Files
EventSnap/e2e/specs/06-export/viewer-caption-injection.spec.ts
fabi 32dfe6874a test(e2e): make nine red specs assert the contracts the code actually implements
The e2e suite had never been run during this audit. It failed 9 of 256; seven of those
predated the audit's changes, established by building a stack from a clean HEAD worktree
and running the same specs against it rather than guessing.

Most were stale assertions rather than product defects:

- quota.spec solved for a target limit using the observed uploader count, but the divisor is
  max(active, estimated_guest_count, 1) and that config seeds at 100 — so every limit it
  aimed for came out 100x small and every "within quota" upload 413'd.
- rate-limit-shared-nat destructured `ticket` from a 429 body and fetched with
  `ticket=undefined`, turning the 429 under test into an unrelated 401. It also faked a
  release with no archive on disk, so the mint's pre-check 404'd and the per-day limiter was
  never reached; it now does a real release and asserts 200 rather than "not 429".
- ddos allowed only [200,429] from ten concurrent streams, so it failed on the very defence
  it exercises: four tickets per session survive and the rest correctly 401. Now asserts
  exactly four, which a tightened cap or an inverted eviction order would catch.
- auth-tampering asserted a throttled IP is refused EVEN with the correct password. That
  contract was deliberately removed — it let any phone on the venue NAT lock the operator
  out of their own admin panel, with a circular escape hatch. Inverted, plus a new check
  that a success does not refill an attacker's bucket.
- moderation-ui assumed a ban leaves a comment "stuck on screen"; `list_for_upload` filters
  banned authors, so it is hidden from everyone including the host. Now pins the pair that
  matters — the ban hides it, and the host's permanent removal survives an unban — and the
  UI leg it used to own is restored as a separate test on a reachable comment.

The export specs mint with `?kind=` now that a download ticket is bound to one archive, and
four of them assert the mint's 404 rather than the download's: with the kind always known,
the pre-check refuses up front instead of after charging a daily download for an archive
that cannot be served.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-11 22:44:48 +02:00

126 lines
5.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Regression guard — a guest-authored caption cannot brick the offline keepsake.
*
* The viewer's data is inlined as `<script>window.__EXPORT_DATA__={…};</script>` (it must be:
* guests open index.html over file://, where a cross-origin fetch of a sibling data.json is
* blocked). Captions and comments are guest text and land in that payload.
*
* The escape used to be `</` → `<\/`. Against XSS that holds — `</script><img src=x onerror=…>`
* round-trips inert. It does NOT stop the caption steering the HTML TOKENIZER: `<!--<script` with
* no later `-->` drives the parser into script-data-double-escaped state, where the template's own
* `</script>` steps back to script-data-escaped instead of closing the element. Everything after —
* including the viewer bundle — is swallowed as script data. Nothing executes and nothing leaks;
* `__EXPORT_DATA__` is never assigned and the keepsake renders blank.
*
* What makes it worth a browser-level test rather than a unit test alone: the failure is SILENT and
* POST-DISTRIBUTION. The export succeeds, the ZIP is well-formed, the job writes `done`,
* /export/status is green, and the host hands out a file that only fails when a guest
* double-clicks it — in every copy, unfixably. It is not visible by reading the escape. It is only
* visible by running a real parser over the real artifact, which is what this does: release, pull
* the actual Memories.zip, extract index.html, open it over file:// in Chromium, and assert the
* viewer actually booted.
*
* The near-miss worth recording: `<!--<script>alert(1)</script>-->` comes back CLEAN, because the
* trailing `-->` returns the parser to script-data state. A probe using the terminated form
* quietly repairs the very thing it is testing for. Only the unterminated variant exposes it.
*/
import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test';
import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { seedUpload } from '../../helpers/seed';
import { BASE } from '../../helpers/env';
/** Unterminated on purpose — see the header. The terminated form self-repairs. */
const TOKENIZER_PAYLOAD = '<!--<script';
/** The classic break-out. Already handled, kept so the fix can never regress on it. */
const BREAKOUT_PAYLOAD = '</script><img src=x onerror=window.__XSS__=1>';
test.describe('Export — a caption cannot brick the keepsake viewer', () => {
test('the exported viewer boots with a tokenizer-hostile caption in it', async ({
page,
host,
guest,
db,
}) => {
test.setTimeout(120_000);
const bearer = { Authorization: `Bearer ${host.jwt}` };
const g = await guest('Trickster');
const a = await seedUpload(g.jwt, { caption: TOKENIZER_PAYLOAD });
const b = await seedUpload(g.jwt, { caption: BREAKOUT_PAYLOAD });
for (const id of [a, b]) {
await expect.poll(() => db.compressionStatus(id), { timeout: 30_000 }).toBe('done');
}
expect(
(await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/host/gallery/release`, { method: 'POST', headers: bearer }))
.status
).toBe(204);
await expect
.poll(
async () => {
const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/export/status`, { headers: bearer });
return (await res.json()).html?.status;
},
{ timeout: 90_000, intervals: [500] }
)
.toBe('done');
const ticketRes = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/export/ticket?kind=html`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: bearer,
});
const { ticket } = (await ticketRes.json()) as { ticket: string };
const dl = await fetch(`${BASE}/api/v1/export/html?ticket=${encodeURIComponent(ticket)}`);
expect(dl.status).toBe(200);
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'eventsnap-viewer-'));
try {
const zipPath = join(dir, 'Memories.zip');
writeFileSync(zipPath, Buffer.from(await dl.arrayBuffer()));
// Extract the WHOLE archive: index.html pulls in the viewer's own JS/CSS, and the point of
// this test is that those later resources are still reachable by the parser.
execFileSync('unzip', ['-qo', zipPath, '-d', dir]);
// file://, not http://. That is how a guest actually opens the keepsake, and it is the
// whole reason the data is inlined rather than fetched from a sibling data.json.
let xss = false;
page.on('dialog', (d) => {
xss = true;
void d.dismiss();
});
await page.goto('file://' + join(dir, 'index.html'));
// 1. The payload was assigned at all. This is the assertion that fails on the old escape —
// the second script block is never reached, so the global stays undefined.
const captions = await page.evaluate(() => {
const d = (window as unknown as { __EXPORT_DATA__?: { posts?: { caption?: string }[] } })
.__EXPORT_DATA__;
return d?.posts?.map((p) => p.caption ?? '') ?? null;
});
expect(captions, '__EXPORT_DATA__ was never assigned — the viewer is bricked').not.toBeNull();
// 2. The captions survived verbatim. The escape is a transport encoding, not a sanitiser:
// a guest's text has to come back exactly, or we have silently rewritten their words.
expect(captions).toContain(TOKENIZER_PAYLOAD);
expect(captions).toContain(BREAKOUT_PAYLOAD);
// 3. And nothing executed.
expect(
await page.evaluate(() => (window as unknown as { __XSS__?: number }).__XSS__ === 1),
'the caption must be inert, not merely non-fatal'
).toBe(false);
expect(xss).toBe(false);
// 4. The viewer actually rendered — the whole document parsed, not just the head. If the
// tokenizer had swallowed the bundle, the body would be empty of viewer output.
await expect(page.locator('body')).not.toBeEmpty();
} finally {
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
}
});
});