Files
EventSnap/backend/src/services/rate_limiter.rs
fabi 89057d605f fix(rate-limit): key the guest-facing limiters per user, not per IP
At a venue every guest is behind one NAT, so an IP-keyed limiter hands the
whole party a single bucket. On a fresh deploy 12 guests arriving together
meant 5 joined and 7 were turned away, with no Retry-After telling them when
to retry. `/feed` (60/min) and `/export` (3 per DAY — the fourth guest to
fetch their keepsake locked out until tomorrow) had the same defect.

`feed_delta` was already keyed per-user and its comment states the exact
rationale ("so one client can't starve others behind a shared NAT"); this
makes its siblings match.

- feed:{ip}   -> feed:{user_id}    (auth was already in scope)
- export:{ip} -> export:{user_id}  (resolved from the download ticket's
  session, which was previously looked up and discarded)
- join:{ip}: pre-auth, so there is no user to key on. Split in two — a loose
  per-IP ceiling that only bounds raw volume (new `join_ip_rate_per_min`,
  default 60, migration 017), plus the real 5/60s anti-spam bucket keyed
  per (ip, name), mirroring the existing `recover:{ip}:{name}`.

admin_login / recover / pin_reset_req stay IP-keyed on purpose and are now
commented as such: they guard credential guessing, where a per-user or
per-name key would just hand an attacker a fresh bucket per guess.

Retry-After: the machinery existed but 7 of 8 sites called `check()` and
hard-coded `None`, so a throttled client was told to back off but never for
how long. Delete the bool `check()` wrapper entirely so `check_with_retry`
is the only entry point and the delay cannot be discarded by accident. Also
surface it for the PIN lockout, where the deadline was already known.

Fix the "unknown" fallback while here: every client_ip() caller passed that
literal, so any request without X-Forwarded-For — anything reaching the app
directly rather than through Caddy — shared ONE global bucket. Serve with
connect-info and use the peer address.

Tests: the reseed forces every limiter toggle off before each test, which is
why this whole class was invisible. Add 01-auth/rate-limit-shared-nat, which
enables them and asserts 12 guests share an IP without collision, that one
guest hammering their own name IS still throttled (so the fix re-keys rather
than removes the limit), and that feed/export buckets are per-user. Retarget
the ddos join test at the new per-IP ceiling — it asserted the defect.

Also seed `admin_login_rate_enabled` (read by the handler, seeded by no
migration and no reseed) and register `join_ip_rate_per_min` in the admin
config allowlist. Unrelated pre-existing red test fixed: 01-auth/join
asserted a "Willkommen!" heading the wedding redesign removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 21:56:49 +02:00

309 lines
12 KiB
Rust

use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
/// Thread-safe sliding-window rate limiter backed by an in-memory HashMap.
/// Each key (e.g. `"join:{ip}"` or `"upload:{user_id}"`) tracks timestamps
/// of recent requests and rejects new ones once the window is full.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct RateLimiter {
windows: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Vec<Instant>>>>,
}
impl RateLimiter {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
windows: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
}
}
/// Returns `Ok(())` if allowed, `Err(retry_after_secs)` if rate-limited.
/// `retry_after_secs` is how long until the oldest slot in the window expires.
///
/// This is deliberately the ONLY entry point. There used to be a `check()` wrapper
/// returning a plain bool, and 7 of the 8 call sites used it and then hard-coded
/// `None` for the response's `Retry-After` — so a throttled client was told to back
/// off but never for how long. Forcing every caller through the `Result` makes the
/// retry delay impossible to discard by accident.
pub fn check_with_retry(
&self,
key: impl Into<String>,
max: usize,
window: Duration,
) -> Result<(), u64> {
let now = Instant::now();
let key = key.into();
let mut map = self.windows.lock().unwrap();
let timestamps = map.entry(key).or_default();
timestamps.retain(|&t| now.duration_since(t) < window);
if timestamps.len() < max {
timestamps.push(now);
Ok(())
} else {
// The oldest timestamp expires at oldest + window; compute remaining seconds
let oldest = timestamps[0];
let elapsed = now.duration_since(oldest);
let remaining = window.saturating_sub(elapsed);
Err(remaining.as_secs().max(1))
}
}
/// Wipe every tracked window. Used by the test-mode truncate route so a previous
/// test's accumulated counters don't bleed into the next test's rate-limit checks.
pub fn clear(&self) {
self.windows.lock().unwrap().clear();
}
/// Drop keys whose windows are empty after expiring old timestamps. Called from a
/// background task (see [`crate::services::maintenance`]) so that long-lived
/// processes don't accumulate one HashMap entry per IP that ever connected.
///
/// Uses a conservative 24h ceiling — anything older than that is gone regardless
/// of which endpoint's window it was tracked under (the longest window today is
/// 24h for export downloads). If we ever add longer windows, raise this constant.
pub fn prune(&self) {
let now = Instant::now();
let ceiling = Duration::from_secs(24 * 60 * 60);
let mut map = self.windows.lock().unwrap();
let before = map.len();
map.retain(|_, ts| {
ts.retain(|&t| now.duration_since(t) < ceiling);
!ts.is_empty()
});
let dropped = before.saturating_sub(map.len());
if dropped > 0 {
tracing::debug!("rate limiter pruned {dropped} idle keys");
}
}
}
/// Extract the client IP from X-Forwarded-For or fall back to a provided socket
/// address string.
///
/// We take the **right-most** entry, not the left-most. Caddy is the sole ingress
/// and the app port is only `expose`d (never published), so the last hop Caddy
/// appends is the real client. A client can prepend arbitrary spoofed values to
/// the left of XFF to dodge throttles — those are ignored here. This assumes
/// exactly one trusted proxy (Caddy); revisit if that changes.
///
/// Pass the peer address as `fallback`, never a constant. Every caller used to pass
/// the literal `"unknown"`, so any request that arrived without XFF — i.e. anything
/// reaching the app directly rather than through Caddy — shared ONE bucket with every
/// other such request, turning the limiter into a self-inflicted global throttle.
pub fn client_ip(headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap, fallback: &str) -> String {
headers
.get("x-forwarded-for")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| s.rsplit(',').next())
.map(|s| s.trim().to_owned())
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.unwrap_or_else(|| fallback.to_owned())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use axum::http::HeaderMap;
const MIN: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
#[test]
fn allows_up_to_max_then_blocks() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 3, MIN).is_ok());
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 3, MIN).is_ok());
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 3, MIN).is_ok());
assert!(
rl.check_with_retry("k", 3, MIN).is_err(),
"the 4th request must be blocked"
);
}
#[test]
fn keys_are_independent() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("a", 1, MIN).is_ok());
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("a", 1, MIN).is_err());
assert!(
rl.check_with_retry("b", 1, MIN).is_ok(),
"a different key has its own window"
);
}
#[test]
fn window_slides_and_allows_again_after_expiry() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
let w = Duration::from_millis(40);
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).is_ok());
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).is_err());
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(55));
assert!(
rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).is_ok(),
"the slot should expire once the window passes"
);
}
/// `retry_after` is not a "some number in range" — it is the time until the oldest slot
/// in the window frees up, and it is surfaced to clients as the backoff they sleep for
/// (see `upload-queue.ts`). Asserting only `(1..=60)` spans the entire reachable domain
/// of a 60s window, so a hardcoded `Err(1)` would satisfy it while telling every client
/// to hammer the server a second later. Pin the actual value.
#[test]
fn retry_after_is_the_remaining_window() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
// The slot was consumed just now, so essentially the whole window remains.
// `as_secs()` truncates the sub-second remainder, so a 30s window reports 29.
let w30 = Duration::from_secs(30);
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("a", 1, w30).is_ok());
let a = rl.check_with_retry("a", 1, w30).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(a, 29, "retry_after must be the remaining window, got {a}");
// A different window must yield a different retry_after: no single constant can
// satisfy both this and the assertion above.
let w10 = Duration::from_secs(10);
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("b", 1, w10).is_ok());
let b = rl.check_with_retry("b", 1, w10).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(b, 9, "retry_after must scale with the window, got {b}");
}
#[test]
fn retry_after_counts_down_as_the_window_elapses() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
let w = Duration::from_secs(30);
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).is_ok());
let first = rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).unwrap_err();
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(1200));
let second = rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).unwrap_err();
// A client that waits 1.2s must be told to wait ~1.2s less — otherwise the advertised
// backoff is a constant, not a deadline.
let shaved = first - second;
assert!(
(1..=2).contains(&shaved),
"1.2s of waiting must shorten the advertised backoff by ~1s (got {first} then {second})"
);
}
#[test]
fn retry_after_floors_at_one_second() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
let w = Duration::from_millis(800);
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).is_ok());
let retry = rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).unwrap_err();
// The sub-second remainder truncates to 0; clients must never be told "retry in 0s"
// (that's a busy-loop). The `.max(1)` floor is what prevents it.
assert_eq!(
retry, 1,
"a sub-second remainder must floor to 1, got {retry}"
);
}
#[test]
fn clear_resets_every_window() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_ok());
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_err());
rl.clear();
assert!(
rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_ok(),
"clear() must free the window"
);
}
/// `prune()` is a memory-leak guard: without it a long-lived process keeps one HashMap
/// entry per IP that ever connected. Nothing in the public API observes the map size, so
/// the only way to catch a no-op body (`fn prune(&self) {}`) is to look at the map — the
/// tests module can see the private field.
#[test]
fn prune_drops_keys_whose_windows_have_fully_expired() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
// A key whose only timestamp is older than the 24h ceiling. We can't sleep for a day,
// so backdate the Instant directly.
let ancient = Instant::now()
.checked_sub(Duration::from_secs(25 * 60 * 60))
.expect("backdating an Instant by 25h");
rl.windows
.lock()
.unwrap()
.insert("stale".to_string(), vec![ancient]);
// ...alongside a key that is still inside its window.
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("live", 5, MIN).is_ok());
assert_eq!(rl.windows.lock().unwrap().len(), 2);
rl.prune();
let map = rl.windows.lock().unwrap();
assert!(
!map.contains_key("stale"),
"prune() must drop keys whose timestamps have all expired"
);
assert!(
map.contains_key("live"),
"prune() must keep keys that still have live timestamps"
);
assert_eq!(map.len(), 1, "exactly one key should survive the prune");
}
#[test]
fn prune_does_not_reset_a_live_window() {
// The counterpart to the test above: pruning must reclaim memory, never quota. If
// prune() dropped live keys, every background sweep would hand attackers a fresh
// budget.
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_ok());
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_err());
rl.prune();
assert!(
rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, MIN).is_err(),
"prune() must not clear a window that is still active"
);
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_takes_rightmost_forwarded_for_entry() {
// The right-most entry is the hop our trusted proxy (Caddy) appended.
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("x-forwarded-for", "10.0.0.1, 203.0.113.7".parse().unwrap());
assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "fallback"), "203.0.113.7");
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_ignores_spoofed_leftmost_entry() {
// A client prepending a fake IP to dodge throttles must not win.
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert(
"x-forwarded-for",
"1.2.3.4, 9.9.9.9, 203.0.113.7".parse().unwrap(),
);
assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "fallback"), "203.0.113.7");
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_trims_surrounding_whitespace() {
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("x-forwarded-for", " 198.51.100.5 ".parse().unwrap());
assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "fb"), "198.51.100.5");
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_falls_back_when_header_absent() {
assert_eq!(client_ip(&HeaderMap::new(), "127.0.0.1"), "127.0.0.1");
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_falls_back_on_trailing_comma_empty_entry() {
// A trailing comma leaves an empty right-most segment after trimming; the
// `.filter(!is_empty)` must reject it and fall through to the fallback
// rather than returning "" (which would collapse callers into one bucket).
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("x-forwarded-for", "203.0.113.7, ".parse().unwrap());
assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "127.0.0.1"), "127.0.0.1");
}
}