Re-review follow-ups (non-blocking quality items): Tests: - moderation H1 specs now assert exact `→ 403` instead of bare .rejects.toThrow(), so a spurious 500 can no longer masquerade as "revocation worked". - config: added case-insensitivity (upper/mixed-case placeholder) and the len==32/31 boundary cases for validate_secrets. - rate_limiter: added the trailing-comma empty-entry case for client_ip (must fall back, not return ""). (Backend unit tests: 35 pass.) Docs: - README: note that with APP_ENV=production a placeholder .env makes the app refuse to boot and Caddy wait unhealthy — reason is in `docker compose logs app`. - SECURITY-BACKLOG + sse.rs comment: document that a mid-session ban does not tear down an already-open SSE stream (new tickets are blocked; low blast radius). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
181 lines
6.8 KiB
Rust
181 lines
6.8 KiB
Rust
use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
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use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
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/// Thread-safe sliding-window rate limiter backed by an in-memory HashMap.
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/// Each key (e.g. `"join:{ip}"` or `"upload:{user_id}"`) tracks timestamps
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/// of recent requests and rejects new ones once the window is full.
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct RateLimiter {
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windows: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Vec<Instant>>>>,
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}
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impl RateLimiter {
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pub fn new() -> Self {
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Self {
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windows: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
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}
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}
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/// Returns `true` if the request is allowed, `false` if rate-limited.
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pub fn check(&self, key: impl Into<String>, max: usize, window: Duration) -> bool {
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self.check_with_retry(key, max, window).is_ok()
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}
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/// Returns `Ok(())` if allowed, `Err(retry_after_secs)` if rate-limited.
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/// `retry_after_secs` is how long until the oldest slot in the window expires.
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pub fn check_with_retry(&self, key: impl Into<String>, max: usize, window: Duration) -> Result<(), u64> {
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let now = Instant::now();
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let key = key.into();
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let mut map = self.windows.lock().unwrap();
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let timestamps = map.entry(key).or_default();
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timestamps.retain(|&t| now.duration_since(t) < window);
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if timestamps.len() < max {
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timestamps.push(now);
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Ok(())
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} else {
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// The oldest timestamp expires at oldest + window; compute remaining seconds
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let oldest = timestamps[0];
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let elapsed = now.duration_since(oldest);
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let remaining = window.saturating_sub(elapsed);
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Err(remaining.as_secs().max(1))
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}
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}
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/// Wipe every tracked window. Used by the test-mode truncate route so a previous
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/// test's accumulated counters don't bleed into the next test's rate-limit checks.
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pub fn clear(&self) {
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self.windows.lock().unwrap().clear();
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}
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/// Drop keys whose windows are empty after expiring old timestamps. Called from a
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/// background task (see [`crate::services::maintenance`]) so that long-lived
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/// processes don't accumulate one HashMap entry per IP that ever connected.
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///
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/// Uses a conservative 24h ceiling — anything older than that is gone regardless
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/// of which endpoint's window it was tracked under (the longest window today is
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/// 24h for export downloads). If we ever add longer windows, raise this constant.
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pub fn prune(&self) {
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let now = Instant::now();
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let ceiling = Duration::from_secs(24 * 60 * 60);
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let mut map = self.windows.lock().unwrap();
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let before = map.len();
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map.retain(|_, ts| {
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ts.retain(|&t| now.duration_since(t) < ceiling);
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!ts.is_empty()
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});
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let dropped = before.saturating_sub(map.len());
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if dropped > 0 {
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tracing::debug!("rate limiter pruned {dropped} idle keys");
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}
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}
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}
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/// Extract the client IP from X-Forwarded-For or fall back to a provided socket
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/// address string.
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///
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/// We take the **right-most** entry, not the left-most. Caddy is the sole ingress
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/// and the app port is only `expose`d (never published), so the last hop Caddy
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/// appends is the real client. A client can prepend arbitrary spoofed values to
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/// the left of XFF to dodge throttles — those are ignored here. This assumes
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/// exactly one trusted proxy (Caddy); revisit if that changes.
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pub fn client_ip(headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap, fallback: &str) -> String {
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headers
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.get("x-forwarded-for")
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.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
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.and_then(|s| s.rsplit(',').next())
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.map(|s| s.trim().to_owned())
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.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
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.unwrap_or_else(|| fallback.to_owned())
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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use axum::http::HeaderMap;
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const MIN: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
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#[test]
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fn allows_up_to_max_then_blocks() {
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let rl = RateLimiter::new();
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assert!(rl.check("k", 3, MIN));
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assert!(rl.check("k", 3, MIN));
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assert!(rl.check("k", 3, MIN));
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assert!(!rl.check("k", 3, MIN), "the 4th request must be blocked");
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}
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#[test]
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fn keys_are_independent() {
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let rl = RateLimiter::new();
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assert!(rl.check("a", 1, MIN));
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assert!(!rl.check("a", 1, MIN));
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assert!(rl.check("b", 1, MIN), "a different key has its own window");
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}
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#[test]
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fn window_slides_and_allows_again_after_expiry() {
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let rl = RateLimiter::new();
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let w = Duration::from_millis(40);
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assert!(rl.check("k", 1, w));
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assert!(!rl.check("k", 1, w));
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std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(55));
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assert!(rl.check("k", 1, w), "the slot should expire once the window passes");
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}
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#[test]
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fn retry_after_is_between_one_and_window() {
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let rl = RateLimiter::new();
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assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_ok());
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let retry = rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).unwrap_err();
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assert!((1..=60).contains(&retry), "retry_after {retry} out of range");
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}
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#[test]
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fn clear_resets_every_window() {
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let rl = RateLimiter::new();
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assert!(rl.check("k", 1, MIN));
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assert!(!rl.check("k", 1, MIN));
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rl.clear();
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assert!(rl.check("k", 1, MIN), "clear() must free the window");
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}
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#[test]
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fn client_ip_takes_rightmost_forwarded_for_entry() {
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// The right-most entry is the hop our trusted proxy (Caddy) appended.
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let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
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h.insert("x-forwarded-for", "10.0.0.1, 203.0.113.7".parse().unwrap());
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assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "fallback"), "203.0.113.7");
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}
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#[test]
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fn client_ip_ignores_spoofed_leftmost_entry() {
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// A client prepending a fake IP to dodge throttles must not win.
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let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
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h.insert("x-forwarded-for", "1.2.3.4, 9.9.9.9, 203.0.113.7".parse().unwrap());
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assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "fallback"), "203.0.113.7");
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}
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#[test]
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fn client_ip_trims_surrounding_whitespace() {
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let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
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h.insert("x-forwarded-for", " 198.51.100.5 ".parse().unwrap());
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assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "fb"), "198.51.100.5");
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}
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#[test]
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fn client_ip_falls_back_when_header_absent() {
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assert_eq!(client_ip(&HeaderMap::new(), "127.0.0.1"), "127.0.0.1");
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}
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#[test]
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fn client_ip_falls_back_on_trailing_comma_empty_entry() {
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// A trailing comma leaves an empty right-most segment after trimming; the
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// `.filter(!is_empty)` must reject it and fall through to the fallback
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// rather than returning "" (which would collapse callers into one bucket).
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let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
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h.insert("x-forwarded-for", "203.0.113.7, ".parse().unwrap());
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assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "127.0.0.1"), "127.0.0.1");
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}
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}
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