fix(e2e): stop the video poster assertion racing the ffmpeg thumbnail

Pre-existing, and it fired for real during the full-suite run on a cold stack.

The lightbox binds `poster={upload.thumbnail_url ?? undefined}`, so the attribute is
absent until compression produces the thumbnail. This test asserted on it immediately
after seeding, never waiting for the worker -- unlike the Range test further down the
same file, which does poll. Against a warm stack the worker usually wins; against a
freshly rebuilt one (`stack:down -v`, cold ffmpeg) it doesn't.

That is the worst possible time for a false failure: the first run after a rebuild is
exactly when you are trying to establish whether a change broke something. Poll for
`compression_status = 'done'` before the poster assertion. The `src` assertion needs
no wait and keeps none.

Verified with --repeat-each=3.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.env.example

@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ POSTGRES_PASSWORD=CHANGE_ME_use_a_strong_password
 POSTGRES_DB=eventsnap
 # Connection pool size. Default 10. For a busy event (~100 guests polling the feed
 # + SSE + uploads at once) raise to ~30 so requests don't queue on a pool permit.
+# PAIRED WITH THE DB CONTAINER'S MEMORY LIMIT: 30 backends plus Postgres 16's default
+# shared_buffers is already snug in the 1G that docker-compose.yml allots the `db`
+# service. If you raise this, raise `db.deploy.resources.limits.memory` with it — an
+# OOM in Postgres doesn't degrade one feature, it takes the whole event down.
 DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS=30
 
 # ── Authentication ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -54,8 +58,26 @@ EXPORT_PATH=/exports
 #   max image size    20 MB
 #   max video size   500 MB
 #   estimated guests 100
-#   quota tolerance  0.75  (fraction of disk that triggers the low-storage warning)
+#   quota tolerance  0.75  (see below — NOT a warning threshold)
 # Adjust these in the admin UI before the event if needed.
+#
+# quota_tolerance is the MULTIPLIER IN THE PER-USER QUOTA FORMULA, not the point at
+# which anything warns you:
+#
+#     per_user_limit = floor(free_disk * quota_tolerance / active_uploaders)
+#
+# It is recomputed against LIVE free space on every upload, so it self-throttles: guests
+# converge on a fixed point at tolerance/(1+tolerance) of the free space you started
+# with — 43% at 0.75, i.e. ~30 GB of a fresh 70 GB.
+#
+# Raising it therefore AUTHORISES GUESTS TO FILL MORE OF THE DISK. Setting 0.95 in the
+# belief that it means "warn me later" moves the fixed point to ~49% and eats the
+# headroom the keepsake needs — and the keepsake needs a lot, because Gallery.zip and
+# Memories.zip are each roughly a second copy of every original (both store media
+# uncompressed). Budget for media + 2x media, or move exports to their own volume.
+#
+# 0.75 is the tested default. Lower it if the box is tight; raise it only if you have
+# provisioned export headroom separately.
 
 # ── Workers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Number of parallel image/video compression workers. Default 2. This is the main

README.md

@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ A guest scans the QR code on their way in, types their name, and is immediately
 ### Planned (v1.x)
 
 - Individual file download button
-- Low-disk alert (< 10 GB free)
 - Event banner / cover image
 - Chunked resumable upload for large videos
 - Host-curated story highlights
@@ -231,6 +230,45 @@ so a host takedown or a ban actually revokes access to the bytes.
 
 ---
 
+## Sizing the disk
+
+`postgres_data`, `media_data` and `exports_data` are all Docker named volumes under
+`/var/lib/docker/volumes`, so **they share one filesystem**. Filling it does not
+degrade one subsystem — Postgres stops being able to write and the whole event goes
+down.
+
+Uploads are self-limiting. `per_user_limit = free_disk × quota_tolerance ÷
+active_uploaders` is recomputed against live free space on every upload, so guests
+converge on a fixed point at `tolerance / (1 + tolerance)` of the free space you
+started with — **43%** at the default 0.75. On an 80 GB box with ~70 GB free after
+the OS and images, media settles at ~30 GB and stops.
+
+**The keepsake is what the 80 GB baseline does not cover.** `Gallery.zip` and
+`Memories.zip` are built concurrently and each is roughly a second copy of every
+original: both write their media `Compression::Stored`, and `Memories.zip` streams the
+untouched original for every video and for every image at or under 5 MB. So a release
+wants room for **two more copies of the gallery** on top of the gallery itself.
+
+| Stage | Used | Free (80 GB box) |
+|---|---|---|
+| Fresh box (OS + images) | ~10 GB | ~70 GB |
+| Guests reach the quota fixed point | ~40 GB | ~40 GB |
+| Host releases → both archives | ~100 GB | **ENOSPC** |
+
+Two ways to size for it:
+
+- **Provision ~3× your expected media** on one volume (media + two archives), or
+- **give `exports_data` its own volume** so a full export cannot reach Postgres, and
+  size that one at ~2× expected media.
+
+This is no longer silent. The export refuses up front with the two numbers rather than
+hitting ENOSPC halfway through a multi-GB write, a rebuild reclaims the superseded
+generation before it starts (so peak is one generation, not two), and the host
+dashboard warns as soon as the keepsake would not fit — which is the only point at
+which anyone can still do something about it.
+
+---
+
 ## Backup
 
 There are **three** things to back up, and they live in three different places.
@@ -242,9 +280,12 @@ never exported into an operator's shell — so every command below runs through
 ```bash
 # 1. Database snapshot. Runs pg_dump inside the db container (the app image has no
 #    postgres client), reading credentials from the compose environment.
+#    --clean --if-exists makes the dump SELF-CLEANING: without it the restore below
+#    aborts on the first "already exists" against a database that has ever booted,
+#    which is every database you would actually want to restore over.
 mkdir -p ./backups
 docker compose exec -T db \
-  sh -c 'pg_dump -U "$POSTGRES_USER" "$POSTGRES_DB"' \
+  sh -c 'pg_dump --clean --if-exists -U "$POSTGRES_USER" "$POSTGRES_DB"' \
   | gzip > ./backups/db_$(date +%Y-%m-%d).sql.gz
 
 # 2. Uploaded media (originals + derivatives) out of the named volume.
@@ -261,7 +302,7 @@ docker run --rm \
   -v eventsnap_exports_data:/src:ro -v "$PWD/backups":/backup \
   alpine tar czf /backup/exports_$(date +%Y-%m-%d).tar.gz -C /src .
 
-# Weekly offsite sync of the three artefacts above.
+# Offsite sync of the three artefacts above.
 rsync -az ./backups/ user@storagebox.example.com:backup/eventsnap/
 ```
 
@@ -274,6 +315,82 @@ from a directory called `eventsnap`. Confirm yours with `docker volume ls`.
 > stops it being reachable except through the ticket-gated download handler.
 > Backing up only the media volume therefore loses every generated keepsake.
 
+### When to run it
+
+**A nightly cron is the wrong shape for this app.** Every irreplaceable byte is
+created inside one eight-hour window, and nobody can retake a wedding. Run the three
+commands above:
+
+1. **The night of the event**, once uploads have stopped. This is the backup that
+   matters; everything else is a formality.
+2. **After the host releases the gallery**, so the generated keepsake is captured too.
+3. Weekly thereafter, until the event is archived and torn down.
+
+Take the DB dump and the media tarball **back to back**, without uploads in flight
+between them. Upload rows reference files by path — a database from 22:00 and a media
+volume from 23:00 gives you rows pointing at files the dump doesn't know about, and
+rows whose files aren't in the tarball. Locking uploads from the host dashboard first
+(**Uploads sperren**) makes the pair genuinely consistent.
+
+---
+
+## Restore
+
+An untested backup is not a backup. Run this once against a scratch host **before**
+the event — it is roughly ten minutes, and it is the only way to find out that your
+tarball is empty or your dump is truncated while that is still a small problem.
+
+```bash
+# 0. Stop the app FIRST. Migrations run on boot and a live pool will fight the
+#    restore — a booting app against a half-restored schema can leave the migration
+#    table and the schema disagreeing, which is its own recovery problem.
+#    Leave `db` running: the dump is restored through it.
+docker compose stop app caddy
+
+# 1. Database. The dump carries its own DROPs (step 1 of Backup), so this replaces
+#    rather than collides. A dump taken WITHOUT --clean --if-exists will abort here
+#    on the first "already exists" — restore that one into a fresh empty database
+#    instead.
+gunzip -c ./backups/db_2026-07-29.sql.gz \
+  | docker compose exec -T db \
+      sh -c 'psql -U "$POSTGRES_USER" -d "$POSTGRES_DB" --set ON_ERROR_STOP=1'
+
+# 2. Media. NOTE the `--numeric-owner` and the chown: the app runs as a
+#    NON-ROOT user (uid 100, gid 101 — `addgroup -S app && adduser -S app`), and a
+#    restore that lands root-owned files makes every upload fail with EACCES deep in
+#    the write path, surfacing to the guest as a generic 500 with nothing in the UI
+#    to suggest permissions. The explicit chown is what guarantees it — BusyBox tar
+#    (which is what `alpine` ships) has no --same-owner, and restores ownership only
+#    because it runs as root here.
+docker run --rm \
+  -v eventsnap_media_data:/dst -v "$PWD/backups":/backup:ro \
+  alpine sh -c 'tar xzf /backup/media_2026-07-29.tar.gz -C /dst \
+                    --numeric-owner && chown -R 100:101 /dst'
+
+# 3. Exports. Same volume-name caveat, same ownership rules.
+docker run --rm \
+  -v eventsnap_exports_data:/dst -v "$PWD/backups":/backup:ro \
+  alpine sh -c 'tar xzf /backup/exports_2026-07-29.tar.gz -C /dst \
+                    --numeric-owner && chown -R 100:101 /dst'
+
+# 4. Back up. Migrations run, then export recovery re-arms any keepsake whose file
+#    didn't come back with the volume.
+docker compose up -d app caddy
+docker compose logs -f app        # watch for "migrations applied"
+
+# 5. Verify — all three, not just the first.
+curl -fsS https://DOMAIN/health && echo            # → ok
+#   … then sign in as host and confirm the feed renders images (proves the media
+#   volume restored AND is readable by uid 100), and that the keepsake downloads.
+```
+
+If the media volume restored but images 404 while the feed lists them, the paths are
+there and the bytes aren't — check `docker compose exec app ls -ln /media/originals`
+and confirm both the files and the `100:101` ownership.
+
+The restore is deliberately **not** automated. It is rare, destructive, and the one
+operation where a script that half-works is worse than a checklist someone reads.
+
 ---
 
 ## Running the backend test suite
@@ -348,7 +465,7 @@ Open:
 - [ ] SSE delta-fetch on foreground reconnect (scaffolded in [sse.ts](frontend/src/lib/sse.ts), not wired)
 - [ ] Live diashow / slideshow mode — see [docs/CONCEPT_DIASHOW.md](docs/CONCEPT_DIASHOW.md)
 - [ ] Individual file download button per post
-- [ ] Low-disk alert (< 10 GB free)
+- [x] Low-disk alert — host dashboard warns below 10 GB free, or whenever the keepsake would not fit
 - [ ] Event banner / cover image
 - [ ] Chunked resumable upload for files > 100 MB
 - [ ] Shared Tailwind config between main app and export-viewer

backend/migrations/020_social_rate.down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+DELETE FROM config WHERE key IN ('social_rate_per_min', 'social_rate_enabled');

backend/migrations/020_social_rate.up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-- Per-user rate limit for social writes (likes, comments, comment deletions).
+--
+-- These were the only writes in the app with no limit at all. Every other mutating
+-- path -- upload, join, recover, export, admin login -- carries one; social.rs
+-- carried none, so the coverage was asymmetric rather than deliberately open.
+--
+-- Severity is genuinely low for an invited-guest event, and the amplification worry
+-- turned out to be contained: a like fans an SSE broadcast to ~100 clients, but the
+-- export regeneration it could otherwise trigger is debounced (REGEN_DEBOUNCE 20s)
+-- and superseded workers are inert. So this closes the gap for symmetry, not urgency,
+-- and the ceiling is set high enough that no real guest will ever meet it -- a
+-- double-tapping enthusiast at a wedding is not the thing being defended against.
+INSERT INTO config (key, value) VALUES
+    ('social_rate_per_min',  '120'),
+    ('social_rate_enabled',  'true')
+ON CONFLICT (key) DO NOTHING;

backend/src/handlers/admin.rs

@@ -127,6 +127,9 @@ pub async fn patch_config(
         // Same shape for /recover: the per-(ip, name) bucket is the anti-guessing control,
         // this only bounds a name-cycling flood in front of a cost-12 bcrypt (migration 019).
         ("recover_ip_rate_per_min", true, 1.0, 100_000.0),
+        // Aggregate ceiling on likes + comments + comment deletions, per user per minute.
+        // These were the only mutating endpoints with no limit at all (migration 020).
+        ("social_rate_per_min", true, 1.0, 100_000.0),
         ("quota_tolerance", false, 0.0, 1.0),
         ("estimated_guest_count", true, 1.0, 1_000_000.0),
     ];
@@ -141,6 +144,7 @@ pub async fn patch_config(
         // missing from this allowlist — so the switch existed in code and could never be flipped.
         "admin_login_rate_enabled",
         "recover_rate_enabled",
+        "social_rate_enabled",
         "quota_enabled",
         "storage_quota_enabled",
         "upload_count_quota_enabled",

backend/src/handlers/host.rs

@@ -35,6 +35,32 @@ pub struct EventStatus {
     pub is_active: bool,
     pub uploads_locked: bool,
     pub export_released: bool,
+    /// Free space on the volume the keepsake is written to. `None` when the mount can't be
+    /// resolved — the UI hides the widget rather than rendering a confident zero.
+    pub disk_free_bytes: Option<u64>,
+    /// What a full keepsake build would need right now (both halves).
+    pub keepsake_required_bytes: u64,
+    /// Whether the host should be warned. See [`disk_is_low`].
+    pub disk_low: bool,
+}
+
+/// Absolute floor below which free space is worth surfacing regardless of gallery size — the
+/// threshold the README has carried on the roadmap since v1.
+const LOW_DISK_FLOOR_BYTES: u64 = 10_000_000_000;
+
+/// Is free space low enough that the host needs to know?
+///
+/// Two triggers, because a fixed threshold answers the wrong question. `postgres_data`,
+/// `media_data` and `exports_data` are all Docker named volumes on one filesystem, so a full disk
+/// does not degrade one subsystem — it stops Postgres writing and takes the event down. That is
+/// what the absolute floor is for.
+///
+/// The second trigger is the one that actually earns its place: the keepsake needs room for two
+/// gallery-sized archives, and the only moment a host can do anything about that is BEFORE they
+/// release. Warning at "you could not build the keepsake right now" turns a post-event dead end
+/// into a decision someone can still make.
+fn disk_is_low(free: u64, keepsake_required: u64) -> bool {
+    free < LOW_DISK_FLOOR_BYTES || free < keepsake_required
 }
 
 /// Count non-banned hosts/admins in the event OTHER than `excluding` — the operators
@@ -72,11 +98,29 @@ pub async fn get_event_status(
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Event nicht gefunden.".into()))?;
 
+    // Measured on the EXPORT volume, not the media one: that is where the cliff is, and it is a
+    // distinct mount point even when both are backed by the same filesystem. The cached reading is
+    // right here — this is advisory, polled on every dashboard load, and a 15s-stale number costs
+    // nothing (unlike the export preflight, which reads uncached because it is about to write).
+    let free = state
+        .disk_cache
+        .snapshot(&state.config.export_path)
+        .map(|d| d.free);
+    let keepsake_required_bytes =
+        crate::services::export::keepsake_space_required(&state.pool, event.id)
+            .await
+            .unwrap_or(0);
+
     Ok(Json(EventStatus {
         name: event.name,
         is_active: event.is_active,
         uploads_locked: event.uploads_locked_at.is_some(),
         export_released: event.export_released_at.is_some(),
+        disk_free_bytes: free,
+        keepsake_required_bytes,
+        // Unknown free space is NOT low. Fails open, exactly as the upload quota and the export
+        // preflight do: a scary banner on an unreadable mount would train the host to ignore it.
+        disk_low: free.is_some_and(|f| disk_is_low(f, keepsake_required_bytes)),
     }))
 }
 
@@ -765,3 +809,45 @@ pub async fn release_gallery(
 
     Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::{LOW_DISK_FLOOR_BYTES, disk_is_low};
+
+    const GB: u64 = 1_000_000_000;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn a_healthy_disk_with_room_for_the_keepsake_is_not_low() {
+        assert!(!disk_is_low(40 * GB, 25 * GB));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_absolute_floor_fires_even_when_the_gallery_is_tiny() {
+        // All three volumes share one filesystem, so running out doesn't degrade one subsystem —
+        // Postgres stops being able to write and the event goes down. A 1 GB gallery would clear
+        // the keepsake test comfortably; the floor is what catches this.
+        assert!(disk_is_low(5 * GB, GB));
+        assert!(disk_is_low(LOW_DISK_FLOOR_BYTES - 1, 0));
+        assert!(!disk_is_low(LOW_DISK_FLOOR_BYTES, 0));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn plenty_of_space_is_still_low_when_the_keepsake_would_not_fit() {
+        // THE case the fixed threshold misses, and the one that matters: 30 GB free is nowhere near
+        // any floor, but a 30 GB gallery needs room for TWO archives. The host can act on this
+        // before releasing; after releasing, they cannot.
+        assert!(disk_is_low(30 * GB, 66 * GB));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn the_keepsake_trigger_is_exact_at_the_boundary() {
+        assert!(!disk_is_low(66 * GB, 66 * GB), "exactly enough is enough");
+        assert!(disk_is_low(66 * GB - 1, 66 * GB));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn an_empty_gallery_needs_nothing_and_only_the_floor_applies() {
+        assert!(!disk_is_low(11 * GB, 0));
+        assert!(disk_is_low(9 * GB, 0));
+    }
+}

backend/src/handlers/social.rs

@@ -10,8 +10,40 @@ use crate::error::AppError;
 use crate::models::comment::{Comment, CommentDto};
 use crate::models::hashtag::{self, Hashtag};
 use crate::models::upload::Upload;
+use crate::services::config;
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
+/// Throttle a social write. Keyed PER USER, like the feed and upload limits and for the same
+/// reason: at a venue every guest sits behind one NAT, so an IP key hands the whole party a
+/// single bucket and the most active guest starves everyone else.
+///
+/// These were the only mutating endpoints in the app with no limit at all — the coverage was
+/// asymmetric, not deliberately open. The ceiling is set well above anything a real guest
+/// produces; this bounds a script, not an enthusiastic double-tapper.
+async fn check_social_rate(state: &AppState, user_id: Uuid) -> Result<(), AppError> {
+    let rate_limits_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "rate_limits_enabled", true).await;
+    let social_rate_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "social_rate_enabled", true).await;
+    if !(rate_limits_on && social_rate_on) {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    let rate_limit = config::get_usize(&state.config_cache, "social_rate_per_min", 120).await;
+    // ONE bucket across likes, comments and comment deletions. Separate buckets would let a
+    // caller triple the aggregate write rate just by alternating between them.
+    state
+        .rate_limiter
+        .check_with_retry(
+            format!("social:{user_id}"),
+            rate_limit,
+            std::time::Duration::from_secs(60),
+        )
+        .map_err(|retry_after_secs| {
+            AppError::TooManyRequests(
+                "Zu viele Aktionen. Bitte warte kurz und versuche es erneut.".into(),
+                Some(retry_after_secs),
+            )
+        })
+}
+
 #[derive(Serialize)]
 pub struct LikeResponse {
     /// The caller's like state *after* this toggle. The client sets `liked_by_me` from
@@ -35,6 +67,7 @@ pub async fn toggle_like(
     if user.is_banned {
         return Err(AppError::Forbidden("Du bist gesperrt.".into()));
     }
+    check_social_rate(&state, auth.user_id).await?;
 
     // Event-scope: the upload must belong to the caller's event (404 otherwise),
     // matching the host handlers' find_by_id_and_event pattern.
@@ -141,6 +174,7 @@ pub async fn add_comment(
     if user.is_banned {
         return Err(AppError::Forbidden("Du bist gesperrt.".into()));
     }
+    check_social_rate(&state, auth.user_id).await?;
 
     // Event-scope: only comment on an upload that belongs to the caller's event.
     Upload::find_by_id_and_event(&state.pool, upload_id, auth.event_id)
@@ -216,6 +250,7 @@ pub async fn delete_comment(
     if auth.is_banned {
         return Err(AppError::Forbidden("Du bist gesperrt.".into()));
     }
+    check_social_rate(&state, auth.user_id).await?;
     let comment = Comment::find_by_id(&state.pool, comment_id)
         .await?
         .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Kommentar nicht gefunden.".into()))?;

backend/src/handlers/test_admin.rs

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ pub async fn truncate_all(
             ('export_rate_per_day',        '3'),
             ('join_ip_rate_per_min',       '60'),
             ('recover_ip_rate_per_min',    '30'),
+            ('social_rate_per_min',        '120'),
             ('quota_tolerance',            '0.75'),
             ('estimated_guest_count',      '100'),
             ('compression_concurrency',    '2'),
@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ pub async fn truncate_all(
             ('feed_rate_enabled',          'false'),
             ('export_rate_enabled',        'false'),
             ('join_rate_enabled',          'false'),
+            ('social_rate_enabled',        'false'),
             ('admin_login_rate_enabled',   'false'),
             ('quota_enabled',              'false'),
             ('storage_quota_enabled',      'false'),

backend/src/services/export.rs

@@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ fn is_superseded_archive(
 /// want, since being wrong low means ENOSPC halfway through.
 ///
 /// Matches [`query_uploads`]' visibility filter exactly, so hidden/banned uploads aren't counted.
-async fn estimate_export_bytes(pool: &PgPool, event_id: Uuid) -> Result<u64> {
+pub async fn estimate_export_bytes(pool: &PgPool, event_id: Uuid) -> Result<u64> {
     let (bytes,): (i64,) = sqlx::query_as(
         "SELECT COALESCE(SUM(u.original_size_bytes), 0)::bigint
            FROM upload u
@@ -1302,6 +1302,20 @@ fn required_free_bytes(media_bytes: u64, armed: i64) -> u64 {
     needed.min(u64::MAX as u128) as u64
 }
 
+/// Free bytes a full keepsake build would need RIGHT NOW, both halves included.
+///
+/// The same arithmetic the preflight uses, exposed so the host dashboard can warn BEFORE the
+/// release rather than reporting a failure after it. The preflight can only ever say "this didn't
+/// fit"; at that point the gallery is full, the event is over, and the remedies (ask guests to stop
+/// uploading, grow the volume) are all much harder. Hard-codes both halves because that is what a
+/// release arms.
+pub async fn keepsake_space_required(pool: &PgPool, event_id: Uuid) -> Result<u64> {
+    Ok(required_free_bytes(
+        estimate_export_bytes(pool, event_id).await?,
+        2,
+    ))
+}
+
 /// Refuse to start an export that cannot fit, with a reason the host can act on.
 ///
 /// Without this the failure mode is ENOSPC halfway through a multi-GB write, and the wreckage

backend/src/services/maintenance.rs

@@ -11,8 +11,9 @@
 //! 2. **Periodic tasks** — pruning that should happen "every hour" rather than per
 //!    request: expired sessions (otherwise the table grows unboundedly), the
 //!    rate-limiter's in-memory windows (so keys for IPs that left long ago don't
-//!    accumulate), and the originals of uploads whose compression permanently failed
+//!    accumulate), and the media of soft-deleted uploads — both the ones whose compression
-//!    (which are deliberately retained for a recovery window, then reclaimed).
+//!    permanently failed and the ones a guest or host deliberately removed — which are
+//!    retained for a recovery window and then reclaimed.
 
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 use std::time::Duration;
@@ -37,6 +38,27 @@ use crate::services::sse_tickets::SseTicketStore;
 /// failed upload still has the file, while the leak stays bounded.
 const FAILED_ORIGINAL_RETENTION_DAYS: i64 = 14;
 
+/// How long a DELIBERATELY deleted upload's files are kept before they are reclaimed.
+///
+/// The same leak, reached by the ordinary path rather than the exceptional one.
+/// `soft_delete_in_event` stamps `deleted_at` and refunds `total_upload_bytes`, but nothing ever
+/// removed the bytes — so the quota stopped bounding the disk. Upload 500 MB, delete, quota is back
+/// to zero, upload another 500 MB: not an attack, just a guest curating their camera roll, which is
+/// what people do. The host then sees guests hitting "Du hast dein Upload-Limit erreicht" while the
+/// admin widget shows a disk full of files no upload row points at, and the quota message is
+/// actively misleading because the space really is gone — just not to anyone the accounting can
+/// name.
+///
+/// Much shorter than the failure window on purpose. Fourteen days outlives the whole event, so a
+/// deliberate delete would never reclaim anything while it mattered. A day still gives an operator
+/// a recovery window for a mis-tap.
+///
+/// NOTE what this does NOT do: within the window the bytes are still spent and still unaccounted,
+/// so a guest deleting and re-uploading through an eight-hour event can outrun the sweep. Bounding
+/// that would mean holding the quota until the file is actually reclaimed rather than refunding at
+/// `deleted_at` — a deliberate trade, and the reason the low-disk warning exists.
+const DELETED_UPLOAD_RETENTION_HOURS: i64 = 24;
+
 /// Reset rows left in flight by a previous crashed instance. Run once on startup,
 /// before the HTTP server starts taking requests, so users never observe the
 /// half-state.
@@ -117,38 +139,59 @@ pub fn spawn_periodic_tasks(
         loop {
             tick.tick().await;
             cleanup_sessions(&pool).await;
-            cleanup_failed_originals(&pool, &media_path).await;
+            cleanup_deleted_media(&pool, &media_path).await;
             rate_limiter.prune();
             sse_tickets.prune();
         }
     });
 }
 
-/// Reclaim the originals of uploads whose compression permanently failed, once they are
+/// Reclaim the media of soft-deleted uploads once they are past their retention window.
-/// past [`FAILED_ORIGINAL_RETENTION_DAYS`].
 ///
-/// Deliberately narrow. It only touches rows that are BOTH `compression_status = 'failed'`
+/// ONLY ever touches rows with `deleted_at IS NOT NULL`, so it can never reach a live upload. Two
-/// AND soft-deleted — i.e. the exact state the compression worker's give-up path leaves
+/// classes, two windows, because the two deletes mean different things:
-/// behind — so it can never reach a live upload or one whose preview works. `original_path`
+///
-/// is cleared in the same pass, which makes the sweep idempotent and stops a later run
+/// - a compression failure the guest didn't ask for and may want investigated —
-/// re-reporting a file that is already gone. The row itself is kept: it is the audit trail
+///   [`FAILED_ORIGINAL_RETENTION_DAYS`];
-/// for the failure, and it costs a few hundred bytes.
+/// - a deliberate removal by the guest or the host — [`DELETED_UPLOAD_RETENTION_HOURS`].
-async fn cleanup_failed_originals(pool: &PgPool, media_path: &std::path::Path) {
+///
-    let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, (uuid::Uuid, String)>(
+/// ALL FOUR paths are reclaimed, not just the original. The previous version cleared
-        "SELECT id, original_path FROM upload
+/// `original_path` alone, which was right for its only case (a failed compression produces no
-         WHERE compression_status = 'failed'
+/// derivatives) but wrong the moment the sweep reaches a successfully processed upload: preview,
-           AND deleted_at IS NOT NULL
+/// display and thumbnail are each a separate file on disk, none of them counted in
-           AND deleted_at < NOW() - ($1 || ' days')::interval
+/// `original_size_bytes`, and nothing else ever removed them.
-           AND original_path <> ''",
+///
+/// Every column is cleared in the same pass, which makes the sweep idempotent and stops a later run
+/// re-reporting files that are already gone. The ROW is kept: it is the audit trail, it costs a few
+/// hundred bytes, and `backfill_stale_derivatives` is guarded on `deleted_at IS NULL` so a nulled
+/// `preview_path` can never make it regenerate what was just reclaimed.
+async fn cleanup_deleted_media(pool: &PgPool, media_path: &std::path::Path) {
+    type Row = (
+        uuid::Uuid,
+        String,
+        Option<String>,
+        Option<String>,
+        Option<String>,
+    );
+    let rows = sqlx::query_as::<_, Row>(
+        "SELECT id, original_path, preview_path, display_path, thumbnail_path FROM upload
+         WHERE deleted_at IS NOT NULL
+           AND CASE WHEN compression_status = 'failed'
+                    THEN deleted_at < NOW() - ($1 || ' days')::interval
+                    ELSE deleted_at < NOW() - ($2 || ' hours')::interval
+               END
+           AND (original_path <> '' OR preview_path IS NOT NULL
+                OR display_path IS NOT NULL OR thumbnail_path IS NOT NULL)",
     )
     .bind(FAILED_ORIGINAL_RETENTION_DAYS.to_string())
+    .bind(DELETED_UPLOAD_RETENTION_HOURS.to_string())
     .fetch_all(pool)
     .await;
 
     let rows = match rows {
         Ok(r) => r,
         Err(e) => {
-            tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "failed-original sweep query failed");
+            tracing::warn!(error = ?e, "deleted-media sweep query failed");
             return;
         }
     };
@@ -157,32 +200,52 @@ async fn cleanup_failed_originals(pool: &PgPool, media_path: &std::path::Path) {
     }
 
     let mut reclaimed = 0usize;
-    for (id, original_path) in rows {
+    for (id, original, preview, display, thumbnail) in rows {
-        let absolute = media_path.join(&original_path);
+        let paths: Vec<String> = std::iter::once(original)
+            .filter(|p| !p.is_empty())
+            .chain([preview, display, thumbnail].into_iter().flatten())
+            .collect();
+
+        // All-or-nothing per row: the columns are only cleared once every file for that upload is
+        // gone. Clearing after a partial success would strand the survivors with nothing pointing
+        // at them — the same unowned-bytes state this sweep exists to drain.
+        let mut all_gone = true;
+        for rel in &paths {
+            let absolute = media_path.join(rel);
             match tokio::fs::remove_file(&absolute).await {
                 Ok(()) => reclaimed += 1,
-            // Already gone (manual cleanup, restored backup) — still clear the column so
+                // Already gone (manual cleanup, restored backup) — still counts as reclaimed for
-            // the row stops being re-selected every hour.
+                // the purpose of clearing the columns, or the row is re-selected every hour forever.
                 Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {}
                 Err(e) => {
                     tracing::warn!(error = ?e, %id, path = %absolute.display(),
-                    "could not reclaim failed original; leaving the row for the next sweep");
+                        "could not reclaim deleted media; leaving the row for the next sweep");
+                    all_gone = false;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if !all_gone {
             continue;
         }
-        }
+
-        if let Err(e) = sqlx::query("UPDATE upload SET original_path = '' WHERE id = $1")
+        if let Err(e) = sqlx::query(
+            "UPDATE upload SET original_path = '', preview_path = NULL,
+                    display_path = NULL, thumbnail_path = NULL
+             WHERE id = $1",
+        )
         .bind(id)
         .execute(pool)
         .await
         {
-            tracing::warn!(error = ?e, %id, "reclaimed the file but could not clear original_path");
+            tracing::warn!(error = ?e, %id, "reclaimed the files but could not clear the paths");
         }
     }
 
     if reclaimed > 0 {
         tracing::info!(
-            "reclaimed {reclaimed} original(s) from uploads that failed compression more than \
+            "reclaimed {reclaimed} file(s) from soft-deleted uploads (deliberate deletes after \
-             {FAILED_ORIGINAL_RETENTION_DAYS} days ago"
+             {DELETED_UPLOAD_RETENTION_HOURS}h, compression failures after \
+             {FAILED_ORIGINAL_RETENTION_DAYS}d)"
         );
     }
 }

backend/tests/failed_original_sweep.rs

@@ -1,19 +1,27 @@
-//! DB-backed tests for the failed-original sweep (`services/maintenance.rs`).
+//! DB-backed tests for the deleted-media sweep (`services/maintenance.rs`).
 //!
-//! Context: the compression worker deliberately no longer deletes an upload's original when
+//! Context, in two halves.
-//! its transcode fails — a transient ENOSPC or a codec panic must never destroy the only
-//! copy of a photo a guest cannot retake. But the row is soft-deleted and the uploader's
-//! quota IS refunded, so those bytes become invisible, unowned and free. A guest hitting a
-//! reproducible codec failure could accumulate orphans at no personal cost, and since
-//! `active_uploaders` counts only users with non-deleted uploads, dropping out of that count
-//! actually RAISES everyone's per-user ceiling while the disk fills.
 //!
-//! The sweep reclaims them after a retention window. Its selection predicate is the whole
+//! The compression worker deliberately no longer deletes an upload's original when its transcode
-//! safety argument — it must reach the give-up path's leftovers and nothing else — so that
+//! fails — a transient ENOSPC or a codec panic must never destroy the only copy of a photo a guest
-//! is what these tests pin, following the same "reproduce the SQL verbatim" pattern as
+//! cannot retake. But the row is soft-deleted and the uploader's quota IS refunded, so those bytes
-//! `upload_concurrency.rs`.
+//! become invisible, unowned and free.
 //!
-//! `#[sqlx::test]` gives each test a fresh database with the real migrations applied.
+//! The SAME hole was reachable by the ordinary path, and that one is not an edge case at all:
+//! `soft_delete_in_event` refunds `total_upload_bytes` on every guest or host delete and nothing
+//! removed the files, so the quota stopped bounding the disk. Upload 500 MB, delete, quota back to
+//! zero, upload another 500 MB — a guest curating their camera roll, which is what people do. The
+//! sweep used to reach only `compression_status = 'failed'`, so it never touched this case; the
+//! test below that now asserts an owner-deleted upload IS reclaimed is the one that used to assert
+//! the opposite.
+//!
+//! Two windows, because the two deletes mean different things: 14 days for a failure an operator
+//! may want to investigate, 24 hours for a removal someone asked for (14 days outlives the whole
+//! event, so a deliberate delete would never reclaim anything while it mattered).
+//!
+//! The selection predicate is the whole safety argument — it must reach both leftovers and never a
+//! live upload — so that is what these pin, following the same "reproduce the SQL verbatim" pattern
+//! as `upload_concurrency.rs`. `#[sqlx::test]` gives each test a fresh, migrated database.
 
 mod common;
 
@@ -21,195 +29,324 @@ use common::*;
 use sqlx::PgPool;
 use uuid::Uuid;
 
-/// SRC: `services/maintenance.rs::cleanup_failed_originals` — the selection, verbatim.
+const FAILED_DAYS: i64 = 14;
-async fn sweep_selects(pool: &PgPool, retention_days: i64) -> Vec<Uuid> {
+const DELETED_HOURS: i64 = 24;
-    sqlx::query_as::<_, (Uuid, String)>(
+
-        "SELECT id, original_path FROM upload
+/// SRC: `services/maintenance.rs::cleanup_deleted_media` — the selection, verbatim.
-         WHERE compression_status = 'failed'
+async fn sweep_selects(pool: &PgPool, failed_days: i64, deleted_hours: i64) -> Vec<Uuid> {
-           AND deleted_at IS NOT NULL
+    type Row = (Uuid, String, Option<String>, Option<String>, Option<String>);
-           AND deleted_at < NOW() - ($1 || ' days')::interval
+    sqlx::query_as::<_, Row>(
-           AND original_path <> ''",
+        "SELECT id, original_path, preview_path, display_path, thumbnail_path FROM upload
+         WHERE deleted_at IS NOT NULL
+           AND CASE WHEN compression_status = 'failed'
+                    THEN deleted_at < NOW() - ($1 || ' days')::interval
+                    ELSE deleted_at < NOW() - ($2 || ' hours')::interval
+               END
+           AND (original_path <> '' OR preview_path IS NOT NULL
+                OR display_path IS NOT NULL OR thumbnail_path IS NOT NULL)",
     )
-    .bind(retention_days.to_string())
+    .bind(failed_days.to_string())
+    .bind(deleted_hours.to_string())
     .fetch_all(pool)
     .await
     .expect("sweep query")
     .into_iter()
-    .map(|(id, _)| id)
+    .map(|(id, ..)| id)
     .collect()
 }
 
-#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+/// Seed an upload aged `deleted_hours_ago` (None = live), with optional derivative paths.
-async fn seed_upload(
+async fn seed_aged_upload(
     pool: &PgPool,
     event_id: Uuid,
     user_id: Uuid,
     status: &str,
-    deleted_days_ago: Option<i64>,
+    deleted_hours_ago: Option<i64>,
     original_path: &str,
+    derivatives: bool,
 ) -> Uuid {
-    let id: Uuid = sqlx::query_scalar(
+    sqlx::query_scalar(
         "INSERT INTO upload (event_id, user_id, original_path, mime_type, original_size_bytes,
-                             compression_status, deleted_at)
+                             compression_status, deleted_at,
+                             preview_path, display_path, thumbnail_path)
          VALUES ($1, $2, $3, 'image/jpeg', 1000, $4,
                  CASE WHEN $5::bigint IS NULL THEN NULL
-                      ELSE NOW() - ($5::text || ' days')::interval END)
+                      ELSE NOW() - ($5::text || ' hours')::interval END,
+                 CASE WHEN $6 THEN 'previews/p.jpg' END,
+                 CASE WHEN $6 THEN 'displays/d.jpg' END,
+                 CASE WHEN $6 THEN 'thumbs/t.jpg' END)
          RETURNING id",
     )
     .bind(event_id)
     .bind(user_id)
     .bind(original_path)
     .bind(status)
-    .bind(deleted_days_ago)
+    .bind(deleted_hours_ago)
+    .bind(derivatives)
     .fetch_one(pool)
     .await
-    .expect("seed upload");
+    .expect("seed upload")
-    id
 }
 
+/// A live upload is untouchable no matter how the windows are configured.
+///
+/// PREVENTS: the catastrophic loosening. Everything else here is about reclaiming more; this is the
+/// one assertion that must never bend.
 #[sqlx::test]
-async fn sweeps_only_long_failed_soft_deleted_uploads(pool: PgPool) {
+async fn a_live_upload_is_never_selected(pool: PgPool) {
-    let event_id = seed_event(&pool, "sweep-event").await;
+    let event_id = seed_event(&pool, "sweep-live").await;
     let user_id = seed_user(&pool, event_id, "Sweeper").await;
 
-    // The one and only thing the sweep may touch: the exact state the compression worker's
+    for status in ["done", "failed", "processing", "pending"] {
-    // give-up path leaves behind, aged past the window.
+        let live = seed_aged_upload(
-    let target = seed_upload(
             &pool,
             event_id,
             user_id,
-        "failed",
+            status,
-        Some(30),
-        "originals/e/target.jpg",
-    )
-    .await;
-
-    // Everything below is a near-miss that must survive.
-    // A healthy live upload — the catastrophic case if the predicate were ever loosened.
-    let live = seed_upload(
-        &pool,
-        event_id,
-        user_id,
-        "done",
             None,
             "originals/e/live.jpg",
+            true,
         )
         .await;
-    // Failed but still inside the retention window: the recovery window is the entire point
+        assert!(
-    // of keeping the file, so reclaiming it early would defeat the fix it protects.
+            !sweep_selects(&pool, FAILED_DAYS, DELETED_HOURS)
-    let recent = seed_upload(
+                .await
-        &pool,
+                .contains(&live),
-        event_id,
+            "a non-deleted upload with status {status} must never be swept"
-        user_id,
+        );
-        "failed",
+    }
-        Some(1),
+}
-        "originals/e/recent.jpg",
+
-    )
+/// THE FIX. An upload a guest or host deliberately deleted is reclaimed once past 24 hours.
-    .await;
+///
-    // Failed but NOT soft-deleted — not the give-up path; something else set this status.
+/// PREVENTS: the regression back to a sweep scoped to `compression_status = 'failed'`, which is
-    let failed_live = seed_upload(
+/// what let the quota stop bounding the disk. This assertion is the inverse of the one this file
-        &pool,
+/// used to make.
-        event_id,
+#[sqlx::test]
-        user_id,
+async fn a_deliberately_deleted_upload_is_reclaimed_after_a_day(pool: PgPool) {
-        "failed",
+    let event_id = seed_event(&pool, "sweep-deleted").await;
-        None,
+    let user_id = seed_user(&pool, event_id, "Curator").await;
-        "originals/e/failed-live.jpg",
+
-    )
+    let deleted = seed_aged_upload(
-    .await;
-    // Soft-deleted by the OWNER, compression fine. Its file is already gone; this row must
-    // never be re-processed.
-    let owner_deleted = seed_upload(
         &pool,
         event_id,
         user_id,
         "done",
-        Some(30),
+        Some(48),
         "originals/e/owner.jpg",
+        true,
+    )
+    .await;
+    // Still inside the window — a mis-tap is recoverable for a day.
+    let recent = seed_aged_upload(
+        &pool,
+        event_id,
+        user_id,
+        "done",
+        Some(2),
+        "originals/e/recent.jpg",
+        true,
     )
     .await;
-    // Already swept: `original_path` cleared. Re-selecting it every hour would log a
-    // phantom reclaim forever.
-    let already_swept = seed_upload(&pool, event_id, user_id, "failed", Some(30), "").await;
 
-    let selected = sweep_selects(&pool, 14).await;
+    let selected = sweep_selects(&pool, FAILED_DAYS, DELETED_HOURS).await;
-
+    assert!(
-    assert_eq!(
+        selected.contains(&deleted),
-        selected,
+        "a deliberate delete past the window must be reclaimed — this is the leak"
-        vec![target],
+    );
-        "the sweep must select exactly the aged give-up-path leftovers"
+    assert!(
+        !selected.contains(&recent),
+        "a delete inside the window keeps its recovery grace"
     );
-    for (id, what) in [
-        (live, "a live upload"),
-        (recent, "a failure still inside the retention window"),
-        (failed_live, "a failed but not soft-deleted upload"),
-        (owner_deleted, "an owner-deleted upload"),
-        (already_swept, "an already-swept row"),
-    ] {
-        assert!(!selected.contains(&id), "the sweep must not touch {what}");
-    }
 }
 
+/// The two windows are independent: a failure is retained far longer than a deliberate delete.
+///
+/// PREVENTS: collapsing them into one. Applying 24h to failures would destroy the recovery window
+/// the retained-original fix exists to provide; applying 14 days to deliberate deletes would mean
+/// nothing is ever reclaimed during an event.
 #[sqlx::test]
-async fn retention_window_is_honoured_at_the_boundary(pool: PgPool) {
+async fn the_two_retention_windows_do_not_bleed_into_each_other(pool: PgPool) {
+    let event_id = seed_event(&pool, "sweep-windows").await;
+    let user_id = seed_user(&pool, event_id, "Windows").await;
+
+    // 48h old: past the deliberate window, nowhere near the failure window.
+    let failed_recent = seed_aged_upload(
+        &pool,
+        event_id,
+        user_id,
+        "failed",
+        Some(48),
+        "originals/e/f-recent.jpg",
+        false,
+    )
+    .await;
+    let deleted_same_age = seed_aged_upload(
+        &pool,
+        event_id,
+        user_id,
+        "done",
+        Some(48),
+        "originals/e/d-same.jpg",
+        false,
+    )
+    .await;
+    // 30 days old: past both.
+    let failed_old = seed_aged_upload(
+        &pool,
+        event_id,
+        user_id,
+        "failed",
+        Some(30 * 24),
+        "originals/e/f-old.jpg",
+        false,
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    let selected = sweep_selects(&pool, FAILED_DAYS, DELETED_HOURS).await;
+    assert!(
+        !selected.contains(&failed_recent),
+        "a 2-day-old compression failure is still inside its 14-day recovery window"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        selected.contains(&deleted_same_age),
+        "a deliberate delete of the same age is past its 24-hour window"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        selected.contains(&failed_old),
+        "a 30-day-old failure is past both windows"
+    );
+}
+
+/// Boundary behaviour on both windows.
+#[sqlx::test]
+async fn retention_windows_are_honoured_at_the_boundary(pool: PgPool) {
     let event_id = seed_event(&pool, "sweep-boundary").await;
     let user_id = seed_user(&pool, event_id, "Boundary").await;
 
-    let inside = seed_upload(
+    let cases = [
+        ("failed", 13 * 24, false, "13 days"),
+        ("failed", 15 * 24, true, "15 days"),
+        ("done", 23, false, "23 hours"),
+        ("done", 25, true, "25 hours"),
+    ];
+    for (status, hours, expected, label) in cases {
+        let id = seed_aged_upload(
             &pool,
             event_id,
             user_id,
-        "failed",
+            status,
-        Some(13),
+            Some(hours),
-        "originals/e/inside.jpg",
+            "originals/e/b.jpg",
+            false,
         )
         .await;
-    let outside = seed_upload(
+        assert_eq!(
-        &pool,
+            sweep_selects(&pool, FAILED_DAYS, DELETED_HOURS)
-        event_id,
+                .await
-        user_id,
+                .contains(&id),
-        "failed",
+            expected,
-        Some(15),
+            "a {status} upload deleted {label} ago: expected swept={expected}"
-        "originals/e/outside.jpg",
-    )
-    .await;
-
-    let selected = sweep_selects(&pool, 14).await;
-    assert!(
-        selected.contains(&outside),
-        "15 days old must be past a 14-day window"
-    );
-    assert!(
-        !selected.contains(&inside),
-        "13 days old must still be retained"
         );
+        sqlx::query("DELETE FROM upload WHERE id = $1")
+            .bind(id)
+            .execute(&pool)
+            .await
+            .expect("clean up");
+    }
 }
 
+/// A row is re-selected until EVERY one of its paths is cleared.
+///
+/// PREVENTS: two failures at once. The sweep used to clear `original_path` alone, which was right
+/// for its only case (a failed compression produces no derivatives) but leaves preview, display and
+/// thumbnail on disk the moment it reaches a successfully processed upload — three files per
+/// upload, none of them counted in `original_size_bytes`, that nothing else ever removes. And a row
+/// whose paths are all cleared must stop coming back, or every hourly tick logs a phantom reclaim
+/// forever.
 #[sqlx::test]
-async fn clearing_original_path_makes_the_sweep_idempotent(pool: PgPool) {
+async fn a_row_is_reselected_until_every_path_is_cleared(pool: PgPool) {
-    // The sweep clears `original_path` after reclaiming the file. Without that, a row whose
-    // file is already gone is re-selected on every hourly tick forever.
     let event_id = seed_event(&pool, "sweep-idempotent").await;
     let user_id = seed_user(&pool, event_id, "Idem").await;
-    let id = seed_upload(
+    let id = seed_aged_upload(
         &pool,
         event_id,
         user_id,
-        "failed",
+        "done",
-        Some(30),
+        Some(48),
         "originals/e/once.jpg",
+        true,
     )
     .await;
 
-    assert_eq!(sweep_selects(&pool, 14).await, vec![id]);
+    assert_eq!(sweep_selects(&pool, FAILED_DAYS, DELETED_HOURS).await, [id]);
 
+    // Clearing only the original is NOT enough — the derivatives are still on disk.
     sqlx::query("UPDATE upload SET original_path = '' WHERE id = $1")
         .bind(id)
         .execute(&pool)
         .await
-        .expect("clear path");
+        .expect("clear original");
+    assert_eq!(
+        sweep_selects(&pool, FAILED_DAYS, DELETED_HOURS).await,
+        [id],
+        "derivatives left behind must keep the row selected"
+    );
 
+    sqlx::query(
+        "UPDATE upload SET preview_path = NULL, display_path = NULL, thumbnail_path = NULL
+         WHERE id = $1",
+    )
+    .bind(id)
+    .execute(&pool)
+    .await
+    .expect("clear derivatives");
     assert!(
-        sweep_selects(&pool, 14).await.is_empty(),
+        sweep_selects(&pool, FAILED_DAYS, DELETED_HOURS)
-        "a swept row must not come back"
+            .await
+            .is_empty(),
+        "a fully swept row must not come back"
+    );
+}
+
+/// The derivative backfill must never resurrect what the sweep just reclaimed.
+///
+/// PREVENTS: an interaction, not a bug in either piece. The sweep nulls `preview_path`, and
+/// `backfill_stale_derivatives` selects on `display_path IS NULL AND preview_path IS NOT NULL` —
+/// close enough that a future edit to either could have the backfill re-decode an original that is
+/// no longer on disk, on every boot. `deleted_at IS NULL` is what keeps them apart.
+#[sqlx::test]
+async fn the_backfill_ignores_swept_rows(pool: PgPool) {
+    let event_id = seed_event(&pool, "sweep-backfill").await;
+    let user_id = seed_user(&pool, event_id, "Backfill").await;
+    seed_aged_upload(
+        &pool,
+        event_id,
+        user_id,
+        "done",
+        Some(48),
+        "originals/e/gone.jpg",
+        true,
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    // SRC: `services/compression.rs::backfill_stale_derivatives` — the selection, verbatim.
+    let backfilled: Vec<(Uuid, String, String)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT id, original_path, mime_type FROM upload
+             WHERE deleted_at IS NULL AND mime_type LIKE 'image/%'
+               AND original_path IS NOT NULL
+               AND (
+                     (display_path IS NULL AND preview_path IS NOT NULL)
+                  OR derivatives_rev < $1
+               )",
+    )
+    .bind(1i16)
+    .fetch_all(&pool)
+    .await
+    .expect("backfill query");
+
+    assert!(
+        backfilled.is_empty(),
+        "a soft-deleted row must be invisible to the backfill, before or after sweeping"
     );
 }

docker-compose.yml

@@ -17,7 +17,15 @@ services:
     deploy:
       resources:
         limits:
-          memory: 512M
+          # 1G, not 512M. DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS defaults to 30 for a ~100-guest event
+          # (feed polling + SSE + uploads at once), and 30 backends plus Postgres 16's
+          # default shared_buffers leaves very little headroom at 512M. An OOM here does
+          # not degrade one feature — it takes the event down, because every request
+          # path touches the database. Memory is the cheaper knob than shrinking the
+          # pool back and reintroducing the queueing it was raised to fix.
+          #
+          # Raising DATABASE_MAX_CONNECTIONS further means raising this too.
+          memory: 1G
 
   app:
     build:

e2e/fixtures/db.ts

@@ -105,6 +105,20 @@ export const db = {
     });
   },
 
+  /**
+   * Overstate an upload's recorded size.
+   *
+   * The keepsake size estimate and the low-disk threshold are pure SQL over
+   * `original_size_bytes` — no file is read — so this is the lever for driving "the keepsake
+   * would not fit" without a genuinely full disk. The bytes on disk are unchanged; only the
+   * accounting the warning reads from moves.
+   */
+  async setUploadSizeBytes(uploadId: string, bytes: number) {
+    await withClient((c) =>
+      c.query(`UPDATE upload SET original_size_bytes = $2 WHERE id = $1`, [uploadId, bytes])
+    );
+  },
+
   async setExportReleased(slug: string, released: boolean) {
     await withClient((c) =>
       c.query(`UPDATE event SET export_released_at = $2 WHERE slug = $1`, [

e2e/specs/03-feed/social-rate-limit.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/**
+ * Regression guard — likes, comments and comment deletions are rate limited.
+ *
+ * These were the only mutating endpoints in the app with no limit at all. Every other write path
+ * -- upload, join, recover, export, admin login -- carried one; `social.rs` carried none, so the
+ * coverage was asymmetric rather than deliberately open.
+ *
+ * Severity is genuinely low for an invited-guest event, and the amplification worry is contained:
+ * a like does fan an SSE broadcast to every connected client, but the export regeneration a
+ * comment deletion triggers is debounced (REGEN_DEBOUNCE 20s) and superseded workers are inert. So
+ * this closes the gap for symmetry, and the ceiling is set well above anything a real guest
+ * produces -- it bounds a script, not an enthusiastic double-tapper.
+ *
+ * The bucket is shared across all three actions on purpose: separate buckets would let a caller
+ * triple the aggregate write rate just by alternating between them. That is what the second test
+ * pins, and it is the part most likely to be lost in a refactor.
+ *
+ * Keyed per USER, not per IP — at a venue every guest is behind one NAT, so an IP key would hand
+ * the whole party one bucket. Third test.
+ */
+import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test';
+import { seedUpload } from '../../helpers/seed';
+import { BASE } from '../../helpers/env';
+
+const like = (jwt: string, uploadId: string) =>
+  fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/upload/${uploadId}/like`, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${jwt}` },
+  });
+
+const comment = (jwt: string, uploadId: string, body: string) =>
+  fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/upload/${uploadId}/comments`, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${jwt}`, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    body: JSON.stringify({ body }),
+  });
+
+test.describe('Social — rate limit', () => {
+  test('a burst of likes past the ceiling returns 429 with Retry-After', async ({
+    api,
+    adminToken,
+    guest,
+  }) => {
+    await api.patchConfig(adminToken, {
+      rate_limits_enabled: 'true',
+      social_rate_enabled: 'true',
+      social_rate_per_min: '3',
+    });
+
+    const g = await guest('Tapper');
+    const uploadId = await seedUpload(g.jwt);
+
+    // Sequential, not parallel: a toggle flips state, so ordering matters for the assertion.
+    const statuses: number[] = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) statuses.push((await like(g.jwt, uploadId)).status);
+
+    expect(statuses.slice(0, 3), 'the first three are within the ceiling').toEqual([200, 200, 200]);
+    expect(statuses.slice(3), 'everything past it is refused').toEqual([429, 429]);
+
+    const limited = await like(g.jwt, uploadId);
+    expect(limited.status).toBe(429);
+    expect(
+      limited.headers.get('retry-after'),
+      'a 429 without Retry-After tells the client nothing about when to come back'
+    ).toBeTruthy();
+  });
+
+  test('likes and comments share one bucket', async ({ api, adminToken, guest }) => {
+    // THE assertion. Per-action buckets would let a caller triple the aggregate write rate by
+    // alternating, which defeats the point of having a ceiling at all.
+    await api.patchConfig(adminToken, {
+      rate_limits_enabled: 'true',
+      social_rate_enabled: 'true',
+      social_rate_per_min: '2',
+    });
+
+    const g = await guest('Mixer');
+    const uploadId = await seedUpload(g.jwt);
+
+    expect((await like(g.jwt, uploadId)).status).toBe(200);
+    expect((await comment(g.jwt, uploadId, 'schön!')).status).toBe(201);
+    // Two writes spent, whichever endpoints they went to.
+    expect(
+      (await comment(g.jwt, uploadId, 'noch eins')).status,
+      'a comment must consume the same budget a like does'
+    ).toBe(429);
+    expect((await like(g.jwt, uploadId)).status).toBe(429);
+  });
+
+  test('one guest hitting the ceiling does not block another', async ({
+    api,
+    adminToken,
+    guest,
+  }) => {
+    // Keyed per user, not per IP. Every request in this suite comes from one address, which is
+    // exactly the venue-NAT shape that made the /join and /feed limits turn guests away.
+    await api.patchConfig(adminToken, {
+      rate_limits_enabled: 'true',
+      social_rate_enabled: 'true',
+      social_rate_per_min: '2',
+    });
+
+    const noisy = await guest('Noisy');
+    const quiet = await guest('Quiet');
+    const uploadId = await seedUpload(noisy.jwt);
+
+    for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) await like(noisy.jwt, uploadId);
+    expect((await like(noisy.jwt, uploadId)).status).toBe(429);
+
+    expect(
+      (await like(quiet.jwt, uploadId)).status,
+      'a second guest behind the same IP must have their own budget'
+    ).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  test('flipping social_rate_enabled off bypasses the limit', async ({
+    api,
+    adminToken,
+    guest,
+  }) => {
+    // The toggle has to actually be honoured, or the admin switch is decorative — the failure
+    // mode two other per-area toggles already shipped with.
+    await api.patchConfig(adminToken, {
+      rate_limits_enabled: 'true',
+      social_rate_enabled: 'false',
+      social_rate_per_min: '2',
+    });
+
+    const g = await guest('Unlimited');
+    const uploadId = await seedUpload(g.jwt);
+
+    const statuses: number[] = [];
+    for (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) statuses.push((await like(g.jwt, uploadId)).status);
+    expect(statuses.every((s) => s === 200)).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

e2e/specs/03-feed/video-playback.spec.ts

@@ -40,10 +40,19 @@ test.describe('Video — the lightbox plays it', () => {
     page,
     guest,
     signIn,
+    db,
   }) => {
     const g = await guest('VideoWatcher');
     const id = await seedVideo(g.jwt);
 
+    // The poster assertion below needs the ffmpeg thumbnail to EXIST — the lightbox binds
+    // `poster={upload.thumbnail_url ?? undefined}`, so the attribute is simply absent until
+    // compression finishes. Without this wait the test races the worker and fails against a
+    // cold stack (first run after `stack:down -v`, cold ffmpeg), which is exactly when a suite
+    // is least likely to be believed. The `src` assertion is unconditional; only the poster
+    // needs the wait.
+    await expect.poll(() => db.compressionStatus(id), { timeout: 60_000 }).toBe('done');
+
     await signIn(page, g);
     await page.goto('/feed');
 

e2e/specs/04-host/low-disk-warning.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/**
+ * Regression guard — the host is warned about storage BEFORE it becomes unrecoverable.
+ *
+ * Storage visibility used to exist in exactly one place: a passive "Speicherauslastung" widget on
+ * the ADMIN dashboard. A host who isn't the admin had no view of it at all, and nothing anywhere
+ * warned anyone. README listed a low-disk alert under "Planned (v1.x)".
+ *
+ * Two things make that a safety net rather than a nice-to-have:
+ *
+ *  - `postgres_data`, `media_data` and `exports_data` are all Docker named volumes on ONE
+ *    filesystem. A full disk doesn't degrade a subsystem; Postgres stops being able to write and
+ *    the whole event goes down.
+ *  - The keepsake needs room for TWO gallery-sized archives (both write their media
+ *    `Compression::Stored`; `Memories.zip` streams the original for every video and every image
+ *    at or under 5 MB). The export preflight can refuse cleanly, but only AFTER the release —
+ *    when the event is over, the gallery is full, and every remedy is harder.
+ *
+ * So the threshold is deliberately NOT a fixed number alone. It fires on an absolute floor (10 GB,
+ * the figure the README always carried) OR on "you could not build the keepsake right now", which
+ * is the trigger a host can still act on.
+ *
+ * These drive it through `original_size_bytes` rather than a genuinely full disk: the estimate is
+ * pure SQL over that column, so overstating one row moves the accounting the warning reads without
+ * touching a byte on disk.
+ */
+import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test';
+import { seedUpload } from '../../helpers/seed';
+import { BASE } from '../../helpers/env';
+
+/** Comfortably larger than any disk this suite could run on. */
+const ABSURD_BYTES = 500_000_000_000_000;
+
+test.describe('Host — low-disk warning', () => {
+  test('a gallery too big to export warns the host, with the numbers', async ({
+    page,
+    host,
+    guest,
+    signIn,
+    db,
+  }) => {
+    const g = await guest('BigShooter');
+    const uploadId = await seedUpload(g.jwt);
+    await db.setUploadSizeBytes(uploadId, ABSURD_BYTES);
+
+    await signIn(page, host);
+    await page.goto('/host');
+
+    const warning = page.getByTestId('low-disk-warning');
+    await expect(warning, 'the host must be warned before releasing').toBeVisible({
+      timeout: 15_000,
+    });
+    // The actionable half: not just "low", but "the keepsake cannot be built".
+    await expect(warning).toContainText(/nicht.*erstellt werden/i);
+    // And the consequence that makes it urgent — the event, not just the download.
+    await expect(warning).toContainText(/gesamte Event/i);
+  });
+
+  test('the API reports the requirement and the verdict together', async ({ host, guest, db }) => {
+    const g = await guest('BigShooter2');
+    const uploadId = await seedUpload(g.jwt);
+    await db.setUploadSizeBytes(uploadId, ABSURD_BYTES);
+
+    const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/host/event`, {
+      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${host.jwt}` },
+    });
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const body = (await res.json()) as {
+      disk_low: boolean;
+      disk_free_bytes: number | null;
+      keepsake_required_bytes: number;
+    };
+
+    expect(body.disk_low).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      body.keepsake_required_bytes,
+      'both halves are armed by a release, so the requirement covers two archives'
+    ).toBeGreaterThan(ABSURD_BYTES);
+    expect(body.disk_free_bytes).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(body.keepsake_required_bytes).toBeGreaterThan(body.disk_free_bytes!);
+  });
+
+  test('an ordinary gallery shows no warning at all', async ({ page, host, guest, signIn }) => {
+    // The mirror that keeps the above honest. A warning that is always on is a warning nobody
+    // reads — and it would sit at the very top of the dashboard, above the PIN-reset queue.
+    const g = await guest('NormalShooter');
+    await seedUpload(g.jwt);
+
+    await signIn(page, host);
+    await page.goto('/host');
+
+    // Wait for the dashboard to actually be loaded before asserting on an absence.
+    await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Host-Dashboard' })).toBeVisible({
+      timeout: 15_000,
+    });
+    await expect(page.getByTestId('low-disk-warning')).toHaveCount(0);
+  });
+});

frontend/src/routes/admin/+page.svelte

@@ -84,9 +84,16 @@
 				{ key: 'feed_rate_enabled', label: 'Feed-Limit aktiv', kind: 'bool' },
 				{ key: 'export_rate_enabled', label: 'Export-Limit aktiv', kind: 'bool' },
 				{ key: 'join_rate_enabled', label: 'Join-Limit aktiv', kind: 'bool' },
+				{ key: 'social_rate_enabled', label: 'Interaktions-Limit aktiv', kind: 'bool' },
 				{ key: 'upload_rate_per_hour', label: 'Upload-Limit pro Stunde', kind: 'number' },
 				{ key: 'feed_rate_per_min', label: 'Feed-Anfragen pro Minute', kind: 'number' },
-				{ key: 'export_rate_per_day', label: 'Export-Downloads pro Tag', kind: 'number' }
+				{ key: 'export_rate_per_day', label: 'Export-Downloads pro Tag', kind: 'number' },
+				{
+					key: 'social_rate_per_min',
+					label: 'Interaktionen pro Minute',
+					kind: 'number',
+					hint: 'Likes, Kommentare und Kommentar-Löschungen zusammen, pro Gast. Bewusst hoch angesetzt — soll ein Skript bremsen, keinen begeisterten Gast.'
+				}
 			]
 		},
 		{
@@ -105,7 +112,20 @@
 					kind: 'bool',
 					hint: 'Reserviert für künftige Anzahl-Limits.'
 				},
-				{ key: 'quota_tolerance', label: 'Toleranz (0–1)', kind: 'number' },
+				{
+					key: 'quota_tolerance',
+					label: 'Speicher-Anteil für Gäste (0–1)',
+					kind: 'number',
+					// "Toleranz (0–1)" with no hint invited exactly the wrong reading — that a higher
+					// number means "warn me later". It is the multiplier in
+					// `floor(freier Speicher × Anteil / aktive Uploader)`, so raising it authorises
+					// guests to fill MORE of the disk, not less.
+					hint:
+						'Anteil des freien Speichers, den alle Gäste zusammen belegen dürfen: ' +
+						'Limit = freier Speicher × Anteil ÷ aktive Uploader. Kein Warnschwellenwert — ' +
+						'ein höherer Wert gibt MEHR Speicher frei. Das Keepsake braucht zusätzlich ' +
+						'etwa das Doppelte der Mediengröße; 0,75 ist der getestete Standard.'
+				},
 				{ key: 'estimated_guest_count', label: 'Geschätzte Gästezahl', kind: 'number' }
 			]
 		},

frontend/src/routes/host/+page.svelte

@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
 		is_active: boolean;
 		uploads_locked: boolean;
 		export_released: boolean;
+		disk_free_bytes: number | null;
+		keepsake_required_bytes: number;
+		disk_low: boolean;
 	}
 
 	interface PinResetRequest {
@@ -395,7 +398,11 @@
 	function formatBytes(bytes: number): string {
 		if (bytes < 1024) return `${bytes} B`;
 		if (bytes < 1024 * 1024) return `${(bytes / 1024).toFixed(1)} KB`;
-		return `${(bytes / (1024 * 1024)).toFixed(1)} MB`;
+		// GB matters here now that this also renders free disk and keepsake size — the previous
+		// version topped out at MB, so 30 GB free read as "30720.0 MB" (and a guest with 2 GB of
+		// uploads was already being rendered the same way in the user list).
+		if (bytes < 1024 * 1024 * 1024) return `${(bytes / (1024 * 1024)).toFixed(1)} MB`;
+		return `${(bytes / (1024 * 1024 * 1024)).toFixed(1)} GB`;
 	}
 </script>
 
@@ -507,6 +514,38 @@
 				{error}
 			</div>
 		{:else if event}
+			<!-- ── Speicherwarnung ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+			     Above everything else on purpose. All three volumes (postgres_data, media_data,
+			     exports_data) sit on one filesystem, so running out doesn't degrade a subsystem —
+			     it stops Postgres writing and takes the event down. And the keepsake needs room
+			     for TWO gallery-sized archives, which is only actionable BEFORE the release: the
+			     export preflight can say "this didn't fit", but by then the event is over and the
+			     remedies are all much harder.
+
+			     Only the admin dashboard had any storage visibility at all, and a host is often
+			     not the admin. `disk_low` fails closed to "not low" on an unreadable mount, so
+			     this cannot cry wolf. -->
+			{#if event.disk_low && event.disk_free_bytes !== null}
+				<div
+					class="rounded-xl border border-red-300 bg-red-50 p-4 dark:border-red-800 dark:bg-red-950/30"
+					data-testid="low-disk-warning"
+				>
+					<h2 class="font-semibold text-red-900 dark:text-red-200">Speicherplatz wird knapp</h2>
+					<p class="mt-1 text-sm text-red-800 dark:text-red-300">
+						Noch <strong>{formatBytes(event.disk_free_bytes)}</strong> frei.
+						{#if event.keepsake_required_bytes > event.disk_free_bytes}
+							Für das Keepsake werden derzeit ca.
+							<strong>{formatBytes(event.keepsake_required_bytes)}</strong> benötigt — es kann
+							momentan <strong>nicht</strong> erstellt werden.
+						{/if}
+					</p>
+					<p class="mt-1.5 text-xs text-red-700 dark:text-red-400">
+						Schaffe Speicher frei oder vergrößere den Datenträger. Wenn der Datenträger vollläuft,
+						fällt das gesamte Event aus — nicht nur der Download.
+					</p>
+				</div>
+			{/if}
+
 			<!-- ── PIN-Reset-Anfragen ──────────────────────────────────────── -->
 			{#if pinResetRequests.length > 0}
 				<div