/specs/10-flow-review/ (offline resume, export integrity, deterministic
anti-race guard) and updates existing specs for the new contracts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
fabi
|
a4b2c5bd1c |
fix(security): harden authz, media gating, recover, SSE, deps
Security audit follow-up. No Critical/High existed; these close the
Medium/Low findings.
F1 [Med] Host privilege boundary: a host could demote a peer host to
guest and then ban / PIN-reset (→ account takeover via /recover) them,
because the ban/pin-reset peer guards key off the target's *current*
role. set_role now blocks a non-admin from demoting a host.
F2 [Med] Moderation now revokes preview/thumbnail access: they are served
through visibility-checked aliases (/api/v1/upload/{id}/{preview,
thumbnail}) that filter soft-deleted / ban-hidden uploads, and direct
/media/previews|thumbnails is 404-blocked. Feed emits the gated URLs;
Caddy keeps them privately cacheable (max-age=300, short so moderation
revokes promptly — the live feed already evicts cards via SSE). Uses a
lean find_visible_media() (paths+mime only) on the media hot path.
F3 [Med/Low] npm audit fix: svelte 5.55.1→5.56.4 (SSR-XSS advisories),
devalue 5.6.4→5.8.1 (DoS). Prod deps: 0 vulnerabilities.
F4 [Low] /recover no longer leaks account existence: unknown display name
returns the same 401 as a wrong PIN, and runs a dummy bcrypt verify so
timing matches — closing the enumeration + timing oracle.
F5 [Low] SSE streams re-validate the session every ~60s and close once it
is logged out / expired, instead of running until client disconnect.
F6 [Info] X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff set at the app layer on all
media responses (defense-in-depth alongside the edge).
Tests: new e2e specs for F1 (host cannot demote peer host), F2 (preview
gated + 404 after delete + direct /media blocked), F4 (uniform 401).
40 backend unit tests + 182 e2e passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
fabi
|
d6c91974eb |
perf(backend): close config/upload/export hot paths + stability fixes
Performance: - Cache the runtime `config` table in-memory (ConfigCache) with synchronous invalidation on every write (admin PATCH + test reseed). Was re-reading each key from Postgres on every request (~8 round-trips per upload). - Stream uploads chunk-by-chunk to a temp file instead of buffering the whole body in RAM (peak was up to the per-class cap, e.g. 500 MB/video); only 512 sniff-bytes are kept for magic-byte detection, then atomic rename into place. - Cache the media-filesystem disk snapshot (DiskCache, 15s TTL) shared by the quota check and admin stats; drop the discarded System::refresh_all(). - HTML export streams video (and small-image) originals straight into the ZIP via a manifest instead of copying them to a temp dir first (removed the transient 2x disk usage) and drops the double directory scan. - Auth extractor resolves session -> live user in one JOIN (was two queries), touching last_seen_at by token hash. Stability: - SSE: on broadcast lag, emit a `resync` event so the client runs a delta fetch instead of silently losing events; frontend reconciles adds, deletions, and (via an in-place refresh) like/comment counts on visible cards. - Storage quota fails OPEN when the disk can't be read (was a 0-byte limit that locked out all uploads). - Graceful shutdown drains in-flight requests on SIGTERM/SIGINT, bounded by a 10s backstop so open SSE streams can't stall a deploy. - Upload removes the persisted file if the DB transaction fails (no orphaned bytes with no row to reclaim them). Tests: - New pure select_disk() with 5 unit tests (longest-prefix, fallbacks, fail-open). - New e2e export-video spec covering the HTML export's video-streaming branch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
fabi
|
faf7a2504a |
fix(audit): restore broken upload pipeline + role-based E2E audit fixes
A comprehensive role-based E2E audit (guest/host/admin, across browser sessions) surfaced one critical and several smaller issues; this addresses them and hardens the tests that missed them. Critical - The client upload pipeline was fully broken: the IndexedDB v1->v2 upgrade opened a *new* transaction inside the upgrade callback, which throws during a version-change transaction and aborted the whole upgrade, leaving the queue object store uncreated -- so no UI upload ever fired. Reuse the version-change transaction the callback provides, and bump the DB to v3 with a contains() guard so installs already corrupted by the shipped bug self-heal on next load. Re-enabled the previously-fixme'd UI upload E2E test. High / Medium - Event lock is uploads-only again: likes, comments and browsing stay open while the event is locked (USER_JOURNEYS 9.3 / FEATURES) -- it was wrongly freezing social interaction. Updated the event-lock spec accordingly. - get_original now excludes soft-deleted and ban-hidden uploads, and direct /media/originals/** serving is blocked, so a hidden user's originals can no longer be pulled by UUID (all originals go through the checked alias). - The upload handler reads the file field with an early-abort size cap chosen from the declared content-type, instead of buffering the entire body before the size check. Low - unban_user mirrors the ban role guard (a host can no longer unban a host/admin banned by an admin). - reset_user_pin's UPDATE is event-scoped. - Admin login returns and stores a real identity (user_id + display name) instead of a blank session. - The host user list no longer renders target-actions (ban/promote/demote/PIN) on the caller's own row, where the backend always rejected them. - /diashow gains a client-side auth guard like the other protected routes. - The join page shows the event name via a new public GET /api/v1/event. Verified: backend cargo build clean, frontend svelte-check 0 errors, full Playwright E2E suite 144 passed / 1 skipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
fabi
|
a490642f5f |
Merge fix/security-review-batch-2: cross-event authz + upload OOM backstop
Brings the batch-2 security hardening into main (forked from the same base as the UX batch; auto-merged cleanly — verified both sides' edits to social.rs / main.rs coexist): - Cross-event authorization: toggle_like / list_comments / add_comment now event-scope the upload via Upload::find_by_id_and_event (404 on cross-event access); delete_comment uses Comment::soft_delete_in_event. Closes the gap where a guest could like/comment/list across events by upload UUID. - Upload OOM backstop: the /upload route gets DefaultBodyLimit::max(576 MiB) instead of disable(), so a multi-GB body can't be buffered before the handler's per-class size checks run. - upload.rs per-class size-limit refactor, XSS allowlist, deploy hardening (Caddyfile, Dockerfiles, docker-compose, .env.example), and a data-mode doc-comment clarifying the original-media route is capability-(UUID-)gated. The event-scope checks sit before, and batch-3's best-effort count broadcasts after, the like/comment mutations — both preserved. Verified: cargo build clean, svelte-check 0 errors. |
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|
fabi
|
e79e020566 |
feat(eventsnap): UX review batch-3 — feed virtualization, a11y/UX fixes, shared primitives
Frontend - Feed: DOM-windowing via @tanstack/svelte-virtual (new VirtualFeed). The window virtualizer keeps the sticky header, pull-to-refresh, infinite-scroll sentinel and bottom nav working. List = dynamic measured heights keyed by upload id + anchorTo:start so an SSE prepend doesn't jump a scrolled reader; grid = measured square rows. Drops the content-visibility band-aid and the old FeedGrid. measureElement(null) on row unmount prevents ResizeObserver retention; stable option callbacks + guarded setOptions avoid O(n) re-measure on like/comment patches. - Global: viewport-fit=cover (activates safe-area insets), lang=de, PWA manifest + maskable icon + apple-touch metas, prefers-reduced-motion, safe-area-top headers. - Feed reactivity: like/comment SSE patch the single card in place; upload-processed debounced in-place merge; IntersectionObserver leak fixed; shared 60s clock. - CLS: list cards reserve the skeleton aspect box. - Destructive actions (promote/demote/unban, gallery release) routed through ConfirmSheet (host + admin). - Export OOM: streamed download via single-use ticket instead of res.blob(). - Shared primitives: IconButton (44px hit area), scrollLock action; UploadSheet a11y. - Polish: api timeout + non-JSON guard, focus-trap offsetParent fix, pull-to-refresh passive:false + guards, diashow keyboard a11y, Toaster assertive errors, dark-mode gaps, aria-pressed on like/chip state, CameraCapture mic-on-video + retry, ConfirmSheet spinner, upload beforeunload warning, emoji->SVG icons. Backend - social.rs: like/comment SSE broadcasts now carry the fresh count so feed clients patch one card in place instead of refetching page 1. - admin.rs / main.rs: supporting changes for the above. Verified: svelte-check 0 errors, frontend build clean, /feed SSR 200. Runtime feed scroll-feel validation still owed (documented in FOLLOWUPS.md). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
fabi
|
edcef0258c |
fix(security): batch-2 hardening — XSS allowlist, event-scoping, deploy
Address the seven findings from the security & deployment review. High: - upload: make infer authoritative — reject files it can't identify (SVG/HTML/JS) and require the detected MIME to be on an ALLOWED_MEDIA allowlist; derive the stored MIME and on-disk extension from the detected type, ignoring client filename/Content-Type. Closes the stored-XSS vector via media served on-origin. - deploy: rename docker-compose.override.yml -> docker-compose.dev.yml so the default `docker compose up -d` no longer publishes Postgres 5432 to the host; the port map is now opt-in via -f. README updated. Medium: - upload: DefaultBodyLimit::disable() -> max(576 MiB) as an HTTP-level OOM backstop; handler still enforces precise per-class size limits. - docker: run backend and frontend as non-root users. Low: - social/upload: event-scope toggle_like, list_comments, add_comment, delete_comment, edit_upload, delete_upload via find_by_id_and_event / soft_delete_in_event — cross-event IDs now resolve to 404. - Caddy: site-wide HSTS / nosniff / X-Frame-Options / Referrer-Policy, plus Content-Disposition: attachment on /media/originals/*. - .env.example: replace default Postgres password with a CHANGE_ME hint. Out of scope: localStorage JWT (root cause fixed; httpOnly cookies are a larger change tracked separately). Verified: cargo build (no new warnings), cargo test (3 passed), caddy validate, docker compose config (no 5432 published by default). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
MechaCat02
|
d228676a56 |
fix(security): cross-event authz, SSE ticket flow, account hardening, audit logs
Follow-up to the comprehensive code review. Five batches: 1. Cross-event authorization: host_delete_upload, unban_user, and host_delete_comment now scope by auth.event_id. Adds Upload::find_by_id_and_event / soft_delete_in_event and a Comment::soft_delete_in_event variant that joins through upload. 2. Token exposure: SSE auth no longer puts the JWT in the URL. New /api/v1/stream/ticket endpoint mints a short-lived single-use ticket bound to the session; the EventSource passes ?ticket=... instead. Refuse to start in APP_ENV=production with the dev JWT sentinel; warn loudly otherwise. 3. Account hardening: per-IP+name rate limit on /recover (mitigates targeted lockout DoS), per-IP rate limit on /admin/login, random 32-char admin recovery PIN (replaces "0000"), structured tracing events for wrong PIN, lockout, failed admin login, ban/unban/role change/pin-reset/host-delete. 4. DoS / correctness: comment listing paginated (LIMIT 50 + ?before= cursor), hashtag extraction whitelisted to ASCII alnum+underscore (≤40 chars) with unit tests, display_name / caption / comment body length validated in chars rather than bytes. 5. Cleanup: session-touch failures now logged, DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS env var (default 10). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
MechaCat02
|
05f76514a2 |
fix(backend): JWT jti, NUL-byte guard, dev-only truncate endpoint
Two bugs surfaced while running the new E2E suite, plus a small test hook: - jwt.rs: add a per-token `jti: Uuid` claim. Without it, two `create_token` calls in the same wall-clock second for the same (sub, role, event_id) produced identical JWT bytes — and identical sha256(token) hashes — which then collided on `session.token_hash UNIQUE` with a 500. Manifests in real use when an admin clicks "Anmelden" twice fast. - auth/handlers.rs: reject display names containing 0x00. Postgres rejects NUL in TEXT columns with `invalid byte sequence for encoding "UTF8"` and the request leaks back as a 500. Now returns 400 with a clean message. - handlers/test_admin.rs + main.rs: new POST /api/v1/admin/__truncate route, compiled in always but only **registered** when EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1 is set on startup. Truncates every event-scoped table, reseeds config from migration defaults, wipes media on disk, and clears the in-memory rate limiter. RequireAdmin-gated so it's not anonymous even in test mode. In production builds (no env var) the route returns 404 — verified by the startup log message. - services/rate_limiter.rs: add `clear()` so the truncate handler can wipe the in-memory window map between tests. - Dockerfile: bump rust:1.87 → rust:1.88 (current dep tree needs it) and COPY ./migrations into the build context so the `sqlx::migrate!()` macro can resolve at compile time. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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MechaCat02
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2e98f5ddf5 |
backend(features): quota enforcement, PIN reset, /me, original download, toggles
- handlers/me.rs (new): GET /api/v1/me/context (profile + role + privacy_note
+ quota toggle state, fetched once on app bootstrap) and GET /api/v1/me/quota
(live used / limit / active uploaders / free disk).
- handlers/upload.rs:
- quota enforcement via the dynamic formula
floor((free_disk * tolerance) / max(active_uploaders, 1)),
gated by quota_enabled + storage_quota_enabled toggles
- new GET /api/v1/upload/{id}/original — unauthed by design
(matches /media/previews/* — URL is the secret) so it works as
<img src> / <video src> / window.open
- rate-limit toggle wiring (rate_limits_enabled + upload_rate_enabled)
- handlers/host.rs:
- POST /api/v1/host/users/{id}/pin-reset — Host may reset guest PINs,
Admin may reset guest + host PINs (never another admin or self).
Returns the freshly-generated plaintext PIN once; emits a global
pin-reset SSE so the affected user's device can clear its localStorage.
- set_role guard expanded so hosts can demote other hosts (not self,
never admins) — backend match for the doc'd permission model.
- handlers/admin.rs: ALLOWED_KEYS split into NUMERIC_KEYS / BOOL_KEYS /
TEXT_KEYS with per-kind validation; saving privacy_note broadcasts an
event-updated SSE so other clients refresh live.
- handlers/feed.rs, handlers/admin.rs (export), auth/handlers.rs:
rate-limit toggle wiring at every limiter call site.
- auth/handlers.rs: when an expired PIN lockout is detected on /recover,
reset failed_pin_attempts to zero before the bcrypt check — without
this every wrong PIN re-locked the user after the cooldown.
- main.rs: wire startup_recovery + spawn_periodic_tasks, register the
new /me/context, /me/quota, /upload/{id}/original, and
/host/users/{id}/pin-reset routes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MechaCat02
|
3dc69e6c6d |
fix: upload body limit, role case, and connection drain (v0.12.1)
- Disable Axum's 2 MB default body limit on the upload route so large
photos/videos are accepted without HTTP 400
- Serialize UserRole as lowercase in JWT so the frontend role checks
('guest'/'host'/'admin') match correctly
- Drain multipart body before returning early upload errors (rate-limit,
ban, event-lock) to keep the HTTP keep-alive connection clean and
prevent cascading Netzwerkfehler / empty-500 responses
- Add TraceLayer for request logging and Vite dev proxy config
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MechaCat02
|
258e2bd84d |
feat: implement export engine
Add async ZIP and HTML offline viewer export workers, download endpoints,
and a guest-facing /export page.
Backend — export workers (tokio::spawn, run after gallery release):
- ZIP worker: streams all non-deleted originals into Gallery.zip via
async_zip (Stored compression), organised into Photos/ and Videos/
with {date}_{uploader}_{id}.{ext} filenames; updates progress_pct in DB
- HTML worker: renders Memories.html via minijinja template (self-contained:
inlined CSS + JS, relative media paths); packs it with README.txt and
all media into Memories.zip (Deflate for text, Stored for media)
- Both workers mark export_job status (running → done/failed), update
export_zip_ready / export_html_ready on the event, and broadcast SSE
export-progress + export-available when both complete
Backend — new endpoints (AuthUser):
- GET /export/zip → streams Gallery.zip if export_zip_ready
- GET /export/html → streams Memories.zip if export_html_ready
- GET /export/status → released flag + per-type status/progress (moved from admin)
Memories.html features: warm keepsake aesthetic, responsive grid, fullscreen
lightbox with captions/comments/likes, client-side hashtag filter chips,
XSS-safe JS, fully offline (no external deps)
Frontend — /export page:
- Locked state: padlock illustration + message
- Released state: ZIP and HTML cards with progress bars (SSE-driven),
download buttons enabled only when ready
- HTML guide modal (unzip instructions + Wi-Fi tip) before download begins
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MechaCat02
|
32c16da3e2 |
feat: implement admin dashboard
Add Admin Dashboard at /admin for server configuration, disk usage
monitoring, and export job status, plus a public export/status endpoint.
Backend — new /api/v1/admin/* endpoints (RequireAdmin auth):
- GET /admin/stats → user/upload/comment counts + disk usage
- GET /admin/config → all config key/value pairs
- PATCH /admin/config → update any subset of config keys; validates
key whitelist and numeric values
- GET /admin/export/jobs → export_job rows for the event
Backend — public (AuthUser) endpoint:
- GET /export/status → released flag + zip/html job status/progress
Frontend — /admin page:
- Stats grid: guest count, upload count, comment count
- Disk usage bar with GB/MB formatting; red ≥ 90%, amber ≥ 75%
- Config form: labelled numeric inputs for all eight config keys,
sends only changed values on save
- Export jobs list: type label, status badge, progress bar for running jobs,
error message if failed; manual refresh button
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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MechaCat02
|
71a2987a3e |
feat: implement host dashboard
Add Host Dashboard for event and guest management, accessible at /host.
Backend — new /api/v1/host/* endpoints (RequireHost auth):
- GET /host/event → event name + lock/release state
- POST /host/event/close|open → lock or unlock uploads; SSE broadcast
- POST /host/gallery/release → set release timestamp, enqueue export jobs
- GET /host/users → all guests with upload count & bytes
- POST /host/users/{id}/ban → ban with optional upload-hide choice
- POST /host/users/{id}/unban → lift ban
- PATCH /host/users/{id}/role → promote guest→host or demote host→guest
- DELETE /host/upload/{id} → host-level soft-delete + SSE
- DELETE /host/comment/{id} → host-level soft-delete
Frontend — /host page:
- Event controls: lock/unlock toggle and release-gallery button with status badges
- Guest table: display name, role badge, upload count, storage used
- Ban flow: modal asking whether to keep or hide the user's uploads
- Promote/demote buttons respecting caller role (host can promote guests; admin can demote hosts)
- auth.ts: getRole() decodes JWT payload client-side to gate the route
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
|
964598e41d |
feat: implement gallery feed with social features and SSE
- Cursor-based feed endpoint using v_feed view with hashtag filtering - Like toggle (INSERT ON CONFLICT), comments CRUD - Feed delta endpoint for SSE-driven incremental updates - SSE client with Page Visibility API (pause/reconnect) - Responsive photo/video grid with infinite scroll - Hashtag filter chips, lightbox modal with comments - Media file serving via tower-http ServeDir Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fabi
|
3f052a4f91 |
feat: implement upload pipeline with compression and SSE
Backend:
- POST /api/v1/upload: multipart file upload with caption + hashtags
- Validates file size against DB config limits (image/video separate)
- Checks user ban status and event upload lock
- Saves original to disk under {media_path}/originals/{slug}/
- Tracks user total_upload_bytes for quota enforcement
- Extracts hashtags from caption text and explicit CSV field
- Upserts hashtags and links them to uploads
- PATCH /api/v1/upload/{id}: edit caption and hashtags (owner only)
- DELETE /api/v1/upload/{id}: soft-delete (owner only)
- GET /api/v1/stream: SSE endpoint with 30s keepalive
- Broadcasts new-upload events to all connected clients
- Uses tokio broadcast channel for fan-out
Services:
- CompressionWorker: Tokio semaphore-bounded (concurrency=2) background processor
- Images: resize to 800px wide JPEG preview via image crate
- PNG originals: lossless compression via oxipng
- Videos: ffmpeg thumbnail extraction (1 frame at 1s, scaled to 800px)
- Updates upload record with preview_path/thumbnail_path on completion
Models:
- Upload with full CRUD (create, find, update caption, soft delete, set paths)
- Hashtag with upsert, link/unlink, extract_hashtags() text parser
- UploadDto for API serialization with like/comment counts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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fabi
|
8b9d916265 |
feat: implement authentication flow
Backend: - AppConfig, AppError, AppState modules for shared infrastructure - JWT creation/verification with HS256 (jsonwebtoken crate) - Session management: SHA-256 token hashing, DB-backed sessions - Auth middleware: AuthUser, RequireHost, RequireAdmin extractors - POST /api/v1/join: name-only registration, 4-digit PIN + bcrypt hash - POST /api/v1/recover: PIN-based recovery with 3-attempt lockout (15 min) - POST /api/v1/admin/login: bcrypt password verification - DELETE /api/v1/session: logout (session invalidation) - Migration 006: user PIN lockout columns (failed_pin_attempts, pin_locked_until) - Models: Event, User (with role enum), Session with all CRUD methods Frontend: - api.ts: typed fetch wrapper with automatic Bearer token injection - auth.ts: JWT/PIN localStorage management with Svelte store - /join: name entry form with PIN display modal and copy button - /recover: name + PIN recovery form with saved PIN pre-fill - /feed: placeholder gallery page with logout - Root layout: auth initialization on mount - Root page: redirect to /join or /feed based on auth state All responses use German language strings as specified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fabi
|
e976f0f670 |
feat: add database schema and SQLx migrations
- 5 reversible migrations: extensions/enums, tables, indexes, views, config seed - Tables: event, user, session, upload, hashtag, upload_hashtag, comment, comment_hashtag, like, export_job, config - Views: v_feed (uploads with like/comment counts), v_hashtag_counts - Indexes optimised for feed queries, session lookup, hashtag filtering - Config table seeded with default rate limits and quotas - db.rs module: PgPool creation with auto-migration on startup - docker-compose.override.yml: expose db port 5432 for local dev - Fix crate names: async_zip, tower_governor (underscore, not hyphen) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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fabi
|
b89b1d6ffa |
chore: scaffold monorepo for EventSnap
- Rust/Axum backend skeleton with all crates, multi-stage Dockerfile - SvelteKit + TypeScript frontend with Tailwind CSS v4, adapter-node, Dockerfile - docker-compose.yml: db (postgres:16) → app → frontend → caddy with healthcheck and named volumes - Caddyfile: TLS via Let's Encrypt, cache headers, API/media routing to backend - .env.example: all environment variables documented with defaults - README.md: project overview, features, stack, deploy guide, roadmap - .gitignore: excludes secrets, build artifacts, node_modules, media uploads Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |