Files
EventSnap/e2e/specs/05-admin/authz-sweep.spec.ts
fabi bbdfae09a0 chore(e2e): add ESLint + Prettier; fix real findings; dedupe BASE
The Playwright suite had no linter and no formatter — only tsc. Add flat-config ESLint
(typescript-eslint, type-aware) and Prettier (2-space, matching the suite's style).

Rules keep the ones that catch real TEST bugs and drop the noise:
  - no-floating-promises KEPT — an un-awaited request/assertion can let a test end before it runs,
    passing vacuously. It caught one: the SSE reader loop in sse-listener is now explicitly `void`.
  - no-unused-vars KEPT — caught three dead bindings (an unused adminToken fixture arg, an unused
    `api` arg, an unused JPEG_MAGIC import), all removed.
  - no-explicit-any OFF — all test code; `any` is the honest type for an untyped res.json() body or
    a page.evaluate() return.
  - no-empty-pattern OFF — Playwright's dependency-free fixtures are `async ({}, use) => {}`.

Refactor: `const BASE = process.env.E2E_FRONTEND_URL ?? '...'` was redeclared verbatim in 23
files — extracted to helpers/env.ts and imported, so a port/scheme change is one edit not a sweep.

Then `prettier --write`. Verified: eslint clean, tsc clean, prettier clean, desktop suite 210
passed / 1 skipped. (One mobile spec flaked once under retries:0 — a pre-existing cross-test
reflow-timing vector from the flakiness audit, not this change: the each-key edit is stable across
16 isolated runs and a clean full mobile re-run.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-15 20:45:59 +02:00

176 lines
7.0 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Table-driven privilege sweep over EVERY host- and admin-gated route.
*
* Before this file, exactly THREE authorization assertions existed in the whole suite (guest →
* /host/event/close, guest → GET /admin/config, host → GET /admin/config). Sixteen of nineteen
* privileged routes had no test proving a guest is turned away — including:
*
* POST /host/users/{id}/pin-reset → reset any guest's PIN, then log in as them via /recover.
* That is account takeover, and nothing guarded it.
* DELETE /host/upload/{id} → delete any guest's photo (unrecoverable after the party).
* POST /host/event/open → retire the released keepsake and reopen uploads to everyone.
* PATCH /admin/config → only GET was 403-tested; a guest WRITING config could
* disable quotas and rate limits outright.
*
* The point of a table is that adding a route to the router and forgetting to protect it should
* make a test fail. So this asserts the WHOLE privileged surface, not a sample of it.
*
* Deliberately NOT covered here: the read-only-ban model (a banned user keeps read access and can
* still download the keepsake) is BY DESIGN, and is asserted in 07-adversarial/authorization-deep.
*/
import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test';
import { BASE } from '../../helpers/env';
type Method = 'GET' | 'POST' | 'PATCH' | 'DELETE';
interface Route {
method: Method;
path: (victimId: string) => string;
name: string;
body?: unknown;
/** admin-only routes must also reject a HOST, not just a guest. */
adminOnly?: boolean;
}
const ROUTES: Route[] = [
// ── Host surface ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
{ method: 'GET', path: () => '/api/v1/host/event', name: 'GET /host/event' },
{ method: 'POST', path: () => '/api/v1/host/event/close', name: 'POST /host/event/close' },
{ method: 'POST', path: () => '/api/v1/host/event/open', name: 'POST /host/event/open' },
{
method: 'POST',
path: () => '/api/v1/host/gallery/release',
name: 'POST /host/gallery/release',
},
{ method: 'POST', path: () => '/api/v1/host/export/rebuild', name: 'POST /host/export/rebuild' },
{ method: 'GET', path: () => '/api/v1/host/users', name: 'GET /host/users' },
{
method: 'POST',
path: (v) => `/api/v1/host/users/${v}/ban`,
name: 'POST /host/users/{id}/ban',
body: {},
},
{
method: 'POST',
path: (v) => `/api/v1/host/users/${v}/unban`,
name: 'POST /host/users/{id}/unban',
body: {},
},
{
method: 'PATCH',
path: (v) => `/api/v1/host/users/${v}/role`,
name: 'PATCH /host/users/{id}/role',
body: { role: 'host' },
},
{
method: 'POST',
path: (v) => `/api/v1/host/users/${v}/pin-reset`,
name: 'POST /host/users/{id}/pin-reset',
body: {},
},
{
method: 'GET',
path: () => '/api/v1/host/pin-reset-requests',
name: 'GET /host/pin-reset-requests',
},
{
method: 'DELETE',
path: (v) => `/api/v1/host/pin-reset-requests/${v}`,
name: 'DELETE /host/pin-reset-requests/{id}',
},
{ method: 'DELETE', path: (v) => `/api/v1/host/upload/${v}`, name: 'DELETE /host/upload/{id}' },
{ method: 'DELETE', path: (v) => `/api/v1/host/comment/${v}`, name: 'DELETE /host/comment/{id}' },
// ── Admin surface ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
{ method: 'GET', path: () => '/api/v1/admin/stats', name: 'GET /admin/stats', adminOnly: true },
{ method: 'GET', path: () => '/api/v1/admin/config', name: 'GET /admin/config', adminOnly: true },
{
method: 'PATCH',
path: () => '/api/v1/admin/config',
name: 'PATCH /admin/config',
adminOnly: true,
body: { quota_enabled: 'false' },
},
{
method: 'GET',
path: () => '/api/v1/admin/export/jobs',
name: 'GET /admin/export/jobs',
adminOnly: true,
},
];
async function call(route: Route, jwt: string, victimId: string): Promise<number> {
const res = await fetch(BASE + route.path(victimId), {
method: route.method,
headers: {
Authorization: `Bearer ${jwt}`,
...(route.body !== undefined ? { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } : {}),
},
...(route.body !== undefined ? { body: JSON.stringify(route.body) } : {}),
});
return res.status;
}
test.describe('Authorization sweep — every privileged route', () => {
for (const route of ROUTES) {
test(`a GUEST is refused: ${route.name}`, async ({ guest }) => {
const attacker = await guest('AuthzAttacker');
const victim = await guest('AuthzVictim');
const status = await call(route, attacker.jwt, victim.userId);
// 403 exactly. NOT "some 4xx" — a 404 would mean the request got past the role gate and
// merely failed to find the resource, which is precisely the vacuity this suite has been
// bitten by: it would still pass with the RequireHost/RequireAdmin extractor deleted.
expect(status, `${route.name} must reject a guest with 403, got ${status}`).toBe(403);
});
}
for (const route of ROUTES.filter((r) => r.adminOnly)) {
test(`a HOST is refused: ${route.name}`, async ({ host, guest }) => {
const victim = await guest('AuthzVictim');
const status = await call(route, host.jwt, victim.userId);
expect(
status,
`${route.name} is admin-only and must reject a host with 403, got ${status}`
).toBe(403);
});
}
// The truncate endpoint wipes every table AND the media directory. It is test-mode only, but it
// is reachable over HTTP and gated solely by RequireAdmin — so it deserves the same proof.
test('a GUEST is refused: POST /admin/__truncate (wipes the whole event)', async ({ guest }) => {
const attacker = await guest('TruncateAttacker');
const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/admin/__truncate`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${attacker.jwt}` },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
test('a HOST is refused: POST /admin/__truncate', async ({ host }) => {
const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/admin/__truncate`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${host.jwt}` },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
// An unauthenticated caller must not get further than an authenticated-but-unprivileged one.
test('an ANONYMOUS caller is refused every privileged route', async () => {
const victim = '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000';
for (const route of ROUTES) {
const res = await fetch(BASE + route.path(victim), {
method: route.method,
headers: route.body !== undefined ? { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } : {},
...(route.body !== undefined ? { body: JSON.stringify(route.body) } : {}),
});
expect(
[401, 403],
`${route.name} must reject an anonymous caller, got ${res.status}`
).toContain(res.status);
}
});
});