/** * Regression guard — a host must be able to remove a guest's content FROM THE UI. * * `DELETE /host/upload/{id}` and `DELETE /host/comment/{id}` were fully implemented, * transactional, SSE-broadcasting, audit-logged — and had zero frontend callers. The feed's * context sheet offered "Löschen" only when `target.user_id === myUserId`, so the only lever * a host actually had against an unwanted photo was banning the uploader. That is both * disproportionate and ineffective: a ban doesn't retract what was already posted, and * because the ban check runs BEFORE the ownership check on the guest delete route, banning * the author makes their abusive comment permanently undeletable by them too. * * The API side was already covered (04-host/moderation). What was missing is the wiring, * so these tests drive the real UI. */ import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test'; import { seedUpload, seedComment } from '../../helpers/seed'; import { BASE } from '../../helpers/env'; test.describe('Host — moderation from the UI', () => { test("a host removes a guest's photo via the feed context sheet", async ({ page, host, guest, signIn, }) => { const g = await guest('PhotoOffender'); const uploadId = await seedUpload(g.jwt); await signIn(page, host); await page.goto('/feed'); const card = page.locator('article').filter({ hasText: g.displayName }).first(); await expect(card).toBeVisible({ timeout: 15_000 }); await card.getByRole('button', { name: 'Mehr Aktionen' }).click(); const remove = page.getByRole('button', { name: /beitrag entfernen/i }); await expect(remove, 'a host must be offered a removal action on a guest post').toBeVisible(); await remove.click(); const sheet = page.getByTestId('confirm-sheet'); await expect(sheet).toBeVisible(); // Moderation copy, not "delete my post" copy. await expect(sheet).toContainText(/beitrag entfernen/i); await page.getByTestId('confirm-sheet-confirm').click(); await expect(card).not.toBeVisible({ timeout: 10_000 }); // And it is really gone server-side, not just dropped from the local list. const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/feed`, { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${host.jwt}` }, }); const body = await res.json(); expect(body.uploads.some((u: { id: string }) => u.id === uploadId)).toBe(false); }); test('a guest is NOT offered any delete action on someone else’s post', async ({ page, guest, signIn, }) => { // The mirror that makes the test above meaningful: if this affordance rendered for // everyone, the host test would still pass on a build that shipped moderation to guests. const author = await guest('SomeAuthor'); await seedUpload(author.jwt); const viewer = await guest('NosyViewer'); await signIn(page, viewer); await page.goto('/feed'); const card = page.locator('article').filter({ hasText: author.displayName }).first(); await expect(card).toBeVisible({ timeout: 15_000 }); await card.getByRole('button', { name: 'Mehr Aktionen' }).click(); await expect(page.getByRole('button', { name: /beitrag entfernen/i })).toHaveCount(0); await expect(page.getByRole('button', { name: /^löschen$/i })).toHaveCount(0); }); test('a promoted guest gets host powers without signing out and back in', async ({ page, api, adminToken, guest, signIn, }) => { // The JWT is never reissued — the backend slides the session row forward and treats the // DB row as authoritative. So the token of a promoted guest still claims `role: guest` // for up to 30 days. The UI read that frozen claim, which meant a guest promoted at the // party saw no Host-Dashboard and no moderation actions until they signed out and back // in — while `/me/context` had been handing the client the real role all along. const g = await guest('LatePromotion'); await signIn(page, g); await page.goto('/account'); await expect(page.getByRole('link', { name: /host-dashboard/i })).toHaveCount(0); // Promote mid-session. The token in localStorage is deliberately NOT refreshed. await api.setRole(adminToken, g.userId, 'host'); const claim = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(g.jwt.split('.')[1], 'base64').toString()); expect( claim.role, 'the token must still carry the stale claim for this to prove anything' ).toBe('guest'); await page.reload(); await expect( page.getByRole('link', { name: /host-dashboard/i }), 'the live role from /me/context must win over the frozen JWT claim' ).toBeVisible({ timeout: 10_000 }); }); test('a host can remove the comment of a guest they have already banned', async ({ page, api, host, guest, signIn, }) => { // The deadlock this closes. Ban first, exactly as a host would react to abuse: from then // on the author gets 403 on their own delete, so if the host has no removal affordance // the comment is stuck on screen forever. // The photo belongs to an innocent third party — a ban hides the banned user's OWN // uploads, so if the comment sat on their own photo the whole card would vanish and // there would be nothing left to moderate. const victim = await guest('PhotoOwner'); const uploadId = await seedUpload(victim.jwt); const author = await guest('CommentOffender'); const commentId = await seedComment(author.jwt, uploadId, 'unangebrachter Kommentar'); await api.banUser(host.jwt, author.userId); // Confirm the deadlock really exists — the author cannot retract it themselves. const selfDelete = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/comment/${commentId}`, { method: 'DELETE', headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${author.jwt}` }, }); expect(selfDelete.status, 'a banned author is blocked from their own delete').toBe(403); await signIn(page, host); await page.goto('/feed'); const card = page.locator('article').filter({ hasText: victim.displayName }).first(); await expect(card).toBeVisible({ timeout: 15_000 }); await card.getByRole('button', { name: 'Bild vergrößern' }).click(); const comment = page.getByText('unangebrachter Kommentar'); await expect(comment).toBeVisible({ timeout: 10_000 }); await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Kommentar entfernen' }).first().click(); await expect(comment).toHaveCount(0, { timeout: 10_000 }); }); });