* Caddy had no read_body, on the reasoning that "a slow body still has to actually send bytes". That is an argument about disk, and disk is not the scarce resource: upload_admission budgets concurrent bodies at 4096 MiB and reserves the DECLARED cap, so a video/* upload reserves 500 MiB. Eight connections that stall mid-body hold the whole budget, every other guest waits 20s and gets a 503, and it never recovers on its own — the permit is held until the handler returns. No attacker needed: eight guests starting real videos and walking out of AP range does it, and TCP will not reap those sockets for hours. 30m carries a 500 MB upload at ~2.2 Mbit/s, so it does not fail the uploads this product exists to collect. * APP_PORT is presented in .env.example as an ordinary editable line, while the healthcheck hardcodes 127.0.0.1:3000 and the Caddyfile hardcodes app:3000. Change it and the app boots and serves happily on the new port, the healthcheck fails forever, app never turns healthy — and because caddy is gated on service_healthy, CADDY NEVER STARTS. Port 443 dead for the whole event, sole diagnostic "dependency failed to start". Pinned in compose beside MEDIA_PATH and EXPORT_PATH, which are there for this reason. * Runbook §12's recovery commands do not run as written: unwrapped "$POSTGRES_USER" is expanded by the operator's shell, which does not have it, so psql answers `FATAL: role "" does not exist`. §9 documents that trap two hundred lines earlier and wraps its own calls in sh -c; §12 did not. This is the block you run with the app crash-looping behind a live Caddy. Its DELETE also hard-coded versions 21,22,23 as if to be copied verbatim, on a tree that now has 31 migrations — now explicitly an example, with the instruction to take the numbers from the actual boot error. * Migration counts corrected across the runbook and .env.example (22 -> 31, commit count 154 -> 196). All four were presented as literal command output the operator is invited to reproduce.
164 lines
8.5 KiB
Caddyfile
164 lines
8.5 KiB
Caddyfile
{
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servers {
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timeouts {
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# Slowloris defence, at the layer that can actually apply it.
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#
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# There was no read or write timeout anywhere, so a client could open a POST, send one
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# byte a minute, and hold a connection, a tokio task and a `.tmp` file indefinitely —
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# and the upload sweeper is keyed on mtime precisely so a live upload never ages out,
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# so ten such connections consumed disk the upload gate could not see.
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#
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# read_header is tight: a legitimate client sends its headers in one go.
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read_header 10s
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# read_body is GENEROUS but present. It was omitted on the reasoning that "a slow body
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# still has to actually send bytes" — which is an argument about disk, and disk is not
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# the scarce resource here. `upload_admission` budgets concurrent bodies at 4096 MiB and
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# reserves the DECLARED cap, so a `video/*` upload reserves 500 MiB: eight connections
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# that stall mid-body hold the entire budget, every other guest waits 20s and gets a
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# 503, and it never recovers on its own because the permit is held until the handler
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# returns. That needs no attacker — eight guests starting real videos and then walking
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# out of AP range does it, and TCP will not reap those sockets for hours.
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#
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# 30m carries a 500 MB video at ~2.2 Mbit/s sustained, which is well under venue wifi
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# and under most cellular, so it does not fail the uploads this product exists to
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# collect. It does bound the leak to something that drains.
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read_body 30m
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idle 5m
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}
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}
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}
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{$DOMAIN} {
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# Compress everything EXCEPT the SSE stream — gzip buffering delays
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# "real-time" likes/comments until the ~30s keep-alive tick.
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@compressible not path /api/v1/stream
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encode @compressible zstd gzip
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# Site-wide security headers (defense-in-depth). HSTS is free since Caddy
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# already terminates TLS. nosniff also covers all of /media/*.
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header {
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Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains"
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X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
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Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
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}
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# X-Frame-Options: DENY everywhere EXCEPT the keepsake download endpoints, which
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# are navigated in a HIDDEN, SAME-ORIGIN iframe so a 404/429 can't unload the PWA
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# (see frontend/src/routes/export/+page.svelte). WebKit enforces XFO *before*
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# honouring Content-Disposition, so a blanket DENY makes the download silently do
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# nothing on iOS Safari — the app's primary platform. SAMEORIGIN still blocks
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# cross-origin framing.
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#
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# Split into two disjoint matchers rather than an override: Caddy applies the
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# FIRST header directive outermost, so it wins on write — a later, more specific
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# `header` would be silently ignored.
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@framable path /api/v1/export/zip /api/v1/export/html
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@not_framable not path /api/v1/export/zip /api/v1/export/html
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header @framable X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN"
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header @not_framable X-Frame-Options "DENY"
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# SvelteKit frontend — static assets with long-lived cache (content-hashed filenames)
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@hashed_assets path_regexp hashed /_app/immutable/.*\.[a-f0-9]{8,}\.(js|css|woff2)$
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header @hashed_assets Cache-Control "public, max-age=31536000, immutable"
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# Preview/thumbnail/display images. These are served by the app through a
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# visibility-checked alias (/api/v1/upload/{id}/{preview,thumbnail,display}) so
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# moderation can revoke access; the app serves no /media route at all, so there is no
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# direct path to the bytes. Privately cacheable for a short window (the app sets the
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# same header; this is the edge carve-out from the blanket no-store below). Kept short
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# so a moderated image stops being served to a direct-URL holder promptly.
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#
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# `display` was missing here while the backend set `private, max-age=300` on it, and
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# because `header` REPLACES, the blanket no-store below silently won. That route is the
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# ~2048px derivative the diashow uses exclusively, so a projector left running all
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# evening re-fetched a full-size JPEG for every slide — roughly 2-4 GB pulled through
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# the app over 8 hours, on the same venue uplink 100 guests are uploading over, and a
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# blank frame on every network hiccup.
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@media_api path /api/v1/upload/*/preview /api/v1/upload/*/thumbnail /api/v1/upload/*/display
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header @media_api Cache-Control "private, max-age=300"
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# API and health — never cache, EXCEPT the gated image routes above. A cached health
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# response would report the last known state rather than the current one.
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@api {
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path /api/* /health
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not path /api/v1/upload/*/preview /api/v1/upload/*/thumbnail /api/v1/upload/*/display
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}
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header @api Cache-Control "no-store"
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# Route API and media requests to the Rust backend.
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#
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# The app serves no /media route at all (see the note in backend/src/main.rs) — media
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# bytes are reachable only through the visibility-checked /api/v1/upload aliases, so
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# /media/* forwards to a plain 404. The proxy line is kept deliberately: it means the
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# edge faithfully hands /media to the app, so if a future change ever re-introduces a
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# static media route the e2e gating specs see it here exactly as production would,
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# instead of being masked by the SvelteKit 404 page.
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reverse_proxy /api/* app:3000
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reverse_proxy /media/* app:3000
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# The backend registers /health on its ROOT router, not under /api/v1, so it needs its
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# own line — without it the catch-all below hands /health to SvelteKit, which has no
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# such route and returns its 404 page. That made the documented post-deploy check
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# (`curl -fsS https://DOMAIN/health`) fail 100% of the time on a perfectly healthy
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# stack. e2e/Caddyfile.test has always carried this line; production never did.
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reverse_proxy /health app:3000
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# Everything else goes to SvelteKit frontend
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reverse_proxy frontend:3001
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# Last-resort page for when Caddy itself cannot reach an upstream — the app or frontend
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# container down, restarting, or still warming up after a host reboot. Without it a guest
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# gets Caddy's bodiless 502: a completely blank page, which reads as "the whole thing is
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# gone" rather than "try again in a moment".
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#
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# THIS DOES NOT TOUCH APPLICATION ERRORS. `handle_errors` fires only on errors CADDY
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# generates; a status the app returns through `reverse_proxy` is written back verbatim and
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# never reaches here. That distinction is load-bearing rather than incidental: the keepsake
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# download navigates a HIDDEN IFRAME and depends on a real 404/429 arriving from the app
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# (frontend/src/routes/export/+page.svelte), and every API route answers 403/404/429 as
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# ordinary JSON that the client parses. Swallowing those into an HTML page would be a far
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# worse regression than the blank 502 this fixes. Verified against this exact config: an
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# upstream 404 through `reverse_proxy` still arrives as `Content-Type: application/json`
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# with its body intact, while only a dial failure renders the page below.
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#
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# Scoped to 5xx so a hypothetical future Caddy-generated 4xx (there is none today) still
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# returns plainly instead of claiming the server is restarting.
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#
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# The body is inline because the caddy service mounts ONLY ./Caddyfile and caddy_data —
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# there is no volume to ship an HTML file through and the image has no build step, so a
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# static file would mean changing the deployed stack's compose definition. No external
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# font, stylesheet or image is referenced: the app may be exactly what is down.
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#
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# `handle_errors` has NO position in the directive order — Caddy hoists it into a separate
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# `errors` route list — so it cannot disturb the "first `header` directive wins" hazard
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# documented at the top of this file. The site-wide security headers still apply to it.
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handle_errors 5xx {
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header Content-Type "text/html; charset=utf-8"
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header Cache-Control "no-store"
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# {err.status_code} preserves the real status. Hardcoding 503 would mislabel a genuine
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# 502 for anything watching from outside.
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respond `<!doctype html>
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<html lang="de">
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<head>
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<meta charset="utf-8">
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<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
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<title>Gleich zurück</title>
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<style>
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html{background:#faf9f7;color:#1a1918;font-family:system-ui,-apple-system,"Segoe UI",Roboto,sans-serif}
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body{margin:0;min-height:100vh;display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;padding:2rem;text-align:center}
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h1{font-family:Georgia,"Times New Roman",serif;font-weight:600;font-size:1.5rem;margin:0 0 .75rem}
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p{margin:0;color:#545350;line-height:1.5}
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@media (prefers-color-scheme:dark){html{background:#100f0f;color:#f5f4f2}p{color:#a6a4a1}}
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</style>
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</head>
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<body>
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<main>
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<h1>Wir sind gleich zurück</h1>
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<p>Die Seite wird gerade neu gestartet.<br>Bitte lade in einem Moment neu — deine Fotos bleiben gespeichert.</p>
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</main>
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</body>
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</html>
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` {err.status_code}
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}
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}
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