Files
EventSnap/e2e
fabi 06ade4e158 fix(audit-3): restore the decode allocation guard, route /health in production
Third round. The decode allocation guard is a regression from round 1: swapping
reader.decode() for into_decoder() silently dropped the max_alloc enforcement
while keeping the comment that claimed it held.

Squashed from 3 commits, original messages preserved below.

──────── fix(imaging): restore the decode allocation guard I removed in round 1

This is a regression I introduced, not a pre-existing gap. Before 05948d8 the
compression worker used `ImageReader::decode()`, which does:

    let mut decoder = Self::make_decoder(format, self.inner, limits.clone())?;
    limits.reserve(decoder.total_bytes())?;   // enforces max_alloc
    decoder.set_limits(limits)?;

Reading the EXIF orientation tag needs `into_decoder()` instead, and that skips
the reserve entirely — the crate's own FIXME concedes `from_decoder` doesn't
compensate. Nothing else enforces `max_alloc`: the JPEG decoder's `set_limits`
only checks support and dimensions. So the 256 MiB budget has been inert since
that commit, and round 2 then propagated the weakened path into export.rs through
the shared helper, in a commit whose message claimed the helper "carries" the
decompression-bomb cap. It didn't, and the comment saying max_alloc "hard-caps
the decode allocation" was simply false.

What was left was only the per-axis cap, which permits 12000x12000 — 412 MiB
decoded, 824 MiB for the two concurrent decodes the worker runs by default,
against a 1 GiB container. Deploy-blocking right now because bumping
DERIVATIVES_REV makes the first boot after a deploy re-decode the entire gallery
two at a time: an OOM kill there restarts the container, which re-runs the
backfill. A boot loop, on the first deploy of these fixes.

Re-add the reserve exactly as `decode()` does it. Per the budget decision it stays
at 256 MiB (~89 MP for RGB8, above any mainstream phone's real output); two
concurrent decodes now peak at 512 MiB. Oversized images take the graceful path
from round 1 — original retained, quota refunded, upload-error toast — and fail
after the header parse but BEFORE any pixels are read, so they cost a header read
rather than an allocation. Measured peak during a concurrent oversized burst: 3.0
MiB.

Test parity is the other half, and the reason this was invisible: the e2e app
container had NO memory limit while production is capped at 1 GiB, so a decode
that would OOM-kill production simply succeeded in CI. Mirror the 1 GiB cap in
docker-compose.test.yml. That is the third divergence of this shape, after WebKit
missing from CI and /health existing only in Caddyfile.test.

Tests: a fixture that is 568 KiB on disk and 283 MiB decoded (11000x9000 = 99 MP,
deliberately UNDER the per-axis cap so the axis check cannot be what rejects it).
A unit test asserts the refusal — it fails against the old code, which decoded it
into an 11000x9000 buffer — with a companion asserting an ordinary photo still
decodes AND still gets its orientation applied, so the guard didn't become a
blanket refusal. An e2e test uploads it singly and as a concurrent pair, asserting
compression lands in 'failed' and the backend is still serving and still
processing afterwards.

──────── fix(deploy): route /health in production, and actually apply Caddyfile changes

Two defects in the update procedure I wrote last round, both of which make a
successful-looking deploy a lie.

1. The documented health check could never pass.

`curl -fsS https://DOMAIN/health` 404s against a perfectly healthy production
stack. The backend registers /health on its ROOT router, not under /api/v1, and
the production Caddyfile proxies only /api/* and /media/* — so /health fell
through to the SvelteKit catch-all, which has no such route and returns its 404
page. With -f, curl exits 22 and the `&& echo` never runs. My own gloss
("Anything other than ok means check the logs") then sent the operator chasing a
phantom outage.

e2e/Caddyfile.test has carried `reverse_proxy /health app:3000` since it was
written — precisely because the catch-all would otherwise swallow it. Production
never did. Per the fix-the-gap-not-the-doc call, production gets the same line,
and /health joins the no-store matcher so a cached response can't report the last
known state instead of the current one. Verified by running the production
Caddyfile against the real backend: /health -> 200 "ok", Cache-Control: no-store,
with /api/v1/event and / unaffected.

2. The sequence never reloaded Caddy, so a Caddyfile-only change was dropped.

`--build` only rebuilds services with a `build:` section, and caddy is a pinned
upstream image. Compose decides whether to recreate a container from its config
hash, which covers the mount SPECIFICATION but not the mounted file's CONTENTS —
so a git pull that changes ./Caddyfile produces no delta, Compose reports
`Running`, and Caddy serves its old config indefinitely. Exit code 0 throughout.

Round 1's iOS download fix (137c4ee) is exactly this shape: Caddyfile plus four
e2e files, so 100% of its production effect is in that one file. Following the
README to the letter deployed it, showed both image IDs changing, and left iOS
downloads broken.

Demonstrated rather than assumed — added a probe header to a Caddyfile, ran the
old sequence (`up -d --build`): header absent, change silently dropped. Ran the
new step 4 (`up -d --force-recreate caddy`): header served.

`--force-recreate` rather than `restart` or `caddy reload` because the bind mount
is resolved to an inode at container-create time and git pull replaces the file
rather than editing in place, so a restart can re-read the stale content — the
exact failure I hit in round 1 when `caddy reload` didn't pick up an edit.

Also rewrites the "db and caddy are untouched … so data volumes survive" sentence.
I wrote it as reassurance; "caddy is untouched" was the bug.

──────── chore: take the Bash(*) permission change back out of the shared settings

`.claude/settings.json` is committed and applies to anyone who clones. Fabi's
local `allow: ["Bash(*)"]` plus deny list ended up in it, inside f0d69f1 — a
commit about the image decode guard, which has nothing to do with permissions.

That was my mistake, twice. The file was already modified when I started the
round: my `git status --short` check printed "(clean)" from an unconditional
`echo` rather than from the status output, so I read a dirty tree as clean. Then
`git add -A` swept it into an unrelated commit, and I reported afterwards that I
had left it untouched. Neither the check nor the claim was true.

Restores the shared file to its previous three narrow entries. The permission
setup itself is preserved, moved to `.claude/settings.local.json`, which
`.gitignore:34` covers precisely so per-user permissions stay per-user — the
existing 442 entries there are kept alongside it.

Not rewriting f0d69f1 to erase this: main is unpushed so it would be safe, but a
visible correction is worth more than a tidy history, and a rebase across the
merge commits carries more risk than the mistake does.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 07:18:08 +02:00
..

EventSnap E2E Suite

Playwright-driven end-to-end tests for the EventSnap stack. The suite spins up an isolated docker-compose stack on ports :3101 (Caddy → frontend + backend) and :55432 (Postgres), and exercises the SvelteKit frontend against a real Rust backend with rate limits and quotas disabled.

Phases 1, 2, and 3-mobile-gestures are landed:

  • Phase 1 — happy-path coverage of every documented user journey, plus a smoke matrix across nine browser/UA profiles to catch engine-level divergences.
  • Phase 2 — adversarial inputs (XSS, SQL-injection, JWT forgery, MIME spoofing, oversize, brute-force) and browser chaos (storage purge, offline/slow-3G, multi-tab, clock skew, no-JS, quota exhaustion).
  • Phase 3 (gestures only) — touch-target audit, safe-area structural check, long-press → ContextSheet, double-tap → like, viewport reflow, plus test.fixme stubs for planned gestures (lightbox swipe, swipe-down dismiss, pull-to-refresh).

Phase 3 real-device compat (Android emulator + Samsung Internet via connectOverCDP, BrowserStack), visual regression, and a11y audits are sketched in the Roadmap at the bottom.

Quickstart

cd e2e
npm install
npm run install:browsers      # one-time: ~500 MB across chromium/firefox/webkit

# 1. Boot the test stack (rebuilds backend + frontend Docker images)
npm run stack:up

# 2. Wait ~20s for migrations + warmup, then run tests
npm run test:e2e              # full Phase 1 suite on chromium-desktop
npm run test:e2e:smoke        # cross-UA smoke matrix (~9 projects × 1 test)
npm run test:e2e:ui           # interactive Playwright UI mode

# 3. After: tear the stack down (deletes volumes)
npm run stack:down

The CI workflow at .github/workflows/e2e.yml runs both jobs on every PR.

What's tested

Every spec covers a journey from docs/USER_JOURNEYS.md or a security/chaos scenario. One folder per area:

Folder Phase Journeys / Topic Tests Notes
specs/01-auth/ 1 §1, §2, §3, §11, §15 13 Join, recover, PIN lockout, admin login, leave event.
specs/02-upload/ 1 §5, §6, §18 5 Gallery picker, multi-file, rate-limit, admin toggle.
specs/03-feed/ 1 §7, §8, §17 5 Like/comment SSE, filter chips, SSE reconnect.
specs/04-host/ 1 §9 5 Event lock, ban/unban, role change.
specs/05-admin/ 1 §11, §16 11 Config validation, foundational auth guards, stats.
specs/06-export/ 1 §12 3 Status, release, download stub.
specs/__smoke/ 1 (matrix) 1 × 9 UAs @smoke-tagged happy-path on every UA project.
specs/07-adversarial/ 2 Input attacks, file upload boundaries, JWT forgery, brute-force, deep authorization, small DDoS ~40 See breakdown below.
specs/08-browser-chaos/ 2 Storage purge, IndexedDB, offline/slow-3G, multi-tab, no-JS, clock skew, quota ~20 See breakdown below.
specs/09-mobile/ 3 Touch-target audit, safe-area, long-press, double-tap, viewport reflow, fixme stubs 23 Runs only on chromium-mobile (Pixel 7 viewport). See below.

Phase 2 — adversarial (specs/07-adversarial/)

  • xss-injection.spec.ts — 13 tests. Six XSS payloads × display-name path
    • four SQLi patterns + length/encoding edge cases (NUL byte, RTL override, caption overflow). Asserts window.__xssFired never gets set and no dialog event fires.
  • ui-rendering.spec.ts — 2 tests. Belt-and-braces: even when a script- payload sits in localStorage as the user's display name, rendering through /account keeps it as text.
  • file-upload-attacks.spec.ts — 9 tests. ELF body claimed as JPEG, oversize image vs max_image_size_mb, zero-byte, missing file field, path-traversal filename, NUL filename, application/* declared category bypass, SVG-with-script.
  • auth-tampering.spec.ts — 8 tests. alg:none forging admin role, signature tamper, payload tamper with original signature, logged-out session reuse, header without Bearer , missing Authorization, PIN brute-force lockout, admin password brute-force (documented finding — no lockout today, bcrypt cost is the only defense).
  • authorization-deep.spec.ts — 6 tests. Cross-user comment delete, banned user across like/comment/feed-read, host→admin escalation attempts.
  • ddos.spec.ts — 4 small-scale abuse tests. 20 parallel /join, 10 MB comment body, 10 concurrent SSE streams, malformed JSON.

Phase 2 — browser chaos (specs/08-browser-chaos/)

  • storage-purge.spec.ts — 5 tests. localStorage.clear() mid-session, cookies cleared (JWT in localStorage still works), sessionStorage cleared, admin force-relogin, PIN intentionally survives clearAuth.
  • indexeddb.spec.ts — 2 tests. Drop all IDB databases mid-session; stub IDB to undefined before navigation.
  • offline-network.spec.ts — 4 tests. setOffline(true) → reconnect, slow-3G via page.route delay, intermittent 503s, 429 from server (no infinite retry storm).
  • multi-tab.spec.ts — 3 tests. Same user two tabs, two users two contexts (storage isolated), logout in tab A doesn't sync to tab B (documented gap).
  • environment.spec.ts — 5 tests. JS disabled, localStorage quota exhausted, hostile CSS hiding nav, clock skew ±1h / -2d.

Pending tests covering features that need a Node-side multipart upload helper are marked test.fixme and will activate when that helper lands.

Browser & UA matrix

Project Engine UA / Device Why
chromium-desktop Chromium Desktop Chrome Baseline. Full suite runs here.
chromium-pixel7 Chromium Pixel 7 device descriptor Chrome Android.
chromium-galaxy-s22 Chromium Galaxy viewport + Samsung phone UA Chrome on Samsung hardware.
samsung-internet Chromium Galaxy viewport + SamsungBrowser UA Tier-A Samsung Internet baseline.
edge-android Chromium Pixel viewport + EdgA UA Edge Mobile (Blink-based).
chrome-ios Chromium iPhone viewport + CriOS UA Chrome iOS (actually WebKit, but UA differs).
webkit-iphone WebKit iPhone 14 Pro Real iOS Safari engine.
firefox-android Firefox Pixel viewport + Firefox Android UA Gecko engine.
firefox-desktop Firefox Desktop Firefox FF-specific quirks.

Only the @smoke happy-path runs across all projects (controlled by grep in playwright.config.ts). The full Phase 1 suite is chromium-desktop-only by default to keep CI under 15 min.

Samsung Internet — three escalation tiers

Samsung Internet ships on every Galaxy phone (~5% of mobile traffic in DE). It's Blink-based, so Tier-A catches ~90% of regressions. Real Samsung divergences (Smart Switch save-data mode, dark-mode injection, custom autoplay, in-browser ad blocking) are only reproducible at Tier B+:

  • Tier A (this repo, free, in CI): Playwright Chromium with the Samsung Internet user-agent + Galaxy viewport. See the samsung-internet project in playwright.config.ts.
  • Tier B (free, manual, future): Android Studio emulator on Linux → install Samsung Internet APK → enable --remote-debugging-port=9222chromium.connectOverCDP('http://localhost:9222'). Setup docs live in docs/samsung-emulator.md (to be written).
  • Tier C (paid, optional): BrowserStack or LambdaTest cloud devices. Real Galaxy S22/S23 hardware via Playwright's cloud integration.

Test isolation

Every test runs against a freshly truncated database:

  1. global-setup.ts waits for /health, logs in admin, and disables every rate-limit and quota toggle via PATCH /admin/config.
  2. The auto-fixture truncate in fixtures/test.ts calls POST /api/v1/admin/__truncate before every test.
  3. The truncate endpoint is only registered when the backend is started with EVENTSNAP_TEST_MODE=1 (see backend/src/main.rs and backend/src/handlers/test_admin.rs). Production builds return 404.

Single-worker by design (workers: 1 in the config). Per-worker isolated DBs are a Phase-2+ change.

Architecture

e2e/
├── docker-compose.test.yml   # Isolated test stack: db :55432, caddy :3101
├── Caddyfile.test            # Proxies /api/* /media/* /health to backend
├── playwright.config.ts      # UA matrix + smoke grep
├── global-setup.ts           # admin login, rate-limit disable
├── global-teardown.ts        # (no-op; use `npm run stack:down`)
├── fixtures/
│   ├── api-client.ts         # Typed wrapper over /api/v1/*
│   ├── db.ts                 # Direct Postgres escape hatch (locked-PIN, etc.)
│   ├── test.ts               # Central test.extend (guest, host, signIn fixtures)
│   └── media/                # sample.jpg, sample.mp4, not-an-image.jpg
├── helpers/
│   ├── sse-listener.ts       # Async SSE iterator with waitForEvent()
│   ├── storage-helpers.ts    # localStorage/sessionStorage helpers
│   └── fake-media.ts         # Camera permissions (Chromium only)
├── page-objects/
│   ├── join-page.ts          # /join
│   ├── recover-page.ts       # /recover
│   ├── admin-login-page.ts   # /admin/login
│   ├── feed-page.ts          # /feed + bottom nav
│   ├── upload-sheet.ts       # UploadSheet.svelte + /upload
│   ├── lightbox.ts           # LightboxModal.svelte
│   ├── account-page.ts       # /account
│   ├── host-dashboard.ts     # /host
│   ├── admin-dashboard.ts    # /admin
│   └── export-page.ts        # /export
└── specs/
    ├── __smoke/              # @smoke cross-UA matrix (1 spec)
    ├── 01-auth/
    ├── 02-upload/
    ├── 03-feed/
    ├── 04-host/
    ├── 05-admin/
    └── 06-export/

Debugging a failure

  • npm run test:e2e:ui — interactive UI with time-travel and selector probe.
  • npm run test:e2e:headed — watch the browser run live.
  • npm run test:e2e:debug — Playwright inspector with breakpoints.
  • npm run stack:logs — tail backend + Postgres logs during a failure.
  • playwright-report/index.html — opens the HTML report (auto-generated on every run).
  • Trace files (test-results/**/trace.zip) drag-and-drop into https://trace.playwright.dev.

Conventions

  • One assertion per expect. Bundling multiple expects in one statement loses the line-level failure context.
  • Wait on data, not time. Use expect.poll for DB checks; never waitForTimeout in production specs.
  • @smoke tag on each suite's happiest path so the matrix run stays under 2 min.
  • test.fixme for features that need infrastructure not yet built (Node-side multipart upload helper, real video fixtures, etc.). Fixme tests don't fail the suite but show up in the report.
  • Page objects own selectors. Specs never use raw locators.
  • German text in assertions is fine — it's not going to change frequently. When it does, the page object is the only file to update.

Roadmap

Phase 2 — Adversarial & browser chaos landed

See the What's tested table above and the per-file breakdown. Known findings surfaced (documented in tests, not silent failures):

  1. /admin/login has no rate-limit or lockout — bcrypt cost is the only defense.
  2. localStorage 'storage' event is not listened for, so logout in tab A doesn't synchronously sign out tab B (the next 401 from any API call clears it).
  3. SVG uploads currently pass the magic-byte check (depends on infer's detection coverage) — consider adding X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
    • CSP on /media/* if SVGs are ever expected as user content.

Phase 3 — Mobile gestures (specs/09-mobile/) landed

Runs only on the chromium-mobile project (Pixel 7 device descriptor with hasTouch and isMobile). The chromium-desktop project explicitly ignores this folder via testIgnore in playwright.config.ts.

  • touch-targets.spec.ts — 4 tests. Audits ≥ 44×44 px on bottom nav, FAB, join submit, admin-login submit, PIN-modal buttons. Uses expect.soft so a single failure surfaces the actual bounding-box dimensions instead of stopping the suite.
  • safe-area.spec.ts — 4 tests. Asserts env(safe-area-inset-bottom) is present in the inline style of every bottom-anchored UI element (bottom nav, UploadSheet, ContextSheet), and that the nav stays flush with the viewport bottom on a no-notch emulated device.
  • gestures-longpress.spec.ts — 3 tests. A 600 ms hold on a FeedListCard opens the ContextSheet; a 200 ms tap does not; the click-suppression logic prevents the lightbox from also opening at pointer-up. Driven via page.mouse.down/up because the longpress action listens for pointer events (mouse/touch/pen unified).
  • gestures-doubletap.spec.ts — 2 tests. Double-tap on a feed card image button records a like; double-tap inside the lightbox triggers the heart-burst animation and records a like. Assertions read the like count back via /api/v1/feed so they don't couple to specific badge markup.
  • viewport-reflow.spec.ts — 5 tests. Portrait, landscape, narrow (320×568), phablet (480×1024) — each asserts the bottom nav is visible, the FAB stays roughly centered, and there's no horizontal overflow on <html>. Plus a rotation test that confirms auth survives a viewport resize.
  • planned-gestures.spec.ts — 5 test.fixme stubs documenting the contracts for gestures from journey §17 that aren't shipped yet (lightbox swipe L/R, swipe-down to dismiss UploadSheet, pull-to-refresh, long-press on a comment). Flip test.fixme to test when wiring each gesture.

Driving gestures: the helpers/touch.ts module

  • longPress(page, locator, durationMs) — holds the pointer down for the duration. Default 600 ms beats the action's 500 ms threshold.
  • doubleTap(page, locator) — two mouse.down/up pairs within the doubletap action's 300 ms window.
  • swipe(page, from, to, steps) — gradual mouse-driven move (used by the fixme stubs once swipe gestures land).
  • inlineStyle(locator) / computedStyle(locator, prop) — read raw style attributes (where env(...) strings live) and computed values.

Phase 3 — Real-device compat & visual / a11y (not landed)

  • Long-press own/other post, swipe lightbox L/R, swipe-down dismiss, pull-to-refresh, double-tap like.
  • Safe-area inset visual diff on iPhone notch.
  • Touch-target ≥ 44 px audit.
  • Tier B Samsung Internet via connectOverCDP on Android Studio emulator.
  • Tier C BrowserStack integration (paid, optional).
  • @axe-core/playwright accessibility audits.
  • Visual regression with screenshot diffs.

Out of scope (handed to other tools)

  • Load testing → k6 / Vegeta.
  • API contract testing → backend cargo test integration tests.
  • Static asset auditing → Lighthouse CI.