use std::time::Duration;

use axum::extract::{Multipart, Path, State};
use axum::http::StatusCode;
use axum::Json;
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use serde::Deserialize;
use uuid::Uuid;

use crate::auth::middleware::AuthUser;
use crate::error::AppError;
use crate::models::hashtag::{self, Hashtag};
use crate::models::upload::{Upload, UploadDto};
use crate::models::user::User;
use crate::services::config;
use crate::state::AppState;

const MAX_CAPTION_LENGTH: usize = 2000;

/// Allowlist of accepted media types, keyed by the MIME that `infer` derives from
/// the file's magic bytes. The detected MIME (not the client-declared one) is what
/// we trust, store, and hand to the compression pipeline — so a text-based payload
/// (SVG/HTML/JS) can never be stored or served on-origin. Each entry maps to the
/// server-controlled file extension we persist the original under.
///
/// HEIC/HEIF are deliberately excluded: the preview pipeline (`image` crate, and
/// the bundled ffmpeg 6.1) cannot decode them, so accepting them would store files
/// that never get a thumbnail. iOS Safari already transcodes HEIC→JPEG when a photo
/// is selected via a file input, so this rejects only the rare HEIC-preserving
/// upload path — with a clear error rather than a silently broken post.
const ALLOWED_MEDIA: &[(&str, &str)] = &[
    ("image/jpeg", "jpg"),
    ("image/png", "png"),
    ("image/webp", "webp"),
    ("image/gif", "gif"),
    ("video/mp4", "mp4"),
    ("video/quicktime", "mov"),
    ("video/webm", "webm"),
];

pub async fn upload(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    auth: AuthUser,
    mut multipart: Multipart,
) -> Result<(StatusCode, Json<UploadDto>), AppError> {
    // Rate limit: N uploads per hour per user. Gated by master + per-endpoint toggles.
    let rate_limits_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "rate_limits_enabled", true).await;
    let upload_rate_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "upload_rate_enabled", true).await;
    if rate_limits_on && upload_rate_on {
        let upload_rate = config::get_i64(&state.config_cache, "upload_rate_per_hour", 10).await as usize;
        if let Err(retry_after_secs) = state.rate_limiter.check_with_retry(
            format!("upload:{}", auth.user_id),
            upload_rate,
            Duration::from_secs(3600),
        ) {
            drain_multipart(multipart).await;
            return Err(AppError::TooManyRequests(
                "Du hast dein Upload-Limit für diese Stunde erreicht.".into(),
                Some(retry_after_secs),
            ));
        }
    }

    // Check if user is banned
    let user = User::find_by_id(&state.pool, auth.user_id)
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Benutzer nicht gefunden.".into()))?;
    if user.is_banned {
        drain_multipart(multipart).await;
        return Err(AppError::Forbidden("Du bist gesperrt.".into()));
    }

    // Check if uploads are locked
    let event = crate::models::event::Event::find_by_slug(&state.pool, &state.config.event_slug)
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Event nicht gefunden.".into()))?;
    if event.uploads_locked_at.is_some() {
        drain_multipart(multipart).await;
        // Reversible: a host can reopen the event, so the client keeps the queued blob and
        // retries on `event-opened` rather than purging it (UploadsLocked, not Forbidden).
        return Err(AppError::UploadsLocked("Uploads sind gesperrt.".into()));
    }
    // Belt-and-suspenders on top of the lock (release ⇒ lock): once the gallery is
    // released the export has been snapshotted, so a late upload could never make it into
    // the keepsake. Reject it explicitly rather than silently diverging the live feed.
    // Also reversible (reopen clears `export_released_at`), so likewise UploadsLocked.
    if event.export_released_at.is_some() {
        drain_multipart(multipart).await;
        return Err(AppError::UploadsLocked(
            "Galerie wurde bereits freigegeben.".into(),
        ));
    }

    // Read config limits from DB
    let max_image_mb: i64 = config::get_i64(&state.config_cache, "max_image_size_mb", 20).await;
    let max_video_mb: i64 = config::get_i64(&state.config_cache, "max_video_size_mb", 500).await;

    // The uploaded file is streamed straight to a temp file on disk (never buffered
    // whole in memory — a 500 MB video used to cost 500 MB of RAM per concurrent
    // upload). We only keep the first ≤512 bytes in memory for magic-byte sniffing.
    // On success the temp file is renamed into place under its detected extension.
    let upload_id = Uuid::new_v4();
    let event_slug = &state.config.event_slug;
    let originals_dir = state.config.media_path.join(format!("originals/{event_slug}"));
    let temp_abs = originals_dir.join(format!("{upload_id}.tmp"));

    let mut streamed: Option<(i64, Vec<u8>)> = None; // (size, head bytes for sniffing)
    let mut caption: Option<String> = None;
    let mut hashtags_csv: Option<String> = None;

    // Wrap the multipart read so any error after the temp file is created still cleans
    // it up (a mid-stream parse failure must not leave a stray `.tmp` on disk).
    let parse_result: Result<(), AppError> = async {
        while let Some(field) = multipart
            .next_field()
            .await
            .map_err(|e| AppError::BadRequest(e.to_string()))?
        {
            let name = field.name().unwrap_or_default().to_string();
            match name.as_str() {
                "file" => {
                    // The client-declared Content-Type does NOT determine the stored
                    // MIME/extension — those come from the file's magic bytes below. The
                    // declared type only picks the streaming cap so an oversized body is
                    // aborted early; a mislabelled type only makes the cap *stricter*
                    // (safe), and the authoritative per-class check still runs on the
                    // detected type.
                    let declared = field.content_type().unwrap_or("").to_string();
                    let cap_bytes = if declared.starts_with("video/") {
                        (max_video_mb * 1024 * 1024) as usize
                    } else if declared.starts_with("image/") {
                        (max_image_mb * 1024 * 1024) as usize
                    } else {
                        (max_image_mb.max(max_video_mb) * 1024 * 1024) as usize
                    };
                    tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&originals_dir)
                        .await
                        .map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))?;
                    streamed = Some(stream_field_to_file(field, &temp_abs, cap_bytes).await?);
                }
                "caption" => {
                    caption =
                        Some(field.text().await.map_err(|e| AppError::BadRequest(e.to_string()))?);
                }
                "hashtags" => {
                    hashtags_csv =
                        Some(field.text().await.map_err(|e| AppError::BadRequest(e.to_string()))?);
                }
                _ => {}
            }
        }
        Ok(())
    }
    .await;

    if let Err(e) = parse_result {
        let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&temp_abs).await;
        return Err(e);
    }

    // From here on the temp file may exist; every validation failure removes it before
    // returning so a rejected upload never leaves bytes behind.
    let (size, head) = match streamed {
        Some(s) => s,
        None => return Err(AppError::BadRequest("Keine Datei hochgeladen.".into())),
    };

    // Validate caption length. Counted in chars (code points) to match the
    // "Zeichen" wording in the error message — `.len()` would be bytes and
    // reject perfectly valid German/emoji captions early.
    if let Some(ref cap) = caption {
        if cap.chars().count() > MAX_CAPTION_LENGTH {
            let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&temp_abs).await;
            return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
                "Beschreibung ist zu lang. Maximum: {} Zeichen.",
                MAX_CAPTION_LENGTH
            )));
        }
    }

    // Determine the file type from its magic bytes and require it to be on the
    // allowlist. `infer` returns None for text-based payloads (SVG/HTML/JS), so
    // those are rejected outright — closing the stored-XSS vector. Both the MIME
    // we persist and the on-disk extension come from the detected type, never from
    // client-supplied values.
    let kind = match infer::get(&head) {
        Some(k) => k,
        None => {
            let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&temp_abs).await;
            return Err(AppError::BadRequest(
                "Dateityp nicht erkannt oder nicht unterstützt.".into(),
            ));
        }
    };
    let (mime, ext) = match ALLOWED_MEDIA
        .iter()
        .find(|(allowed, _)| *allowed == kind.mime_type())
        .map(|(m, e)| ((*m).to_string(), *e))
    {
        Some(v) => v,
        None => {
            let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&temp_abs).await;
            return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
                "Dateityp wird nicht unterstützt: {}.",
                kind.mime_type()
            )));
        }
    };

    // Validate file size against the authoritative per-detected-class limit.
    let max_bytes = if mime.starts_with("video/") {
        max_video_mb * 1024 * 1024
    } else {
        max_image_mb * 1024 * 1024
    };
    if size > max_bytes {
        let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&temp_abs).await;
        return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
            "Datei ist zu groß. Maximum: {} MB.",
            max_bytes / (1024 * 1024)
        )));
    }

    // Per-user storage quota — dynamic formula based on available disk space and the
    // number of active uploaders. Gated by master + per-area toggles so the admin can
    // disable it on trusted instances.
    let quota_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "quota_enabled", true).await;
    let storage_quota_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "storage_quota_enabled", true).await;
    // When quota is enforced, this holds the byte ceiling so the increment UPDATE below can
    // enforce it atomically (`WHERE total + size <= limit`). Without that guard, two
    // concurrent uploads from the same user (e.g. phone + laptop) both pass this stale
    // pre-check and both increment, blowing past the quota. The pre-check stays as a
    // fast path that avoids the disk write when the user is already clearly over.
    let mut quota_limit: Option<i64> = None;
    if quota_on && storage_quota_on {
        let estimate = compute_storage_quota(&state).await;
        if let Some(limit) = estimate.limit_bytes {
            quota_limit = Some(limit);
            let prospective_total = user.total_upload_bytes.saturating_add(size);
            if prospective_total > limit {
                let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&temp_abs).await;
                return Err(AppError::QuotaExceeded(
                    "Du hast dein Upload-Limit für dieses Event erreicht.".into(),
                ));
            }
        }
    }

    // All checks passed — atomically move the temp file to its final, extension-correct
    // path (same directory, so the rename is cheap and atomic).
    let relative_path = format!("originals/{event_slug}/{upload_id}.{ext}");
    let absolute_path = state.config.media_path.join(&relative_path);
    tokio::fs::rename(&temp_abs, &absolute_path)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))?;

    // Process hashtags from caption and explicit CSV
    let mut tags: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
    if let Some(ref cap) = caption {
        tags.extend(hashtag::extract_hashtags(cap));
    }
    if let Some(ref csv) = hashtags_csv {
        for tag in csv.split(',') {
            let t = tag.trim().trim_start_matches('#').to_lowercase();
            if !t.is_empty() {
                tags.push(t);
            }
        }
    }
    tags.sort();
    tags.dedup();

    // Quota accounting, the upload row, and its hashtag links must be atomic: a
    // crash between the bytes increment and the insert would permanently charge
    // bytes with no row to reclaim them (silent quota erosion / spurious lockout).
    let tx_result: Result<Upload, AppError> = async {
        let mut tx = state.pool.begin().await?;

        // RE-CHECK THE LOCK, UNDER A ROW LOCK, INSIDE THE COMMIT TX.
        //
        // The pre-flight check at the top of this handler ran BEFORE we streamed the body — which
        // for a 500 MB video is minutes. Trusting it here is a TOCTOU that silently loses photos
        // from the keepsake, and it is the real cause of the "stale keepsake" bug that survived
        // three rounds of fixes inside the export state machine:
        //
        //   1. guest starts a big upload; the lock check passes (event open)
        //   2. host releases the gallery → uploads lock, export workers snapshot the uploads table
        //   3. this upload commits AFTER that snapshot → it shows up in the live feed but is
        //      MISSING from the downloaded keepsake, permanently (nothing ever regenerates it)
        //
        // `FOR SHARE` conflicts with the `UPDATE event` in `release_gallery`, which serializes us
        // against it. Either we take the lock first — and release (hence the export snapshot) is
        // strictly ordered after our commit, so the snapshot CONTAINS this upload — or release
        // commits first and we observe the lock here and reject. Either way the keepsake is
        // complete. `UploadsLocked` (not Forbidden) is reversible: the client keeps the blob and
        // resumes it when the host reopens.
        let (locked_at, released_at): (Option<DateTime<Utc>>, Option<DateTime<Utc>>) =
            sqlx::query_as(
                "SELECT uploads_locked_at, export_released_at FROM event WHERE id = $1 FOR SHARE",
            )
            .bind(auth.event_id)
            .fetch_one(&mut *tx)
            .await?;
        if locked_at.is_some() || released_at.is_some() {
            return Err(AppError::UploadsLocked("Uploads sind gesperrt.".into()));
        }

        // Increment the user's byte total. When a quota is in force, guard it atomically
        // (`total + size <= limit`) so two concurrent uploads can't both slip past the
        // stale pre-check — the loser's UPDATE matches 0 rows and we abort with the same
        // terminal quota error (the tx rolls back on drop; the on-disk file is cleaned by
        // the error path below).
        let inc = if let Some(limit) = quota_limit {
            sqlx::query(
                "UPDATE \"user\" SET total_upload_bytes = total_upload_bytes + $2
                 WHERE id = $1 AND total_upload_bytes + $2 <= $3",
            )
            .bind(auth.user_id)
            .bind(size)
            .bind(limit)
            .execute(&mut *tx)
            .await?
        } else {
            sqlx::query("UPDATE \"user\" SET total_upload_bytes = total_upload_bytes + $2 WHERE id = $1")
                .bind(auth.user_id)
                .bind(size)
                .execute(&mut *tx)
                .await?
        };
        if inc.rows_affected() == 0 {
            return Err(AppError::QuotaExceeded(
                "Du hast dein Upload-Limit für dieses Event erreicht.".into(),
            ));
        }
        let upload = Upload::create(
            &mut *tx,
            auth.event_id,
            auth.user_id,
            &relative_path,
            &mime,
            size,
            caption.as_deref(),
        )
        .await?;
        for tag in &tags {
            let h = Hashtag::upsert(&mut *tx, auth.event_id, tag).await?;
            Hashtag::link_to_upload(&mut *tx, upload.id, h.id).await?;
        }
        tx.commit().await?;
        Ok(upload)
    }
    .await;

    // The file is already on disk at `absolute_path`. If the transaction failed, no DB
    // row will ever reference it, so remove it now rather than orphan bytes on disk.
    let upload = match tx_result {
        Ok(u) => u,
        Err(e) => {
            let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(&absolute_path).await;
            return Err(e);
        }
    };

    // Spawn compression task
    state
        .compression
        .process(upload.id, relative_path, mime.clone());

    // Broadcast SSE event
    let dto = UploadDto {
        id: upload.id,
        user_id: auth.user_id,
        uploader_name: user.display_name,
        preview_url: None,
        thumbnail_url: None,
        mime_type: mime,
        caption,
        hashtags: tags,
        like_count: 0,
        comment_count: 0,
        liked_by_me: false,
        created_at: upload.created_at,
    };

    let _ = state.sse_tx.send(crate::state::SseEvent::new(
        "new-upload",
        serde_json::to_string(&dto).unwrap_or_default(),
    ));

    Ok((StatusCode::CREATED, Json(dto)))
}

#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct EditUploadRequest {
    pub caption: Option<String>,
    pub hashtags: Option<Vec<String>>,
}

pub async fn edit_upload(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    auth: AuthUser,
    Path(upload_id): Path<Uuid>,
    Json(body): Json<EditUploadRequest>,
) -> Result<StatusCode, AppError> {
    // Banned users keep read access but cannot mutate (USER_JOURNEYS §10).
    if auth.is_banned {
        return Err(AppError::Forbidden("Du bist gesperrt.".into()));
    }
    let upload = Upload::find_by_id_and_event(&state.pool, upload_id, auth.event_id)
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Upload nicht gefunden.".into()))?;

    if upload.user_id != auth.user_id {
        return Err(AppError::Forbidden("Nur eigene Uploads bearbeiten.".into()));
    }

    // Caption update + hashtag wipe-then-relink in one transaction, so a crash
    // mid-relink can't leave the upload with its hashtags stripped.
    let mut tx = state.pool.begin().await?;
    if let Some(ref caption) = body.caption {
        Upload::update_caption(&mut *tx, upload_id, Some(caption)).await?;
    }
    if let Some(ref hashtags) = body.hashtags {
        Hashtag::unlink_all_from_upload(&mut *tx, upload_id).await?;
        for tag in hashtags {
            let h = Hashtag::upsert(&mut *tx, auth.event_id, tag).await?;
            Hashtag::link_to_upload(&mut *tx, upload_id, h.id).await?;
        }
    }
    tx.commit().await?;

    Ok(StatusCode::OK)
}

pub async fn delete_upload(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    auth: AuthUser,
    Path(upload_id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<StatusCode, AppError> {
    // Banned users keep read access but cannot mutate (USER_JOURNEYS §10).
    if auth.is_banned {
        return Err(AppError::Forbidden("Du bist gesperrt.".into()));
    }
    let upload = Upload::find_by_id_and_event(&state.pool, upload_id, auth.event_id)
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Upload nicht gefunden.".into()))?;

    if upload.user_id != auth.user_id {
        return Err(AppError::Forbidden("Nur eigene Uploads löschen.".into()));
    }

    Upload::soft_delete_in_event(&state.pool, upload_id, auth.event_id).await?;

    // Evict the card live on every other feed + the projector diashow — otherwise
    // a self-deleted post lingers until each viewer manually reloads. Same event
    // the host-delete path already emits and the frontend already handles.
    let _ = state.sse_tx.send(crate::state::SseEvent::new(
        "upload-deleted",
        serde_json::json!({ "upload_id": upload_id }).to_string(),
    ));

    Ok(StatusCode::NO_CONTENT)
}

/// Number of leading bytes retained in memory for magic-byte (`infer`) sniffing. Every
/// allowed type's signature sits well within this; 512 is comfortably generous.
const HEAD_SNIFF_BYTES: usize = 512;

/// Stream a multipart field straight to `dest`, aborting with a 400 the moment it
/// exceeds `max_bytes`. Only the first [`HEAD_SNIFF_BYTES`] bytes are kept in memory
/// (for type detection); the rest goes chunk-by-chunk to disk, so peak memory is a
/// single chunk rather than the whole file. Returns `(total_size, head_bytes)`. On any
/// error the partial temp file is removed so no stray `.tmp` is left behind.
async fn stream_field_to_file(
    mut field: axum::extract::multipart::Field<'_>,
    dest: &std::path::Path,
    max_bytes: usize,
) -> Result<(i64, Vec<u8>), AppError> {
    use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;

    let mut file = tokio::fs::File::create(dest)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))?;
    let mut total: usize = 0;
    let mut head: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(HEAD_SNIFF_BYTES);

    loop {
        let chunk = match field.chunk().await {
            Ok(Some(c)) => c,
            Ok(None) => break,
            Err(e) => {
                let _ = file.shutdown().await;
                let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(dest).await;
                return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
                    "Datei konnte nicht gelesen werden: {e}"
                )));
            }
        };

        total = total.saturating_add(chunk.len());
        if total > max_bytes {
            let _ = file.shutdown().await;
            let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(dest).await;
            return Err(AppError::BadRequest(format!(
                "Datei ist zu groß. Maximum: {} MB.",
                max_bytes / (1024 * 1024)
            )));
        }

        if head.len() < HEAD_SNIFF_BYTES {
            let need = HEAD_SNIFF_BYTES - head.len();
            head.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..need.min(chunk.len())]);
        }

        if let Err(e) = file.write_all(&chunk).await {
            let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(dest).await;
            return Err(AppError::Internal(e.into()));
        }
    }

    if let Err(e) = file.flush().await {
        let _ = tokio::fs::remove_file(dest).await;
        return Err(AppError::Internal(e.into()));
    }

    Ok((total as i64, head))
}

/// Drain a multipart body so the HTTP connection stays clean when returning an early error.
/// Without draining, the client may still be sending the body after we've sent our response,
/// which can corrupt the keep-alive connection for subsequent requests.
async fn drain_multipart(mut mp: Multipart) {
    while let Ok(Some(mut field)) = mp.next_field().await {
        while field.chunk().await.ok().flatten().is_some() {}
    }
}

/// Snapshot of the dynamic per-user quota used both by the upload pre-check and the
/// `GET /me/quota` endpoint. `limit_bytes = None` means quota enforcement is currently
/// off (the frontend hides the widget in that case).
pub struct QuotaEstimate {
    pub limit_bytes: Option<i64>,
    pub active_uploaders: i64,
    pub free_disk_bytes: i64,
    pub tolerance: f64,
}

/// Pure per-user quota formula: `floor((free_disk * tolerance) / max(active, 1))`.
/// Extracted from `compute_storage_quota` so it's unit-testable without a DB or disk.
fn quota_limit_bytes(free_disk: i64, tolerance: f64, active_uploaders: i64) -> i64 {
    let active = active_uploaders.max(1);
    ((free_disk as f64 * tolerance) / active as f64).floor() as i64
}

/// Computes the per-user storage quota using
/// `floor((free_disk * tolerance) / max(active_uploaders, 1))`. Returns `limit_bytes =
/// None` whenever the storage quota is currently disabled — callers should skip the
/// check (upload handler) or hide the UI (quota endpoint).
pub async fn compute_storage_quota(state: &AppState) -> QuotaEstimate {
    let quota_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "quota_enabled", true).await;
    let storage_quota_on = config::get_bool(&state.config_cache, "storage_quota_enabled", true).await;
    let tolerance = config::get_f64(&state.config_cache, "quota_tolerance", 0.75).await;

    let (active_count,): (i64,) = sqlx::query_as(
        "SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT user_id) FROM upload WHERE deleted_at IS NULL",
    )
    .fetch_one(&state.pool)
    .await
    .unwrap_or((0,));
    let active = active_count.max(1);

    // Cached disk reading. `None` means we couldn't resolve the media filesystem.
    let disk = state.disk_cache.snapshot(&state.config.media_path);
    let free_disk = disk.map(|d| d.free as i64).unwrap_or(0);

    let limit_bytes = if quota_on && storage_quota_on {
        match disk {
            Some(d) => Some(quota_limit_bytes(d.free as i64, tolerance, active)),
            // Fail OPEN, not closed: if the disk can't be read we don't know the real
            // free space, and enforcing a 0-byte limit would reject every upload with a
            // spurious "quota reached". Skip enforcement this round and warn instead.
            None => {
                tracing::warn!(
                    "disk snapshot unavailable; skipping storage-quota enforcement this round"
                );
                None
            }
        }
    } else {
        None
    };

    QuotaEstimate {
        limit_bytes,
        active_uploaders: active,
        free_disk_bytes: free_disk,
        tolerance,
    }
}

/// Stream a media file from disk into an HTTP response with a fixed set of security
/// headers. Every media response (original, preview, thumbnail) goes through here so
/// they consistently carry `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` (defense-in-depth against
/// content-type confusion, even if the edge proxy is bypassed) plus an explicit
/// `Content-Disposition` and `Cache-Control`.
async fn stream_media_file(
    absolute: &std::path::Path,
    content_type: String,
    disposition: &str,
    cache_control: &str,
) -> Result<axum::response::Response, AppError> {
    use axum::body::Body;
    use axum::http::{header, Response, StatusCode};
    use tokio_util::io::ReaderStream;

    if !absolute.exists() {
        return Err(AppError::NotFound("Datei nicht gefunden.".into()));
    }

    let file = tokio::fs::File::open(absolute)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))?;
    let metadata = file
        .metadata()
        .await
        .map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))?;
    let stream = ReaderStream::new(file);

    Response::builder()
        .status(StatusCode::OK)
        .header(header::CONTENT_TYPE, content_type)
        .header(header::CONTENT_DISPOSITION, disposition)
        .header(header::CONTENT_LENGTH, metadata.len())
        .header(header::CACHE_CONTROL, cache_control)
        .header(header::X_CONTENT_TYPE_OPTIONS, "nosniff")
        .body(Body::from_stream(stream))
        .map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))
}

/// Streaming download of the original file behind an upload. Used by:
///   - the per-post "Original anzeigen" context action (`window.open`)
///   - `<img src>` / `<video src>` in the feed, lightbox, and diashow when the user is in
///     Data Mode = Original
///
/// **Auth model:** the route is intentionally unauthenticated so it works from
/// `<img src>` / `window.open`. The URL contains the upload's unguessable UUID. Unlike
/// raw `/media` files, this alias is the *only* way to fetch an original: direct
/// `/media/originals/**` access is blocked in the router, and this handler filters out
/// soft-deleted and ban-hidden uploads (via `find_visible_media`) so moderation actually
/// removes access to content. Preview and thumbnail variants are gated the same way (see
/// [`get_preview`] / [`get_thumbnail`]).
pub async fn get_original(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    Path(upload_id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<axum::response::Response, AppError> {
    let media = Upload::find_visible_media(&state.pool, upload_id)
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Upload nicht gefunden.".into()))?;

    let absolute = state.config.media_path.join(&media.original_path);
    let filename = absolute
        .file_name()
        .and_then(|n| n.to_str())
        .unwrap_or("original");
    let disposition = format!("attachment; filename=\"{filename}\"");

    // Full-res original: force download, never cache at the edge.
    stream_media_file(&absolute, media.mime_type, &disposition, "no-store").await
}

/// Streaming access to an upload's compressed **preview** image. Gated exactly like
/// [`get_original`]: `find_visible_media` drops soft-deleted / ban-hidden uploads, so a
/// deleted or moderated post's preview 404s here even though the file may still be on
/// disk. Direct `/media/previews/**` is blocked in the router, making this the only path
/// to a preview.
///
/// Served inline (it's an `<img src>`) and privately cacheable for a short window. The
/// window is intentionally short (5 min) so a moderated image stops being served to a
/// direct-URL holder promptly; the live feed already evicts the card instantly via the
/// `upload-deleted` / `user-hidden` SSE events, so this only bounds the raw-URL edge case.
pub async fn get_preview(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    Path(upload_id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<axum::response::Response, AppError> {
    let media = Upload::find_visible_media(&state.pool, upload_id)
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Upload nicht gefunden.".into()))?;
    let rel = media
        .preview_path
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Vorschau nicht verfügbar.".into()))?;
    let absolute = state.config.media_path.join(&rel);
    stream_media_file(&absolute, "image/jpeg".to_string(), "inline", "private, max-age=300").await
}

/// Streaming access to an upload's **thumbnail** (video poster). Gated identically to
/// [`get_preview`].
pub async fn get_thumbnail(
    State(state): State<AppState>,
    Path(upload_id): Path<Uuid>,
) -> Result<axum::response::Response, AppError> {
    let media = Upload::find_visible_media(&state.pool, upload_id)
        .await?
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Upload nicht gefunden.".into()))?;
    let rel = media
        .thumbnail_path
        .ok_or_else(|| AppError::NotFound("Thumbnail nicht verfügbar.".into()))?;
    let absolute = state.config.media_path.join(&rel);
    stream_media_file(&absolute, "image/jpeg".to_string(), "inline", "private, max-age=300").await
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::quota_limit_bytes;

    #[test]
    fn divides_free_space_by_uploaders_with_tolerance() {
        // 1000 * 0.75 / 3 = 250
        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(1000, 0.75, 3), 250);
    }

    #[test]
    fn floors_fractional_results() {
        // 1000 * 0.75 / 7 = 107.14… → 107
        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(1000, 0.75, 7), 107);
    }

    #[test]
    fn active_uploaders_below_one_is_clamped_to_one() {
        // Guards against divide-by-zero when no one has uploaded yet.
        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(1000, 1.0, 0), 1000);
        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(1000, 1.0, -5), 1000);
    }

    #[test]
    fn zero_free_disk_yields_zero() {
        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(0, 0.75, 3), 0);
    }

    #[test]
    fn full_tolerance_is_identity_for_a_single_uploader() {
        assert_eq!(quota_limit_bytes(500, 1.0, 1), 500);
    }
}