Files
EventSnap/backend/src/services/rate_limiter.rs
fabi e5201a9889 test(backend): DB-backed tests for the risky SQL; test isolation; clippy cleanup
All 40 backend tests were pure-function tests — not one line of SQL ran under `cargo test`,
even though the riskiest code in the repo is SQL. Add 12 DB-backed `#[sqlx::test]` tests
(fresh throwaway DB per test, real migrations) pinning the invariants that code is
load-bearing for, each mutation-verified to fail on broken code:

  export_epoch.rs (8): epoch is post-increment on release (a worker born pre-increment is
    inert); epoch strictly monotonic across reopen; a retired-epoch worker's writes are
    no-ops; export_current is EXACTLY the invariant (8-case table); the ViewerOnly
    carry-forward carries a done ZIP forward AND matches nothing when the ZIP is unfinished
    (the af997a8 strand bug); boot recovery doesn't clobber a live ZIP.
  upload_concurrency.rs (4): the atomic quota UPDATE stops two stale-snapshot uploads from
    both committing (sequential AND concurrent-tx via EPQ); the FOR SHARE upload lock
    serializes against release, blocking a photo from committing after the export snapshot.

Deleting FOR SHARE, or the carry-forward's `status='done'`, each makes a test fail.

Test isolation: TRUNCATE now also resets disk_cache and sse_tickets. The stale disk
reading was harmless only while quotas were globally off in e2e (they no longer are — see
the new quota spec), i.e. two holes were masking each other.

clippy: `cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings` now passes (it did not). Deleted the
dead jobs.rs (an unused BackgroundJob sketch) and unused model methods; `#[allow(dead_code)]`
+ comment on the sqlx FromRow field-sets that ARE populated by the DB. No SQL or logic
changed. `cargo test` requires DATABASE_URL by design.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-15 07:26:08 +02:00

280 lines
11 KiB
Rust

use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
/// Thread-safe sliding-window rate limiter backed by an in-memory HashMap.
/// Each key (e.g. `"join:{ip}"` or `"upload:{user_id}"`) tracks timestamps
/// of recent requests and rejects new ones once the window is full.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct RateLimiter {
windows: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<String, Vec<Instant>>>>,
}
impl RateLimiter {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
windows: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
}
}
/// Returns `true` if the request is allowed, `false` if rate-limited.
pub fn check(&self, key: impl Into<String>, max: usize, window: Duration) -> bool {
self.check_with_retry(key, max, window).is_ok()
}
/// Returns `Ok(())` if allowed, `Err(retry_after_secs)` if rate-limited.
/// `retry_after_secs` is how long until the oldest slot in the window expires.
pub fn check_with_retry(&self, key: impl Into<String>, max: usize, window: Duration) -> Result<(), u64> {
let now = Instant::now();
let key = key.into();
let mut map = self.windows.lock().unwrap();
let timestamps = map.entry(key).or_default();
timestamps.retain(|&t| now.duration_since(t) < window);
if timestamps.len() < max {
timestamps.push(now);
Ok(())
} else {
// The oldest timestamp expires at oldest + window; compute remaining seconds
let oldest = timestamps[0];
let elapsed = now.duration_since(oldest);
let remaining = window.saturating_sub(elapsed);
Err(remaining.as_secs().max(1))
}
}
/// Wipe every tracked window. Used by the test-mode truncate route so a previous
/// test's accumulated counters don't bleed into the next test's rate-limit checks.
pub fn clear(&self) {
self.windows.lock().unwrap().clear();
}
/// Drop keys whose windows are empty after expiring old timestamps. Called from a
/// background task (see [`crate::services::maintenance`]) so that long-lived
/// processes don't accumulate one HashMap entry per IP that ever connected.
///
/// Uses a conservative 24h ceiling — anything older than that is gone regardless
/// of which endpoint's window it was tracked under (the longest window today is
/// 24h for export downloads). If we ever add longer windows, raise this constant.
pub fn prune(&self) {
let now = Instant::now();
let ceiling = Duration::from_secs(24 * 60 * 60);
let mut map = self.windows.lock().unwrap();
let before = map.len();
map.retain(|_, ts| {
ts.retain(|&t| now.duration_since(t) < ceiling);
!ts.is_empty()
});
let dropped = before.saturating_sub(map.len());
if dropped > 0 {
tracing::debug!("rate limiter pruned {dropped} idle keys");
}
}
}
/// Extract the client IP from X-Forwarded-For or fall back to a provided socket
/// address string.
///
/// We take the **right-most** entry, not the left-most. Caddy is the sole ingress
/// and the app port is only `expose`d (never published), so the last hop Caddy
/// appends is the real client. A client can prepend arbitrary spoofed values to
/// the left of XFF to dodge throttles — those are ignored here. This assumes
/// exactly one trusted proxy (Caddy); revisit if that changes.
pub fn client_ip(headers: &axum::http::HeaderMap, fallback: &str) -> String {
headers
.get("x-forwarded-for")
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.and_then(|s| s.rsplit(',').next())
.map(|s| s.trim().to_owned())
.filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
.unwrap_or_else(|| fallback.to_owned())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use axum::http::HeaderMap;
const MIN: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
#[test]
fn allows_up_to_max_then_blocks() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check("k", 3, MIN));
assert!(rl.check("k", 3, MIN));
assert!(rl.check("k", 3, MIN));
assert!(!rl.check("k", 3, MIN), "the 4th request must be blocked");
}
#[test]
fn keys_are_independent() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check("a", 1, MIN));
assert!(!rl.check("a", 1, MIN));
assert!(rl.check("b", 1, MIN), "a different key has its own window");
}
#[test]
fn window_slides_and_allows_again_after_expiry() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
let w = Duration::from_millis(40);
assert!(rl.check("k", 1, w));
assert!(!rl.check("k", 1, w));
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(55));
assert!(rl.check("k", 1, w), "the slot should expire once the window passes");
}
/// `retry_after` is not a "some number in range" — it is the time until the oldest slot
/// in the window frees up, and it is surfaced to clients as the backoff they sleep for
/// (see `upload-queue.ts`). Asserting only `(1..=60)` spans the entire reachable domain
/// of a 60s window, so a hardcoded `Err(1)` would satisfy it while telling every client
/// to hammer the server a second later. Pin the actual value.
#[test]
fn retry_after_is_the_remaining_window() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
// The slot was consumed just now, so essentially the whole window remains.
// `as_secs()` truncates the sub-second remainder, so a 30s window reports 29.
let w30 = Duration::from_secs(30);
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("a", 1, w30).is_ok());
let a = rl.check_with_retry("a", 1, w30).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(a, 29, "retry_after must be the remaining window, got {a}");
// A different window must yield a different retry_after: no single constant can
// satisfy both this and the assertion above.
let w10 = Duration::from_secs(10);
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("b", 1, w10).is_ok());
let b = rl.check_with_retry("b", 1, w10).unwrap_err();
assert_eq!(b, 9, "retry_after must scale with the window, got {b}");
}
#[test]
fn retry_after_counts_down_as_the_window_elapses() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
let w = Duration::from_secs(30);
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).is_ok());
let first = rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).unwrap_err();
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(1200));
let second = rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).unwrap_err();
// A client that waits 1.2s must be told to wait ~1.2s less — otherwise the advertised
// backoff is a constant, not a deadline.
let shaved = first - second;
assert!(
(1..=2).contains(&shaved),
"1.2s of waiting must shorten the advertised backoff by ~1s (got {first} then {second})"
);
}
#[test]
fn retry_after_floors_at_one_second() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
let w = Duration::from_millis(800);
assert!(rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).is_ok());
let retry = rl.check_with_retry("k", 1, w).unwrap_err();
// The sub-second remainder truncates to 0; clients must never be told "retry in 0s"
// (that's a busy-loop). The `.max(1)` floor is what prevents it.
assert_eq!(retry, 1, "a sub-second remainder must floor to 1, got {retry}");
}
#[test]
fn clear_resets_every_window() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check("k", 1, MIN));
assert!(!rl.check("k", 1, MIN));
rl.clear();
assert!(rl.check("k", 1, MIN), "clear() must free the window");
}
/// `prune()` is a memory-leak guard: without it a long-lived process keeps one HashMap
/// entry per IP that ever connected. Nothing in the public API observes the map size, so
/// the only way to catch a no-op body (`fn prune(&self) {}`) is to look at the map — the
/// tests module can see the private field.
#[test]
fn prune_drops_keys_whose_windows_have_fully_expired() {
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
// A key whose only timestamp is older than the 24h ceiling. We can't sleep for a day,
// so backdate the Instant directly.
let ancient = Instant::now()
.checked_sub(Duration::from_secs(25 * 60 * 60))
.expect("backdating an Instant by 25h");
rl.windows
.lock()
.unwrap()
.insert("stale".to_string(), vec![ancient]);
// ...alongside a key that is still inside its window.
assert!(rl.check("live", 5, MIN));
assert_eq!(rl.windows.lock().unwrap().len(), 2);
rl.prune();
let map = rl.windows.lock().unwrap();
assert!(
!map.contains_key("stale"),
"prune() must drop keys whose timestamps have all expired"
);
assert!(
map.contains_key("live"),
"prune() must keep keys that still have live timestamps"
);
assert_eq!(map.len(), 1, "exactly one key should survive the prune");
}
#[test]
fn prune_does_not_reset_a_live_window() {
// The counterpart to the test above: pruning must reclaim memory, never quota. If
// prune() dropped live keys, every background sweep would hand attackers a fresh
// budget.
let rl = RateLimiter::new();
assert!(rl.check("k", 1, MIN));
assert!(!rl.check("k", 1, MIN));
rl.prune();
assert!(
!rl.check("k", 1, MIN),
"prune() must not clear a window that is still active"
);
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_takes_rightmost_forwarded_for_entry() {
// The right-most entry is the hop our trusted proxy (Caddy) appended.
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("x-forwarded-for", "10.0.0.1, 203.0.113.7".parse().unwrap());
assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "fallback"), "203.0.113.7");
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_ignores_spoofed_leftmost_entry() {
// A client prepending a fake IP to dodge throttles must not win.
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("x-forwarded-for", "1.2.3.4, 9.9.9.9, 203.0.113.7".parse().unwrap());
assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "fallback"), "203.0.113.7");
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_trims_surrounding_whitespace() {
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("x-forwarded-for", " 198.51.100.5 ".parse().unwrap());
assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "fb"), "198.51.100.5");
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_falls_back_when_header_absent() {
assert_eq!(client_ip(&HeaderMap::new(), "127.0.0.1"), "127.0.0.1");
}
#[test]
fn client_ip_falls_back_on_trailing_comma_empty_entry() {
// A trailing comma leaves an empty right-most segment after trimming; the
// `.filter(!is_empty)` must reject it and fall through to the fallback
// rather than returning "" (which would collapse callers into one bucket).
let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
h.insert("x-forwarded-for", "203.0.113.7, ".parse().unwrap());
assert_eq!(client_ip(&h, "127.0.0.1"), "127.0.0.1");
}
}