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EventSnap/docs
MechaCat02 2d7169e971 harden: low-severity bucket — unspoofable IP, admin floor, log/SSE hygiene
The cheap, real LOWs from the review (bucket 🅰); 🅱 items and won't-fix
decisions are recorded in docs/SECURITY-BACKLOG.md.

- XFF spoofing (highest-value): client_ip now prefers an unspoofable X-Real-IP
  (Caddy `header_up X-Real-IP {remote_host}`) and otherwise takes the *rightmost*
  X-Forwarded-For token, never the client-controlled leftmost. The join cap,
  recover throttle, and admin-login floor all keyed on this. Unit-tested.
  Caddyfile also drops the dead /media/previews|originals cache matchers (the
  gateway sets its own Cache-Control) and the false "only host can download"
  comment.
- admin_login: add a hard, non-disableable rate floor (30/5min/IP) so the DB
  rate-limit master toggle can't remove brute-force protection.
- SSE: the broadcast upload-error payload no longer includes the raw error
  (absolute filesystem paths) — generic message to clients, details logged
  server-side only.
- Access logs: the request span logs the path only, never the query string, so
  the replayable media `?sig=` capability isn't written to logs.
- Reaper TOCTOU: reap_deleted now deletes rows by the ids it actually unlinked
  (DELETE … WHERE id = ANY) instead of re-evaluating the time predicate, so a
  row crossing the grace line mid-sweep can't be row-deleted without its files
  unlinked.
- Dockerfile: run the backend as a non-root user; create /media owned by `app`
  so a fresh volume is writable.
- a11y: aria-labels on the upload caption and feed search inputs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-27 18:01:41 +02:00
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