Files
EventSnap/backend/src/services/rate_limiter.rs
fabi 41ac742af8 test+docs: tighten H1 assertions, cover secret/XFF edges, document boot & SSE-ban
Re-review follow-ups (non-blocking quality items):

Tests:
- moderation H1 specs now assert exact `→ 403` instead of bare .rejects.toThrow(),
  so a spurious 500 can no longer masquerade as "revocation worked".
- config: added case-insensitivity (upper/mixed-case placeholder) and the
  len==32/31 boundary cases for validate_secrets.
- rate_limiter: added the trailing-comma empty-entry case for client_ip (must
  fall back, not return "").
  (Backend unit tests: 35 pass.)

Docs:
- README: note that with APP_ENV=production a placeholder .env makes the app
  refuse to boot and Caddy wait unhealthy — reason is in `docker compose logs app`.
- SECURITY-BACKLOG + sse.rs comment: document that a mid-session ban does not
  tear down an already-open SSE stream (new tickets are blocked; low blast radius).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 07:14:33 +02:00

181 lines
6.8 KiB
Rust

use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
/// Thread-safe sliding-window rate limiter backed by an in-memory HashMap.
/// Each key (e.g. `"join:{ip}"` or `"upload:{user_id}"`) tracks timestamps
/// of recent requests and rejects new ones once the window is full.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct RateLimiter {
windows: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Vec<Instant>>>>,
}
impl RateLimiter {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
windows: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
}
}
/// Returns `true` if the request is allowed, `false` if rate-limited.
pub fn check(&self, key: impl Into<String>, max: usize, window: Duration) -> bool {
self.check_with_retry(key, max, window).is_ok()
}
/// Returns `Ok(())` if allowed, `Err(retry_after_secs)` if rate-limited.
/// `retry_after_secs` is how long until the oldest slot in the window expires.
pub fn check_with_retry(&self, key: impl Into<String>, max: usize, window: Duration) -> Result<(), u64> {
let now = Instant::now();
let key = key.into();
let mut map = self.windows.lock().unwrap();
let timestamps = map.entry(key).or_default();
timestamps.retain(|&t| now.duration_since(t) < window);
if timestamps.len() < max {
timestamps.push(now);
Ok(())
} else {
// The oldest timestamp expires at oldest + window; compute remaining seconds
let oldest = timestamps[0];
let elapsed = now.duration_since(oldest);
let remaining = window.saturating_sub(elapsed);
Err(remaining.as_secs().max(1))
}
}
/// Wipe every tracked window. Used by the test-mode truncate route so a previous
/// test's accumulated counters don't bleed into the next test's rate-limit checks.
pub fn clear(&self) {
self.windows.lock().unwrap().clear();
}
/// Drop keys whose windows are empty after expiring old timestamps. Called from a
/// background task (see [`crate::services::maintenance`]) so that long-lived
/// processes don't accumulate one HashMap entry per IP that ever connected.
///
/// Uses a conservative 24h ceiling — anything older than that is gone regardless
/// of which endpoint's window it was tracked under (the longest window today is
/// 24h for export downloads). If we ever add longer windows, raise this constant.
pub fn prune(&self) {
let now = Instant::now();
let ceiling = Duration::from_secs(24 * 60 * 60);
let mut map = self.windows.lock().unwrap();
let before = map.len();
map.retain(|_, ts| {
ts.retain(|&t| now.duration_since(t) < ceiling);
!ts.is_empty()
});
let dropped = before.saturating_sub(map.len());
if dropped > 0 {
tracing::debug!("rate limiter pruned {dropped} idle keys");
}
}
}
/// Extract the client IP from X-Forwarded-For or fall back to a provided socket
/// address string.
///
/// We take the **right-most** entry, not the left-most. Caddy is the sole ingress
/// and the app port is only `expose`d (never published), so the last hop Caddy
/// appends is the real client. A client can prepend arbitrary spoofed values to
/// the left of XFF to dodge throttles — those are ignored here. This assumes
/// exactly one trusted proxy (Caddy); revisit if that changes.
pub fn client_ip(headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap, fallback: &str) -> String {
headers
.get("x-forwarded-for")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| s.rsplit(',').next())
.map(|s| s.trim().to_owned())
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.unwrap_or_else(|| fallback.to_owned())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use axum::http::HeaderMap;
const MIN: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
#[test]
fn allows_up_to_max_then_blocks() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check("k", 3, MIN));
assert!(rl.check("k", 3, MIN));
assert!(rl.check("k", 3, MIN));
assert!(!rl.check("k", 3, MIN), "the 4th request must be blocked");
}
#[test]
fn keys_are_independent() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check("a", 1, MIN));
assert!(!rl.check("a", 1, MIN));
assert!(rl.check("b", 1, MIN), "a different key has its own window");
}
#[test]
fn window_slides_and_allows_again_after_expiry() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
let w = Duration::from_millis(40);
assert!(rl.check("k", 1, w));
assert!(!rl.check("k", 1, w));
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(55));
assert!(rl.check("k", 1, w), "the slot should expire once the window passes");
}
#[test]
fn retry_after_is_between_one_and_window() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_ok());
let retry = rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).unwrap_err();
assert!((1..=60).contains(&retry), "retry_after {retry} out of range");
}
#[test]
fn clear_resets_every_window() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check("k", 1, MIN));
assert!(!rl.check("k", 1, MIN));
rl.clear();
assert!(rl.check("k", 1, MIN), "clear() must free the window");
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_takes_rightmost_forwarded_for_entry() {
// The right-most entry is the hop our trusted proxy (Caddy) appended.
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("x-forwarded-for", "10.0.0.1, 203.0.113.7".parse().unwrap());
assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "fallback"), "203.0.113.7");
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_ignores_spoofed_leftmost_entry() {
// A client prepending a fake IP to dodge throttles must not win.
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("x-forwarded-for", "1.2.3.4, 9.9.9.9, 203.0.113.7".parse().unwrap());
assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "fallback"), "203.0.113.7");
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_trims_surrounding_whitespace() {
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("x-forwarded-for", " 198.51.100.5 ".parse().unwrap());
assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "fb"), "198.51.100.5");
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_falls_back_when_header_absent() {
assert_eq!(client_ip(&HeaderMap::new(), "127.0.0.1"), "127.0.0.1");
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_falls_back_on_trailing_comma_empty_entry() {
// A trailing comma leaves an empty right-most segment after trimming; the
// `.filter(!is_empty)` must reject it and fall through to the fallback
// rather than returning "" (which would collapse callers into one bucket).
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("x-forwarded-for", "203.0.113.7, ".parse().unwrap());
assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "127.0.0.1"), "127.0.0.1");
}
}