Files
EventSnap/e2e/specs/04-host/moderation.spec.ts
fabi 41ac742af8 test+docs: tighten H1 assertions, cover secret/XFF edges, document boot & SSE-ban
Re-review follow-ups (non-blocking quality items):

Tests:
- moderation H1 specs now assert exact `→ 403` instead of bare .rejects.toThrow(),
  so a spurious 500 can no longer masquerade as "revocation worked".
- config: added case-insensitivity (upper/mixed-case placeholder) and the
  len==32/31 boundary cases for validate_secrets.
- rate_limiter: added the trailing-comma empty-entry case for client_ip (must
  fall back, not return "").
  (Backend unit tests: 35 pass.)

Docs:
- README: note that with APP_ENV=production a placeholder .env makes the app
  refuse to boot and Caddy wait unhealthy — reason is in `docker compose logs app`.
- SECURITY-BACKLOG + sse.rs comment: document that a mid-session ban does not
  tear down an already-open SSE stream (new tickets are blocked; low blast radius).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 07:14:33 +02:00

101 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* USER_JOURNEYS.md §9 — ban / unban / promote / demote. Driven mostly through
* the API because the host dashboard UI changes shape often; integration
* coverage of the buttons lives in a separate UI-focused spec.
*/
import { test, expect } from '../../fixtures/test';
test.describe('Host — moderation API', () => {
test('ban with hide_uploads=true sets the right flags', async ({ api, host, guest }) => {
const target = await guest('Banned1');
await api.banUser(host.jwt, target.userId, true);
const users = await api.listUsers(host.jwt);
const row = users.find((u: any) => u.id === target.userId);
expect(row?.is_banned).toBe(true);
expect(row?.uploads_hidden).toBe(true);
});
test('ban without hiding leaves uploads_hidden=false', async ({ api, host, guest }) => {
const target = await guest('Banned2');
await api.banUser(host.jwt, target.userId, false);
const users = await api.listUsers(host.jwt);
const row = users.find((u: any) => u.id === target.userId);
expect(row?.is_banned).toBe(true);
expect(row?.uploads_hidden).toBe(false);
});
test('banned user cannot call /upload', async ({ api, host, guest }) => {
const target = await guest('Banned3');
await api.banUser(host.jwt, target.userId, false);
// Direct fetch — multipart body shape is just a marker; the auth middleware should reject before parsing.
const res = await fetch((process.env.E2E_FRONTEND_URL ?? 'http://localhost:3101') + '/api/v1/upload', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${target.jwt}` },
body: new FormData(),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
});
test('host can promote a guest to host', async ({ api, host, guest }) => {
const target = await guest('Promoted');
await api.setRole(host.jwt, target.userId, 'host');
const users = await api.listUsers(host.jwt);
const row = users.find((u: any) => u.id === target.userId);
expect(row?.role).toBe('host');
});
});
/**
* Regression for the review's H1: role & ban used to be trusted from the JWT and
* never re-checked against the DB, so a demoted/banned host kept full powers for
* the life of their token (up to 30d) and a banned host could even unban
* themselves. The auth extractor now re-reads the live user row, so these take
* effect on the *existing* session with no re-login.
*/
test.describe('Host — live role/ban revocation (H1)', () => {
test('a demoted host loses host powers on their existing session', async ({
api,
adminToken,
guest,
}) => {
const u = await guest('DemoteMidSession');
await api.setRole(adminToken, u.userId, 'host');
// Fresh host token (role is encoded at mint time).
const { body } = await api.recover(u.displayName, u.pin);
const hostJwt = body.jwt;
// Sanity: the token currently has host powers.
await api.listUsers(hostJwt);
// Demote via admin — the host does NOT re-login.
await api.setRole(adminToken, u.userId, 'guest');
// Same token is now rejected with exactly 403 (RequireHost sees the DB role,
// not the JWT claim). Asserting the status guards against a spurious 500
// masquerading as "revoked".
await expect(api.listUsers(hostJwt)).rejects.toThrow(/→ 403/);
});
test('a banned host is locked out immediately on their existing session', async ({
api,
adminToken,
host,
}) => {
// Sanity: host token works.
await api.listUsers(host.jwt);
await api.banUser(adminToken, host.userId, false);
// Banned users are rejected with 403 by the auth extractor before any handler runs.
await expect(api.listUsers(host.jwt)).rejects.toThrow(/→ 403/);
});
test('a banned host cannot unban themselves', async ({ api, adminToken, host }) => {
await api.banUser(adminToken, host.userId, false);
await expect(
api.unbanUser(host.jwt, host.userId, { expectedStatus: [204] })
).rejects.toThrow(/→ 403/);
});
});