Files
EventSnap/frontend/src/lib/api.ts
MechaCat02 61119be817 Merge branch 'fix/deploy-unattended-blockers' into main
Two independent lines of production hardening diverged at 7d0334b and attacked
overlapping problems. Neither was a superset, so this is a merge of substance
rather than a fast-forward: every conflict was resolved on the merits, and the
losing side's intent was re-checked against the winner rather than assumed.

MIGRATIONS. The branch's 021/022/023 collided with main's already-DEPLOYED
021_hashtag_counts_respect_bans and 022_client_upload_idempotency. Renumbered to
023/024/025 in a prior commit — main's versions are applied in production, so
their version numbers are immutable and the branch's had to move. Verified by
running the full sqlx::test suite, which applies the whole chain from scratch.

RESOLVED IN MAIN'S FAVOUR (the branch would have regressed these):
  * upload-queue.ts wholesale — the branch's copy has ZERO client_upload_id
    references, so taking it would have silently destroyed end-to-end upload
    idempotency, the one thing standing between a lost response and a duplicate
    photo charged twice against the guest's quota.
  * maintenance.rs supervisor — the branch replaced it with a bare tokio::spawn,
    where one panic silently stops session pruning, media reclaim, the temp
    sweep and both HashMap prunes, permanently and with no log line.
  * The decode-budget probe on spawn_blocking, not inline on the async runtime.
  * feed/+page.svelte's 8s debounce + jitter + max-wait + hidden-tab deferral,
    against the branch's naive 800ms — at 100 guests the branch's version walks
    straight into the per-user feed rate limit.
  * db.rs pool tuning, /uploaders, and the docker-compose deployment story.
  * ONE /health, still DB-backed. The branch's split (dependency-free liveness +
    DB-backed readiness) is defensible, but a constant-"ok" /health is the exact
    defect faea555 fixed and verified live, its motive (Caddy's boot gate) is
    already covered by app depends_on db: service_healthy, and the two handlers
    were the same SELECT 1 under two names.

TAKEN FROM THE BRANCH:
  * The large-PNG OOM guard and its bounded-retry counter (023). Together these
    turn a single upload that can OOM-kill a 1G container into a bounded failure
    instead of an infinite restart loop under `restart: unless-stopped`.
  * 024_feed_scalar_counts — the feed no longer aggregates the whole event per
    page. Pure SQL; column names, order and types are unchanged by design.
  * The admin-lockout fix: look the admin up BY ROLE, never by name. 025 also
    frees any guest already squatting on a reserved name.
  * PIN lockout tier ordering, bounded caption/hashtag reads, SSE ticket caps,
    PoolTimedOut -> 503 + Retry-After, and the ffmpeg stderr drain.
  * backfill_video_posters, which main lacked entirely.
  * TempFileGuard, plus sweep_orphan_originals wired into main's SUPERVISED loop
    (not the branch's bare one) — it reclaims final-named originals whose commit
    never happened, a class main's .tmp-only sweep structurally cannot see.
  * shouldAbortForStall, hand-ported into main's upload-queue.ts since that file
    was resolved to main. Widens the watchdog at loadend instead of disarming it,
    bounding a half-open socket at 2 minutes rather than handing the window to
    xhr.timeout (5-60 min) with the whole queue's `processing` latch held.

ALSO: RUST_LOG and EXPORT_PATH pinned in compose. The code fallback was
`debug` (a line per request, all night) and EXPORT_PATH was the one path with a
mount-shaped default that nothing validated.

Verified: cargo check --all-targets, cargo clippy (clean), 144/144 backend tests
against a live Postgres including upload_idempotency and upload_concurrency,
51/51 vitest, svelte-check 0 errors, eslint clean, vite build.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 21:16:31 +02:00

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import { getToken, clearAuth } from './auth';
const BASE = '/api/v1';
export class ApiError extends Error {
status: number;
code: string;
constructor(status: number, code: string, message: string) {
super(message);
this.status = status;
this.code = code;
}
}
const TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000;
/** Pages that ARE the recovery flow — redirecting from them would loop. */
const AUTH_ROUTES = ['/join', '/recover'];
/**
* Send a guest whose session died back to the join screen.
*
* Deliberately uses `window.location` rather than SvelteKit's `goto`: `toast-store` already
* imports `ApiError` from this module, so pulling a store or `$app/navigation` in here would
* create an import cycle. A full document load is also the more correct behaviour after a
* session loss — it resets every module-level store, which is exactly what we want, and the
* queued upload blobs live in IndexedDB so they survive it.
*/
function redirectToJoin(): void {
if (typeof window === 'undefined') return;
const path = window.location.pathname;
if (AUTH_ROUTES.some((r) => path === r || path.startsWith(`${r}/`))) return;
window.location.assign('/join');
}
async function request<T>(method: string, path: string, body?: unknown): Promise<T> {
const headers: Record<string, string> = {};
const token = getToken();
if (token) {
headers['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${token}`;
}
if (body !== undefined) {
headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
}
// Abort hung requests so a dead connection surfaces as a friendly error
// instead of a spinner that never resolves.
//
// The timer must stay armed until the BODY has been read, not just the headers.
// `fetch` resolves as soon as the response head arrives, so clearing it in a `finally`
// around the fetch left `res.text()` below completely uncovered — and no longer
// abortable, since the controller had already been disarmed. An upstream that sends
// headers and then stalls the body (the shape of a half-dead proxy, or of the pool
// saturation this same release adds shedding for) hung that call forever.
const controller = new AbortController();
const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), TIMEOUT_MS);
let res: Response;
try {
res = await fetch(`${BASE}${path}`, {
method,
headers,
body: body !== undefined ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,
signal: controller.signal
});
} catch (e) {
clearTimeout(timer);
if (e instanceof DOMException && e.name === 'AbortError') {
throw new ApiError(0, 'timeout', 'Zeitüberschreitung bitte erneut versuchen.');
}
throw new ApiError(0, 'network', 'Netzwerkfehler bitte Verbindung prüfen.');
}
if (res.status === 204) {
// Must clear on this path too, or every no-content request (logout, delete, like)
// leaks a live 20 s timer.
clearTimeout(timer);
return undefined as T;
}
// A 5xx behind a proxy (or a crash page) can return HTML, not JSON — parsing
// it directly would throw an opaque SyntaxError. Read text, parse defensively.
let raw: string;
try {
raw = await res.text();
} catch (e) {
if (e instanceof DOMException && e.name === 'AbortError') {
throw new ApiError(0, 'timeout', 'Zeitüberschreitung bitte erneut versuchen.');
}
throw new ApiError(0, 'network', 'Netzwerkfehler bitte Verbindung prüfen.');
} finally {
clearTimeout(timer);
}
let data: { error?: string; message?: string } | unknown = null;
if (raw) {
try {
data = JSON.parse(raw);
} catch {
data = null;
}
}
if (!res.ok) {
// An expired/invalid token (401) clears the dead session. Banned users are
// NOT logged out — they keep read access by design (USER_JOURNEYS §10) and
// simply get a 403 "gesperrt" toast on writes.
if (res.status === 401) {
clearAuth();
// Clearing auth alone leaves the guest stranded: the bottom nav and FAB are
// gated on `isAuthenticated` so they simply vanish, route guards only run in
// onMount (which does not re-run), and a standalone PWA has no URL bar — so
// there is no way back to /join. Real triggers mid-event are a host PIN reset
// (which revokes that guest's sessions) and a redeployed JWT_SECRET.
// Queued upload blobs survive in IndexedDB and are picked up again after
// re-joining — via the `onSetAuth` hook in upload-queue.ts, NOT the boot-time
// call in +layout.svelte: this redirect lands on /join with no token, so the
// layout's `if (getToken())` skips it, and the subsequent recover navigates
// with `goto()`, which never re-runs `onMount`.
redirectToJoin();
}
const d = (data ?? {}) as { error?: string; message?: string };
throw new ApiError(
res.status,
d.error ?? 'unknown',
d.message ?? `Serverfehler (${res.status}).`
);
}
return data as T;
}
export const api = {
get: <T>(path: string) => request<T>('GET', path),
post: <T>(path: string, body?: unknown) => request<T>('POST', path, body),
patch: <T>(path: string, body?: unknown) => request<T>('PATCH', path, body),
delete: <T>(path: string) => request<T>('DELETE', path)
};