At a venue every guest is behind one NAT, so an IP-keyed limiter hands the
whole party a single bucket. On a fresh deploy 12 guests arriving together
meant 5 joined and 7 were turned away, with no Retry-After telling them when
to retry. `/feed` (60/min) and `/export` (3 per DAY — the fourth guest to
fetch their keepsake locked out until tomorrow) had the same defect.
`feed_delta` was already keyed per-user and its comment states the exact
rationale ("so one client can't starve others behind a shared NAT"); this
makes its siblings match.
- feed:{ip} -> feed:{user_id} (auth was already in scope)
- export:{ip} -> export:{user_id} (resolved from the download ticket's
session, which was previously looked up and discarded)
- join:{ip}: pre-auth, so there is no user to key on. Split in two — a loose
per-IP ceiling that only bounds raw volume (new `join_ip_rate_per_min`,
default 60, migration 017), plus the real 5/60s anti-spam bucket keyed
per (ip, name), mirroring the existing `recover:{ip}:{name}`.
admin_login / recover / pin_reset_req stay IP-keyed on purpose and are now
commented as such: they guard credential guessing, where a per-user or
per-name key would just hand an attacker a fresh bucket per guess.
Retry-After: the machinery existed but 7 of 8 sites called `check()` and
hard-coded `None`, so a throttled client was told to back off but never for
how long. Delete the bool `check()` wrapper entirely so `check_with_retry`
is the only entry point and the delay cannot be discarded by accident. Also
surface it for the PIN lockout, where the deadline was already known.
Fix the "unknown" fallback while here: every client_ip() caller passed that
literal, so any request without X-Forwarded-For — anything reaching the app
directly rather than through Caddy — shared ONE global bucket. Serve with
connect-info and use the peer address.
Tests: the reseed forces every limiter toggle off before each test, which is
why this whole class was invisible. Add 01-auth/rate-limit-shared-nat, which
enables them and asserts 12 guests share an IP without collision, that one
guest hammering their own name IS still throttled (so the fix re-keys rather
than removes the limit), and that feed/export buckets are per-user. Retarget
the ddos join test at the new per-IP ceiling — it asserted the defect.
Also seed `admin_login_rate_enabled` (read by the handler, seeded by no
migration and no reseed) and register `join_ip_rate_per_min` in the admin
config allowlist. Unrelated pre-existing red test fixed: 01-auth/join
asserted a "Willkommen!" heading the wedding redesign removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Diashow completeness rewrite so every eligible upload is shown regardless of
bursts, disconnects, or library size:
- queue.ts: SlideQueue with live/shuffle queues, allKnown map, recentlyShown
ring; merge(dedup, live-first), remove/removeByUser (prunes recentlyShown),
knownIds for reconcile-eviction. Adds queue.test.ts (burst/completeness/race).
- diashow/+page.svelte: reconcile (full paginate + evict, pre-scan snapshot to
spare concurrent uploads) on mount/reconnect/periodic; catchUpNew paginate-
until-known for bursts with debounced maxWait; hard-cut removals; decode
timeout + candidate fallback + bounded skip so a broken image never stalls.
New ~2048px "display" derivative for big-screen sharpness, decoupled from the
data-saver preview (800px) used on phones:
- migration 016: upload.display_path + v_feed rebuilt (DROP+CREATE, not REPLACE,
to slot the column beside preview/thumbnail).
- compression: generate_image_derivatives emits preview+display (downscale-only
guard, no upscaling); backfill_missing_display regenerates on startup (safe:
logs on error, never soft-deletes).
- upload.rs/main.rs: GET /upload/{id}/display (mirrors preview auth/cache),
/media/displays direct-serve blocked.
- feed.rs + types.ts: display_url in feed/delta DTOs.
- diashow candidate chain: display -> original -> preview.
Verified on the running stack: migration applied, 10/10 existing images
backfilled (2048px cap honoured, small images not upscaled), /display serves
200, /feed returns display_url, diashow cycles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The backend had never been run through rustfmt. Doing it in one mechanical pass (134 files)
so no future functional diff is buried under formatting churn, then gating `cargo fmt
--check` in checks.yml so it stays clean.
Formatting only — no logic, SQL, or behaviour changed. Verified after the reformat:
cargo test 56 passed, clippy --all-targets -D warnings clean, cargo fmt --check clean.
This is the deferred cleanup noted when CI's Format step was first left out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follows the perf + security + user-flow work with a role/persona audit (guest, host,
admin, projector) and fixes across three review rounds. Highlights:
HIGH
- Ban now replays on reconnect. A ban isn't a soft-delete, and the `user-hidden` SSE has
no replay, so a client that missed it (esp. the unattended diashow) kept cycling a
banned user's slides. New `uploads_hidden_at` (migration 013) + `hidden_user_ids` in
/feed/delta; feed + diashow evict those users. Applied even on a truncated delta.
MEDIUM
- Locked-upload data loss: a photo staged offline during a lock/release was purged as a
terminal 4xx and lost when the host reopened. New reversible `uploads_locked` error code;
the queue keeps the blob and auto-resumes on the `event-opened` SSE.
- Reopen after release now warns (ConfirmSheet) that it revokes the published keepsake.
- Host "forgotten-PIN" badge updates live (`pin-reset-requested` was broadcast but never
in KNOWN_EVENTS / subscribed); host page also refetches on `pin-reset` so a two-host
race can't hand out a conflicting PIN.
- Ban modal copy fixed (read-only ban, not "session ended"); Degradieren/Sperren/Entsperren
hidden on peer-host rows for non-admins (they always 403'd).
- Host dashboard shows live keepsake generation progress / ready state + link to /export.
- Admin JWT moved to sessionStorage (§11.1) to bound exposure on shared devices.
Export generation guard (H1 from the prior round, hardened): per-(event,type) `release_seq`
(migration 012) with seq-guarded claim/finalize/mark_failed/update_progress, per-generation
temp/final paths, download follows `file_path`, prune only strictly-older generations.
LOW: diashow coalesces upload-processed (avoids self-rate-limit); event-closed reconciles
galleryReleased; /recover gains a forgot-PIN request + drops a stale cached PIN on 401;
delta `>=` tie-break + 429 retry; misc copy/labels.
Adds e2e: ban-replay, upload-lock-code, and rewrites export-reopen-rerelease with a
data-completeness test. Reconciles USER_JOURNEYS §9/§11.
Verified: cargo build clean, 40 unit tests, svelte-check 0 errors, 33 frontend unit
tests, 155 e2e passing on chromium-desktop.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security audit follow-up. No Critical/High existed; these close the
Medium/Low findings.
F1 [Med] Host privilege boundary: a host could demote a peer host to
guest and then ban / PIN-reset (→ account takeover via /recover) them,
because the ban/pin-reset peer guards key off the target's *current*
role. set_role now blocks a non-admin from demoting a host.
F2 [Med] Moderation now revokes preview/thumbnail access: they are served
through visibility-checked aliases (/api/v1/upload/{id}/{preview,
thumbnail}) that filter soft-deleted / ban-hidden uploads, and direct
/media/previews|thumbnails is 404-blocked. Feed emits the gated URLs;
Caddy keeps them privately cacheable (max-age=300, short so moderation
revokes promptly — the live feed already evicts cards via SSE). Uses a
lean find_visible_media() (paths+mime only) on the media hot path.
F3 [Med/Low] npm audit fix: svelte 5.55.1→5.56.4 (SSR-XSS advisories),
devalue 5.6.4→5.8.1 (DoS). Prod deps: 0 vulnerabilities.
F4 [Low] /recover no longer leaks account existence: unknown display name
returns the same 401 as a wrong PIN, and runs a dummy bcrypt verify so
timing matches — closing the enumeration + timing oracle.
F5 [Low] SSE streams re-validate the session every ~60s and close once it
is logged out / expired, instead of running until client disconnect.
F6 [Info] X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff set at the app layer on all
media responses (defense-in-depth alongside the edge).
Tests: new e2e specs for F1 (host cannot demote peer host), F2 (preview
gated + 404 after delete + direct /media blocked), F4 (uniform 401).
40 backend unit tests + 182 e2e passing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Performance:
- Cache the runtime `config` table in-memory (ConfigCache) with synchronous
invalidation on every write (admin PATCH + test reseed). Was re-reading each
key from Postgres on every request (~8 round-trips per upload).
- Stream uploads chunk-by-chunk to a temp file instead of buffering the whole
body in RAM (peak was up to the per-class cap, e.g. 500 MB/video); only 512
sniff-bytes are kept for magic-byte detection, then atomic rename into place.
- Cache the media-filesystem disk snapshot (DiskCache, 15s TTL) shared by the
quota check and admin stats; drop the discarded System::refresh_all().
- HTML export streams video (and small-image) originals straight into the ZIP
via a manifest instead of copying them to a temp dir first (removed the
transient 2x disk usage) and drops the double directory scan.
- Auth extractor resolves session -> live user in one JOIN (was two queries),
touching last_seen_at by token hash.
Stability:
- SSE: on broadcast lag, emit a `resync` event so the client runs a delta
fetch instead of silently losing events; frontend reconciles adds, deletions,
and (via an in-place refresh) like/comment counts on visible cards.
- Storage quota fails OPEN when the disk can't be read (was a 0-byte limit that
locked out all uploads).
- Graceful shutdown drains in-flight requests on SIGTERM/SIGINT, bounded by a
10s backstop so open SSE streams can't stall a deploy.
- Upload removes the persisted file if the DB transaction fails (no orphaned
bytes with no row to reclaim them).
Tests:
- New pure select_disk() with 5 unit tests (longest-prefix, fallbacks, fail-open).
- New e2e export-video spec covering the HTML export's video-streaming branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two items surfaced by the branch re-review:
CSP regression (blocking): script-src 'self' blocked the template-authored
anti-FOUC theme script in app.html — SvelteKit's mode:'auto' only hashes
scripts it injects. Added nonce="%sveltekit.nonce%" so it's substituted per
request and included in the CSP (survives future edits, unlike a pinned hash).
Verified: emitted CSP nonce matches the script tag; no violation, no flash.
feed_delta silent truncation: the LIMIT 200 (added earlier to kill the
stale-`since` DoS) returned only the newest slice with no signal, so a client
that missed 200+ uploads during a reconnect could not tell it should full-
refresh — the older missed uploads were dropped and unrecoverable (the next
delta advances `since` past them). DeltaResponse now carries `truncated`; the
feed's feed-delta handler calls loadFeed(true) to resync from page 1 instead
of merging a partial slice.
Verified: cargo check clean, svelte-check 0 errors, production build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
H1: auth extractor re-reads the live user row — trusts the DB role (not the
JWT claim) and rejects banned users mid-session. e2e proves a demoted
host loses powers and a banned host is locked out and can't self-unban.
H2: client_ip takes the right-most XFF hop (the one Caddy appends); spoofed
left-most entries are ignored, restoring IP-based throttles.
H3: Caddy excludes /api/v1/stream from `encode` so SSE isn't buffered.
H4: upload — quota increment + row insert + hashtag links now one txn.
H5: feed keyset pagination tiebroken on (created_at, id) + composite index
(migration 010); feed_delta bounded with LIMIT.
H7: LightboxModal keys its comment load off upload.id, ending the
SSE-driven refetch storm.
H8: CSP via SvelteKit kit.csp (svelte.config.js) hardens the localStorage
token model against injection.
Migration 010 also adds the latent comment/comment_hashtag indexes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- handlers/me.rs (new): GET /api/v1/me/context (profile + role + privacy_note
+ quota toggle state, fetched once on app bootstrap) and GET /api/v1/me/quota
(live used / limit / active uploaders / free disk).
- handlers/upload.rs:
- quota enforcement via the dynamic formula
floor((free_disk * tolerance) / max(active_uploaders, 1)),
gated by quota_enabled + storage_quota_enabled toggles
- new GET /api/v1/upload/{id}/original — unauthed by design
(matches /media/previews/* — URL is the secret) so it works as
<img src> / <video src> / window.open
- rate-limit toggle wiring (rate_limits_enabled + upload_rate_enabled)
- handlers/host.rs:
- POST /api/v1/host/users/{id}/pin-reset — Host may reset guest PINs,
Admin may reset guest + host PINs (never another admin or self).
Returns the freshly-generated plaintext PIN once; emits a global
pin-reset SSE so the affected user's device can clear its localStorage.
- set_role guard expanded so hosts can demote other hosts (not self,
never admins) — backend match for the doc'd permission model.
- handlers/admin.rs: ALLOWED_KEYS split into NUMERIC_KEYS / BOOL_KEYS /
TEXT_KEYS with per-kind validation; saving privacy_note broadcasts an
event-updated SSE so other clients refresh live.
- handlers/feed.rs, handlers/admin.rs (export), auth/handlers.rs:
rate-limit toggle wiring at every limiter call site.
- auth/handlers.rs: when an expired PIN lockout is detected on /recover,
reset failed_pin_attempts to zero before the bcrypt check — without
this every wrong PIN re-locked the user after the cooldown.
- main.rs: wire startup_recovery + spawn_periodic_tasks, register the
new /me/context, /me/quota, /upload/{id}/original, and
/host/users/{id}/pin-reset routes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backend: rate limiter gains check_with_retry() returning seconds until
the next slot opens. Upload 429 responses include retry_after_secs in
JSON and a Retry-After header.
Frontend: upload queue catches 429 as RateLimitError, resets affected
item to pending, schedules processQueue() for the server-reported delay,
and shows a live countdown banner in the queue UI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add sliding-window in-memory RateLimiter service (Arc<Mutex<HashMap>>)
with per-IP and per-user-id limits on all public endpoint classes:
- POST /api/v1/join: 5/min per IP
- GET /api/v1/feed: configurable per IP (feed_rate_per_min, default 60)
- POST /api/v1/upload: configurable per user (upload_rate_per_hour, default 10)
- GET /api/v1/export/zip|html: configurable per IP (export_rate_per_day, default 3)
Limits are hot-reloadable via the config table. All 429 responses use
German error messages. Client IP is read from X-Forwarded-For (Caddy).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Cursor-based feed endpoint using v_feed view with hashtag filtering
- Like toggle (INSERT ON CONFLICT), comments CRUD
- Feed delta endpoint for SSE-driven incremental updates
- SSE client with Page Visibility API (pause/reconnect)
- Responsive photo/video grid with infinite scroll
- Hashtag filter chips, lightbox modal with comments
- Media file serving via tower-http ServeDir
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
