Files
EventSnap/backend/src/auth/middleware.rs
MechaCat02 8faf702208 feat(media): authenticated signed media gateway (C1, C2-sink, C3, H2, H10)
Replaces the DB-blind `/media` ServeDir with a signed, DB-aware gateway at
`GET /media/{kind}/{id}`. Every media byte now flows through an HMAC-SHA256
signature check (minted into feed/upload DTOs for authenticated members; <img>
can't carry a Bearer header) plus a DB lookup:

- C1: export ZIP/HTML have no upload row, so they are unreachable by path —
  download stays behind the authenticated /export endpoints.
- C2 (sink): responses carry X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and a locked-down
  CSP (default-src 'none'; sandbox), neutralizing any active content.
- C3 / H2: find_by_id filters deleted_at and the handler rejects ban-hidden
  uploaders, so deleted and moderated artifacts 404 — and the unauthenticated
  get_original alias (the H2 hole) is removed entirely.
- H10: delete paths (owner + host) now unlink original/preview/thumbnail after
  commit; soft_delete returns the paths; an hourly reaper reclaims disk for
  rows soft-deleted past a 1-day grace and hard-deletes them (FKs cascade).

Signed URLs are bucketed to a 1h window so they stay stable across feed polls
(browser cache hits) while expiring within 24h. media_token sign/verify has a
unit test (roundtrip + tamper + expiry).

Frontend: FeedUpload/pickMediaUrl now use the backend-provided signed
original_url; no client constructs a media path anymore.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-27 15:30:30 +02:00

119 lines
4.1 KiB
Rust

use axum::extract::FromRequestParts;
use axum::http::request::Parts;
use uuid::Uuid;
use crate::auth::jwt;
use crate::error::AppError;
use crate::models::session::Session;
use crate::models::user::UserRole;
use crate::state::AppState;
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct AuthUser {
pub user_id: Uuid,
pub event_id: Uuid,
pub role: UserRole,
pub token_hash: String,
}
impl FromRequestParts<AppState> for AuthUser {
type Rejection = AppError;
async fn from_request_parts(
parts: &mut Parts,
state: &AppState,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
let header = parts
.headers
.get("authorization")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Token fehlt.".into()))?;
let token = header
.strip_prefix("Bearer ")
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Ungültiges Token-Format.".into()))?;
let claims = jwt::verify_token(token, &state.config.jwt_secret)
.map_err(|_| AppError::Unauthorized("Token ungültig oder abgelaufen.".into()))?;
let token_hash = jwt::hash_token(token);
// Reconcile the session against the live `user` row. We do NOT trust the
// JWT claims for role/ban/event — a token can outlive a ban or demotion
// (default lifetime 30 days). The single JOIN query is the same number
// of round-trips as the old existence check.
let ctx = Session::find_auth_context(&state.pool, &token_hash)
.await
.map_err(|e| AppError::Internal(e.into()))?
.ok_or_else(|| AppError::Unauthorized("Sitzung nicht gefunden oder abgelaufen.".into()))?;
// Ban takes effect immediately on the next request, regardless of the
// token's remaining lifetime.
if ctx.is_banned {
return Err(AppError::Forbidden("Du bist gesperrt.".into()));
}
// Defend against a JWT that was issued for a different user/event than
// the session's DB row points at (e.g. a swapped or replayed token).
if claims.sub != ctx.user_id || claims.event_id != ctx.event_id {
return Err(AppError::Unauthorized("Token passt nicht zur Sitzung.".into()));
}
// Update last_seen_at in the background (fire-and-forget). Failures are
// non-fatal but worth surfacing — silent swallowing hides DB connection
// pressure that would otherwise be the first symptom of a real problem.
let pool = state.pool.clone();
let session_id = ctx.session_id;
tokio::spawn(async move {
if let Err(e) = Session::touch(&pool, session_id).await {
tracing::warn!(error = ?e, session_id = %session_id, "session touch failed");
}
});
Ok(Self {
user_id: ctx.user_id,
event_id: ctx.event_id,
// Live role from the DB, not the claim — demotion/promotion takes
// effect on the next request.
role: ctx.role,
token_hash,
})
}
}
/// Extractor that requires at least Host role.
pub struct RequireHost(pub AuthUser);
impl FromRequestParts<AppState> for RequireHost {
type Rejection = AppError;
async fn from_request_parts(
parts: &mut Parts,
state: &AppState,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
let auth = AuthUser::from_request_parts(parts, state).await?;
match auth.role {
UserRole::Host | UserRole::Admin => Ok(Self(auth)),
_ => Err(AppError::Forbidden("Nur für Hosts und Admins.".into())),
}
}
}
/// Extractor that requires Admin role.
pub struct RequireAdmin(pub AuthUser);
impl FromRequestParts<AppState> for RequireAdmin {
type Rejection = AppError;
async fn from_request_parts(
parts: &mut Parts,
state: &AppState,
) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
let auth = AuthUser::from_request_parts(parts, state).await?;
match auth.role {
UserRole::Admin => Ok(Self(auth)),
_ => Err(AppError::Forbidden("Nur für Admins.".into())),
}
}
}